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"THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING -A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS" 
Firstly it is necessary to examine insider trading in corporate 
securities in it's social and economic context. Before any discussion 
of substantive regulation can meaningfully take place it 1s necessary 
to consider such questions as the incidence of insider trading 
and whether in fact it causes harm. In, particular the question of 
'fairness' is considered, and the economic arguments sometimes 
raised in support of insider trading explored. 
Corporate disclosure is directly related to insider trading. The 
ability of corporate insiders to abuse their positions is 
obviously related to the effectiveness of company disclosure. 
Furthermore apart from the effect corporate disclosure has on 
the availability of information for investors, disclosure of 
insiders transactions may discourage abusive trading and 
assist in the enforcement of regulatory provisions. Disclosure 
may also be used as a sanction. The impact of expanded corporate 
disclosure policies and in particular the disclosure of price 
sensativa information to employees is considered. 
One or the main problems with anti-insider trading regulation is 
the satisfactory determination of a definition for insiders. This 
determination will set the scope of regulation. In drawing up this 
definition attention must be given to the problem of 'tippee 
trading' and the effect that such provisions might have on the 
securities industry. 
An extensive study of the present law relevant to insider trading, 
in Britain, Australasia and Canada is provided with particular 
reference. to the role of self regulatory authorities. Recent proposals 
for anti-insider trading legislation in the United Kingdom are analysed. 
At the heart of any discussion of insider trading must be the question 
of enforcement Civil enforcement is discussed in the context of 
derivative actions and class suits. The present structure of regulation 
is analysed and a now enforcement agency is suggested. The crucial 
availability of effective market surveillance-is discussed in the 
context of the experience of other countries. 
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PREFACE 
During the last decade British lawyers have become increasingly 
aware of the problems posed by the effectice legal regulation of 
insider trading in corporate securities, on the basis of privileged 
information. There is a long history of anti-insider trading 
regulation-in the United States of America, and several Cämmonwealth 
countries have had legal inhibitions on insider dealing for almost 
twenty years. Many other countries outside the Commonwealth have 
adopted the anti-insider trading laws of the United States of 
America, in one form or another. In short there is a considerable 
amount of experience in this field to'which British'lawyers 
could make reference in attempting to deal with the problem in 
the United Kingdom. 
The present author has attempted to discuss the question of insider 
trading in Britain in the context of extensive reference, to the 
existing legal and self regulatory provisions. It is only by taking full 
account of the extra legal scheue of anti-insider trading' regulation 
that anything approaching an informed view as to the present situation 
can be obtained. The associated topic of corporate disclosure, both on 
a continuous and. also a timely. basis must also be considered. Indeed 
it is often necessary to consider much wider aspects of securities 
regulation and general company law to obtain a fair picture of 
anti-insider trading regulation in any particular country. 
Originally the present study'cornprehended an extensive discussion 
of insider trading regulation throughout the World. Given the necessity 
to reduce the dimensions of this thesis it was thought appropriate to 
exclude all such comparative accounts except those relating to Australia 
and Canada. In Chapter III a considerable amount of North American 
material has also been retained on the basis that in no other country 
has there been the same degree of experience in regulating insider 
trading by 'non-insiders' and 'tippees'. The materials omitted from 
this study are published elsewhere. 
(') 
No attempt has been made to make specific legislative recommendations 
with regard to the regulation of insider trading in Britain. It'is 
probable that future legislation will be closely modelled an the 
provisions of the 1973 Companies Qi11. These provisions are 
extensively discussed in Chapter VIII, and the author has 
made submissions on this question to the Companies Policy 
Division of the Department of Trade. Furthermore it. is likely 
"r 
that even greater attention will be given in the future to 
self regulatory proceedures"designed to doal with insider 
trading and the abuse"of confidential information. 
The author would like to record his deep appreciati*on.. to his 
Supervisor, Professor A. J. Boyle of the University of London., 
for the great assistance given. him during his course. It would 
not be appropriate in a work of this nature to express one's 
appreciation to other individuals. It is sufficient to state 
that without the full cooperation and provision of information 
sometimes of a confidential nature, to the author, by a large 
number pf persons, in'this country and abroad, this study Would 
not have been possible. The author would also like to express 
his appreciation to a number of overseas universities for 
making their facilities available to him, and inparticular to 
Harvard Law School, the University of Toronto., the University 
of New South Wales. and Atenao Law School, Philippines. ' 
Thu law is as stated an April 1st 1977. 
1st August, 1977 
Jesus College, 
Cambridge. 
Barry A. K. Rider,. 
Fellow of Jesus College. 
CHAPTER I 
r 
INSIDER TRADING, SO ß, ' INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS. 
by Rev. R. C. Baumbart, 
(1) 
of some 1700 executives, found that 
: whilst in possession of material inside information, 
42 would buy for themselves, 
2; S would tell a broker, 
14% would tell a friend,. 
56 % would do notbing. 
But perhaps more interestingly, when the sample was asked 
what they thought other executives would do, 
61, "Y; would buy for themselves, 
11% would tell a broker,, 
46-'j. 6 would tell a friend, 
29, E would do" notbing. 
A similar survey was carried out in Britain, by Simon Webley, 
in 1971, 
(2) 
the response from 830 nana ers was, 
24-; ý would buy for themselves, 
0.9% would tell a broker, 
2% would tell a friend 
65.4% would do nothing 
7.7% don't know. 
Simon Webley thought that the reason why one in four managers 
said they would trade on inside information reflected the 
fact that not all of them were or would be directors, and 
because of- their character would not be given access to 
such information. Only 12.5% of the sample thought that 
directors would utilise such information. A survey 
conducted by Business Administration, in April 1976, found 
that out of a sample of 150 managing directors of British 
companies, 20 had been offered bribes, and the same 
proportion thought that other directors accepted such. 
(3) 
It would thus appear probable that the degree of insider 
trading likely to take place is of, a significant proportion. 
It is thus legitimately a matter of concern. ' 
The next question whigh must be answered, is that even 
accepting that the incidence of insider trading is 
. significant or likely to 
be such should it be discouraged. 
In short is, the incidence of such conduct acceptable? It 
would seen that in the past, there have been cases of insider 
trading, which were either ignored or criticised on some 
other ground, the inference being that insider trading was 
not then necessarily-considered objectionable . 
(4) It is 
possible however to find early statements where it has been 
condemned on moral grounds. - For example the Commercial and 
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Financial-Chronicle for the 8th February 1872, described 
" it as 'a very great evil'*.. '- Indeed, 'Winston . Churchill 
thought that the suggestion by the editor of the Financial 
News that : be 'had ' acquired- 'securities -in. 
INarcdni on the basis 
of-privileged information . was' 'downright insulting and 
libellous'. ' 
It' would - seem that. 'the great . preponderence . of opinion 
today, at-least'-'in Britain is that insider tr9ding is 
unethical, or immoral-. It is probable however, 'that this 
-view is more strongly held, -by those'. outside the business 
world than those inside its' There is weight in the 
observati6n that most ordinary citizens, once-acquainted 
with what insider trading-is, would simply consider it to 
be-unfair. 
(5), it would certainly be wrong for the law to 
ignore this. 6) It'is'also true that"wben'. lawyere have 
sought to argue that: insider trading is. wrong and should 
be, prevented they too have placed weight on the unfairness 
aspect. The insider should not be able to take advantage 
of his position over an outsider-to derive-an extra 
-advantage. This is" slightlytdifferent than. saying there 
should be equality in a substantive way, " although might 
equate to an- equality.. of bargaining. The:. difficulty, of 
determining whether insider 'trading is acceptable is thus 
transferred to the justification of the principle of 
equality of opportunity. No attempt will here be made to 
justify this principle',. as-essentially its-acceptance will 
' 'be determined'by an a priori value-judgement-Of-the assessor. 
However, it would seem from empirical 'analysis that the 
'principle of equality-of bargaining-and thus. opportunity 
within `a market context--'can " and'- has been. ' legitimately 
accepted by courts as a "basis -for- determination. ' -" It must 
be emphasised that adherence tö--this-concept: only requires 
'that-the parties start 'equally, ' and derive no'-advantage 
from. a -superior 'privilege ''possessed-'by the' one. and denied. 
to the other. ' Of course- given' different., financial, 
educational, intes-lectual and analytical- abilities there 
is 'no ' attemp P `to attain' substantive 'equality: " The 
fiindaiientäl- difficulty 'lays in 'kn'öaing -or' determining 
where' the line between" acceptable' unfairness and- unacceptable 
unfairness "should 'be" drawn. ' It ii§ 'said, by'many that the 
insiders advantage is illßgitimate' as' be 'did `not' acquire 
his privileged knowledge through any intrinsic merit in 
himself. This ignores the fact 
, 
that his insider position 
was probably acquired ia'tbe first place by industry. 
Furthermore,. the same economic structure that has placed 
the insider . in the position 'of ascendency will also allow 
him other financial' privileges in most cases.,.. which are not 
dubbed unfair, indeed can there ever be , equality.. of 
opportunity on a market where one investor might be worth 
in excess-of £500,000,000 as-compared with. another worth 
onlyýa. tiny fraction of such.. Nevertheless,. there is 
considerable support for, the notion that insider-trading is 
unfair and thus immoral, 
. The American, House, of-Representatives'-Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, has been trenchantly 
criticised by at least one writer for engaging in a 
'self-righteous' and hypocritical attack-on insider tradingC7? 
The Committee had stated that, 
'Among the most vicious practices unearthed... was the 
, flagrant betrayal of, their fiduciary duties by "'directors and officers of corporations Oho used their 
positions of trust-and the confidential information 
which came to them in such.. -. to- aid them in-their 
market activities'. ($) 
Professor ? Tanne considers that the American law has not 
properly, taken account. of the logical and economic aspects 
to,. insider trading. \hilst the statements of the 
Congressional Committees are admittedly emotive, there is 
logic, in the. equation of directors-and officers to trustees 
(9) and in. regarding inside information as trust property. 
. 
The' emotive attacks on insider., trading do not. belie the 
fact that the Congress 
. 
was.. simply extending already, 
recognised principle. s,.; of fiduciary law. How far. the 
. . underlaying,. equitable , 
principles were as a matter of 
history a result of . notions of 
fairness and good faith is 
irrelevent',. as such, are, 'now recognised legal normsýl0) 
The. application of : 
the Fairness principle bas °been 
'attacked on a number of - grounds , 
in the present context. 
"It', has'. rightly been pointed out: that. the law can. never 
ensure. complete equality; of, information, or indeed 
substantial equaiity... 
} 
. 
In 
. essence 
the discrepancies in 
information - are: one- of ; 
the inherent risks that those who 
trade on. the" stock exchange, must accept. 
". 
Professor rlanne 
seizes upon - this . point. when he. describes the securities .... ... .. _.... ., is-- - .. _ ,.... ,. _.. _:. ' ... ........ 
.. 
market as essentially. anexchange of information the market 
17 
-placing relative values*on"par; ticular types and qualities 
of . information. 
ý1 
- This " neglects' the * fact 'that 
in certain 
instances the insider will be trading on information that 
the other party ' cotiild *not'"have 'obtained or used no matter 
what analytical capabilities be possessed. 
(13) Thus Manne 
is thrown back on'his fundamental hypothesis that"insider 
trading causes no one any identifiable harm. - This again is 
misconceived" and goes to econoiiic - justification and not 
fairness. 
The main attack'on the-traditional American approach to 
insider trading by"Manne is frontal, 'he asserts that the 
'insiders gain is not-made at the expense of anyone 
(14) 
Manne argues that trading by insiders is only avery small 
proportion of active trading, and in fact only -a small 
proportion of outstanding securities are actively traded 
anyway. . obere good `information' is "concerned shareholders 
ýiho, retain their securities suffer no -loss, and it is only 
those who sell just before the announcement wbo can be said 
to have suffered. -Indeed insofar"as the outsiders loss is 
the difference between the trensaction'price and that which 
would"have been the price had the information been known, 
' to the extent that insider trading results in the "market 
price moving upwards the insider benefits selling outsiders 
by reducing their loss; according to "Manne'ýs tYiesis. Manne 
also distingiiislies"between those "who " trade because of market 
pressures and-those whose transactions are dictated by 
external factors, such as the need to obtain liquid resources. 
In the"latter case insi der' trading is said to be a direct 
benefit. 
Where someone sells out - before the 'full `effect of the 
insiders trading" is felt on. the market, it can -be- equally 
said. that 'the insider `has ' caused loss to that'-person. Market 
trade's, who ''deal . on the basis of 'the market 'and not for 
personal*or extraneous reasons can also'be said to have 
suffered in that they would. presumably 'not have 'traded, bad 
they know what the * insider . bad known. They in effect picked 
the wrong time -td-sell, but in' logic "it is hard to attribute 
responsibility, for `-this error to 'the insider. 
(15) 
There is 
probably weight in riaxines argument with regard to loss, that 
" 
'It is simply . not enough to*, say that, itmay. on, occasion 
happen. The truth is that for any individual with whom 
we are. -concerned, . 
tbe. absolute odds in favour of his 
losing anything as a result of, insider trading are 
so small as to be unworthy of serious concern'. (16) 
Manne does not. really discuss the situation where an 
outsider acquires securities. from an insider selling on bad 
information. 'Of course 
- 
in a market context it is. likely 
that the outsider. is already in the market ready to trade 
at the market price, and if be had. not tradedrwith the 
insider be would have traded with someone else.. In the 
case of .a sale by. an 
insider however, there is no room for 
Manne to, argue that it is only the short term speculator 
" who suffers, indeed he is likely to suffer the legst 
in 
such a case. 
(17) 
It has also been argued that insiders do not generally 
perform better than any other class of market trader, and 
thus whether they. trade or not, on what-they consider to 
be inside information in violation of their trust, the 
result in financial terms is the same. Whilst little 
" empirical research has been conducted on this point, it 
would seem that there is evidence that insiders' 
performance in the market is superior to that of outside 
investors. (18) Thus although Manne is probably justified, 
at least in market transactions for attacking the concept 
of -fairness 
from the standpoint of_ . 
individuals suffering 
causally related loss, bis arguments. ignore. the wider 
question of 'fairness'. That is. whether an insider should 
be allowed to pass on a loss to another or-take a: profit, 
absent any compelling reason of public policy or morality 
justifying such. '' Certainly the law through the award of 
punitive or contemptuous damages has already indicated a 
concern for acknowledging questions of public policy in 
the context pof individual suits. 
c) 
Moreover,. the 
criminal law, where public policy demands it, interfers on 
an apparent basis of 'fairness' such as in'. racial or sexual 
discrimination. 
Professor Manne would -argue'. that there are compelling 
reasons why insiders should be allowed. to pass on loss and 
cream off profits, which displace. the general norm of fair 
-dealing. Perhaps. the most 'astounding'. suggestion, has 
been that insider trading is one of *tbe _rewards for 
-entreprenural - ability, `and- a 'stimulus to -the inventive 
I9 
. mind, 
(20) 
Manne the " arch exponent "of .: this view conceives 
'of. -the : entreprenure as" distinct 'fror mere managers or 
capitalists as the driving force behind 'a progressive 
economy. In the immediate context"he,, considers the 
entreprenure as an innovator can be. operative just as much 
in the world or finance as in-manufacture. The prospect 
. of= large. profits -through share dealing, in effect backing - 
himself, '=-is the-only ' form' of compensation that is adequate 
to act , 
as a. stimulus to this kind of activity. --As one 
might . *expect the, criticisms -that have--been made of 
this 
view are -legion. It' is only. necessary, to cite the more 
"obvious*here. How is"it possible 'in the modern corporation 
-. -'to = identify the entreprenure,, and how is it . possible to 
, 
devise a' scheme of' deliberate exploitation of confidential 
information for him. -. Indeed entreprenures are. 'likely to 
have limited resources and are thus likely not to be able 
to maximise their 'legitimate''entitlement, and in any case 
it does- not- follow that an" entrepreaure . will have access 
to other information'about the enterprise. -which might 
dictate " an alternative 'course of conduct.. Furthermore even 
if, the prospect of " such uncertain profits coüld: be 
: considered"a sufficient-inducement, surely Manna's argument 
could not be substantiated where the'insider-entreprenure 
'attempts - to "-sell out when his innövatioizs have-failed. Of 
course Manne does take a"müch. broader approach,. to the 
traditional-view-of' insider, trading- and considers that 
insiders trade 'information as -much . 'as they would. indulge 
.. 'indirect -trading. -- '. It is also hard to 'justify, the, 
"entreprenure being-'allowed to'do this or'tip. generally on 
any kind of rational basis'. 
From the- British point'- of- view there might be some 
support. for. Professor Manne's-arguments given the propensity 
of-certain companies, -- and in*. pärti'cular . Slater " talker 
Securities,, to promote: personal share-. dealing - companies for 
executives to-provide incentive. `-Given the financial 
collapse of 'the- Slater Walker,. Group; one'- wonders if such 
. '©htreprenural--activity' should-be-encouraged. on economic 
grounds' let ' "älone: moral: or so ciah.: "` = It is ., true that when 
an economy is in a state-of depression: ahd.. there is a 
significant- rate- of- inflation-. normal. executive- remuneration 
through salaries is likel to be-an insufficient stimulus 
to incentive activi .. 
(21 
But few are likely to have 
the capital ' or. credit to. risk in, the equally depressed 
securities markets, ; regardless, of. whether many but a tiny 
handful would have the- ability , 
to generate or. obtain 
-sufficiently sensational information.: 
It has, also been. argued that the 
. prospect- of 
liability, 
particularly the crushing liability that seeiis possible 
in. the United States, is a. disincentive, topersons who 
.. would otherwise be 'eligible tobe directors . 
to - accept 
such an appointment. Certainly j. t is . true that _ 
many firms 
of stockbrokers and. merchant: banks now actively discourage 
or indeed prohibit their senior, officials. accep. ting 
directorships. Where managerial skill is scarce this is 
obüiously a matter of. some concern. There is undeniably 
a need for the law, to be reasonably clear in such cases 
and not through the additional burden. of uncertainty on 
the potential insider. Having accepted this, last point, 
there would seem to be.,. no problem for 
. 
insiders in accepting 
such appointments, they should merely refrain from trading 
whilst in possession of material confidential information. 
'In certain instances where a-great many directorships are 
held,, the prospect. of jeopar 
(22ý dy. is much 
, 
greater.,; but 
. then is. it. desirable. that a man should , 
be,, allowed to place 
himself in such a-position, that be cannot be. reasonably 
expected to know, exactly what. he is; doing,, or 
. 
what his- 
investment position , 
is, . in, each, of the,., relevant 
. 
companies. 
'It, has been.,. questioned . whether insider trading laws 
would' have the, result of 
., 
discouraging directors 
. from 
holding shares in theýr-, own 
. 
companies, which many consider 
desirable in 
, 
that' it. promotes, identity: of , 
interest with 
the financial fortunes, of the . company.. 
Given 
, 
the 
increasing recognition , 
that, the. mere provision, of labour 
should; entitle, particip, ation, at, 
_ 
least in-management one 
wonders. whether this. extra economic identification is as 
necessary. -as, it, "might have been in the , past. _, _, 
In any. case 
given. 
. 
the 
, 
dimensions 
. of modern . 
corporations-it.. is . unlikely 
that. 
"most. 
directors are; going to, hold" but., a; derisory. 
proportion: of ... 
the 
, whole. - ,, 
However', as has , already 
been 
pointed out, '- the., sole... prohibition. here.. being; considered 
2i 
is , that " directors ý should not trade whilst 
in. possession of 
inside information, this sbould. not. inhibit honest directors 
from trading when not. in this prohibition. 
= On the other band it. bas been said that: insider trading 
" can be criticised from the. standpoint of, management 
in that 
it allows managers-. to.: manipulate. events . and' 
in particular 
-corporate disclosures to . benefit- their own 
trading positions. 
. Whilst'it-is. certainly true that-the 
Congressional Committees 
found evidence of. _ ddirectors. timing'. disclosure for. the 
benefit of = pool . 'operations - 
it : is :. doubtful how far' such could 
be done today. In many cases corporations are not in 
control of the disclosure . scheme and,. very 
few corporate 
executives-would'be in a position to dictate, the. timing of 
corporate disclosures. Of course this is not to deny that 
in-many ýnstances-of possible takeover operations, one of 
the potential participants.. bas not suddenly. and unexpectedly 
. -come , up with some. -item of, important 'information 
that should 
. be brought before the sbäreholders.... *. Disclosures. can 
certainly be very opportune. Given the speed at. wbich 
transactions.. in.. securities can be. executed it.. is. doubtful 
: whether there would- be . any need for. -executives . to 'specifically 
plan to ' delay : disclosures.. * There information-it-self is 
manipulated. then , the -law already:. provides*. remedies. 
= :. It has also.:. b6en_argued that insider trading can injure 
. the commercial operation of: the company. and its ., reputation. 
.. This would -sorely, depend' upon tbe.. circumstances. . Althougb 
- this :. problem- is dealt with elsewhere. -it should. be -noted 
here, that otherwise than , by effecting. the possible ability 
--. of a"company to take.. full advantage' : of -, the capital markets 
-this. -. ground is not . 'over. persuasive. - 
-. 
'. 
: Directors. and.. other officers undeniably owe.. certain 
duties-of loyalty-to their corporate. principals and it may 
= be. -argued: that... if .: such are at liberty. to indulge 
in insider 
- -trading : there-: may be - a'.. diversion'. from.: _the. pursuit of 
the 
conpany's. objectives. 
23ý This surely goes.. too far, 
Corporations.. are not _-entitled. to.. the, full and undivided 
services. ° and"_Dattentions of their officers ,. all the.. time. 
Associated, with. -this point_. is'-that Lan ability.. 
to': engage in 
insider trading may adversely. effect. the determination of 
insiders= to-avoid. the collapse of.. their company. 
Considering that. security . of employment. and 
direct 
remuneration is likely. to be, far more. important to the 
average executive than. bis investments"in. the corporation, 
again this is:: härdly persuasive. 
. Turning to.. the effect. tbat insider trading"might have on 
the. securities markets as a whole, it bas. been argued, again 
. by Professor - Manne; .. that insider 
trading actually 'renders 
the markets more efficient.. By an efficient market 
economists generally mean one where there.. is.; a_: high degree 
of absorption of pro-release information and tbus'. a gradual 
adjustment of price'rather than a heavily fluctuating 
market. 
(24) 
It. is argued that insiders by-basing tbeir-trading on 
inside information iron out misguided flucuations and bring 
the market price down to.. that . which reflects'. more accurately 
the true situation. This appears. dubious, -given the likely 
dimensions. of insider trading: in any sophisticated market. 
Manne goes much.. further than arguing that - insider : trading 
can and does influence prices, which in certain circumstances 
few would disagree with. He argues that the market is divided 
between those-who.. possess inside. information or reliable 
information, and those who trade merely on that general 
information that is publicly. available. "-Given the certainty 
. aspect of the. insiders information they will be, the 
. dominating market influence and will. bring the. market into 
accord with., the real information. There. is no real as 
opposed to theoretical. evidence that insiders could or 
indeed do have this result'. through their:: trading, on the 
market. Indeed. wbat evidence there iscavailable. suggests 
that insider trading has a'negligible impact:. on the market. 
It would also seem'that, there is little. evidence of trading 
induced or attracted. by'-the insiders transactions. 
(25) 
Moreover, it, is not necessarily th. e: case that sharp rises 
or falls:. in the market price. will'.. do. more., damage to the 
confidence or performance' of -the markets. than'. gradual 
leakages of information. Indeed; :. as.. is discussed".. later, 
most organised securities"markets suspend. trading to allow 
- . to a sharp readjustment of price. consequent: upon.. a corporate 
disclosure. Certainly"fewer persons,.. trade. under. the 
.. influence of the false. 'market. 
-Perhaps one of. -the most., -impobtant. consiaerations 
is the 
effect that unrestricted insider trading has or'may have 
z3 
should it attract sufficient publicity, on the confidence 
of the investor. Obviously the attraction of capital to the 
market which is the traditional allocator of the scarce 
capital resources of a market economy is a critical 
consideration. It would seem obvious that public respect 
for the integrity of a market will diminish on the knowledge 
that insider trading and manipulation can and do occur 
thereupon. Furthermore, public investors would expect to 
be if not on the same level as an insider with regard to 
investment in the'relevant issuer, at least subject to a 
substantially equal degree of risk. 
It is thus thought that the' arguments adduced in favour 
of allowing insider trading to take place do not over ride 
the wider principles of fairness already mentioned. Indeed 
there would appear to be substantial reasons for prescribing 
the practice. Thus it is both legitimate and desirable to 
examine the scheme of regulation both in operation and 
proposed in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. 
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INSIDER -TRADING AND THE QUESTION OF-DISCLOSURE IN BRITAIN 
(I) - I`TTRODUCTI0IN7' 
The ability; of corporate insiders :, and. their associates to 
trade on the basis of privileged information is obviously 
inter-related to-the effectiveness -and extent of the 
corporate disclosure mechanisms employed. in. that particulate 
environment.;. . Insider trading is,. only, objectionable where 
the insider utilises non-public information acquired by 
virtue of his. special po. sition,, the actus. reus of the 
'offence' is-the trading in corporate securities without 
a_proper disclosure of the. information influencing the 
transaction. It is axiomatic that in those countries 
where corporate disclosure is poor 
, or. unreliable 
investors 
are reluctant to trust their fortunes to equity investment. 
(') 
The point was well made by the, Whitepaper on-Company Law 
Reforp,, 2) the point was also made that 'the more people can 
see what is, actually happening tbe 
, 
less likely. they are to 
harbour general suspicions - and the less opportunity there 
is for concealing improper or even criminal activities. 
Openness... is the first principle in securing responsible 
behaviour'. (3) 
.. Thus disclosure of-corporate information. has the dual 
effect of, allowing an investor to. determine what. would be 
the most. beneficial.. allocation of his wealth, for'_the 
, Purpose. -of. -producing more.. wealtb,, and also _the , 
effect of 
affording investors, and also., the public a , 
degree -of 
confidence in the way that the means of production are 
being -managed, and the propriety., of,, the utilisation of 
scarce . capital 'resources. 
(ý 
Both are. necessary. _elements in the modern. capitalist world.: 
,, 
The so called disclosure 
philosophy has.. a long,. history,, and; was clearly. announced 
, 
by. the Select Committee on, Joint Stock Companies, as-early 
as 1844.5). 
The disclosure. approach in, company:. law was a, direct 
result of the-laissez ifair. e., attitude of the time 
(6) 
Provided.. that. investors were given an, adequate.... degree of. 
information about. a particular enterprise, it was up to the 
individual concerned to make up. his own mind, and then 
protect his investment, either by, action within, the 
enterprise or in the last resort by liquidating his 
investment. - 'The Government -wöiild"önly'-intervene to 
prevent fraud or a blatant, disregard of this principle) 
The primary notion was summed up by the Israeli Committee 
on the Issuance * and= Trading -of -Securities. 
-The Committee stated, '-to give. the 'Authority broader 
powers than-diselosure: ':. would impose, -upon--the-authority... 
excessive -responsibilit' --and 'would'-inordinä-tely-restrict 
economic 'initiative' .. 
($5 "- Of -course it is now -recognised 
.. -in-Britain, that. i. ri'many areas disclosuro, '! whilst of 
extreme importance is not the universal cure'that the 
Victorians seemed"to consider that'it was., -' ' 
" Although there have been-instances-in'Britain where 
disclosure has 'itself 'been utilised t'o curb 'abuses and 
fraud, (9) rather than as a mere means- of- providing 
Information,: it 'is- the- Americans that have fastened 
particularly upon this aspect of'disclosure. The immortal 
words of'Louis D. Brandeis that 'sunlight is.. '. the best 
disinfectant, -electric light the most'efficient policeman, 
'hardly need repetition'here. 
('10) 
Closely related. to this 
-aspect is the-impact-that disclo: ure'can have as a 
" deterrent', or as indeed'- ä -sanction. Thus- for our present 
purposes it is convenient to isolate three distinct aspects 
''to disclosure-and the-philosophy-that-surrounds them. 
(11) 
--These aspects are, ... _ .... t ..:: ''.. . - 
(a)-where disciosur@ is 'used as-a means-'of providing 
'information' thate will 'enable the'- reasonable'recipient to, 
-- arrive at an informed' decision -about "-his. "pre'sent and future 
-- conduct', . 
'... :: '".. -.. ... - ... _. , .:...:. . 
(b) '-where-- disclosure is used 'to facilitate` the 
'--enforcement 'of specific' prohibitionäry norms: in this 
instance 'the disclosure mdy'be , -directed -at -the forbidden 
act'.. ör the violator: of of *. course both. 
(c) where 'disclosure 'is -'used to "provide a ''sanction or 
as a means or preventing or at least discouraging a 
`certain type ofýconduct, 'which-itself-need not necessarily 
be-forbidden. -The--effect-' s" directed to. the- . relevant 
pressure group or - agency - which' is 'caliable - of 'exerting some 
'kind of influence-. on'-the --sub ject: - =-° 
Invariably any«-speci'fic enumeration-of' aspects of a concept, 
such as disclosure, will- be 'fallacious. -'andthe' present 
instance, is 
.. no, excepti, ii--" 
however whilst. it Is obviously 
possible to ^_ý"ý Jagcx` 4umber.: of, other. aspects, the three 
neatly emphasise those.. factors particularly 
g; ermain to. the,: regulation . of _ 
insider 
, 
trading.... However it 
will _be -evident . 
that the three aspects,. disclosure as a 
means, of. information - the .. 
labelling effect; -as a 'means of 
enforcement; - and as a sanction, -, whilst distinct enough 
in 
' 
theory are. practically intimately.. related in both'their 
application ap. d. result. Thus no attempt will be made to 
discuss them distinctly, -other than with. regard to the third 
aspect, disclosure as a sanction, as this has special 
relevance in the regulation-of-insider trading. -' . 
Before ye. -enter upon a -detailed discussion '. of : the 
British pattern -, of , 
disclosure, 
. 
it is necessary : to.: briefly 
point out certain facets of the subject that should be 
borne in mind when discussing this area. It is important 
to appreciate that disclosure cannot be adequately studied 
in the abstract and that it is essential to examine the 
direct and indirect impact that certain information will 
have on the particular subjects. Disclosure-in all its 
aspects will ideally be tailored to a specific category of 
recipients, its effectiveness will depend upon the 
dissemination, understanding and access to the information 
on a consistent basis of this group and its constituent 
members. This is particularly relevant in the case of the 
provision of information to investors for the purpose of 
allowing them to come to a sensible investment decision. 
Thus as the requirements of the Stock Exchanges listing 
agreements have been directed towards the goal of providing 
information to investors and their professional advisers on 
the market, it is hardly surprising that social and 
environmental disclosure will be absent. To criticise this 
is to misread the mechanisms. 
(12) 
Particular groups have 
particular informational needs, 
(13) 
and to confuse such, or 
try and accommodate all in one scheme is to invite disaster. 
Another factor worthy of mention is that there have been 
and are today trends and alterations in the pattern of 
disclosure. Whilst the British disclosure system is 
probably one of the most advanced in the world, it is 
interesting that Peter Shore, N. P. could state with some 
justification in 1965, that 'far too much of industry has 
what I would call a Victorian Attitude to: disclosure, 
company affairs are treated as-the Victorians used to 
treat their bathing costumes - that they ought to be very 
decent and all-covering' . 
(14) 
. In recent years there has 
been considerable pressure for'a'greater"degree of 'public 
. interest " 
discloslir e' --rather* than- the traditional''- 
company-investor disclosure pattern: 
(15: )" 
'= It"-is 
It 
more than 
likely that the-traditional-patterns, of disclosure-will 
alter radically-in the next few years. Whils't' the greater 
availability'of corporate-, information on a"reliäbl"e and 
timely basis obviously to 'a greater--br lesser extent curbs 
insiders opportunities to'misuse their positioný"much of 
this-information is likely to be of '-not too greater 
significance in "the 'determination' of investment' decisions 
as such. - 
3i 
(2) THE SCHEME AND IICCHANISM Cr DISCLOSURE 
The British disclosure scheme like that of most 
economically developed nations is dualistic, in that it 
composes a level of legal regulation and a more exacting 
self-regulatory level of disclosure required by the Stock 
Exchange. 
(16) 
Obviously both levels are composed of highly 
technical rules that it would be impossible aria misleading 
to attempt to adequately describe in detail here, thus 
attention will be. given only to the broad structure of 
disclosure, and those aspects of particular relevance to 
the regulation of insider trading. Furthermore it should be 
appreciated, that disclosure as a means of information, in 
the context of insider trading is far more important when it 
is'prompt and timely, and that it is information of an 
essentially sensational kind that affords the best 
opportunities for abuse. This area of timely disclosure 
will be discussed elsewhere. Another consideration that 
permeates the system of disclosure is that the subject of 
the disclosure requirement is invariably the person 
obligated to make the disclosure, and thus there is a 
strong incentive on that person to bend the mechanism so as 
to best accommodate bis own interests. Thus the integrity 
of disclosures depend: upon the degree of integrity of the 
reporters and the degree of surveillance that is and can be 
exercised. 
Having said this, attention will now be given to the 
system of disclosure, which will primarily involve the first 
two aspects of disclosure referred to above, namely 
disclosure as a means of information and as a means of 
enforcement. The present analysis will focus upon three 
broad catagories of disclosures, 
(a) Information required to be filed at the Companies 
Registration Office, 
(b) Information retained by, and available at the 
Company itself, 
(c) Information sent to shareholders individually. 
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(A) INFORMATION REQUIRED TO BE FILED AT THE COMPANIES 
REGISTRY 
(1) THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 
The Companies Acts-require that a wide amount of. information 
be filed at the Companies Registration Office and thereby 
available to public inspection. In_general the information 
concerned here is that relating.. to the company's capital 
structure, constitution,. seat and officers. 
(17) 
- The company's constitutional documents must be filed with 
the Registrar. under Section 12 of the 1948 Act,. as must any 
alterations. 
(* 8) 
Under section 21 of the 1976 Companies Act 
a statement must accompany the constitutional documents 
containing the names and relevant particulars of the 
directors and secretaries. The relevant particulars are 
those details which are required to be included in the 
register of directors. By virtue of section 200 the company 
must. keep at its registered office and send to the Registrar, 
details of its directors and secretaries. The details are 
kept in the form of a register, must include the name, 
address, nationality, occupation, particulars of other 
directorships held, and in some cases the age of such 
persons. 
(19-) 
However, it is not necessary for the- register 
to contain particulars of directorships held by a director in 
companies of which the company is the wholly owned subsidiary, 
or which are the wholly. owned subsidiaries either of the 
company or of another company of which tbe, company is a 
wholly owned subsidiary. 
(20). 
Within a period of fourteen 
days from. the appointment or from a -change , of appointment 
the 
company. must make-a return to the Registrar of the relevant 
particulars: 
2' )- purthermore it should be noted that' under 
Section 200(9) 'a person in accordance with whose directions 
or instructions the directors of-a company are accustomed to 
act shall be deemed to be a director or officer of the 
Company' for: the purposes of this section. 
(22) 
Section 23 of the 1976 Act requires the company to 
disclose the-. location of its registered office,. in the 
statement required to be made under section 21. Similarly 
section 107 required-such a notice for companies filing 
their documents before 1977. Under both sections changes 
in the location of the registered office must be notified to 
.... -_ 
the Registrar within 
, 
14.; days . .., 
This 
. 
information. allows the 
public to find out where the additional and perhaps more 
up to date information that companies are required to 
maintain at their registered-'-öffice; -is' iii 'fact kept. Where 
the company keeps the register of members or debentureholders 
-elsewhere than its registered office similar notice must 
be 
given-to the'Registrar. 
(2ýý 
'. ' Ihiormation. relating to -the - share = capital'"must -also be 
given 'tö the Registrar, 
(25) 
as must-the creation r of 'charges 
on the company's property and acquisitions of-property 
already charged. 
(26) 
- Yet another important 'source of 
information about-the company is that provided by the filed 
prospectus of'a-public company, or its statement in lieu of 
prospectus. 
Apart from information which must, -be filed -within a 
reasonably short time - of -the event, -there are-requirements 
directed to providing a consolidated picture of-the periodic 
information over the last year. Every company having a 
share capital-is-obliged under -Section 114(1) , ý, every 
: calendar year to make a *return -to the Registrar of Companies 
containing such'information as is laid down-in-Part I of the 
Sixth' Schedule -of =the 1948 Companies -Act, - in such -. fö-rm as is 
", . provided- 
in Part II. -'In the - case of-companies-with--a share 
--., capital. the' information -. contained in -the- returns, as to 
-. - allotments must be-consolidated. -as indeec1 "must-- the -'-. -- 
information relating to the register of -members. -'-Paragraph 5, 
of-the Sixth Schedule'-requires-:. that a -list containing the 
names .. and addresses of all persons who -on -', the ffourteenth day 
after the, 'company's annual meeting 'were- registered- as° members, 
as well *-as -th-e -names -and , -addresses of -those whö. " ceased to be 
=- members since the-last annual return must be-filed.. 
ý27) This 
list -must also contain information as 'to. the number of shares 
held =by `'each. "of the existing ýmembers""at the , date 'Of the return, 
-specifying -the' shares "transferred since -the däte. tof -the last 
return by pe-rsons 'who -are -still members 'and- have 'ceased to 
be- members', 'respectively; Sand 'the -dste--of -registration of 
the transfers. -' -Furthernore' paragraph G -of -the -Schedule 
. requires that -'the' information contained- in the-"register of' 
directors and secretaries be included- in the -annual- -return. 
Before the 1976 Companies' -Act,, -under -section 127 limited 
3ý 
companies were required*to'annex to the annual return a 
copy of.. the ' balance sheet for the - relevant period, and a 
:. copy . of 
the auditors and accountants 
. 
report. Under 
the provisions, in the, Act -it- was_: possible that. the 
-accounts so annexed might be three. years oid. 
(29) Of 
course now under section 1= of the 1976 Act an obligation 
is placed upon limited companies to register: the accounts 
.. and: reports. within narrowly defined periods, which are 
still, however generous. 
C39 The effect of this is that 
the registering of accounts is now divorced from'the 
filing of the annual return. Of course most companies 
provide the necessary_information in the form of.. an annual 
report to shareholders, which substantially complies in 
its formation with Part II of the Sixth Schedule. - Under 
the 1976 Act the provisions relating to noncompliance 
have been-significantly tightened up. 
(31) 
In particular 
an, obligation: to , lay -and deliver the accounts and -reports 
is now placed specifically upon the directors-themselves 
under section 4. Where there is persistent. default in 
complying with these provisions the director concerned 
might well be subjected to a disqualification order. 
(32) 
Another important addition to the enforcement machinery 
is the power of the Court on application to make default 
orders. 
(33) 
This is a considerable improvement on the 
previous situation. 
(34) 
It has been increasingly recognised in recent years 
that the filing of information at the Companies Registry 
is a deficient disclosure mechanism. 
(35) 
Successive 
Governments and the Department of Trade and its 
predessors have only been able to secure minimal 
compliance. The White-paper, entitled Company Law 
Reform (36) stated that, 
'there is obviously 'a massive difficulty in enforcing 
these provisions over the very large field represented. 
by all limited liability companies. The position is 
not improved by the fact that the present provisions 
allow the latest accounts filed with the Registrar to 
relate in extreme cases-to events nearly three years 
old... furthermore a very sizeable proportion of 
companies... are at any one time late in filing their 
annual returns. (37) 
Concern was also expressed at the extremely low level of 
fines that werevactually, 'imposecl. by Magistrates, when cases 
were brought before them. 
(38) 
Of course the provisions of 
the 1976 Act will no doubt go someway to dealing with these 
problems. However, there has been considerable concern 
expressed in Parliament, "in. the -last few years-about 
inadequate enforcement. 
(39) The Secretary-of State for 
Trade stated in-1970 that the Companies Registration Office 
"r 
seeks as a matter of practice, to 'secure compliance before 
proceeding to prosecute'. 
(40) 
. In-1973; -Sir Geoffery Howe, 
the Minister of Trade and Consumer Affairs, stated that the 
Registrar before considering a prosecution would send three 
reminders to the company in default. 
(41). It is true that 
in recent years the number of prosecutions has greatly 
increased.. (42) However the conviction figure remains 
relatively low. Computerisation has and will continue to 
help in enforcement. 
(43) 
, Now defaults can be automatically 
identified and some 10000 reminders can be despatched 
weeklyt 
) 
. 
'. 
.... 
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(2) THE COMPANIES REGISTRATION OFFICE. 
Probably far. more serious than inadequacies in 
enforcement, which are. in any case apparently being cured, 
is the moving of the Companies Registration Office from 
its traditional^location. in. City Road. to Maindy Buildings 
in Cardiff. Although the move was supported by virtually 
all the political-parties, from outside Parliament the move 
was greeted with almost universal and trenchant criticism. 
The highly controversial decision to transfer, the records, 
. 
at the Companies. tegistration Office and, its 1000 civil 
servants to Cardiff was allegedly taken' as' a' result of 
the recommendations of the 'Hardman Report' , on the Dispersal 
of Government Work from 
, 
London. Sir 
_Geoffery 
Howe, The 
Minister for Trade and Consumer Affairs at a Conference, on 
Company Law Reform, organised by the Financiäl, Times and 
Investors Chronicle 45) emphasised' that the 'plan-is not 
the result of some wild and irrational impulse on the part 
of the`Governmant, but on the contrary it is the consequence 
of a cool managerial decision'. The Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry two weeks later,. circulated a D. T. I. 
memorandum enumerating the reasons for this 'cool managerial 
decision'. The primary reason for the move was stated to 
be 'the growth in registration work and-in searches of 
company files. 'In fact total workloads had been increasing 
annually by some 25%-(46) In 1973 there were some 1,944,914 
public searches, alone. 
(4' 
Of course it also has to be 
remembered that since 1969, the Companies Registration Office 
provides a limited amount of information in response to 
telephone inquiries. (43) Obviously the number of, searches 
and inquiries is not constant rand on some days the staff 
have been faced with over 11,000 searches . 
(49) The D. T. I. 
in its memorandum stated that because of the inevitable 
overcrowding of public search facilities great inconvenience 
was being caused to inquirers'. The Governments answer, 
rather illogically, was tö transfer the records some 153 miles 
away from. Loidon, and reduce the viewing seats in the City 
from 426 to 400. Furthermore the Government added that the 
London Registry was simply running out of storage room for 
the filings that were 'made. Indeed Sir Geoffery Howe 
stated, 'our projections show that nothing can make the 
Companies Registration Office an efficient operation in 
Central London. Unless. radical action is'taken... there 
will be a virtual breakdown in the whole öperatiön!. 
(50) 
The Government'in its memorandum referred to the 
increasing difficulty of finding suitable staff in the 
Central. London area, and stated that to reduce the delay in 
. 
registrations the staff häd been doubled in then last five 
years, nonetheless 'pursuit of default in filing accounts 
is some'. two years behind'scbedule'. 
(51) 
It is. interesting 
that the vast majority of new recruits in the Companies 
Registration Office are clerical officers and assistants, 
and that out of the new 500 employees, there has only been 
au increase of 14 examiners in the section concerned with 
the. prevention of fraud. 
(52) 
One of the most significant factors in the overwhelming 
of the Companies Registration Office has been the vast 
increase'-in company incorporations and in particular the 
quantity of shelf-companies. 
(53) Another significant 
problem has been the lack of automation, and the almost 
exclusive reliance on manual procedures. The D. T. I's 
memorandum emphasised that no matter what short term 
expedient was adopted, an increase 'in automation, particularly' 
with regard to the retrieval of information was`vitally 
necessary. In particular the Government was concerned that 
computerisation would substantiailly assist in*the detection 
and identification of defaults and villations. Whilst as we 
have seen the advent of computerisation has had. ä marked 
effect on. the number of prosecutions . brought, 'the figure is 
less''than was "expected, 
X54) 
and the Department of . 
Trade 
still insists that criminal prosecutions should be a. last 
resort. Furthermore it'is interesting*that there. were more 
. prosecutions 
brought in 1973 before the programme of 
computerisation. had been. completed, than in'1974 when*it 
had. become fully operative. 
The Department'of Trade and Industry, emphasised 
_, 
throughout the debate 
. 
that the principle search. facility 
would continue to be located in London, and it' would be 
served by a micro fiche system. The Government stated 
that there would be a micro-fiche envelope for each. Company 
3ý) 
o. tbe register, and each envelope would include three 
sets of materials. 
(55) 
One. would include the incorporation 
documents, subsequent changes. in capital structure, the 
location and changes-in such, of the registered office, 
appointments and changesIn. directors, over a seven-year 
period. The second set would include the annual return, 
.. which comprehends the accounts, directors reports, 
particulars of shareholders, for the last three"- years and 
gradually with the effusion of time this would be extended 
to seven years. Finally the third set would include the 
mortgage register, "and. relevant documents to such. The 
Governments original plans were, significantly less 
.1 .1 
. extensive 
than this. (56) Sir Geoffery Howe,. stated that 
.. 
the new service would provide the public with at least 80'% 
of, all the information that-. they would require, -and the 
remainder would be available at Cardiff. 
(57). 
-Whilst this 
sounds reasonable, it should be noted that it-was not until 
the summer of 1974 that the Registrar. started"to issue, 
questionnaires designed to determine inquirers informational 
needs, so it is difficult to see how the Minister"of Trade 
and Industry arrived at the percentage be did...; 
Considerable-opposition-was raised to the move of the 
Registry. ' The Labour Research Department, and a. number of 
. trade unions protested on the ground that, -they. would not 
have.. staff - available at Cardiff. to ascertainvital. 
information for. collective bargaining. 
C58ý ThoýCity of 
London Solicitors Company, and. Law,, Society saw-: thel. move as 
endangering the financial preeminance. of the., City,. land 
thought that the non-availability: of vital information would 
be highly detrimental to. the working of London.,. as a. 4capital 
market. 
C 59) The press 1 
in the. last . few months of 1973 
contained almost daily attacks on- the . move , _, 
from an 
extragrdinary; ypripty: of interests. 
ý6° 
The Deputy Chairman 
of, the . 
Stock Exchange, . Ms "Dundas Hamilton emphasised that 
. 
Members of the Exchange and the quotations-Department had 
need -of 
tborough records very frequently, and : in,, great 
urgency. 
(61) 
The magazine Accountancy. Age. published the 
results of a survey that it had undertaken. among the London 
firms ofChartered. accountants, and some 80% stated that 
they on a , number of occasions had to have immediate, access 
to detailed corporate records.. 'urthermore they considered- 
that the information that would be available in LQfdon 
would be mostly insufficient for 'tb: eir needs. 
62) A 
special working party of the Association of Certified 
Accountants, - whilst admitting that 'computerisation 'of the 
" records was desirable, thought, "tha*t there would 'be 
considerable expense in having to -h e the facilities of 
search agents, or in- sending employees temporarily or 
permanently' to Cardiff. ; Of- course certain inquiries cannot 
be handed over tö outside agencies because of the need for 
secrecy. 
(63) 
, The Companies Registration Office'sought'to answer a 
number of these " ob j ections by., drawing' *attention - to the fact 
that several copies 'of the documents would be available, and 
thus searches would be speeded up and facilitated, 
(64) 
and 
a subscriber service would be available 'where by personal 
and private libraries could be created. 
(65)--It is certainly 
possible that the City Institutions, and perhaps the larger 
financial-houses could take advantage, of this-service, but 
it is expensive. ' It is interesting that a number--of 
financial houses and professional firms have established or 
are intending to establish offices in Cardiff. 
Whilst there is-no doubt great weight in the Governments 
desire to modernise-the-Registry and facilitate enforcement 
through automation, ýit is doubtful whether the primary 
reason it advanced for the move to Cardiff-is'-wholly valid. 
Whilst it is true-that incorporations`have-increased rapidly' 
in recent years, there are-signs-that the --number- is 
decreasing, and with-suggestions for new forms of business 
, 'organisation'-and the likelihood-that minimum capital 
-requirements will be introduced 'in the -near future 'the 
argument is far from convincing. ' ' Furthermore -much' of the 
backlog was caused by the abolition of exempt private 
companies, and the increased'disclosüre requirements of the 
1967 Companies- . Act. Thus it is reasonably clear '-that the 
increase'in work and paper-would not-have continued in the 
dimensions that the Government' indicated;.: -: - Similarly the 
cost of -labour and--office space has-not riser in --the same 
way in recent years as it, was feared -it would. 
:. What is perhaps ý the --most ' disturbing -questi,. on in--the 
Governments approach, 'is the utter 'disregard of ' the -twenty 
4' 
or so per cent of users who. will not be-accommodated by the. 
new scheme.. In a , Circular issued by . the. Companies 
Registration Office in November 1973, it is . simply stated. 
that 'the small numb-er of people who need tobrowse in an 
old. file will -need to go. to Cardiff'.. Whilst it, would no 
doubt be-too expensive to. =micro film all the: information 
that is-currently available in. the Registry, the-dangers 
in restricting its access by transferring. it to"Wales should 
not be underestimated.. 'Iihilst*officials at"the. *Department 
of-Ttade have dismissed these users as 'mere browsers who do 
not often know. what 'they 'are looking. -for' 
6-this 
neglects 
the fact that among such are officers of'the: various police 
fraud squads, and a host of *öther . Official and quasi-official 
.. user. . Peter. 'Wilsher(67)'considers that the Department of 
Trades apprdach 'is remarkable'. and''fallacious: - Scotland 
Yard, had seconded . four- full time specially-trained. - 
researchers,. and"apolice telex operator-to the-Companies 
Registry in London, who"ön average made some. -forty 
investigations each day, and annually carried'out-some 
10,000. -Obviously these inquiries are-often, . complex, wider 
ranging and urgent, land. more to-the point it is=invariably 
necessary to go-further-thail the information which is now 
. contained, in the micro-fiche envelopes. - The accuracy, 
reliability-ahd, confidentiality of. -the-, investigation-'is of 
extreme 
- 
importance,. and the-police would thus : be'. " reluctant 
. to use outsiders. In-addition individual officers-will be 
engaged . in their-own investigations, and-many will require 
facilities-to make. personal searches themselves, particularly 
if they are essentially- on a "' fishing expedition' ." It goes 
withoi't_ saying that a Detective-. is, not going to have-or often 
be given the time to e just . 'pop --down' to Cardiff-to-browse in 
the records; as he could-once have -done "with".: ease'--in the 
City.. Road. (68) 'The problems-caused 'by the move of -the 
Companies Registry 
, 
were discussed-by the police ät "ä,. two day 
conference on-the investigation -of Commercial-Fraud, in 
.. November 1973.; -'A Chief Superintendent of the Metropolitan and 
City. of London--Companies-Fraud Department, '-, stated that 'our 
big- worry is-one-of divorcing-. the routine--s earch'operation 
from the accumulated '. knowledge and experience that -we have 
built up.. in London. -We are. not. usually . interested, "in bare, 
face-value. information carried-in the files. But, lwe have. 
officers. with long memories and deep experience who can 
put together names, addresses, and odd bits of. 
, -information -- often- 
from half a dozen apparently 
-unconnected sources and companies and tome up With all 
sorts* of leads.... º Now. we get inquiries from allover. the 
,. country, and we can pool ' our: 
knowledge- suggest places and 
ways to look,: and if necessary. go around to" CoEapanies 
House. ourselves. -That will no longer be-possible in 
Cardiff'. '69) 
. 
In* a Times Editorial the same point.. was 
made, 
(70) 
, and 
the -Sunday. Times doubted whether -!. the . new 
category of'white collar criminal' sucb as the. insider 
could be adequately-caught with the full records only being 
.. available in Cardiff,. 
(71 )' It is open to . 
doubt whether the 
Scotland Yard, researchers will remain with. the Registry, 
and it is dubious as to whether the 'Cardiff police would 
be. willing to take over this role. 
Of course it is not only the police that-are concerned 
with this type. of 'browsing'. There. have been numerous 
instances where individuals w, , 
ho are either . dealing with a 
corporation, or who are indeed members of such. have taken 
the trouble to detect irregularities and. frauds. by making 
personal inquiries. Now if an in depth analysis is 
required the wQuld be 
, searcher . would 
have 
_to 
journey down 
to Cardiff, and perhaps incur expenses. for accommodation, 
where the, search cannot be completed -in, a single-day. 
.. 
Furthermore browsing through docunents.. is -far 'easier: than 
scanning micro-fiche. Another extremely important browser 
is the financial journalist. Peter. Wilsher the. Editor of 
, 
the. Sunday. Times Business News, has. remarked. that.. often 
journalists. to check.. out. their. suspicions: have. '. to. j follow 
the threads back to the year dot, jumping from half clue-to 
,, ' . 
half clue over 
_a mound 
of forgotten files!. 
(?.. 2.... Solicitors, 
. accountants, credit protection. agencies " and. a variety of 
other persons. cannot . always satisfy 
their. needs. by the kind 
-of, information thatwould. be available on.. micro.. fiche, even 
'.: if , 
the Companies 
. Registration Office with . the "aid of its 
computers can ensure that filings, -are kept -reasonably°up to 
date. It. is at_ least arguable.. tbat,, the . needs :. of .. 
these 
unaccommodated 20% of users ; are .: 
likely : to be more important 
from the public interest point; of view: -than '. the eighty per 
cent, of ordinary users.. It. is 
. 
because. of 
.. 
their, special 
ý ý'ý 
needs that they-are important,. -and-it is 'misconceived to 
merely retort- that, the information 'is -available still in 
Cardiff. 
Search facilities will, naturally be available in Cardiff, 
and a- 100' micro-fiche- viewing- stations have been installed, 
in addition to"the '400 in- London. " The- Registrar -of Companies 
stated-at a--meeting-of the. 'Law Stationers Association, that 
no original"files will be available even-at Cardiff except 
on 'completion of a-special questionnaire, -and certainly not 
all' docunents, will 'be" on micro fiche even at-Cardiff- 
(72) 
"Another problen -is' that- the micro-film equipment 
installed, - as normal viewing-'equipment-cannot produce full 
siz'e'-copies and particularly in =the -case of list's-of, 
shareholders , it -is probable 'that special -viewing 'stations 
"'will hnve! to be used. 
(73) 
Thus a-searcher "could have to 
search through, original''documents, and two categories of 
'micro-fiche in two different viewing stations. 
(74)' There 
have been other technical problems! 
(75) 
The City'was'particularly'concerned about the 
'impracticalities of having to file docunents,, particülarly 
prospectuses in Cardiff, and-when a : new --Government came into 
- office' considerable 'pressure ""was' applied on-the-relevant 
Ministers to reconsider this'-aspect'ef the new*scheme. 
(76) 
"I'-deputation 'frod the City -institutions, "had a, number of 
''meetings with Department Of Trade-officials-'and-'- the Secretary 
of-State for'-Trade, Mr Peter- Shore'. (79) The : main'-result of 
these persistent representations, was that -the-Government 
agreed to make a concession with regard to--the filing of 
'documents-. -Under the'revised-'plan"prospeetuses, mortgages, 
Court 'Orders and 'appointnents -of'- receivers''c-an'-ibe : filed at 
Cardiff or London. '" The Government also -agr'eed' that whilst 
-at first 'the bulk 'of the material'''available"- in London on 
micro ftche-would' data-back -only 'three years details of, 
and -changes in : directors "and'; officers' would, a's from the 
''start -date"back`'the` full- seven -years However"where 
shareholders' =lists' are- note -included' a's"part 'of""the- annual 
return, but' -fiýle"d'-sep'arätely; """ tliey' are''not ävail'ab1e on 
micro- fiche' in `London Nand reference, has 'tD be' made-to 
Cardiff The" Registrar' on' an ber''of' occasions emphasised 
that "bo'th"'offices, would be~ in telex-. comet-dnication- and that 
--the 'facili'ties 'for `facsimile 'cörmunication 'between London 
_. and,, Cardiff would. "be streamlined and that a postal 
service., would be : initiated, whereby -inquiries could 
be 
answered by post. It is submitted that the new. scheme 
will. provide a -better and more efficient service, except 
with.., regard to, a- small, but: , ass we 
have seen, important 
category; of user. , 
Even, if it. is possible for. the police 
to - provide -resident searchers in Cardiff, and presumably 
the: Department of, -Trades, Companies . 
Investigation. Branch 
would have its . own: officers- . there, the problem of the 
private,., press and semi-official user, such as the Takeover 
Panel or, Stock, _Exchange 
is not solved. -Whilst it is likely 
that only a. small proportion of--these investigations would 
-necessitate searching beyond the information. stored in 
London, -especially as the-programme advances and the 
information relates back some seven years, it is certain 
: that cases will arise where the London information is 
insufficient. Furthermore . the opportunity.. for 'irdepth' 
browsing is removed. 
It. -would appear that there is now only one practical 
. -solution, given. the fact that the move . bas 
taken place 
. and. some. Z71000,000. bas already been spent.. . 
This. would 
- be . to. extend, the micro-fiche service to -all documents 
,.,. -presently, in original form at. Cardiff. This would be very 
expensive,. but. surely the protection of, the public against 
fraud and abuse"is,. a consideration of greater weight. Of 
., course, _any chanfie.. 
is likely to generate a certain amount 
of . criticism(79), . 
but 
. 
in the present case -much of it is 
-well founded, 
The -deficiencies , in enforcement. of . 
the filing and 
disclosure. xequirements have. already been alludedFto. 
The--Conservative Government in its White Paper-on Company 
Law Reform, . 
(80ýpromised 
to create a specific. obligation 
on-directors to-file-the required documents,. and prescribe 
wi-tbr some . strictness the period. after the terminatiot of 
-the,. company's financial . year in which , 
this must be done. 
In-addition the-then Government, promised. to correct the 
- . practical: -inadequacy of the' present enforcement 
provisions. . 'The Companies Bill 1973 would. 
have. given 
effect to . 
this promise.. Clause 58 would have. required 
directors-to prepare and lay before.. the-General Meeting, 
as well as deliver to the -Registrar .. the accounts and 
required annexed documents, 
(81) 
and by virtue of Clause 59 
this would have to be done within seven months from the 
end of the financial year to which such related, or ten 
months in the case of a private company. The Companies 
Bill would also have strengthened the penalties for 
non-compliance with the filing requirements. 
(82) 
Although, 
the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry during the 
Second Reading of the Bill stated that the increased 
penalties would show that default was 'a serious offence 
and not a mere technicality'(83), NNigel Spinks has-commented 
that 'as for punishment for late filing... the experience 
of the Registrar has shown that penalties act as a deterent 
to filing and not as an inducement'. 
(84) The subsequent 
Labour Government agreed with the sentiments expressed in 
the legislative. proposals contained in the 1973 Bill, 
(85), 
and such have been substantially enacted in sections 1 to 7 
of the 1976 Companies Act. Section 5 is of particular. 
interest in that it allows a shareholder, creditor of the 
Registrar to apply to the Court for a compliance order. 
4 
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(B) INFORMATION MAINTAINED WITH THE COMPANY 
A number of provisions in the Companies Acts require the 
company to maintain specified records and registers 
generally at its registered office. A lot of this 
information duplicates that required to be filed at the 
Companies Registration Office. However, as the information 
maintained with the company has invariably to bp kept 
substantially up to date, the continuous disclosure 
programme provided through this mechanism is far more 
immediate than the other two mechanisms of disclosure. 
Obviously a high propörtion*öf the information that companies 
are required to keep although no doubt adding to the overall 
disclosure scheme, is of little interest from thepoint of 
view of insider trading. Thus attention will be given in 
detail only to those aspects directly relevant to the topic 
under discussion. 
The practical utility of the present disclosure mechanism 
obviously depends on the avdilability of the information 
maintained by the company to investors and others. Under 
Section 426 it is provided that any person may inspect 
documents maintained by the Registrar of Companies and 
obtain copies thereof on payment of a fee. 
(86) 
If the 
information required to be kept by the company merely 
duplicates that in the Registry generally it is open to 
public inspection. It should be remembered that even if the 
information is available at the Registry the information 
maintained by the company will be more up to date. " This is 
particularly the case with the register of members maintained 
by the company and the particulars of shareholders supplied 
annually to the Registrar. 
The register of members,, under Section 113 and~the 
register of directors and secretaries under Section 200 are 
open for public inspection on payment of the statutory fee, 
and open to members without charge. The register"of 
charges is open freely to members and creditors, but only 
to others on payment of the statutory fee, under Section 104. 
However under' Section . 105 whilst available to meibers and 
creditors`the instrument creating the charge is not 
publicly available. Whilst the Coipänies Acts/do not in 
fact require a register of debentureboldersý87ý sections 86 
and 87 do contain provisions for the maintenance, and 
inspection of such, along the sane lines as with-the 
register of members. - With. regard to the mandatory minute books, section 145 
requires that minutes be recorded with regard to 
proceedings. 'of. the general meeting and of the. directors. 
However section 146 is silent on the question of who is 
entitled to inspectthe minutes of directors meetings. 
Thus. it would appear neither the public or shareholders 
have the right to examine''such, although at common law it 
would seem directors and their advisers do. 
ý88) 
With 
. 
regard to ' the minutes' of ". general . 
meetings the members of 
the company have a- statutory right`of'inspection under 
section 146.. 
Aere registers' or books are . 
available for . inspection. 
under the Companies-Act, the standard provision is that 
the registers' are , 
to be kept 'available 'during business 
hours, subject to such reasonable restrictions as. the 
company may-by its articles *of association or in general 
meeting impose, so that not less than two hours in each da 
are allowed for °inspection, at 'its registered office. 
;; here there is non- compliance the company and every offic 
in default is liable to a. default fine, -. and the 
Court can 
be approached för. an order compelling"inspection. 
ý89) 
In the case of*books'of account*or accounting records 
section 147(3) provides "that 'such'"shall at all "times be 
open'to inspection by the -directors'-(9CA) although 
apparently -not the shareholders or anyone else, except of 
course the auditors. However in the case of'companies wi 
articles of association in accordance with Table A, artic 
125. it is provided that 'the direct ors. shall from time to 
time determine whether and to what extent and at what tim 
and places and-under what conditions... the accounts and 
books of the -company or any of them shall be open to 
inspection by the members. ' ' It-would 'seem under this 
article the general meeting. could empower someone to 
inspect the books, and this has been for instance in the 
case of Cour tüne 
(9Q) , Nevertheless the BritlS 
shareholder or debentureholder as an individual has no 
right of inspection of the books of the company. (91) 
ýý 
The position Iis different in the United 
States. - The 
American courts -emplöying" on' the concepts of a' shareholder 
as a co-venturer have always allowed generous 
rights of 
inspection, -on a- stewardship basis-. ' The-right of 
inspection of : the - corporate 'books `and-, r'ecords has become 
fundament-al--to-, the--viability--of derivative suits-and 
proxy -contests " aimed-- at "-management-. Inspection-- of'-" 
shareholders' - lists ,, although : often'-- spoken- of as' a 
`common 
-law-right, -)-- in-most-states has-received-statutory 
recognition. - Tbis -particular, "right "is' narrower--in "scope 
and more -freely -granted - than the -`-right to examine the 
corporate -records-: 
(92) The - wider -right to- inspection of 
records-"has also been embodied in-statute in many states, 
although where more expansive the common'law-still applies(93) 
However under the-common-law the shareholder'has'the 
burden of alleging and proving a proper purpose. 
94) The 
common law, and statutory rule in most instances allows a 
shareholder 'to inspect corporate records, ' when- -'I-acting in 
good faith- for the purpose -of advancing the -interests of 
the corporation-and protecting' their rights as-owners'. 
05) 
This right includes the privilege of allowing the 
shareholder tobe 'accompanie-d- by a professional adviser to 
assist in the'interpretation of the records. -(96)-'There is 
some controversy - as to -whether-'directors' have " an absolute 
right of -inspection', ' or 'one' conditioned upon proper 
ý" 
The inspection has been extended'tö-internal purpose: 
(97 
corporate information; not constituting records as: suchC98) 
--As--a normal rule confidential-communications; trade-secrets 
and 'inside "information' 'wozild"'"not be availäble. 
(99) 
-Thus the rights of individual shareholders- in American 
"'' -corporations, to " inspect "'the `'documents` and records ' of the 
company are-far in excess-of a nything 1"that' the British 
shareholder, possesses. Of "course, "in, Britain, `a -shareholder 
can "always "avail ""himself -of 'the -ordinary methods of-' 
obtaining 
"evi'dence`'and discovery -of 
"docürftents in` the case 
of "litigation, 
100), 
and'-this--extends-to ä-member-asking the 
--Court for -an order enabling"bin"'with". professional = 
-assistance -to ' inspect -a company's records 'or dociiments if 
-he can '"establish ""t0 the satidfacti`on ' öf the Court 'that he 
has a valid , complaint-to which 'the evidence-sought 
reasonably relates. Mere 'fishing' is. not allowed, and 
the Courts order must be directed., towards a specific 
complaint. 
(101) 
It might be convenient to mention here, another: 
possible means for investors to obtain information. 
directly from the company, -and"indeed exercise a degree 
of surveillence over the directorate. This is,. the medium 
of the general meeting, which. in traditional corporate 
theory if nowhere else is considered the font of. corporate 
democracy. Shareholders are entitled to ask: as many 
questions as they. like at company. meetings, 
_although 
there 
is no obligation upon-the directors or the Chairman to 
answer, and little if anything can be done in the face of 
an assertion that answering a particular question : would 
harm the interests of the company. Of course, as we 
shall see elsewhere, investors have been extremely, 
apathetic and reluctant to assert themselves,, or even 
attend. shareholders meetings. 
('102 
There are signs that 
this situation is changing, and at least some-shareholders 
are prepared to question, and persistently demand. 
information from directors '. (103) The role of-institutional 
investors in this aspect of disclosure. is. likewise becoming 
more. sign. ificant. 
(104) 
However, it would seem that. even 
if. a request for information is made at, a general meeting 
and it has a bearing on. a proposed resolution it is 
unlikely that the courts would entertain aninterference 
with the integrity of the resolution,. in the absence of 
fraud, even if it could be shown that the information if 
it-had-been given would have, been likely to-have had a 
material impact on the voting. 
(105) 
The only disclosure 
obligation on. the directors is. to give such information in 
the notice calling the meeting 
(106) 
that would enable 
members to come to. an informed decision about the merits 
of, a_proposed resolution. It has-been. authoritively 
stated a. ' ... special resolution obtained, by means of a 
. notice which did not substantially piit the shareholders in 
a position to know-what they were voting about cannot be 
supported'. 
('C? ) 
Directors who seek to derive some benefit 
from the resolution must-declare the nature and extent of 
such, clearly. 
0. C$) Whilst the British 
_law 
no doubt 
51 
gives sore protection to investors it is hardly sufficient 
in this respect. 
(109) 
ry 
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(i) -THEREGISTER Or HEMBERS 
Under the terms of Sections 110 to*123 every_company 
registered under the Companies Act 1948 must maintain a 
register of its members.: This register must include inter 
Lia (110). the names and addresses of each shareholder and 
'a statement of the shares held by each member, 
distinguishing'each share by number, so long as the share 
has a number, and of the amount to be considered as paid 
on the shares of each member'. '("") With regard to the 
numbering öf shares, section 74 provides that eäch'share 
in a company, baving_a'share capital, must 'be distinguished 
by its number However, *'if at any time all the issued 
shares therein of a particular class' are` fully paid up 
and rank pari passu for all purposes none of the shares 
need thereafter have d distinguishing mark so long as it 
remains fully paid up and ranks pari passu for all purposes 
with all shares of the same class'. Thus as the majority 
of shares are issued as fully paid up, ' and rank pari passu, 
numbered shares are rare, at least in public 6ompanies. 
(h12) 
However. asa matter of convenience registrars utilise 
transfer and allotment' numbers, which will appear in the. 
register of transfers. 
(113) Certificates are also, again 
as' a matter of . practice numbered. 
(114) The register of 
members must also show the date upon which the person 
named 'became 'a member and the " date upon which such ceased 
" to be one. 
ýýý5) 
A practice, which 'does little härm now, 
but 
, 
which could be very significant if anti-insider trading 
laws were enacted, is that it is'not uncommon for registrars 
to enter in the register, nöt 'the" date when the person 
named as ä member became ä' member but; when he agreed , 
to 
become such. 
(116) 
Of course this is"contrary to the 
Companies At as a'person other than a subscriber to the 
. memorandum, under 
Section 26, does not become a member of 
the company. until his name is properly entered in the 
register. If'the date that the'person became a member is 
false the register witii 'regard' to that member is falsified. 
The register of members will'. invariably be' kept at the 
companies registered office, although it is provided in 
Section' 110(2) that' it may be 'kept at the office where the 
register is bade up`if this is elsewhere than the 
registered office. It must obviously be situate somewhere 
in England. If the register is kept at a place other than 
at the registered office the company' must give notice to 
the Registrar of Companies, as to where the register is 
in fact to be kept. (117) Of course itie important to 
note that the register of members itself is not available 
at the Companies Registration Office, althoügh'as-we have . 
seen similar details are'included in the annualýreturns. 
(1I ) 
Under section 113 the register of members and the index(119) 
must except where the register is closed, under the 
provisions of the Act, be open for a period of at least two 
hours a day, as we have already seen. 'A company, may close 
its register for not more than thirty days each year, 
provided notice is given in local press of where its 
registered office. is situated, under section 115. 
(120) 
Prost companies today with the assistance of automation, do 
not in fact close their registers any more than . is: 
absolutely necessary - to do so is regarded as bad investor 
relations. 
(121) 
It is provided insertion 113(2) that 
anyone can require a copy of the 'register, or any part 
thereof, on payment of 10p for every 100 words* 
(122) The 
company must supply the copy within ten days, and if there 
is a failure toýdo so, or to allow inspection, the company 
and every officer who is in default(123) is liable to a 
fine of £2 and a default fine of Z2, under. Section 1130), 
() 
and application can be made to the Court, for an order. 
If default is made in complying with section 110 itself, 
either by failing to keep' a register in the required form, 
or in failing to give notice to the Registrar within 14 
days of moving the register to a location other than the 
registered office, the company and every officer* in default 
is liable to an unspecified default fine. 
(-125) 
An important question from the stand point~ of tracing 
past transactions in' securities, is for how *long is' it 
necessary for companies to retain closed registers and 
documents such as transfer forms. With.. the cost of 
storage and labour many registrars 
. 
are anxious tö"dispose 
of such, as soon as possible. Taken literally Section 
110(1) (c) has the effect' of requiring companies, to retain 
the records of the shareholdings; names, 'and addresses, 
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of persons who have long ceased-to have been members. The 
law gives no guidance on. this matter, and considerable 
controversyl. has been-generated-by the . uncertainty. 
Although 
there is-little. doubt that. a number of companies have taken 
'a calculated-change' and. disposed many old documents, 
others. -feel , that to dispose of, 
documents 
- of 
title is a 
. danger"they. should not encounter. The 
Chartered Institute 
of Secretaries, ' and the Registrars. Group,. with . 
the 
assistance of legal advice have"commendably. attempted to lay 
-down retention guide lines:. For 
instance it is-recommended 
that- transfers,, deb. enture', " -loan stock, redeemable 
preference and. share amortisation records, ' as well. as 
dividend, debenture and: loan stock interest lists should 
be retained for at least. twelve, years after they expire. 
On the other-hand-dividend and debenture and loan stock 
interest warrants need only be retained six y9ars, mandates 
four years, and ordinary correspondence only one year. 
(126) 
In the case of registers required to be kept under the 
Companies. Act it would seem to be the opinion. of registrars 
that it. would be far too dangerous in' the absence of 
statutory provisions to dispose of old records'. ý- Tire- 
tuestion of. retention of documents was considered by the 
Jenkins. -Committee. 
(127). 
-The Committee 
decided' that there 
was no--need-for any special -exemption 'in . the' case of 
documents relating. to , dividends, as such' matters would be 
" coveied by the, ordinary six years'.. statute of . 
limitations. 
However . with. regard. to documents', effecting 
title. to 
securities the: Committee suggested. that there' should be a 
statutory. provision. providing against theimpuning of any 
entry-on the. share register relating -to .a 
transaction 
"- occurring'. mores than -thirty years previously. - Thus provided 
there had been "no. challenge.: in this period. the - register 
could, be_ . destroyed.. 
ýý. 2ýý 
Whilst the "vast majority' of, shares . 
in- the United.. Kingdom 
äre. held. in- nominative ors registered form, under Section 
83(1). a.. comp'any, limited... by shares,., being, a.. public company, 
provided so authorised: by its '. articles: of association, may 
issue .. bearer. share- warrants 'with regard to, fully paid 
shares'..:.. , Obviously . the-. 
presence ,: of bearer -shares would 
make -insider: . trading regulation: fundamentally, more 
difficult, than the -use., of registered shares. -. The . Exchange 
" Control Act of 1947, as amended imposes stringent 
restrictions on such securities 
"129) 
which have combined 
with the general dislike of bearer securities. in the 
United Kingdom-(130)to render then rare and of. very little 
significance. -In many Europeaxi - countries bearer securities 
have acquired a-considerable popularity, -'at 
least initially 
because of the possibilities for tax evasion. This, in the 
main, has wisely not been tolerated in the United-Kingdom. 
Given the problems of tracing. ownership and effecting 
corpor'ate' disclosure- where bearer -securities are concerned, 
it is probable; that the existence of such have encouraged 
or at least facilitated insider trading. Fortunately so 
far as' Britain, and most Commonwealth countries are 
concerned, given their practical insignificance it is 
possible to pass on without further discussion of the 
matter. 
Before leaving the register of members, it should be 
pointed out that there are provisions in the Companies Acts 
for companies-which carry on business"in part,. in some place 
outside the United Kingdom, yet within the Commonwealth, 
Colonies, Republic of South Africa, or Federation of 
Malaysia to keep a 'Dominion Register' of members, composing 
a register of members resident in that country. 
(131) 
As 
'the dominion register is part of the principal register and 
the details in the branch register appear in the principal 
one, ät'the companies registered office, and the same 
provisions that apply to the principal register. apply mutatis 
mutandis it is-not really necessa to 
('132} 
ry pursue this natter. 
: Finally, there are several point s- "'th at should be made, 
concerning presentätion-of the register,. tbat could be 
important, ' from the point of, view of tracing transactions. 
A listed company is, bound by the Stock, Exchanges Listing 
Requirements to 'arrange for-designated accounts'-if. 
requested by; holdere of securities'. 
( 33) Thus holders of 
, -securities-maybe allowed to have several accounts in their 
own'names, differentiated-only-by ä designation number or 
letter, = '-The'- number of. separate. accounts that may be allowed 
to be held"by a single member in a-company. depends. upon the 
flexibility of the. company's system of numbering. of accounts 
and thus the, discretion': bf the. registrar. Transfers of 
securities[. from onedesignated- account to another, owned 
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beneficially by the same person can be made by a written 
request of the shareholder. The designation of accounts 
is used to great advantage by large trust and nominee 
companies, and can of course obscure exactly what 
transactions have occurred, although obviously this is not 
the purpose of the facility. Another factor that can cause 
difficulty in tracing ownership on the register is that 
securities can cause difficulty in tracing ownership on 
the register is that securities can be held in joint names 
or in more than a, single name. Under the Companies Acts 
there is no limit upon how many joint holders can appear 
in the register as legal owners. Thus in the absence 
of a provision in the articles of association usually 
limiting the number to four, all declared joint holders 
must appear in the register, with the required particulars 
of Section 110. Most registrars would admit that the 
information contained in the register can be deceptive and 
misleading. For instance members do not necessarily inform 
the company where they change their names or woman changes 
her surname upon marriage. 
(135) 
In large registers amazing 
coincidences are experienced, for instance in one case two 
registered members were both Lieutenant Colonels, both had 
the same initials and surname, and both used the account 
services of Lloyds Bank Pall Mall. 
(136) 
All these factors 
must be considered, when thinking of the register as a 
mirror of current ownership. 
Jý 
(ii) REGISTER OF DIRECTORS AND SECRETARIES 
When discussing the information required to be filed at 
the Companies Registration Office, it was stated that 
Section 200(1) requires that every company must maintain 
at its registered office a register of its, directors and 
secretary. For the purposes of this-provision under 
Section 200(9) a. person. in accordance with whose 
instructions the directors are accustomed to act will be 
regarded as a director. Of . course 
this is a difficult 
matter to establish, as directors are unlikely-to admit to 
accepting instructions from an 'outsider' as such itself 
amounts to a breach of their fiduciary duties. But where 
such are trying to lessen the burden of blame upon 
themselves, such proof may arise, as it might from the very 
circumstances, of the case. 
(137) 
Furthermore it should be 
noted that Section 455 provides that the term dir. ector 
includes 'any person occupying the position of director by 
whatever name called'. 
This register must contain the full names'and titles, 
former names, usual residential address, nationality, his 
business, if any, particulars of other directorships, his 
age, of the directors, individually. Where a corporation 
is a director the company's name and registered office must 
be stated. It is not necessary under Section 200(2) for 
the register to contain particulars of directorships held 
by directors in companies of which the company is the 
wholly owned subsidiary, or which are the wholly owned 
subsidiaries either of the company or of another company of 
which the company is a wholly owned subsidiary. The 
disclosure requirements with regard to the secretary are 
less extensive. Only his names, former names, and usual 
residential address are necessary, although where there are 
joint secretaries the information must be provided as to 
each. Where*all are partners in a firm, the name and 
principal office can be stated rather than individual 
personal details of the partners, under Section 200(3). 
As we have already seen the company is obligated to send 
copies of the register to the Registrar of companies and 
. 
details of any changes therein. (138) The Register is open 
to inspection, and copying on. the same terms as the register 
of members, and there are similar provisions in the case 
of default. 
Under section : 407 overseas companies, 
(139) 
which have 
established a place of business in the United Kingdom, but 
which were incorporated abroad, must supply the Registrar 
of Companies within one month of the establishment of that 
place of. business, with details, of its directors and 
secretaries, as are required by Section 200. Changes must 
be notified within twenty one days, and penalties. are 
provided in the case of default; 
(140) 
_` 
ý. .. _ 
Gt 
(iii) THE REGISTER OF SUBSTANTIAL SHAREHOLDERS AND 
THE PROBLEMS OF NOIMINEE REGISTRATIODT. 
(a) NATURE Or THE PROBLEM 
Various societies for a. multitude of reasons, have 
perfected practices which enable property of all kinds to 
. 
be held and to all the world appear as owned by- a person. ' 
who in fact-holds it for the benefit of a 
. 
hidden owner. 
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This very, factor of secrecy.. of,. the true owner, has. an 
-obvious impact, on the question of effective and anti-insider 
trading regulation. It-is a fundamental aspect to the 
detection and regulation of the abuse. The accommodation 
of secrecy that nominee holding allows'is also of 
significance from the point of view of corporate control, 
and it is this aspect which has received the most 
legislative attention throughout the world. There-is a 
greater public interest in it being known who controls and 
owns the nations capital and means of production than in 
catching the odd insider trading behind a nominee or 
associate.. Thus it is appropriate to discuss the major 
topic of nominee registration at this particular juncture. 
The register of members. required to be kept under 
Section 110, does not enable the company or indeed anyone 
else, to ascertain more than the name and address of the 
registered shareholder. Whilst the Cohen Committee 
considered that one of the main reasons for the register of 
members was to allow investors and creditors to see who 
their coadventurers were, 
(142) 
it would seem that when 
Parliament legislated for this register in 1862 it was 
only concerned that legal ownership should be reflected. 
This was quite reasonable. as the. company,. and for that 
matter most other persons would only be; concerned to see 
who was legally responsible for the rights and obligations 
, of membership. 
('143) 
That the original conception of the 
register of members was only to list those legally 
responsible participators, from the company's standpoint, 
is affirmed by Section 117, and its predecessors. 
(144) 
This section provides that 'no notice, of any-trust, express 
or implied or constructive shall, be entered on the register 
or be receivable by the registrar... '(147) This section 
was-interpreted by Lord Coleridge, in Re Perkins, ex parte 
(146) The learned Mexican Santa Barbara rIining Company. 
Chief Justice stated, 
It seems to-me extremely 1m ortant' not to throw any 
doubt on the principle that companies have nothing 
whatever to do with the relation between trustees 
and their cestuis que trusts in respect of the 
shares of the-company.. If a trustee is on-the company's- 
register as the holder of the shares,. the relations 
that he may have with some other person in respect of 
the shares are matters with which the company have 
nothing whatever to do with, they can look only-to the 
man whose name is on the register'. -(147) 
Although this is not the universal proposition that it 
might appear, 
(1) for our present purposes it suffices 
to state that a company will not accept and will not wish 
to receive indications of rights and interests laying 
behind a registered title, in the normal course of events. 
Indeed registrars as a matter of practice immediately 
return such notices to the sender explaining the company's 
lack of interest. 
(149) It is of course true that. whilst 
the law treats nominees as not being such,, 'this noble 
disregard for reality is not shared by business which 
rightly considers nominees as being a 
. 
different catagory 
from a shareholder beneficially interested in his 
securities'. 
(150) 
The Cohen Committee observed that, 
'whatever may have been the intention of Parliament, 
it is clear that at an early date investors made use of 
nominees, for as long ago as 1895, Sir Francis Palmer 
in his standard work, referring to the benefits of 
anonymity in private companies said, 'This is in many 
cases a matter of great importance, and especially in 
the case of syndicates, for it very commonly happens 
that leading financiers, Members of Parliament-and 
commercial men whilst willing to subscribe to the 
syndicate, make it a condition that their names do 
not appear. (151) 
It is very. difficult to judge accurately just what 
proportion of securities in Britain are held in nominee 
form, as' the very nature-of-such resists detection and 
computation. 
(152) ! fin indication of the extent of nominee 
ownership is given by two surveys, one submitted to the 
Cohen Committee and the other to the Jenkins . Committee. 
Whilst it is appreciated both'are now somewhat dated, 
they do nevertheless provide some guidance. (153) 
ý3 
The Committee of'Löridon Clearing Banks in their 
evidence to 'the 'Cohen 'Committee submitted details on the 
extent of nominees in the 'context of the Clearing Banks. 
It appeared 'th-a C 'tome 600,000 individual holdings of 
debentures and: 'sh*ar'es' Ver'e regi'st'ered' in the name of 
member' bank's' of, th'e British- Bankers" Ässociation . or their 
nominee companies in 1943. Although dated, -thie analysis 
by one of the banks, of" its 72, '456 "nominee- holdings is of 
great interest, and bears reproduction here. It is 
important to remember that the following analysis, 
only 
extends to first tier nominees, and of course there could 
in many instances by multiple nominees through which the 
beneficial nexus ran. 
The analysis was as follotts, 
Residents outside the U. K ........... % of Total 
18.381o 
Stock Exchange Members . ........... 
5' of Total 8.59 
Insurance and Trust Companies........ °% of Total 3.86% 
Security for advances ................ 
f of Total 11.16; 
For convenience 
(a) Facilitation of-Stock Exchange.. 5ö of Total 
transactions 
(b) absence abroad ................. 
% of Total 
Executors and Trustees ...... ;........ 
?% of Total 49.28% 
Unidentified purposes.....:.......;.. / of Total 0.6 % 
The Cohen Committee pointed out-that it was quite possible 
'-that other sections than the one designated as- 'unidentified 
purposes. ' could ' well- involve' the use of nominees for 
improper. purposes 'and for concealment of identity, rather 
. --than because of the various administrative advantages 
in 
having'securities held in nominee registration: - The Committee 
of London Clearing Banks in their evidence to the Jenkins 
Committee, (155) presented up-dated evidence as- to the extent 
of nominee holdings 'ýn their member banks, and the uses 
that the device was apparently been put to. The Banks 
stated that they-had some 800,000 individual holdings in 
nominee registration. - The modified analysis, -was as 
follows'. 
As security for advances .............. 
Stock Exchange Members .............. 
Insurance and Trust Companies......... 
Pensions and analagous funds ......... 
For Trustees...... ..................... 
For residents outside the U. K......... 
For convenience, - 
(a)'-Yacilitation of Stock Exchange 
Transactions .......... 
(b) absence abroad ........ ..... `..... 
(c) general.. ...................... w.. 
For Investment Management ............. 
Executors'and Trustees ................ 
Unidentified purposes ................. 
.% 
of Total 4.689o' 
ö, of Total 4.391/o' 
-/ of Total 1.56% 
% of Total 5.04%ä 
of Total 1.26% 
% of Total 2.41/% 
9. 
of Total 4.77; 
% of Total 2.085G 
% of ' Total 6.26% 
% of Total 16.81% 
of Total 49.83 
% of Total 0.91% 
Again it is to be emphasised that concealment and improper 
" purpose is not'nece särily to be limited within the category 
- of 'unidentified'p11rpöse' . It would seem that most nominee 
- accounts are-someWh at more active than ordinary accounts. 
" Returning to*the'evidehce'Submitted to the Cohen Committee, 
the same bank that analysed its users also analysed the 
work which three of its nominee companies did in 1938, a 
relatively inactive period on the Stock Exchange. Out of 
a total 37,974*individualnominee holdings held by the 
- three companies, in one year it was discovered that there 
had been so' me 137,215 executed transfers. 
(156) 
Moreover 
in the same year dividends received. by the three nominee 
companies from eight British companies. in-respect of 1013 
nominee accounts, in 840, cases. were for overseas beneficiaries. 
These, statistic, s, have. 
_obvious 
implications for... the 'effective 
regulation of insider. trading.. -In a one day transaction 
study 
. 
by 
, 
tbe Stock Exchange on August' 7th 1971+,. it was found 
that a quarter of the value of equity turnover was in 
foreign company: stocks -and one half of the. deals in foreign 
company's securities were for overseas. clients or on an 
arbitrage, account. 
(157) 
Apart from emphasising the 
importance of, London as an International financial centre 
these figures indicate the 
. 
quantity.. of foreign trading that 
in fact exists. Given this and the extent of nominee 
trading it is no small wonder that a number of investigations 
into alleged insider activity have foundered. 
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The Clearing Banks in their evidence to the; Jenkins 
Committee pointed out that it was likely that an 
increasing- 'proportion of securities -would. be - transferred 
into nominee registration in: the future "(158) The 
Banks also emphasised that there had been a marked 
increase. in the number of bank nominee holdings, and 
in particular there was a-growing trend-for British 
banks*toac. täs. depositaries and agents"for. overseas 
principals.., 'In such. cases one registered holding in 
the name 
, 
of, a. nominee-company may amount to many 
thousands or even millions of shares-the beneficial 
ownership. of which is, widely spread and-completely 
unknown, to the British bank'. 
(159) 
The memorandum of 
evidence submitted to the Jenkins Committee by Guest 
" 
Keen andNettleford Ltd, made the same point 
(160)and 
stated that three out of the ten largest.: holdings in 
. ........ ...... the company, as of January 1960,: were 'known''to be 
of such nominee companies. registered in the names. 
. 
Given this and the advent of unit trusts and investment 
clubs, the memorandum stated that .' it was. much more 
" difficult to keep a register of beneficial. -. 
shareownership'. 
(161 ). 
The Board of Trade in-the Notes 
that it supplied to the Jenkins Committee-stated that 
an analysis'of"Shareownership was 'at present-impossible 
because-of-the prevalence *of *nominee lloldings... ' 
(162) 
The second-of the -surveys referred-to above', and 
submitted to the Jenkins - Committee, was that carried 
out by Messrs '. R. S. Revell and C. H. Eeinstein,. of the 
-Department . of-Applied 
Economics,. of- Cambridge . University. 
One of the ' most -interesting. analyses . "in -this . survey was 
that-of the 'shareholdings . of -the listed ordinary share, ' 
capital of-United Kingdom public companies.: This 
analysis'shows the composition'at market-value of the 
shareholdings, ' based on .a sample of . share registers of 
--public-companies. with- a stock exchange quotation. The 
: period during --which the survey, was, conducted was from 
-1956 * to 1958.:. -Whilst . this .. is'.. now. quite dated, the 
-researchers -. themselves . point - out _ 
that -'tbe .. composition 
ofshareholdings does not'... change" : rapidly... and_. apart 
from . "the*. effects Of such general trends. as.. the 
increasing use of nominees and the growth of pension 
funds, it is unlikely that the results fora more recent 
date would be appreciably different'. 
63) 
The analysis, submitted by Revell-and. Feinstein, aas as 
follows, 
Insurance and assurance companies..... %-of -Total 8.0% 
British Banks and Nominees .........:. '. %0 of Total 15.3iä 
Pensiön Funds.... ** .......... '......... 
% of Total 1.2% 
Investment Trusts... I............... ý of Total 3. ßy5 
Other Financial Institutions.......... % of Total 1.5/ 
Industrial and Commercial Companies... % of Total 2.0% 
Charities and Religious Orders........ % of Total 1.3% 
Overseas, 0- 
(a) Holders resident outside-the U. R. % of Total 4.3516 
(b) Overseas Banks and Nominees...... / of Total 0.60 
Executors and Trustees..... *........... /o of Total 2.1" 
Personal Holdings ...............:......: ö of-Total 55.6°, ö 
Unclassified ....................... % of Total 5.1% 
The evidence submitted by the London Clearing Banks 
should be viewed-in the light of this far more comprehensive 
analysis. The London Clearing Banks stated-that nearly 1% 
of their nominee business"'was for unidentifiable purposes 
which could embrace concealment'. 
(164) From Revell and 
'. Eeinstein's. analysis it-is apparent that some 15/0 of the 
public quoted companies securities are.. held by bank 
nominees,. thus the degree : of unidentifiable purpose, merely 
in, the 
.. case Qf. 
bank nominees ssgumes a sizeable proportion, 
or : at least one . not 
to 
. 
be ignored. -, -Of course it is 
necessary*to view any survey with a degree, of, circumspection 
and : it should be pointed, out that John : Moyle -in 
'the Pattern 
of Ordinary Share Ownership . 
1957 to 1970!., 
(165_ 
analysed 
the catagories.. of., shareholder . in some,. instances 
significantly different... . For , 
instance , individual holdings 
. of. common , stock,: -which 
included tbat held by. -executors and 
trustees,. was : placed . at 
47.4% as. of . 
the 31st.. Decenber 1969. 
. The-., proportions of securities *. held. by. the, --institutions also 
varied.. There.. would, seem however.. to'-be,. little doubt 
that . the.. proportion . of.. nominee holdings. has;. increased, 
(167) 
and Revell . and Moyle, in the '. Owners of. Quoted.:. Ordinary 
CST 
Shares -a survey for 1963'-(168) stated that the 
proportion, of nominees , 
had risen, from 12.6/. on 1st July 
1957 to 20.5516 as of.. 31st December 1963., 
In their-original memorandum of. evidence. to the Jenkins 
Committee Revell and Feinstein, pointed out that their 
. task'in. analysing shareholder composition had"been, made 
significantly more difficult by: the presence of nominees 
and that'the survey 'took no account-of. those, -holdings 
registered-in the names of individuals without any 
indication that they were trustees 
, 
or-nominees!. 
(169) 
Thus. they emphasised that although when- executors, trustees 
and nominees were added together the figure-was over 17iä 
this was a minimum, and in all probability the figure 
should, be significantly higher. . 
Tßany registrars whom the 
present author has consulted, in-the case of quoted public 
companies would today place the nominee percentage at 
between*22% and. 26/, but all agree that it is increasing. 
ý17Cý 
It is hardly surprising that Professor Kahn-Freund 
writes, 'the thorniest. of all the thorny problems 
. confronting the Cohen Committee, was that of nominee 
shareholdings'. 
t171 The Cohen Committee gave considerable 
attention--to. the nominee problem, '172) Among the alleged 
benefits of disclosure of *beneficial ownership, the 
Committee thought that such would inhibit those unscrupulous 
directors who utilised such as a, cloak for insider trading. 
173) 
Whilst the Committee was not wholly pursuade, d of the weight 
of all-the disadvantages. it was alleged the-nominee system 
caused, the Committee wisely stated"that. 'we do. not attach 
conclusive importance -to "the absence of any proven cases of 
abuse since in"the nature of things-such evidence would not 
be forthcoming'.. (l? k) In the result the Committee thought 
that full disclosure on the basis 'that the public is 
entitled to. know in whom control is vested' would not 
prejudice any valid interest. However the Committee did 
have' reservations as to whether beneficial disclosure 
"could be' effectively and conveniently , enforcedr without 
causing: unnecessary-. work. 
(175) 
. 
The Report repeatedly 
emphasises the desire of the Committee not to erect an 
'unworkable: mechanism the benefits of which -could be 
disproportionate to'the"work involved in servicing and 
policing such. The Committee took evidence-and considered 
a number of schemes to effect complete disclosure. However 
the Committee considered that 'the majority of suggestions 
would involve ä volume of work out of all proportion to the 
probable benefits to-tbe public' and that there was no 
'watertight' solution that would catch all nominees, 
particularly the foreign private and corporate'nominee. 
(176) 
The proposed disclosure scheme was only maintainable if 
there was 'a reasonable degree of effectiveness' in the 
Comitittee's mind. 
(177) 
Abandoning the ideal of complete disclosure, the 
Committee concentrated on improving the amount of 
disclosure in the register of members, and in facilitating 
the disclosure of control, or at least allowing indications 
of such. The Committee considered that a nominee 
shareholder should be distinguished on the share register 
from a beneficial owner. 
(178) 
The detection of nominees 
was to be via a system of declarations, upon every transfer, 
the form would contain a declaration that the transferee 
was or was not to be regarded as the true beneficial owner 
of the securities concerned. 
(179) 
With regard to. existing 
holdings the Committee recommended that every company 
after the proposed law comes into effect should send a 
form to the shareholders with the notice of the following 
'annual' general meeting requiring a declaration--of status. 
It was-also'suggested that once a declaration . bad been made 
if -the' beneficial ý owner became a 'nominee or vice versa, 
then: a declaration- should ' be required-to be made to the 
company. ' Annual= reminders bf the ' ditty- to declare 
shareholder status-; -in the Committees view could be 
contained in the-notices'of--the annuäl'general'meeting. 
(180) 
The company'in-the register of members would keep'two lists, 
one - of * declared beneficial 'owners'. and'*another' for declared 
nominees. .-,. 
The-Committee-refrained from suggesting that declared 
nominees should be--required to -state who the beneficial 
o ner was, - as* the amount 'of ' ädministratiorL- that this would 
require would-be -disproportionate; - and 'in a =case -where 
beneficial disclosure was materiail-the true owner.. ' could 
very easily take -steps to -remain -behind the, curtain' 
(181) 
ýý 
and render the scheme a snare and delusion. However the 
Cohen Committee did consider that an obligation should be 
placed upon any person who directly or indirectly the 
beneficial owner of more than one 'per cent of the capital 
of the company, or any class of shares,: to file a 
declaration of bis ownership within two months of the 
commencement of 'the proposed law, or ten days after he 
became" such. ' "A similar duty of notification would exist 
with regard to any change- in 'such particulars as had been 
declared. (182) The duty to declare would however only 
apply wbere_the securities were not registered in that 
persons name. The Committee thought that the declarations 
should bb included in a special register, available for 
inspection, and such details should be included in the 
annual return. The Committee further considered that 'these 
provisions should as a'deterrent apply to bearer securities 
although detection of a breach would be difficult'. 
083) 
: I'hilst recognising that there would inevitably be cases 
where there was non-compliance, the Committee thought that 
the ennactnent of such obligations would discourage 
persons 'who would at present see no danger in concealing 
their identity' from continuing in this vein. Furthermore, 
it was recommended that where there bad been no or a 
deficient declaration or votes were exercised by a person 
who had not made a declaration there should be a fine of 
'500 and, or six months imprisonment, on conviction. 
(186) 
Before the 1947 Companies Bill was drafted, Lord Cohen 
and a number of other'experts' devoted several months 
attempting to 'devise a mechanism for full-disclosure of 
beneficial ownership, with the Board of Trade, ' 
(185) 
However h6 scheme that was sufficiently comprehensive or 
fullproof could be devised. With regard to the'proposed 
requirement that 1% shareholders should disclose, it, was 
known that the Board of Trade favoured this, and this 
recommendation was included in the Bill. However it met 
very great criticism because of the amount of work that 
it would impose on company officers and the fact that it 
could be easily ignored, or circumvented by using foreign 
nominees. Furthermore the relevant clauses in the Bill 
were. incredibly complex, involving some five pages of 
small print. The Board of Trade in its Notes to the 
Jenkins Committee stated that 'it was thought that even 
lawyers would find, it difficult to understand, and that 
methods of evasion could be easily devised'.. 
Furthermore, evidently Lord Jowitt, the Lord Chancellor, 
and Sir Stafford Cripps the President of the Board of 
Trade considered that it was just not possible to devise 
any systen. for the disclosure of beneficial ownership 
which would not have the fatal flaw or easy evasion. 
The Board of Trade, in its Notes to the Jenkins. Committee 
stated, 'both the Government and the Opposition were 
generally in favour of disclosure, but confessed themselves 
defeated by the difficulty of legislating'. 
(187) 
In the 
result the only recommendations of the Cohen Committee on' 
nominee disclosure, except-those in relation to directors 
which will be examined later, that were enacted in 1948 
were those relating to the powers of the Board of 'Trade to 
investigate the ownership of securities, which will be 
discussed here, for the sake of clarity. 
-7c 
(b) INSPECTIONS . INTO BENEFICIAL 
OWNERSHIP-OF-, SECURITIES, 
By virtue of' sectio 172(1)' ' where -'it -'appears -to the 
Department of'Trade that there is good reäsoh to'do so', 
they may appoint one or more'cdmpetent inspectors-to 
investigate änd report''ön the'mombership of: any company 
änd''otherwise with respect to -the company for the 
purposes. of 'determining the true persons whb-'axe -or have 
been '±inancially 'interested in the success- or -failure, 
real or apparent' of the 'company; 7'br able : to` control or 
materially, to' influence the policy of , the : company. Under 
subsection (2) the appointment of'an inspector under this 
section may define the scope-of the-investigation in 
relation' to'- the-matters to be investigated or 'the 'period 
to which' the , inspection is' to relate, or indeed' both. ' 
Moreover the inspection may also be limited to'-'matters 
connected with particular shares or debentures'. ". The 
Department of Trade'and its predecessors have 'ben' 
extremely reluctant to exercise this power, " as, we shall 
see later, 'they have been with the appointment of, 
inspectors generally. It'is most rare to find a case 
where the-'Depa'rtment has used the powers accorded it under 
Section 172' alone' and riot. in 'conjunction with one of the 
other sections relating to the appointment of, inspectors. 
Where an application for an investigation under 
Section 172"i`s' made, in respect of particular shares or 
debentures to the Department, by "not less than-two hundred 
members, or by members having not less than one-tenth of 
the issued shares, the Department of Trade must appoint, 
an inspector,: 'unless they are satisfied *that the-' 
application is vexatious'. 'Under Secti6n'172(3)'the Board 
of Trade'` in `their Notes, submitted to the Jenkins Committee 
statedthat they had interpreted 'vexatious'''as meanin 
'foran im 
. 
Proper purposeor without sufficient reason!. 
ý88) 
The Inspectors' appointment- Bannot exclude 'from' 'the scope 
of the investigation any matter which the share olders 
application- seeks'to have included, subject to the'- 
Departments bolding that ouch-would be unreasonable. The 
= Department' of Trades' record with, regard to--appointments 
under Section'172(3) bas'been better thän'under its own 
'discretionary- powers of a1 o intý ment 1. 
(189) 
On average 
there, are at.. least.. two _ appointments annually.. ). 
in recent 
years, but often in conjunction with the more general 
inspection provisions in Sections 164, and 165.0 
90) 
UIr Arthur Lewis M. P. asked the Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry, what procedure, the Department followed 
when it received. applications under Section 172(3). 
Mr Ridley_M. P. stated that the-application would be given 
due consideration and if the identity of the. controllers 
of the 
, 
company were. unknown it would, be , 
normal to grant 
an inspection. 
(191. ). 
This-perhaps illustrates"tbe 
narrowness of the provision. 
(192) 
The inspectors powers under Section 172 are-as the 
Cohen Committee recommended wide and 'drastic' 
(193) 
subject to the terms of his appointment the inspectors 
powers will extend, to the investigation of any 
circumstances suggesting the existence of an arrangement 
or understanding which though not legally binding is or 
was observed, or is likely to be observed in practice, and 
which is relevant to the purposes of the investigation. 
Moreover an inspector has the same . powers, under 
Sections 166 
to 168, that those appointed under Sections 165 and 166, 
and which are- discussed elsewhere, have. 
(194) 
" I. t. is also 
provided that the Department of Trade. need not supply the 
company or anyone else with a copy. of the inspectors report 
'if they are of the opinion that . 
there . is , good- reason for 
not divulging the, contents of the report or parts. thereof!. 
However the registrar should be, supplied with a. copy if the 
Department is not of the opinion that. there'is"not a good 
reason for publishing the informatiom, or-a copy of such 
parts as are-unobjectionable on: this ground. 
('95)' It 
should also-be noted that the cost. of. an inspection under 
section, 17Zis. to be borne_, by the, Department of Trade. 
Apart from a full scale inspection the Department of 
Trade is given.. a less 'drastic' 
_ 
power. under Section 173. 
Under this section where it, appears necessary or. that there 
is good reason, in: the Departments view, to investigate the 
ownership of any securities and yet, in their opinion it is 
unnecessary to appoint an inspector, they can require, 
whomever the. Dep. artment has reasonable cause to. believe to 
have. been interested in those particular securities, or to 
have acted,. as a solicitor or agent of someone who was in 
73 
fact interested. in they securities, to give them information 
'which he_has. 
-or can reasonably 
be expected to obtain as 
to the present and past interests in those securities and 
the names and addresses of. the persons interested and of 
any person. who acted or who is acting in relation to 
those securities'.. For the purposes of Section 173(1) a 
person will be deemed to have an interest ina'"security 
if he has any right to acquire or dispose of it, or any 
interest therein,. or to vote in respect thereof, or if 
his consent is necessary for the exercise of any of the 
rights of 
_ 
other.. persons interested therein, or if other 
persons interested in the-securities can be required or 
are accustomed to exercise. their rights in accordance with 
his instructions. (196) Failure to give information 
required under Section 173 or the giving of false 
information, intentionally or recklessly, is constituted 
an offence under section 173(3) with a fine of £500 and, 
or six months imprisonment. 
(197)- 
It is difficult to 
determine how Often the Department of Trade and its 
predecessors have used this potentially very useful 
section.., In their Notes, submitted to the Jenkins 
Committee 
. 
the Board of Trade stated that since its 
ennactment they had. only utilised it on-two occasions, 
and in both instances it was only. invoked as an adjunct to 
an already existing inspection under Section 165(b). 
(198) 
The criteria in both Sections 172(1) and 173(2) is that 
the Department , of Trade, considers that 'there is good 
reason' to'initiate. an inspection, or investigation. The 
Cohen Committee had. recommended, however, that 'we think 
, that the Board of Trade should have the power in any case 
where. they äre"of the opinion'that"it is; desirable in the 
public' interest to ascertainby-whom control-of--a company 
is exercised'. 
(199) 
In. "Recommendation (n) on. päge 45 of 
the Cohen Committee Report, , -it, was -again : stated . that 'if the. -Board of - Trade considers - it necessary in the public 
interest-to' investigate. the'. ownership of shares in a 
company they may appoint-an inspector'-to.: cöndüct such 
investigation'. The Board of Trade in their Notes to the 
Jenkins Committee stated that the Solicitor-General during 
the passage of the 1947 Companies Bill concluded that it 
was necessary to 'substitute 'the 'good reason standard' for 
that of the 'public interest'' criteria in-order to make it 
more easy for-the Board of Trade to'decide'whether to 
initiate an investigation. 
(200) 
Exactly what'the impact 
of this alteration in'the-drafting of the provision has had 
is a moot point. It is arguable that the Cohen Committee 
thought that there was a public interest in-the disclosure 
of beneficial ownership generally, ý'ör" at' least- when there 
wastno equal or prevailing. 'public interest against'suchc201 
It would seen"'howdver, that the'-Board of Trade and the 
sponsors of the 1947 Act, considered that the'-'public 
interest' requirement of the Cohen committee was narrower 
than the 'good reason'- criteria. The Governnent"took the 
view that on this premise the Board of Trade" should not 
have to wait until' some grave 'circumstance's 'had arisen' 
'so'that it could be said that it was in-the public 
interest to mount an inspection'. The Notes of the Board 
-of-Trade"given to the Jenkins Committee stated that 'the 
Solicitor General took the view that anything that could be 
said 'to be a good-reason from a sensible point 'of view 
should be sufficient to warrant an-inspection'.. .. In 
practice however the Boardzof Trade'claimed"'they'have not 
in "fact" found it necessary-to -make great'- use " of their 
"powers' , 
(ß03) 
and it is-doubtful whether an even,. -more. 
restrictive approach to these sections would indeed have 
'been-possible. 
-In-the Board of Trades Notes, it was stated' that the 
President of, the Board of 'Trade -regarded the objective of 
the provisions relating to-nominee shareholdings in the 
'Companies Pict ` 1948, ' as threefold. ' These-were : "' ' 
'first to. ascertain ownership where it is a matter of 
'national' importance -that such should 'be", done; 'second 
to. check improper.. dealings by direcVors, in_ the ; 
securities of companies of which thgy are directors, 
which they could do by-concealment; tbird=-to'make the 
-. f.. register of members, more .. 
informative 
, 
to 
. companies and to the. public.; The first two, to ascertain 
ownership where it' is-na. tionälly important 'and- to 
' ý. checkAmproper dealings, -can be, done ': by -the, powers of 
investigation that are given: ' in these clauses to the 
Board of =Trade ; ,:, _.. ý ,... .. 
The Boards Notes continued that. in consequence it bad been 
the policy and -practice of the- Board' of Trade-- to- interpret 
75 
the words 'good reason' in the same way and sense as 'in 
the public interest' as for example if it was suspected 
that a foreigner was attempting to obtain control over an 
essential British industry. 
20 Thus -in the Board of 
Trades view, and that of its predecessors, the 'criteria 
of good causer-must have a sufficient public interest 
element. 
(205) On behalf of the Board of Trade, Mr Dean 
in giving oral evidence to the Jenkins Committe"e-stated 
that the Board had taken advice on the interpretation of 
these sections and took the stand that for an investigation 
there must be some question of public-interest as distinct 
from the interest of an individual. 
(206) 
In"the view of 
both the Cohen Committee and also the declared policy of 
the Board of Trade and its successors it would seem that 
the investigation of 'improper transactions', which would 
include insider trading, would come within the composite 
criteria of 'good cause and public interest'. " 
The Cohen Committee realised-that if the investigatory 
powers were to be at all meaningful it would be necessary 
`to provide the Government- with some means, preferably of 
an administrative nature, to prevent changes in ownership 
of the securities under investigation. 
(207 ) Thus it is 
provided in Section 174 that where in connection-with an 
. 
investigation under Sections 172 and 173. it appears to the 
Department of Trade that there is difficulty in finding 
out the relevant facts about any securities,, -and that 
difficulty is due wholly or'in part to the unwillingness 
of the persons concerned to`assist the investigation as 
they are required to, the"Department may by order-make a 
number of orders subjecting the . -securities-to a variety 
of restrictions: These restrictions are listed in 
Section " 174(2) "and include, that auy transfer of "those 
securities, or wliere such are unissued *`any '"transfer of 
the right to have such issued, and any issue, =will be void, 
that no voting rights with-regard-to the securities are to 
be exercised, that no fiirther securities are- "to be issued 
. 
in pursuance of a right stemming-from 'the-holding of 
securities already--issued, or in pursuance of - any other 
offer to the holder, -'-and except -where " there: is -a. 
liquidation that no-money is-to be paid out. on-those shares. 
Where-the Department of: Trade--makes such an-order, or 
where it refuses to lift such once made, any person 
aggrieved thereby may apply to, the. Court. The Court can 
direct that the order-in whole of in part should cease to 
have effect. Even if the. Court or Department lifts the 
restrictions, on transferability it is still feasible for 
the restrictions on further. issues of securities. and 
payments of money to remain intact, under Section 174(4). 
If the corporation disregards such an order and does issue 
securities or pay out money, the company and every officer 
in default is liable on conviction to a fine of £, 500, under 
subsection 6,, and any person who exercises. or purports to 
exercise any right, when to his knowledge such are subject 
to restrictions, under the section, or who being the 
registered holder fails to. notify another who he knows to 
be-unaware-of the restriction and who is exercising the 
right, is-liable to a fine of £500 and or six months 
imprisonment., However no prosecution, can be brought 
without the consent of-the Department of Trade. 
In the Board of Trades evidence to the Jenkins Committee 
it was stated that Section 174 had never been used, and 
this has remained the case until relatively. recently. 
However in the last couple of years. there have been several 
instances where Section 174 has been used to some effect. 
In July 1975 the Secretary of State for Trade appointed 
Millett Q. C. and Bowie, to investigate the ownership of 
Darjeeling. Holdings. (208) The Inspectors discovered that 
some . 
28% of Darjeeling's securities were held. by Fireball 
a company registered in the Isle of Man. There was a 
complete lack of cooperation as to who in fact was the 
beneficial owners, and Mr Peter Shore, the ßecr'etary of 
. 
State:, made 
, 
an order under Section 174, in effect freezing 
the 28% holding. 
C209) 
Because of 
-the inconvenience that 
this caused,,. it was reported in the press some four months 
later that the officers and accountants of the companies 
concerned haci, banded over the required documents and 
details. to the Inspectors. (210) A similar order was 
issued with regard to some. 464,500. shares in Ashbourne 
Investment. s,. by Mr Shore,. under Section 174. Again the. 
Inspectors, who. bad.. been. appointed to investigate Ashbourne 
Investments-could not find. out,, who . 
these 
. securities 
belonged to,:; as they were registered in the name*of 
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Samuel Montagu (Nominees) for a Swiss bank. 
(211) Obviously 
these are very useful powers and could be used with great 
advantage in 'cracking' nominees, and assisting in the 
regulation of any future laws on insider trading. 
Y 
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(c) LEGT SLATIVE' PROPOSALS . 
The Jenkins Committee asked for'evidence specifically on 
'whether the practice of nominee : registration Baas . valid, 
and if. a general-scheme of beneficial disclosure would 
be 
advantageous. The answers'that the Comnittee'.. received were 
as interesting äs they were-diverse. The majority approach 
was that expressed by-the'Accepting'Houses Committee and W 
Issuing Houses-Association; 'the administrative advantages 
of the nominee system are so great that ' any. attempt to do 
away with it would seriously affect the efficient working 
of the City's day to day business' . 
(212 ) 
Even the Board 
of Trade acknowledged that " it seems 'widely. recognised 
that the'nominee system confers substantial advantages, 
and that there is'a real risk that 'foreign business might 
be lost if there were a universal obligation on nominees to 
disclose true beneficial ownership' 
(213) 
Some of the 
reasons advanced for their retention were-less than 
convincing. NIr Lawson giving oral evidence for the 
Committee of-London Clearing Banks thought that nominees 
were beneficial, -for allowing employees to conceal. their 
true earnings, "and : to allow competitors' to obtain a 
company's balance sheets. The Estates and Agency-Company 
Ltd, thought that nominee registration was useful as it 
allowed a director where he-wanted to 'dispose'of a large 
number of shares for purely personal reasons' . 
to do so 
without causin harm to the company, -by other investors 
following him. 214) 
. There was'evidence submitted calling for the abolition 
of nominee' registration, however. 'For"instance De-La Rue 
Company Limited advocated legislative prohibition of nominee 
holdings, 'even at the., expense of. 'administrative 
inconvenience. (215) Apart from the "question * of 'whether 
nominee regi'strätion should be abolished, there was 
controversy as. to 'whether -there should 'be a -mandatory 
disclosure of -all 'beneficial ownership 'or whether it would 
be sufficient to require disclosure'-only-where there was an 
element-of control. Apart-from-with-regard to " the disclosure 
of directors shareholdings, - 'which wil-1 be-'examine'd later on, 
*the general consensus of-opinion was"against-*mandatory 
nominee disclosure'., For example' the Counciltof - the Law 
society stated that there was. no general principle in 
English law that required an agent to disclose who his 
principal was or indeed for a principal to do such, and 
it was emphasised that 'the Council do not accept that it is 
in the public interest to change this principle', 
(216) 
Indeed. Mr Ocklepton, for the Council of Associated Stock 
Exchanges thought nondisclosure of beneficial ownership was 
un-objectionable even when a person was attempting to obtain 
control. 
(217) 
A number of witnesses emphasised that 
securities were property, and as with other forms-of 218ý 
property should be allowed to be dealt With in confidence. 
However, a number of witnesses took the point raised by 
Lord Jenkins, that securities were a special kind of 
property in that 'in a way they are like playing cards, if 
you have got more than a certain number in your hands you 
may get an enormous advantage' . 
(219) The Bank of. England 
for instance, in its evidence, stated that 'it appeared 
from the Governors discussions in the City that there is a 
considerable volume of City opinion, which whilst 
recognising the. difficulties, would welcome some workable 
scheme, if one could be devised, which required declaration 
of-interest, when beneficial interest in the capital of a 
company reached a certain level, which might well be 
considerably-higher than that suggested by the Cohen 
Committee'. (220) The Accepting Houses Committee, which 
had opposed full beneficial disclosure, on the grounds 
inter alia of banking secrecy, thought that disclosure of 
-control status was necessary if investor confidence was to 
be preserved.. Thee Faculty of Advocates thought that it was 
necessary from the standpoint of minority shareholders to 
be able to determine whether their. directors were in the 
control of someone else, and similar sentiments were 
expressed by the Board of-Trade itself. 
(221 The Board 
.. of 
Trade thought that the extended definition of director 
,. 
in certain sections, such as sections 195 and 200 would 
: comprehend controllers. On the other hand the Chartered 
Institute of Secretaries thought that these extended 
definitions were so uncertain and vague as to be 
practically useless, and indeed the Board of Trade, 
admitted; as much, 
(222) 
but thought that it might have 
some deterrent effect. 
The Jenkins . Committee,. did' look at the Cohen Committee's 
suggestions for individual declarations in some detail, 
despite. the general opposition to. such,. on principle. The 
bulk'of evidence received-on-this point was characterised 
in a remark by Mr Lawson,. speaking-for the Committee of 
Clearing Banks, '. I do not think that is a runner, Sir, if 
I may say so!.. 
C223 
The'amount of extra. work, 
rthe 
complexity 
of definition. and administration and the difficulties of 
enforcement were in-the main considered. too. much. ' Certain 
witnesses thought the. answer. would. be, a declaration of 
. status, with the provision of a-power. to the directors in 
-particular cases to. demand further.. details. 
(22 ). 
Messrs 
Revell and Feinstein,. thought that, 'it is probably 
impossible to suggest a registration procedure . which 
cannot be evaded by a determined person, but this-is no 
reason. for not trying, to obtain as wide a declaration of 
beneficial. ownership as possible. 'They also drew - 
attention to conceiving of the register as an. instrument 
designed to prevent fraud. Although by, disclosure Revell 
and Feinstein, thought that 'it is possible to, discourage 
those that will'only be dishonest if it, is-not too' 
dangerous' and that a disclosure scheme would. have the 
advantage that anyone who violated it, if-detected would 
in the words of the Cohen Committee(225) 'be put upon 
their defence and start that defence under . a' . 
handicap 
which will certainly be severe'. -It 
is also interesting 
that unlike the other witnesses,, Revell and Feinstein pointed 
out, that as nominee registration was. for. administrative 
convenience in most-. cases, "most principal. would not object 
to the disclosure of ''their . 
identity... No, empirical ! evidence 
on this was however given. 
With regard to disclosure. of shareholdings of 'control' 
significance, as, has been. stated there.. was wide agreement 
that such, would be beneficial. provided that.. the disclosure 
threshold-was not so low as. to generate the same. kind of 
problems-that applied to the disclosure of beneficial 
ownership-generally. -. There was.. considerable discussion 
among the various . witnesses- giving evidence to., the Jenkins 
Committee. as_to 
- where 
the appropriate_ disclosure threshold 
(r) 
should be drawn-. 220,: Most --supported: the 'figure of.. . 
ten per cent, as in the words-of the Second Secretary to 
to the Board of Trade', ten per cent is a compromise 
between a too small figure, where there is no 
justification or requirement, for disclosure, and a too 
high figure where disclosure would be. too. late'. 
(227) 
The Board of Trade made. it. clear that this was directed 
towards 'claudestine-creeping control'. Professor 
E. V. Morgän, of the University of-Wales; although 
sceptical of how warehousing(228). could be'prevented., 
with a threshold of ten per cent thought-that. -the' 
percentage should refer to a class-of securities and not 
the entire capital. 
(229 
There were representations for 
a five per cent threshold in certain instances, 
(230) 
others mentioned fifteen per cent, 
(231) 
and twenty per 
cent, 
(232) 
Revell-and. Feinstein thought that the 
threshold should be set at a'1000 holding of the nominal 
share capital, and not of voting rights or the market 
value. This would -in their view amount to about a 
5 to 1TIo holding of voting- capital, on the basis, of 
their survey.. 
Revell and Feinstein"also considered the obligation to 
disclose should be placed on the nominee and not upon the 
beneficial owner or registrar. The Board of Trades view 
on this was. ambiguous, as the Permanent Secretary, 
Sir Richard Powell merely spoke of the disclosure 
obligation. being on 'the individual',. although another 
officer of. the' Board. bf Trade did say that the disclosure 
. obligation. should.. be; on. the person controlling ten per cent 
of the- voting. rights. 
(233) 
The Scottish Bank General 
Managers and. the-Committee. of London Clearing. Banks thought 
that the obligation should be on the beneficial owner. 
Concern was expressed that because of the difficulties 
in'enforcement disclosure-of 'control holdings' could act 
as a snare and-mislead shareholders. S. r Richard. Powell, 
the Board. of. Trades Permanent. Secretary, whilst 
-. acknowledging the difficulty. -of enforcement -thought that 
by - placing. a strong 'penalty on default there would be a 
great*. impetus: to disclose-. 
(234) 
-The majority of-. witnesses 
whilst agreeing. to, the difficulties of'comprehensive 
. enforcement thought there would be substantial. compliance 
with a legal disclosure obligation. 
(? 35)-. 
The Federation- 
S3 
of British Industry, opposed legislation on the ground 
that enforcement would be impracticable, because of the 
use of foreign nominees; bearer'securities, -and, mutiple 
nominees. Furthermore it was stated that it-would 
discourageý'foreign investment through the share deposit 
system, under which such organisations`as the Guarantee 
Trust of, America. and SICOVAM, hold blocks of'securities 
in British companies and issue depositary certificates 
which are freely transferable' as 'bearer documents. The 
British company cannot gö behind'tYe-cOmpany's name in 
which such are registered". But''as Professor, Morgan 
stated 'any law can be 'evaded and 'is evaded to some 
extent, no law is 1COi% effective, unfortunately. 
(236). 
Nonetheless, as the Federation of British Industry 
stated 'it is the very cases where disclosure would be 
beneficial that it will not be made'. It is important 
to remember, however, that a person who is seeking to 
gain control of a company will inevitably at sometime 
have to 'show his band' and thus expose himself"to the 
penalties foe non-compliance. The British and Scottish 
Chambers of Commerce thought here the appröpriate remedy 
would be deprivation of voting rights, in total, 'br in 
excess of the disclosure threshold. ' This was opposed by 
the Clearing Banks on the'ground that the proposed 
legislation would be extremely complex, and if the 
threshold was based on a percentage of share capital, the 
beneficial owner might well contravene the law inadvertently. 
A number of witnesses were in fävour of the directors 
being given the power todemand'details "of' beneficial 
ownership in particular cases', 
(237) 'and the. Econömist 
recommended that the shareholders by ordinary resolution 
should be given the power to demand directors to make such 
inquiries;. C238 However both Lord Piercy and Professor 
Morgan, in evidence thought that'the possession of such 
powers placed the directors in an invidious position, and 
thought that it would be preferable 'to expand the" scope and 
availability of official investigations. A niimber of other 
witnesses thought that it would be appropriate to provide 
the directors of a company with 
"the 
power to require or ask 
the Board of Trade to make inquiries, under its powers for 
the. investigation. of share ownership. 
(239). 
On the other 
hand many pointed out that, investigations,. because of 
their inevitable delay provided. scant protection. 
(240) 
The Jenkins Committee was-. obviously impressed. by the 
amount of evidence that it. had. been given, on. the. question 
of nominee registration, and in particular the general 
view that such served a practical and beneficial purpose. 
However at the sametime,. althougb seeming. to accept, that 
complete beneficial disclosure was impossible or 
impractical, the Committee thought that there. should be 
disclosure obligations in the case of directors, which 
will be discussed later, and in the situation where 
persons are acquiring or have acquired a certain control 
status. It is not without interest that the Committee was 
impressed by the American evidence that wap submitted to 
it, to the effect that Section 16(a) had -received .a 
'remarkable degree' of compliance. 
(241) 
The Jenkins 
Committee also. took the point that someone attempting to 
obtain control through stea]7th would inevitably have to 
show his hand, and provided the penalties were strong 
enough this should act as a deterrent. Furthermore the 
principal would be in the hands of his nominee and open to 
blackmail and coercian. Of course this reasoning is based 
on disclosure of control and not disclosure of insiders 
transactions, as in the latter there is no inevitability in 
the true status emerging. In the result the. Committee 
recommended that Section 195 of the 1948 Companies Act 
should be amended so as to require the. beneficial owner of 
ten per cent or more of, the equity capital. or any class of 
-equity shares , 
(2 2) 
or of any other class conferring 
ordinary voting rights of a company whose, shares, or any 
class of such, were quoted, on a recognised stock exchange, 
to disclose his identity and report his 'subsequent 
transactions. This new provision in the Committee's' view 
should not apply to directors as they. would*be under a 
separate duty to report all their transactions in the 
issuer. (243) 
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(d) STATUTORY PROVISIONS RE<ýUIRING DISCLOSURE OF 
BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 
The result of these recommendations was the enactment 
of Section-33 of the 1967 Companies Act. 
(? } 
The 
complexity of . 
the, section equalled. the worst , 
fears of 
those pessimistic- witnesses who-had given evidence to the 
Jenkins. Committee. 
(Basically Section 33(1) provides 
that holders 
(2k6) 
of substantial interests. in securities, 
which are defined as holdings of ten per cent,. or more, of 
the nominal value of any class of shares carrying 
unrestricted voting rights, must on the occurrence of 
certain stipulated events, notify the., company. in writing. 
This provision applies however only to a company 'of which 
there has, as respects the whole or any proportion of its 
share capital, been granted a quotation on a recognised 
stock exchange'. 
( 7) it should be noted nonetheless, 
that the obligation to report does not-only extend to the 
class of. securities so quoted. 
The events. upon the occurrence of which the-shareholder 
must notify the company,. are where a person becomes 
interested in ten per-cent or more of the nominal value, 
of the class of shares with unrestricted voting. rights, 
where that persons former interests and acquired interests 
amount to ten per. cent or more, where having. already become 
a 
. 
ten per cent shareholder he. acquires or, disposes shares 
of that same class, his holding still remaining above ten 
per cent,, or where already having ten per. cent. or. more of 
the relevant share capital he suffers. a decrease in the 
nominal value of his interest in the relevant. share capital 
so that his interest is reduced, below ten. per. cent. The 
notification to the company must state the. occurrence of 
the event and the date upon which it occurred. and according 
to. the circumstances-of the case the number of shares 
comprised in; the share capital, specifying. such, -in which 
immediately-after the occurrence of the event : the . 
declarant 
is interested, or the fact that after, the. event_he--is not 
any longer so-interested in the shares. Moreover, it is 
necessary for the notice to identify the declarant by name 
and address, and where he is a director of the company 
state that it is given in pursuance of Section 33. 
(249) 
It should be noted that contrary to the recommendations 
of the- Jenkins -Committee, direct'or. _ öf* the" c'ompany are 
required to comply with Section 33, 'äs well as with 
Section 28. (250) This underlines, again'the fact that the 
disclosure mechanism under Section'33 is concerned with 
control both actual and potential änd not with insider 
trading. Indeed the price at which the-transaction was 
effected-is not required to be stated: under Section 33, 
-although of course, given the-information that is required 
it would not be 'too difficult in most 'cases to find this 
out. The same notice provisions apply wbenpart`of the 
company's share capital'is first granted-6 stock exchange 
quotation, or where shares are enfranchised with 
unrestricted voting rights. 
(251) 
Under subsection (5) it 
is provided that the notice must be communicated to the 
company within fourteen' working days-of the occurrence. of 
the-event giving rise to the obligation. 'This''tine period 
commences, if at the time of the occurrence bf"the event 
giving rise to the obligation the person under the 
obligation knows-of the occurrence of the event the day 
next following that on whidh the event occurse 
(252) 
Otherwise if the'occurence of the event was not known 
then-the fourteen day period comnences''with the day next 
following'that on which the occurrence of the event giving 
rise to the obligation comes to hi's knowledgeI 
(253) 
It 
is interesting that the Jenkins Committee had recommended 
that the notification should be 'within seven days-'of such 
transaction coming to his knowleäge(254)ý and-the Cohen 
Committee thought ten days, but did not state 'whether the 
declarant should know-or not. The Cohen Committee'merely (255) 
-stated-that the disclosure was to be 'activated by the change, 
apparently whether 'the owner was aware of'such or not. 
Under the Section, 'it. would seem that the'declarant should 
have actual knowledge aid negligence"is not sufficient. If 
this interpretation is correct, it would seem unsatisfactory, 
as there-should be ä' duty upon per sons. having*'substantial 
investments in a'company to exercise ht lease-"reasonable 
care -in--ensuring compliance with Section 33. ' 
The provisions in Section 28of, the 1967 Act which 
delineate the meaning of directors interests, and which will 
$7 
be discussed later on, are made applicable to substantial 
shareholders by virtue of Section 33(4). However there 
are a number of modifications that should be mentioned 
here, with regard to the applicability of Section 28 to the 
obligations imposed under Section 33. For instance 
debentures, query,. convertible debentures, are excluded 
from the, purview 
_ 
of Section 33. A number of ytipulated 
'interests'. comprehended in Section 28, are specifically 
excluded from Section 33; for example an interest for 
life for himself, or another, of a person under 'a 
settlement, in the case of which the property comprised 
therein consists of, or includes, shares being a 
settlement with respect to-which the settlement-is 
irrevocable and the settler has no interest in any income 
arising under or property comprised in tbe_settlement, 
(256) 
. 
is excluded from Section 33. Likewise the interest of a 
person arising by holding shares as security for an 
advancement of money in the ordinary course of business 
is excepted. 
(257) 
Moreover, under Section 33(4)e 'any 
such interest, or interests of such class, as may be 
prescribed... by regulations made by the Department of 
Trade by statutory instrument' are excluded, and 'a 
definition of a class of interests for. the purposes of 
regulations made under paragraph (e) may be framed'by 
reference to any circumstances whatsoever'. 
(? 58) Among 
the 'interests' that the Department of Trade had excepted 
from Section. 33, are the interests of a United'. Kingdom 
corporation, engaged in banking. or insurance,,. which under 
the rules made'. under the Public Trustee Acts 1906 and 1957 
is entitled to act as a custodian trustee, and likewise 
various subsidiaries"of such companies. Similarly interests 
of a company acquired as. a. result of the acceptance of a 
conditional offer made by the corporation as part*of.. a 
takeover, made-to all the shareholders. -or all a class 
thereof, 
-being interests subsisting while the condition 
_o 
259) the takeover offer remains unfulfilled have beencexcepe tl 
The penalties, which both the Cohen Committee-and Jenkins 
Committee should be severe, so as to-act as a deterrent, 
(260) 
are stipulated in Section 33(6). A person wbo*fäils to 
comply with-the disclosure obligations, or who knowingly, 
or recklessly make a false statementzis liable on summary 
conviction. to, d-fine of £200 and, or three months. 
inprisonnent and on indictment an unspecified fine and or 
two years imprisonment. Prosecutions can.. only be. 
instituted with the consent of the Department of Trade or 
Directorof Public Prosecutions.. .w 
In accordance with the recommendations of the Jenkins 
Committee (261) section 34 provides that every company 
subject to section 33, must keep-an-indexed"register in 
which against the name of the substantial shareholder the 
date and required, information in chronological order, must 
be reco"riled, within three 'days of the 'Company: -receiving 
the notice. 
(262) 
The Register of substantial shareholders 
must be kept where the register of directors-interests is 
located, and is to be available for inspection and 
copying on the same terms as the register of members. 
(263) 
Where there is default in complying with the requirements 
of this section the company and every officer in default 
are. liable to. a. fine of; £200 and a' default fine, and the 
Court may. be approached for an order compelling. inspection 
or the. provision of a copy. 
(264) 
.., 
' The power. to inspect the register is qualified. und. er 
Section 34(5) insofar as there. is "" no right to. inspect 
information with respect to a company for . the time!. being 
entitled. to avail itself of the. provisions. in . Sections 3(3) 
and 4(3) of the 1967 Companies Act. 'These provisions 
permit a* company to. seek a dispensation from the. ."`. 
Department of. Trade, allowing it -to . witbold 
from.. its 
accounts or from the statements . required to be . annexed 
to 
the 
. annual return 
information about. a subsidiary or an 
associated company which is incorporated outside the United 
Kingdom or carries on. business outside the United... Kingdom. 
Without the. exenption in,. Section 34(4) it would have. 
followed that-if the. information was open to inspection 
., there would be publication of . the fact,. that ; the , company 
keeping the register was a. subsidiary or an associated 
company with a_company that had been granted a dispensation. 
This would of course nullify. the object of-. the dispensation 
which was to prevent publication of such. a relationsbip. 
(265) 
The principle in Section, 117. is 
. reinforced, as 
in the 
case of the register of directors interests, under 
Section 29(6) by Section 34(4) which provides that the 
company shall not by virtue of anything done in compliance 
with the section, be affected with notice or put upon 
enquiry as to the rights of any person in respect of the 
shares. 
(266) 
Whilst Section 33, has in the main appeared to work 
reasonably well, and has faacilitated the identification of 
controllers and transactions by those persons in an 
influential position in the company, particularly-by the 
press, 
(26? ) 
there has still been considerable concern 
expressed about nominee registration and the attendant 
possibilities for undersirable practices. During the 
Conservative Governments review of company law, for the 
purposes of reforming legislation, a number of -questions 
were asked in the House of Commons as to'-whether the 
Department of Trade and Industry would consider 
recommending-abolition of the practice of nominee 
registration altogether. 
(268) 
It-is not without interest 
that a number of politicians took the view that 'there is 
no doubt at all that nominee shareholdings does offer a 
particularly appropriate 
(269) 
vehicle for skulduggery'. 
Sir D. Walker-Smith M. I. P. specifically drew the attention of 
the Secretary of State for Trade and"Industry'to the 
possibilities for undetected insider trading that nominee 
registration afforded. 
(270) 
teilst admitting that nominee 
registration was a matter being examined the Secretary of 
State considered that nominees were not necessarily used 
for improper purposes. In the Governments subsequent 
White Paper, it was stated that 'there-is notbing-inberently 
wrong with the practice-of holding shares through-' 
noninees... Purtbermore there is a large and complex area of 
common law and trusts which would be involved in-any attempt 
to forbid the practice even if that were thought desirable'* 
(271) 
After consideration of the public concern about nominee 
holdings and alleged abuses; the Government did-'consider 
that legislative action was needed with regard to -one 
particular aspect, that of 'warehousing'. 
(2"72)' 
The - 
difficulty b6 d been caused by the absence of any 'aggregation 
or acting in concert provision in Section 33. Of. course the 
broad definition of interests might dictate disclosure where 
a person utilised. nominees, but not where associates, or 
members- of his family. acquired in their own right. The 
Government announced its intention of dealing with 
warehousing in two ways, firstly by.. lowering the 
disclosure threshold, 
, 
down to at. least five per cent, and 
secondly by reducing the period of time-in which 
notification should be made 'to the minimum consistent 
with, practical operation' . 
(273) 
Of. course by lowering 
the disclosure threshold, it. would be necessary to involve 
more parties, if control was the objective-. of-the. ' (274) 
operation, and. tbereby risk a greater exposure to detection. 
The White Paper also - accepted. the recommendation of the 
Jenkins Committee that directors should have 'the right to 
demand details of beneficial ownership where they 
suspected that the, company's securities were being 
'warehoused'. However it was admitted that 'an enquiry 
which ultimately leads to a nominee acting for a person 
overseas is unlikely to get any further, but even that 
(275) 
information may be inferentially if not directly useful. 
Prior to the publication of the White Paper, the Stock 
Exchange had published a memorandum entitled, 'The. Views of 
the-Stock Exchange on Company Law Reform' 
(276) The nominee 
problem was discussed in the context'of. the regulation of 
insider trading. (277) Because it was difficult to determine 
whether securities were in fact being held by a nominee the 
Stock Exchange thought it-would be. impossible. to prohibit 
such. 
(278) 
However in the view of the Stock Exchange and 
also the Take-over Panel, 
(279) the police should be given 
the power to call for details pf. beneficial. ow, rnersbi. p, if 
indeed insider trading was made a. criminal offence as they 
suggested. "The Stock Exchange, -following the, recommendation 
of the Cohen Committees thought that a person. declaring his 
substantial interest should be obligated, to. state, who his 
nominees in fact are. 
(280) 
Moreover 'tbe Stock 'Exchange28'l 
pointed to the.. inadequacy of Section ". 33, in failing to 
identify control, concentrations of-. pore than. ten per cent 
that were held. by members of "a -group of.. individuals or 
companies. - Thus in their view 'section 33 should -be 
extended to cover: the. acquisition and disposalýöf an 
equity holding, of the relevant size be persons whether 
natural or corporate -who are acting in 'concert with each 
other'. This recommendation was -reiterated in a letter to 
the' Department 'of Trade and Industry, 'from the Stock 
282ý 
Exchange Council after publication of the White Paper. 
( 
The Council also pointed out, in their letter, that the 
reduction of the disclosure threshold to'five per cent 
could create difficulties for Stock Exchange member firms, 
and an exemption for Jobbers was urged, provide,. d. -such was 
acting in the ordinary course of business. 
(283) 
Both the -Confederation of British Industry, 
(284') 
and the 
Wider share Ownership Council, 
(235) 
endorsed the approach 
of the White Paper with regard to nominee shareholdings. 
Although it is interesting that th'e Wider Share Ownership 
Council emphasised-that whether a particular instance of 
warehousing was undesirable'or not depended upon the 
circumstances of the case. The Company Law 'Committee, of 
the British Section of the International Commission of 
Jurists, Justice, in a Commentary to the White Paper(28S) 
affirmed the notion that every company should have the 
right to know whom its controllers ; are. The Committee 
thought that the-company should have the right to require 
shareholders to disclose the names'of any person who is 
entitled to give them instructions 'on'the exercise of 
voting rights. The Committee also thought 'that nominees 
should be required to inform the'company of their status, 
and that they should, provided they were not trustees of 
ordinary family settlements; have to disclose the identity 
of the beneficial owners on the company's request. 
Unfortunately the Committee did ndt-elaborate on these 
suggestions and explain bow sucli' could be'"nade to 'work, in 
view-of the unanimous rejection of -such an approach by the 
Cohen and 'Jenkins Committees: ' The: practical difficulties 
were fastened upon' by the 'City: of London Solicitors 
Company ''in their: Report on Insider' Trading. 
(287) 
Whilst 
appreciating that-insider trading laws would be almost 
impossible to enforce in many cases where"nominees had been 
used`, 'the' Committee' thought tbät' a' mandatory disclosure 
scheme was unworkable, -and thought that the suggestion to 
deprive' beneficial'- owners of all 'their legal rights to 
control-their`securities, placed-in-the hands* of nominees 
was too extreme, purely in the context of anti-insider 
"ý',,; ýý 
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trading regulation. ,, 0 ,º 
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The promised, '. important provision... relating to nominee 
" shareholders and... warehousing' 
was introduced by the 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Mr Peter 
Walker, 
288) in the form of Clause 18 of the Companies 
Bill, 1973. The philosophy behind Clause 18, was-that of 
the. White 
. 
Paper. Nofifications of substantial 
shareholdipgs. and than 5 es in such were to be required 
within. three days, 
(289 instead of fourteen. It is 
somewhat disturbing that the Secretary of State evidently 
thought that the present noficication period was 
. 
twenty-eight days. 
(290) Furthermore Mr Peter Walker 
evidently thought that Clause 18 required notification to 
be made to the Stock Exchange 'where it would be put on 
the Stock Exchange board and become public knowledget. 
(291) 
The Bill was completely silent on this, in the context of 
Section-33 disclosure. 
Clause 18(2) would have reduced the disclosure threshold 
to five per cent, and empowered the Secretary-of State to 
reduce it even further by regulation under Statutory 
Instrument. Whilst. Mr Rodgers I. P. criticised the five 
per cent threshold as too high, during the Second Reading 
of the Bill, The Secretary of State made it clear that if 
'undersirable practices continued the threshold, would be 
lowered. 
(292) The disclosure mechanism in Clause 18, was 
reinforced by Clause 19, which provided that a company to 
which section 33 applied, could by notice in writing 
require any member of-"the company within such reasonable 
time as is specified in the notice to inform it whether 
he holds the securities as a trustee and to indicate, if 
such -be . 
the case, . as far as. he can the person for whom 
he 
holds, 
-the securities, either 
by, name or by other particulars 
sufficient to . 
enable, those persons to be identified and the 
nature of their interest. Under the terms of sub-clause (2) 
if-.. the company serves such a notice and is given details 
of. whom the registered shareholder in fact holds the 
.: securities 
for,, the company can serve a similar notice 
upon that person so-as to determine if indeed he is the 
beneficial owner or a mere trustee for someone else. 
Furthermore the company would have been empowered to serve 
1 'Ii 
l'I 
a notice on any member of the company requiring } 
information as tozwhether any of the voting-rights 
carried by any shares comprised in the relevant share 
capital of the company held-by him are the subject of an 
agreement or arrangement under which another person is 
entitled to control his exercise of those rights and if 
so to give particulars of the agreement or arrangement 
'and the parties' to it. --Whenever a company received 
information from a person in pursuance of a requirement 
imposed under thi's clause, the company would have been 
under an obligation to inscribe against the name of the 
member concerned in a separate part of the register of 
substantial shareholders' kept under Section 34, . the 
'fact that the requirement to give' information was-imposed 
by virtue of the company's exercise of _its statutory 
powers, the date upon which it was required and the 
information received thereby. The same rights of 
inspection and copying that apply to the register'of 
substantial shareholders would have applied to'this part 
of the register. Failure to comply with a request for 
information of the intentional or reckless making of a 
false statement, bore a penalty of two years imprisonment, 
and or an' unspecified fine, -under Clause 19(6). 
(293) 
The 
person'to whom the request was' directed could escape, 
however, if he could establish that the required 
information was already in-the possession of the company, 
or that the request had, been: vexatious and frivolous. 
-Furthermore, and not without' interest; Clause 19(8) 
provided that a'person would- not -be boun& 'to' comply : with 
aý'request, if he had sought-and obtained the exemption of 
the Secretary of State; who coul"d only grant-such an 
exemption after consultation with the Governor of-the Bank 
öf England, and on being satisfied-' that- on the basis of the 
applicants written'ündertaking`; special-circumstances 
existed justifying an exemption. = 
'Itow effective this provision - would bave'- been in 
'cracking'nominees' is an-open question. Mr Rodgers M. P. 
considered- that Clause 19 was fuel of loopholes and was 
particularly-concerned that information about the- 
principal need only be given-to the'extent 'that the 
noMiiaee was able to give it. ' This was of course 
exceedingly vague, and did not necessarily.. override the 
nominees duty of confidentiality, or impose a duty. of 
enquiry upon him. Furthermore concern was expressed to 
the vagueness of the 'vexatious and frivolous' 
exception. 
(294). 
11r Neacher M. P. also voiced the opinion 
that Clause 19 would do little to. frustrate insiders 
utilising nominees, particularly. as it was - the, directors 
in whom the power to require, d. isclosure was. vested. The 
Secretary of State, emphasised that-it was., notthe 
purpose -of the provision to invade the. secrecy, - of small 
shareholders, and it was evident from Mr Walkers 
observations that he intended Clause. l9 to. appl primarily 
if. not exclusively in take-over situations. 
( 
Of 
-course the Bill never became law, but it is thought that 
the, approach embodied therein would still represent the 
Conservative Party's views. 
(296) 
The subsequent 
, 
Labour Government indicated that 
legislation would be introduced inter alia on the-practice 
of . 
'warehousing' . The Report of a Working Group of the 
Labour Party's Industrial Policy Sub-Comnittee(297) 
although disproportionately concerned with insider 
trading, expressed concern about warehousing operations, 
and. the practice of warehousers selling out their 
accumulated holdings to offerors, in a take-over. situation, 
at. a great capital profit.. 
(298). Thus the Working Group 
recommended that the disclosure threshold should be 
reduced significantly, and below that of five per. cent. 
Furthermore the. 'Green Paper' recommended that 'the level 
is intended to-apply to the total of shareholdings of 
persons acting in concert'* 
(299) The acknowledged 
difficulties of definition and administration would in 
the Working Groups, view be. appropriate matters for the 
-proposed Companies-Commission, to. deal with. The 'Green 
Paper' also expressed its support.: for full.. di. sclo sure of 
beneficial ownership, - although refrained. from considering 
how this.. could-be achieved. It is of, interest that the 
, 
Green Paper's main indictment: of the. -nominee system was 
, 
based on the degree, of abuse that it had engendered. 
However, apart from an inferential allusion to asset 
stripping, 
(300) 
and the preoccupation. of the-Working 
Group with insider trading, no mention was made as to 
. what these abuses might be. Furthermore whilst 
the 
Green Paper produced no evidence of abuse, both the Cohen 
. Committee and Jenkins Committee stated 
they had found 
'no proven' case of abuse.. Whilst there are obviously 
cases of abuse, 
(301) 
a balanced view must be taken. 
The Stock Exchange, in their 'Comments on the Labour 
Working Party's Green Paper on the Reforn of Company Law 
and its Administration' 
(302) 
expressed agreement with the 
Green Paper's approach to 'acting in concert' and 
disclosed that the previous. Government had attempted to 
include such a provision"in'the Companies Bill of 1973, 
but had been frustrated by the problems of drafting 
such. 
(303! 
Great concern was expressed as to the 
reduction of the disclosure threshold would have on 
jobbers; and the Stock Exchange opposed the views expressed 
in the Green Paper on nominee registration, indeed the 
Stock Exchange's new TALISMAN system depends upon suchC30 
) 
IWhen the Labour Government introduced the Companies Bill 
(no 2) 1976, which was primarily a technical provision 
basically concerned with audit, 
(305) the Conservative 
Opposition placed considerable pressure on the Government 
to accept amendments directed at nominee registration and 
warehousing. Given the urgency that the Government felt 
to enact the Bill and the desire of the Opposition to get 
the amendments accepted the result was the implementation 
of the clauses in the 1973 Bill, Section 26 of the 1976 
Companies Act ennacts Clause 18 of the 1973 Bill, 
(306) 
but bas in addition two extra stib-sections, one incredibly 
tortuously drafted. Section 26(8) provides'that a person 
who would: otherwise be under a duty to notify the company 
under section 3-. 5, -and section 26(1) of this Act will be 
excused if 
(a) the nominal value of--shares compriýed'in the relevant 
share capital of the company-in which he, was"interested 
immediately before the event, and 
(b) the ndrainal -value. of shares, so comprised in which he 
is interested immediately after the event, produce 
' when each of them-ia expressed as a percentage of 
"- the -nominal -value -. of . 
that share. capital and (as so 
expressed) is rounded down,: 'if not a whole number, 
-to the nearest such numbers-the-same result'. 
The effect of this provision-is that if a shareholder with 
a present holding of 5.75iß acquires another 0.2 lo he will 
not have to make a separate report for that acquisition, 
but in the, case of an-acquisition of 0.26; . he 'would. The 
duty to report is, based on 1% bands:, Although thi-d is 
probably salutary,. the provision'is most obscurely.. worded 
and is likely to c1use considerable confusion. The other 
new clause, -which reflects the recommondations of. the w 
Stock Exchange Council excludes from the reporting duty, 
shares 'held by a jobber in the . course of 
bis business.. 
(30? ) 
Section 27, 
_reinforces 
Section 26, as. Clause 19 did 
Clause 18 in the 1973 Bill. The-only difference, of 
substance between Section 27 and Clause 19 is that 
Section 27(4) extends the investigatory powers of the 
company to the person who the registered shareholder 
discloses as being. interested in. the shares. The company 
can send . 
that person a similar notice, with similar 
penalties prescribed consequent on non-compliance, as a 
registered shareholder. 
. 
It is- open to question how useful these provisions will 
be, although it is nQticeable that certain companies have 
welcomed them and indicated a willingness to use section 
27.. Certainly thisshould. be of assistance in. Stock 
Exchange and other. investigations..; It should be noticed 
that as with the. very similar Australian provision discussed 
later, the company can serve notice on any member and not 
. only 
those reporting under section 33.. There is however, 
weight in Professor Kahn-Freunds observation-directed at 
the Cohen. Committee's recommendations, that 'the separation 
of legal and beneficial ownership is a. perennial problem of 
English'. Law. Henry VIII did not solve it, and it-will 
hardly be-solved this time round' . 
(308) 
Finally, as certain companies suggested to the Jenkins 
Committee,, it is possible for companies to tackle the 
problem of nominee. registration through provisions in'their 
own articles oftassociation*'--For example-in January 1975 
the Lyle Shipping Group altered its articles so, as to 
obligate all nominees to'disclose their positions. This 
was,.. reinforced by a provision allowing the company to 
, refuse registrätibn on transfer. In July 1976, the 
company announced that it was suspending the voting 
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rights of three anonymous shareholders, and were 
considering suspending the rights of a fourth if he did 
not identify himself. 
Before examining bow the United States have attempted 
to deal with nominees, the question of banking secrecy in 
the United Kingdom will be briefly discussed, and then 
the powers of the Inland. Revenue Commission, which might 
provide a 'useful model in the field of securities 
regulation, and then finally bow prepared the Courts are 
to penetrate corporate nominees. 
(e) BRITISH BANKING SECRECY 
Although the relationship between a banker and client is 
essentially that of debtor and creditor and thus of a 
contractual nature, 
(309) there are may occasions where a 
more exacting fiduciary relationship could be created, 
(310) 
and given the wide range of activities now encompassed by 
the typical banker, it would be dangerous to be over dogmatic 
about the nature of the relationship in any given instancýýh1) 
Whether a confidential relationship develops in equity 
or not, it is established that there is an implied 
contractual obligation between a banker and depositor that 
confidentiality of the account will be observed. Whilst 
this duty was thought of as a moral one, in the leading 
case of Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of 
England, 3' Banks L. J. stated that 'at the present day I 
think it may be asserted with confidence that the duty is 
a legal one arising out of contract. 
(313) However, this 
is not an absolute duty, and Banks L. J. in his judgement 
identified certain instances where the duty of-secrecy 
would not apply. These are where disclosore is required 
under compulsion of law, where there is a duty to the 
public to disclose, where the interests of the bank require 
disclosure and where disclosure is made at the express or 
implied consent of the customer. 
(314) These exceptions 
would appear extremely wide, although it is interesting 
that the Younger Committee on Privacy, 
(315) 
stated that 
the banks assured them that 'they considered themselves 
under a legal obligation not to disclose their customerbt. 
affairs without, authority and that they were conscious of 
the importance of confidentiality in the relationship'. 
'There are of course a number of legal duties to disclose 
information, but from the point of view of detection and 
enforcement, by the police; the most important duty is 
imposed under Section 7 of the Bankers Book Evidence Act 
1879. This section provides that '... on the-application 
of any party to a legal proceeding a court or judge may 
order that such party b'e at liberty, to inspect and take 
copies of any entries in a bankers book, for any of the 
purposes of such proceedings. An order tinder this 
section may be made either with 'or without summoning the 
II 
bank or any other party...!.. The crucial term 'legal 
proceedings' is defined in Section 10, as meaning 'any 
civil or criminal proceedings or enquiry in which evidence 
is or may be given and includes an arbitration'. 
Given the apparent width of this section it might appear 
that there would be little problem in the United Kingdom in 
demanding information from bankers about their clients 
and their transactions. However, this is not the case in 
practice. The Courts from very early on refused to apply 
section 7 literally which would have in. fact given either 
party to 'legal proceedings' the right to seek inspection 
of the others bank account even though such had. little or 
no relevance to the case in point. 
(310) 
The courts were 
opposed to any appearance of 'fishing' for evidence, and 
it was held that the Act was merely procedural and did not 
create any new rights of inspection. 
(317) 
there the 
request related to an account which was not prima facie 
that of3agparty, to the suit, even greater caution was 
taken. Apart from holding that Section 7. was only 
-available where there would have been a right of 
inspection under the pre-1879 law, it was also held, on a 
number of occasions that the right of inspection under 
Section 7 must be read as being subject to the normal rules 
relating to discovery of documents. 
(319) The Court. of 
Appeal has laid it down that there bas to be some evidence 
that the banking account had entries in it directly and 
solely relevant to the issues before the court. 
(320) 
Whilst the position in civil litigation has been 
reasonably well. delineated by the Courts until 1972 
there had been no criminal case where the application of 
Section 7 to criminal procedings bad been tested. This 
question did arise however in the recent case of. Williams 
and others v Summerfield. 
( 321) Lorca Chief Justice Widgery 
referring to the earlier decisions stated that 'the courts 
had set their face against Section 7 being used as a kind 
of searching enquiry or fishing expedition beyond the 
ordinary rules of discoveryt.. 
C322) The Divisional Court 
emphasised that if the police initiated criminal. 
proceedings simply for the purpose of seeking inspection 
of the defendants and others bank accounts with the view 
lot 
of finding more evidence relating to different offences 
or even the one charged, that was wholly improper. In the 
present case the Court assumed that the summonses were 
'genuine' in that they alleged offences-that would be 
prosecuted, even though it appeared that the summonses 
had been obtained at an earlier stage than would normally 
be the case, at-least partly so the police could utilise "r 
the procedure under Section 7. - 
The defendant in the present case argued that Section 7 
should not be allöwed to apply to criminal cases, because 
it placed a person in a position of perhaps having to 
incriminate himself. The Lord Chief Justice rejected 
this and stated that by both its intention and form the 
section definitely applied to criminal cases. However 
the Lord Chief Justice added, that 'it is an order which 
clearly must only be made after the most careful thought 
and on the clearest grounds. I would like to adopt the 
approach in civil proceedings were that practical'. 
(323) 
Of course in criminal proceedings there is nothing 
analogous to discovery.: The only equation that the 
Court could draw was that of-the power of the-Justices 
to issue search warrants: Thus Lord Widgery stated 
'that in criminal proceedings Justices-should warn 
themselves of the importance of the step which they are 
taking in making an order under Section 7 and-should 
always recognise the care with which the-jurisdiction 
should be exercised, should take into account amongst 
other things whether there is other evidence-in the 
possession of the prosecution to support the charge, or 
'whether the application under Section 7 is of a -fishing 
expedition in the hope of: finding' some material'"on which 
the charge can be hung'. 
(324) 
Lord Widgery added also that 
in view of the difficulty in exercising this particular 
jurisdiction the magistrate could always refer the decision 
to the High Court for determination. 
With regard to the other exceptions to the bankers 
obligation of secrecy announced by Banks L. J. in the 
Tournier decision, there is a substantial degree of 
uncertainty. So far as disclosure in the public interest 
is concerned it would appear that some kind of 'serious 
ýZ 
: J1 
iniquity of a public character' is required. 
('325) 
Ätlin L. J. in the Tournier case seemed to suggest that 
the bank could disclose where such would protect the 
legitimate interests of the bank, persons interested, or 
the general 
. 
public, 'against fraud or crime'. 
(326) This 
would seem to be similar to the circumstances where an 
employee is at liberty to disclose wrongs or crimes by 
his employer despite his general duty of loyalty. 
C327ý 
The third exception mentioned by Banks L. J. disclosure 
where it is in the, banks interest, would appear to include 
instances such as where the bank sues for a debt that is 
owed to it, and thus has to disclose information relating 
to the account. 
(328) The final exception, that is where 
disclosure is at the express or implied consent-of the 
clients creates-few problems. 
(329) It should be noted that 
'a banks duty of secrecy to its customers is not... confined 
to ordinary banking transcations, but would extend-to all 
banking transactions which are effected for a customer 
ordinarily or extraordinarily' . 6030). 
It is disturbing, however, that many individual and 
organisations giving evidence to the Younger Committee on 
Privacy stated that in their experiences the banks had been 
lax in preserving 
. 
confidentiality, and. would give highly" 
confidential information on occasions even over the telephone. 
Of'course in a case of wrongful disclosure the client has 
remedies both in contract and tort, but in most cases once 
the disclosure has been made, it is unlikely that the civil 
law will provide the. necessary recompense. 
(331) It is 
probably true that the legal rights of the bank to provide 
information does. not reflect what occurs in practice. 
However; the protection, is, at least in theory. nonetheless 
there. 
el 
(f) THE POWERS Or THE INLAND REVENUE TO PENETRATE. 
NOMINEES AND FOREIGIT 'CORPORATIONS . 
M. 
The sanctity of'corporate personality and nominees in the 
vast majority of countries has been breached by taxation 
laws. (332) Obviously Governments have a direct interest 
in preventing the devices of their own legal'systems being 
utilised'for the purposes of depriving them of revenue. 
Whilst there are numerous provision's in the British tax 
laws to combat evasion, which are consistently being added 
to, attention will here be given to the'powers of the 
Inland Revenue to demand information relating-to nominees 
and foreign companies, primarily in the sphere of tax 
avoidance. 
(333) 
Talbot-and Wheatcroft in Corporation Tax 
and Income Tax upon companvDistribution-, 
(334) 
aptly state 
that 'most tax avoidance schemes are complicated and most 
anti-avoidance legislation appears excessively so'. 
Attention will thus be focused on two main provisions that 
could arguebly prove useful models in the'field of 
securities regulation, namely sections 453 and 481 of the 
Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970. 
(335) 
Under Section 453, it is provided that an inspector may 
by notice in writing require any person being a party to a 
-settlement to furnish him within such time as any he may 
-direct, not being less than twenty eight days with such 
particulars as he thinks necessary for the purposes of 
administering the provisions of the Act. The definition of 
settlement in section'454 includes any disposition, trust, 
covenant, agreement or arrangement. The leading case on 
this section is that of : vilover 2dominees'Ltd., v Inland 
'Revenue Commissioners, C33 and the 'facts of -the case are 
interesting from the point of view of the present discussion 
on insider trading regulation. The Revenue learnt that 
Wilover Nominees Ltd claimed itself to be a trustee of a 
settlement stated to have been declared by Marita Seigal. 
The Inspectors served a section 453 notice on the trustees 
requiring information as to the full terms of the trust and 
declaration, the address of the settler, the names and 
addresses of every person who has provided any assets to be 
held on the declared trusts apart from Marita Seigal, 
details of all acquisitions and disposals by the trustees 
of. assets related to the trust, copies of board minutes 
regarding matters related to the carrying out of the trust. 
The nominee company refused to give information under 
certain of the requirements, in. particular that relating 
to transactions by the trustees and the. minutes of the 
board meeting.,, and sought .a declaration to this effect 
in 
the Chancery Division. It is interesting, to note that the 
nominees claimed.,. inter.. alia that the ,: 
requests;. were of a 
'fishing nature'. 
The Declaration was refused by Goulding J. on the ground 
that Parliament had given the Commissioners a very wide 
discretion in the information that they, could,, demand, and 
that the information. need not reasonably be related to the 
particular chapter of the Act to which the provision was 
made directly-. applicable, and could be extended so as to 
effect the statutory purpose of preventing evasion. 
('37) 
On appeal Stamp L. J. pointed out that the Revenue'would 
not be in a position to determine whether the particular 
Chapter of the Act in question applied. to the. settlement 
if the Revenue were not allowed to ask questions about it338) 
until it had been established that. the settlement was in 
fact one within the relevant taxing provisions. Indeed to 
escape,, the taxpayer must*establish that the Inspectors did 
not in. fact . think that the information was, relevant, and 
thus they had been motivated by an improper purpose, or by 
muddled thinking. Goulding. J. emphasised that 'Parliament... 
deliberately left it to the Commissioners and_not the 
Courts to judge what disclosure. is required in each case'; 
339) 
The burden of establishing impropriety being firmly on the 
taxpayer, 3 
), in the present case, the conduct of the 
nominees had been 'obstructive and grossly dilatory' and 
it. w. as appropriate to dismiss their, contention3. 
(341) 
It is also not withoutinterest that, as in a number of 
instances under section 7 of the, Bankers Book Evidence Act, 
it was contended-on the part of the nominees that the 
Inspectors questions, were too far reaching and thus 
premature. This. the Courts 'again , rejected,. and pointed 
to 
the, great delay, that would result if. the Inspectors had to 
conduct their investigation on a gradual and step by step 
" 42 
approach., Thus a comprehensive notice was unobjectionable 
W5 
It was also thought that whilst the Inspectors bad 
thrown the net widely, they 'are concerned to, investigate 
not-only the settlement effected by the declaration of (343) 
trust but any wider arrangement, of which it might be part. 
This'-is therefore a provision of some width. 
It-is a basic principle of revenue law that the income 
of a person not resident within the United Kingdom which 
"r 
arises outside the United Kingdom escapes the British tax 
laws. 
C34' 
To prevent evasion of taxation by transferring 
income producing-assets out of the United Kingdom, yet 
" retaining an interest in them, and enjoying the income 
abroad, sections 478-481-of the Income'and Corporation 
Taxes Act 1952 have been enacted. 
(345) 
-Basically section 
478 becomes operative whenever there is a transfer of 
assets whether out of the United'Kingdom or not which has 
the effect of directly or through 'associated operations' 
" providing that the income becomes payable to persons, 
including companies, resident or domiciled outside the 
United Kingdom. As a general proposition where any 
individual who is ordinarily resident in the. United 
Kingdom has the power to enjoy the income of a person 
resident or'domociled outside of the United Kingdom, such 
income is treated as his income for all purposes of the 
income tax regulations. Furthermore where property is 
transferred to a non-resident corporation whose shares 
are then settled on discretionary trusts with a number of 
beneficiaries ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom it 
would appear that each beneficiary could be assessed as a 
person having. a power to enjoy the whole of the income 
which the non-resident company does-not distribute. 
(346) 
There are also provisions that enable the Commissioners to 
exempt transactions where they-are satisfied that the 
purpose was not to avoid tax. 
Of particular interest are -'the powers of the Revenue 
to obtain information for the purposes of these sections 
which are unusually wide'. 
347 Under the terms of 
" Section 481 the Commissioners may by notice in-writing 
require any person to furnish them within such time as 
they may direct, being not less than twenty eight days 
? such particulars as they think necessary for the purposes 
of this Chapter of the Act. Under sub-section 2 the 
particulars can include information as to transactions with 
respect to which he is or was acting on behalf. of others 
and-as to transactions which in the opinion of the Board 
it is proper, that they. should investigate for the purposes 
of this Chapter,. notwithstanding that in the opinion of 
the person -to whom the -notice -is given no liability for 
tax under this chapter arises. 
. 
Information can also be 
demanded as. to whether the person to whom the notice is 
given bas taken or is taking any and if so what 
transactions of a description specified in'-the notice. 
In sub-sections (3) and (4), there are 
. 
special, provisions 
relating to solicitors and banks. The provisions relating 
to solicitors, having its origin in Section l? (2) of the 
Finance Act 1939, gives effect to the usual attorney 
client privilege except that there is an obligation on 
the solicitor to disclose the names. of parties . 
involved. 
The provision relating to bankers, which has a history in 
Section 17(3) of the 1939 Act provides that there is no 
obligation on a bank to furnish any particulars, of an 
ordinary banking transaction between the bank and its 
customers carried out in the ordinary 'course of business, 
'unless the bank has acted or is acting on behalf of the 
customer in connection with the-formation or management of 
any such body corporate or trust' as is stipulated in 
Section 481(3). 343 
. 
There have been two recent and significant cases on 
this section, and it is perhaps worth while taking a 
closer . look, at. each. In the Royal Bank- of Canada v 
"Inland. 
Revenue Conmissioners,.. 4 the Commissioners 
served a notice under Section 414 of the Income Tax Act 
1952, which-is the same as.. Section 481. of the 1970 Act, 
on the Royal Bank of Canada, requiring it to. give certain 
details of : transactions and persons involved relating to the 
sales of gilt-edged securities carried out-by the bank on 
behalf of a company. _ incorporated in. the Bahamas. Unknown 
to the Bank these were ', bond washing' transactions. This 
involved short-term trading in. bonds, which in certain 
cases results in a slender profit at the expense of the 
Revenue, gilt-edged stock is purchased ex-dividend, often 
107 
-through a nominee and then sold cum dividend during the 
period within which transactions in such stocks can quite 
correctly be ex or cum dividend. 
The Commissioners demanded information as to the 
particulars"of the manner in which the instructions for 
each sale were received and the names and addresses of the 
persons giving such instructions and other persons-acting on 
behalf of the Bahamas company, also particulars of the 
agreement under which the transactions were carried out 
together with the'names and details of the persons 
concerned and the name and details of persons believed by 
the Royal Canadian Bank and its officers and employees 
and agents to have control or have a beneficial interest 
in the Bahamas Company. Furthermore the name and address 
of the representative of the company who at a certain 
interview had discussions with a representative of the 
bank. The Royal Canadian Bank refused to comply with 
the notice and sought a declaration that they were not so 
bound to comply on the grounds that the transactions had 
been carried out in the ordinary course of banking and 
were thus protected by the predecessor of Section 481(1), 
furthermore that the only particulars that should under 
the section be demanded were particulars of transactions 
in which the addressee of the notice had been engaged and 
if any single question in the notice was outside the 
Commissioners authority, the whole notice was rendered bad. 
These submissions were rejected by TIegary-J. who 
considered that the Commissioners powers as., laid down in 
the statute were sufficiently wide to encompass the 
particulars mentioned in the notice. The only-qualification 
was that the Commissioners thought that the information was 
necessary for the administration of the tax avoidance 
provisions. The notice need not be limited to information 
relating to the address but could properly-extend to*any 
information in the possession of the addressee. - Furthermore 
the stipulated particulars in the section about which 
questions could be directed, ' were not necessarily exclusive. 
It followed that if it was established that the 
Commissioners thought-that the information was necessary 
" no objection could be made that -the -information -demanded 
was outside the statutory authority of the section. It 
is not without interest that Megary. J. 'questioned the 
demand of the notice that any information as to the 
beneficial ownership or controllers of the Bahamas 
corporation in the, possession of the Royal Bank of Canada, 
its officers, employees, agents and directors, must be 
given to the Commissioners, and wondered whether it was 
not too unduly burdensome and a viable practicäbility, 
particularly as the transaction in question had occurred 
five years previously. The Court stated that, 'it"seems 
to me that the wider the powers that Parliament confides in 
the Commissioners, the more important it is that the 
Commissioners should not exercise those powers in an 
unduely burdensome or oppressive way'C350) The 
Commissioners contended that the words 'officer employee 
and agent' should be understood to refer to those who 
appeared to the Bank properly able to give the. information. 
Of course the notice had not stated this, and the Court 
warned that in future the Commissioners should take 
greater. care in the drafting of their notices, the more 
so because of the criminal penalties. 
(351) 
The Court emphasised that Section 481(4) was a limited 
provision and only protected. against disclosure of the 
particulars as to the transactions themselves-and not to 
the names of the participants, the transaction must be 
such that it can be said to be an ordinary banking 
tranpaction and only transactions between the bank and its 
customers are protected, furthermore the transactions must 
be executed in the course of the banks ordinary banking 
business. 
(352) 
Jiegary J. held that the statutory 
protection in Section 481(4) of, the banks confidentiality 
was'no where near as extensive as their duty of secrecy. 
Whilst the evidence, that was presented to the Court 
indicated that the transactions, involving the instruction 
. 
to tpke delivery of. the stock-and place it in the banks 
nominees and to then sell. it. via a broker, delivery being 
against payment was a common. occurrence throughout banking 
practice in the City. However there were certain unusual 
features in this particular case, such as those of bond 
washing and the fact, that the Bahamas nominee company, 
10ý ! 
had instructed the bank to effect sales through a 
specified jobber, who was privy to the entire operation. 
Furthermore the fact that the customers were resident 
outside the United Kingdom was another unusual factor 
that should have placed the bank upon inquiry. 
(353) 
Furthermore the burden of proof was on the bank to avail 
themselves of the protection of the provision.,. The bank 
in the present case had failed to establish that the 
transactions in question were banking transactions let 
alone in-the ordinary course of such. It was also the 
Courts view that even if certain requirements in the 
notice had been invalid the entire notice would not have 
fallen. In the result the Bank was. held to be bound to 
make the required disclosures. 
The other significant decision in this field from the 
standpoint of the present discussion, is that of 
Clinch v Inland Revenue Commissioners. 
(354) The plaintiff 
in the action was the London representative of N. T. Butterfield 
& Sons Ltd., a banking corporation incorporated in Bermuda. 
In 1970 the London Office had been incorporated into a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of the Bermudan Bank. This London 
branch's primary function was to advise customers actual 
and. potential about the advantages of transferring money 
to Bermuda and the general services of the Bank. The 
Inland Revenue in something of a trial move, issued a 
notice under section 481 to the plaintiff requiring him as 
a former representative of the Bank in Bermuda to furnish 
them with details of transactions since April 1965 where 
he had acted for a United Kingdom customer in or in 
connection with any transactions or operations involving 
the formation or management of a foreign company, or 
partnership the creation or execution of foreign trusts, 
the transfer of assets to any foreign company,. partnership, 
or settlement and the acquisition of any interest or option 
to acquire an interest in the share capital or loan capital 
of any foreign company, partnership, or settlement. In 
each case the name and address of the customer, or his 
agent all the particulars of the transactions in the 
plaintiffs knowledge; and the name and address, of any 
other person to whom the plaintiff introduced the customer 
for the purposes of completing or carrying out any such 
transactions'or operations. 
(355) 
'The plaintiff had not 
kept a separate-file as to the information germain to 
Chapter III, and although there is no compliance with the 
anti-ävöidance*provisions in the Act virtually, and as 
a matter of practice dictated such. The plaintiff thus 
sought a. declaration that . the' section did not empower the " 
Commissioners to demand information from an intermediatory 
relating to unidentified transactions on behalf of 
unidenified principals and that the Commissioners in 
exercising their statutory powers had acted unreasonably 
and were being burdensome and oppressive. 
The declaration was refused by Ackner J. Although 
rejecting the notion that the statute should be constued 
'contra proferentum' the Revenue, 
(35°) 
the Court 
emphasised that there must be the clearest authority 
before an invasion of-the subjects-liberty and: freedoms are 
to'be'tolerated. (35? 
) 
The Court was however of the opinion 
that Section 481 was sufficiently wide and clear to justify 
the questions'asked in the notice. Furthermore the 
questions could quite properly be directed at such an 
intermediary as the plaintiff, as a stepping stone to 
establishing the relationship of other persons to various 
con-6anies and trusts. Moreover it was emphasised that it 
rested upon the addressee of the notice to establish that 
the Commissioners had behaved improperly and that the 
information that they had demanded went beyond their powers, 
so that it was unduly oppressive and burdensome. 
(358) In 
Wilover Nominees v I. R. C., Goulding J. whilst agreeing 
with the sentiments of Ackner J. stated that 'it is equally 
vital for `the Court ... to ensure that 'the 
officers of the 
Revenue are able' to exercise' the full powers... with which 
Farlidment has armed them for the performance of their 
difficult and Often thankless duty under' the law', ' as well 
as-protecting the' individual from executive abuse. 
(359) 
The-plaintiff adduced evidence tliat to comply with the 
requirements -of 'the notice it 'would take himself and an 
assistant and'als. o a secretary, ' with occasional assistance 
from a lawyer and accountant five 'months of *full time 
ýý 
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work. The Court whilst sceptical of this pointed out 
that the plaintiff under the terms of the notice was only 
required to give information which he had. had access to 
and other than refreshing this once held knowledge there 
was no obligation on him to pursue enquiries beyond this 
and moreover there was no legal requirement for him to 
give notice to the various clients of the information 
that he had been required to disclose to the Commissioners, 
although such would in practice be done as a normal matter 
of banking courtesy. Even if the plaintiffs assessment 
of the time and expense involved was correct the Court 
accepted the submission of the Revenue that 'the plaintiff 
cannot pray in aid of his own failure to have this 
material reasonably available'. 
(360) 
To this extent the 
plaintiff had been 'the author of his own misfortune' as 
he should have prudently maintained the information now 
demanded of him. In the result the Court found that the 
plaintiff was bound to comply with the notice in its 
entirety with expedition. 
Having regard to these provisions and the other similar 
sections in the tax laws(361) it is possible to find a 
model that could be utilised with great advantage in the 
field of securities regulation. As has been pointed out 
by Professor Gouer, (362) there is much in the observation 
of Devlin J. in the Bank voor Handlel era Scheepvaart N. V. 
v Slatford, 
(363) 
that 'no doubt the legislature can forge 
a sledgehammer capable of cracking open the corporate 
shell; and it can if it chooses demand that the Courts 
ignore all the conceptions and principles which are at the 
root of company law. 'There have in recent years been 
significant advances in the powers of the revenue 
authorities to demand information, and not only from the 
object of the investigations, and this has been criticised 
by many as smacking of a 'secret police'(364) particularly 
where the information might be passed on to other 
Government departments. C3ý'S). There has also been a growing 
trend, internationally to override the traditional 
professional secrecy obligation in tax cases.. 
(366) 
In 
recent years there has also been a marked increase in the 
attention given to offshore tax avoidance centres, and 
the curtailment of such facilities, (367) and not only by 
Z 
the British authorities (366) 
r. 
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(g) LIFTING THE VEIL. OF INCORPORATION AND INSIDER TRADING 
Although it is not possible to enter into a, protracted 
discussion of this area of the law, 
(369) 
it is necessary 
. to, point out its significance 
in the regulation of insider 
trading. A simple example suffices to illustrate the 
importance of this aspect of company law. Let it be 
supposed that an. insider of X corporation, who is the 
controller 'of Y corporation deals on inside information 
through Y corporation. Disregarding the question of 
whether Y- corporation is a tippee the question arises as 
to whether or not Y corporation could be said to be the 
insiders alter ego. The position is considerably more 
confused where a string of interrelated companies is 
'utilised. This resolves itself into the question of 
whether the Courts would be likely to lift the corporate 
veil, or pierce corporate pers9nality. 
(370) 
There are of course a number of statutory and common 
law exceptions to the doctrine of separate corporate 
personality.. The most significant exceptions by statute 
are probably contained in the tax laws, although there 
are a number. of other instances, 
C371 
none of which are 
particularly of interest to this present discussion. 
With-regard to the common law exceptions Gore Browne 
states 'it is not possible to formulate any single principle 
as the basis of these decisions, nor are they all.... entirely 
consistent with one another' . 
(372) 
Certainly. it is true 
that. the development of the law in this respect has been 
extremely susceptible to the public policy considerations 
of the particular age, and the Courts have shown a 
considerable degree of expediency and often a. -desire to do 
substantive justice, although not of 'course always., The 
cases. have proceeded in-isolation and, each must be 
regarded as exceptional with regard. to, the fundamental 
corporation principle. 
In a number of cases the momentum of the House of Lords 
decision in Salomon v Salomon 
(373) 
has proved too much 
for an encroachnent(374) but- where vital or significant 
public: interests are, at issue a bolder approach-has been' 
taken; - For instance in time of -war the Courts will 
examine who are the company's. actual controllers so as 
to.. dete. ct enemy -intervention. 
(3? 5). 
Although_a company is 
not an-agent-for the individual shareholders or 
controllers in general, where there is ran express 
agreement-to this effect the -position is -different. 
(376) 
The problems arise mainly-in those cases where-the Courts 
are - asked "to -infer such an -agreement, 
(3? 7) 
and the 
courts-will normally only do this-where there is some 
compelling-reason of 'public policy-. 
(378) = Where the 
Courts-do find an agency relationship they are not as 
such, piercing"the'corporate veil as the distinct 
corporate 
personalities-remain-intact. 
(379-) 
The position is- 
different where'the Courts consider that"one-person or 
company is the alter ego of the'otber. 
C38 
-In the 
latter case the company concerned would have to be-'a 
facade concealing the true facts', or a shell, with 
identity of interest. 
(381) 
The Courts will be prepared to penetrate'the veil where 
the company was formed for a fraudulent purpose or-as a 
sham. 
(382) It is a well tried principle of equity that a 
statute cannot be used as an engine of fraud, -as neither 
can a legal principle, -thus corporate personality-will be 
-penetrated where-the, corporation is 'a device and a sham, 
a mask which (the defendant) holds before bis face in an 
attempt to avoid recognition 'by' the eye ' of equity' , 
C3s3) 
"" 1'he -Courts have *al so " been prepared to . examine the, ' 
inter-relationships of-holding and subsidiary companies, 
particularly in- the context of agency. It would seem that 
the-Courts have by and large-been more prepared to find an 
agency relationship -or an alter ego, -where the controller 
has - been a" corporation rather than' an individual. ' Professor 
Gower considers that this-might: indicate an awareness of a" 
group concept. 
(384), It, is'important to remember, however, 
that'-the mere, -fact that ohe company is -a subsidiary of 
another even a"wholly owned subsidiary is not of itself 
sufficient to make the subsidiary an agent of the holding 
company. 
(385) 
' Although it- has been '-contended; * that in 
certain instances, -the company is-a-. trustee -of its property 
or--certain rights, for its: members beneficially; -such 
has 
rarely-been accepted. 
(386) 
whilst it is 
.. unquestionably 
possible for the company to act 'as trustee of certain 
'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property for a beneficiary class- which- may indeed 
constitute the members of the company, what is certain 
is 
that the mere relationship of member and company does not 
without more involve a trust relationship with regard to 
the corporate property. 
(387)- 
ºWhere ratification of 
corporate acts is in question, certain Courts have taken 
a more realistic stance and have treated'an-agreement by . 
every person entitled to vote as the equivalent of, -a 
resolution in general meeting. 
(383) Similarly--as with enemy 
status the Courts 'will examine where the business--'control 
is resident in establishing the location of the company's 
seat for taxation. 
(389) 
The Courts with regard to criminal, quasi=criminal and 
tortious acts have also been prepared to look beyond the 
corporate form. 
(390) This is a complex area of the law 
and no attempt will be made-here to discuss it. It would 
be fallacious to regard these various exceptions- where the 
Courts have been prepared to venture'beyond Salomon as 
exclusive. Certainly the development of further 
exceptions 
is probable particularly in view of the pronouncements of 
the Court of Appeals in ', lallersteiner v Moir. 
391) Although 
we will be looking at this case in more detail elsewhere, 
it is pertinent to mention that 'Lord Denning M. R. -was 
critical of the use of foreign companies incorporated in 
places not well' known for the' strictness of their 
incorporation laws, for trading in the-British- Isles. 
Referring to one "of Dr. Wallersteiners company' s'Rotbscbilds 
Trust', the Master of the Rolls-'said 'it was, an obscure 
concern of little worth registered in Leichtenstein. That 
is a tiny European State squeezed in somewherebetween 
Switzerland and Austria with a population of 20,: 000 all 
told'. 
(392) 
. The Court of Appeals distaste for the 
utilisation of Leichtehstein and Bahamas(393)-in this 
manner was evident: 
(394) 
Th'e Master of the*- Rolls 
considered ' that -it is plain that Dr.. Wallersteiner used 
many companies, trusts'and -other legal entities as if they 
belonged to him. - He "was in -control of them as -much. as any 
'one-man company' - is under the control-of the -one man who* 
owns a11 the shares and is the chairman and managing 
director' . 
(395) 
It iss not. without interest that = 
I 
Mr. Lincoln Q. C. for Dr. Wallersteiner maintained that the 
principle in Salomon was sacrosant: and that if the Court 
attempted to treat the various companies and concerns 'as 
being Dr Viallersteiner himself under another, hat we should 
not be, lifting a corner. of the corporate veil. We should 
be-sending it up, in flames',. 
(39°) 
, 
On the other hand 
Mr Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson Q. C. as amicus_curiae suggested 
that, all'the various overseas companies were in fact used 
by Dr. Wallersteiner as a facade 'so that each could be 
treated as his alter ego. Each was in reality 
Dr. Wallersteiner. wearing another hat', 
(397),; 
Lord Denning 
in a most significant statement-observed that 'I am prepared 
to accept that-the English concerns-those governed by 
English Law or its counterparts in Nassau or Nigeria - were 
distinct legal, entities. I am not so sure about the 
Liechtenstein concerns... ' 
98) Although some have greeted 
this statement as a repudiation-of the separate corporate 
entity principle in the case of such foreign companies, in 
view of the acceptance of the use and separate entity of 
Nassau incorporated companies it would seem that this is 
an over hasty interpretation of what the Master of , 
the Rolls 
really meant. It would preferably. appear that the Court 
only doubted whether Liechtenstein corporations should be 
recognised as having a separate corporate personality, 
because no evidence had been given to the Court on this 
point and the law in Leichtenstein. Thus : 
the Master of the 
Rolls was not saying that the. Courts would not, 'recognise the 
separate legal, entity. of foreign corporations but that in 
cases where the company had not been incorporated in a 
jurisdiction operating a legal system based on the British 
law, 
, 
affirmative evidence would, have to be, presented to the 
Court that the . foreign.,, jurisdiction . concern 
did: indeed 
. 
itself recognise that, the, corporation had, a separate legal 
personality. This is of'course'tbe usual practice iii such 
cases. However, Lord Denning continues that despite the 
assumption that all the, 
'companies 
had a separate legal 
personality in theory they 'Were in fact merely the puppets 
of Dr. Wallersteiner,, 'he controlled, their every. movement 
each, danced to his bidding. He pulled the strings. - No one 
else got within reach of them. 'Transformed into legal 
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language they were his agents to. do as he commended. He (399) Thus Lord Denning was the principal behind t'nem'. 
held that the corporate veil should be lifted and. tbat 
Dr.: ºallersteiner should be regarded as responsible for 
the activities-of his creatures. 
(-400). 
. 1hilst the 
remainder of the Court, 
(401) 
was far more cautious and 
guarded in their observations than the Master of the Rolls 
it would appear that there was basic agreemen'on this 
" point. -. 
Whether the Courts would be prepared to lift the 
corporate veil in cases of insider-trading-is thus a 
matter of some uncertainty. There has-been a growing 
trend to penetrate corporate personality where there has 
been 'fraud' and abuse of the type exhibited in the 
Wallersteiner case. 
(402) 
Furthermore-the profits made 
by certain trusts and companies in the control of Sir 
Denys Lowson, which made profits by insider trading were 
treated as making the profit for. Sir Denys, who was thus 
'obligated' to make restoration by the Department of Trade 
Inspectors in their Report on the affair. The safest 
answer, although hardly helpful is that much would depend 
upon the individual facts and the degree of identification 
of benefits. 
Given the rather confused state of the British law on 
this, point, it might be of some assistance to briefly 
examine the law on lifting the corporate, veil in some 
other countries. The American jurisprudence on the 
-doctrine has been of major significance in influencing 
the: practice of many other countries in Europe-, -and others 
such as the Philippines. 
(403 The basic approach of the 
American Courts is aptly summed up by-Circuit Judge 
Sanborn in U. S. v Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit' 
Company, (4.04), ... a corporation swill be-looked upon as 
a legal entity as a general rule.. -. but when the notion of 
: legal- entity is used to defeat public convenience justify 
wrong, protect-fraud, or defend- crime the law will regard 
the corporation as an association of persons' 
(405) 
-Professor Cary puts the test slightly-differently, 'whether 
individual- controlling shareholders or a parent 
corporation are 'involved the- same question 'arises', do the 
facts warrant the application of equitable principles 
should the court go. behind the corporate personality of 
one company in-favoir of the-economic entity of which it 
is part' . 
(406- 
Throughout the American, authorities there 
is the strain that the Courts will not allow the corporate 
fiction-to be. used, to facilitate an abuse. 
(40. 
or to 
frustrate. a legal remedy. 
(408) 
Thus it is 
. accepted 
that 
there-is no concept of corporate personality that will 
suffice. to solve -all situations, and that resort has 
inevitably to be had to the broad principles, of equity. 
ýyý9 
The mass of case law in the, United States on the 
practical application of this broad principle is just too 
voluminous to be given attention here. However it would 
seem that the. Courts are reluctant to allow actions 
against the shareholders of a corporation in"disregard 
of. the separate corporate personality of the company in 
the absence of agency or fraud. 
(410) 
Where separate 
corporate personalities are used with, the. objective of 
evasion of the law, or policy of legislation the. Courts 
will lift the corporate veil. This much- was laid down by 
Chief Justice Cardozo, who held that, 
'it has often been held that the interposition of a 
corporation will not be allowed to defeat a 
legislative policy whether that was the aim or only 
the result of the arrangement... tbe 'courts will not 
permit themselves tobe blinded. or deceived by mere 
forms of law but will deal 'with. the. substance of 
the-. transaction involved as if the corporate agency 
did not exist and as the justice 
. 
of the case may require'. (411) 
In 
, another case. 
it was-stated? -, by the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut that -'where a corporation is manipulated by 
an -individual , 
or another corporate entity as to become a 
mere puppet or. tool for the manipulator justice may 
require that the courts disregard the corporate. fiction 
and impose liability on the real actor'. 
(02) 
It would 
thus seem that wherever necessary to prevent__ evasion of 
the anti-insider trading laws in the United States, the 
Courts would generally be prepared to-. penetrate the 
principle,. of .. corporate personality. 
(41 3) 
)The bully 
, 
of . , continental law on, . lifting the corporate 
veil has been. -, absorbed from the: United. _States- of 
America, 
although there is little doubt that the principle has' 
become established in the corporation laws of most 
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European states, at least to-some extent. 
(414). 
Apart from 
in the field of taxation there are few statutory provisions, 
and there has been no codification of the law on this 
matter. It would-also appear that in all countries in 
" Europe, lifting the 'corporate... -veil 
is treated as an exception 
to'-the 'corporate personality rule, .: which as a norm 
is 
paramount. 
Whilst it-has been contended in-West Germany that the 
principle of corporate personality is so fundamentally 
; important it should remain inviolate except where-. there is 
intentional abuse and fraud the Courts: have rejected this 
approach- as too restrictive. 
(415: ) 
It has 
. 
been accepted 
that the separate personality of-the corporation and its 
sole participator, cannot always be separated, and-'if the 
realities of life, the economic requirements and the power 
of facts render-, it imperitive for a judge to disregard the 
differentiation of the personality-and the assets of the 
corporation and-its sole participant'. 
(416) 
Thus to 
penetrate the veil of incorporation, the German Courts do 
not require a fraudulent intention or purpose. There are 
a number of cases where a sole or controlling- shareholder 
has been held liable for the companies. debts. 
(417) 
It 
would also-appear that where a sole of controlling 
shareholder. utiLises the. company for 'obtaining immoral 
profits' such as a bribe, he himself will be liable to 
repay, such, even if. it was * . paid 
to. the corporation. 
(418) 
This would seem-to have obvious. implication for insider 
trading--profits. 
There , are -provisions: in. the Aktiengestz. 1965 which in 
effect -penetrate the corporate veil,, and of -particular 
significance in this respect are the provisions relating 
to groups of companies and holding.. -and subsidiary companies. 
Another provision of some interest in this respect is (419) 
Article 117 'which deals with abusive influence on companies. 
-Apart from - this, with regard, to statutory 'provisions it is 
to` -. be -doubted , how , effective the German', cases illustrating 
the lifting-of--the corporate . veil are. - There. are 
certainly verv"few -instances-where the veil has been 
-successfully lifted and most 'could have- been -decided on 
.. some other ground. 
ý420) 
. 
Due-to: the greater-variety of corporate. forms'in France 
º0 . 
than exist in Britain, the United States or Germany the 
law on lifting the corporate veil is significantly more 
complex. There are a number of provisions in the various 
statutes dealing, with-the business. organisations - 
constituted thereunder,. which pierce the corporate veil. 
(421) 
Of some- interest, is a Decree of -the , 
20th . larch 1955 under 
which the bankruptcy of a company may be, extended to all 
those persons who have carried out their own commercial 
transactions under the cover of the company and have used 
the company's assets. as though they were their own, 
alternatively under a Decree of the 9th August 1953 in 
determining a case of a company's bankruptcy the court can 
hold all or part of the company's liabilities to be placed 
on those who have taken an active part-in the company's 
management. 
(422) 
There are a number of cases where the 
Courts have made orders under these provisions. 
(423) 
There are also cases adopting the notion-that a company 
created in order to conceal the personal transactions and 
activities of a person is a fictitious entity which need 
not be'regarded as a separate personality from that 
particular person. 
(424) The law in France and Germany, 
like continental civil law generally does not-recognise 
that-the place of incorporation is determinative in 
issues concerning conflict of laws, but-where the real 
seat-of business"is, and thus the problem of piercing the 
" veil-of foreign corporations. does not - present, the same 
problems as in"the United Kingdom. 
The law in Italy, whilst rich in academic: writings is 
confused by' the* . presence of" companies with varying 
degrees, of juristic, personality. 
(425) Among : the various 
theories "in. Italian. jurisprudence concerning -corporate 
personality there'is that of the''imprenditore occulte' 
which' provides that- a -controller -who hides behind a 
company which he. uses. 'as an instrument of his will" will 
be identified with the-corporate-personality. The 
personality, of' the. corporation can. also be merged with 
that : of a sole- shareholder. 'in the case Pf, the compan 's 
bankruptcy under-. Article 2362 'ofthe-Civil Code.. 
c426' 
The 
Italian Courts, particularly . 
the superior courts have not 
shown a great willingness-to espouse. the notion of 
' imprenditore occulte' " however, and have _basically 
Rý 
, II 
ý; 
., 
'i ý, 
, 
I, 
,I 
.ý ýý 
tiý 
ýý, 
1. 
., 
I2 t 
fastened on the more formalistic approaches to corporate 
personality. 
27) 
Whilst there are a number of statutory 
provisions which result in lifting the corporate veil 
(428) 
and a number of lower court decisions, the superior courts 
treat the doctrine as having minimal impact on corporate 
personality. 
The Swiss Federal and Cantonial Courts have been 
influenced to a great extent by the German law; and thus 
generally assume a complete separation of personality 
between a corporation and its shareholders. 
(429) 
-However 
the Courts have accepted that there must be exceptions, 
and have applied the goodfaith and abuse of right tests 
utilised in Germany. 
(430 ) The approach of the Swiss 
Courts has been cautious and hesitant, and as a general 
proposition the Courts will not allow the corporate veil 
to be lifted where such would benefit the con, roller, 
(431) 
although this is not always the case. 
(432) 
There are cases where the Federal Supreme Court, in 
particular has gone to considerable lengths in 
penetrating the veil of corporate personality, and held 
the corporation liable for the fraud of its sole director, 
and probably sole shareholder. In Re; ana v Saxer, 
(433) 
the Supreme Court emphasised that the crucial factor was 
the identity of economic interest between the corporation 
and the perpetrator of the fraud. The Court pointed out 
that even if the members of the wrong doers family bad also 
been shareholders there would still have been a sufficient 
identity of economic interest. 
(434) 
In Leuzigerv 
Staatsanwalt Thur. anu, 
(435) 
a controller was held liable 
for the criminal acts of the sole director of the company 
who had undertaken to abide by the controllers orders. 
The Federal Supreme Court emphasised that originators of 
crimes should not be allowed to bide behind the 
administrative organs of companies under their contrdl. 
Although nominees are extremely difficult to go behind in 
a domestic environment they have proved almost impenetrable 
on the international level. 
(436) There are procedures for 
requiring disclosure of ownership, and investigating such- 
in the Companies Acts, and under various other statutory 
provisions, however such are in most instances 
jurisdictionarily, and in all cases practically confined 
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to matters arising within the United Kingdom. There 
foreign nominees are involved the problem is 
significantly greater. It might thus be instructive to 
examine the experience of the United States of America 
in this field, both with regard to-domestic and foreign 
nominees. 
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(h) NOMINEE REGISIRATION IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Let it be said at the outset that 'one of the problems 
that the SEC has not yet resolved involves the regulation 
of securities in the names of nominees,. brokers, 
banks 
and trust companies'. 
('+ A very common method of 
holding securities in the United States is in 'street name', 
'these are securities held in the name of a broker instead 
of his customers name..:. this occurs most often when the 
securities have been purchased on margin, or where the 
customer wishes the securities to be so held... 1(438) 
Street names are used on a great many stock certificates, 
as this saves the investor considerable trouble in handling 
the certificates, -and facilitates transfer. 
(439) 
There have been a number of surveys and analyses of 
share-ownership and holding in the United. States, and 
although there are differences in the results of such it 
would seem that something between 23%% to 30% of -securities 
in the United States, of public companies, are held either 
in street name or by a nominee. 
('C) To this figure must 
be added the vast amount of capital in the bands of 
institutional investors. The New York Stock Exchanges 
Fact Book for 1974, stated that the institutions held over 
451/o of the securities traded on the Exchange. 
(mal) In 
recent years the American Government has become increasingly 
concerned about the level of institutional control and the 
presence of large foreign nominee holdings. 
(+2) As a 
result of recent Congressional activity in this field it 
is likely in the near future that the disclosure obligations, 
relating particularly to 'tbe institutional' investors and, 
large nominee and trust companies, with regard to equity 
ownership will be increased. 
('+43) 
The nominee problem has confronted the SEC in two areas, 
in particular, they are the regulation. of proxies and. the 
detection of fraud, including insider trading. It'is upon 
the second aspect, that attention will here be given. 
() 
On 12th August 1957, Senator , 
J.. "J. Fulbright`, the Chairman 
of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency wrote to 
the Chairman of the-SEC, Mr. E. N. Gadsby'emphasising that 
the Committee was 'concerned about the possible evasion of 
the Federal Securities Laws... accomplished by-trading in 
United States corporate securities through foreign 
institutions that as a netter of law and practice decline 
to disclose the identity of their clients. 'The letter, 
also expressed the concern felt by the Congress and a 
number of other Federal agencies, and asked the 
Commission 
to institute a study of the matter. 
(445) 
The Staff of the 
SEC immediately started to make a comprehensive study of 
the question of evasion through foreign institutions and 
nominees. The Staff Report, 
6ý found that foreign 
institutions and corporations had been used in a number of 
occasions as a means of concealing the identity of 
the 
persons involved and the nature of the 
transaction, 7 
this was particularly so with regard to the anti-fraud 
provisions of the securities laws. The Staff also stated 
that even where foreign individuals had been used it was 
just as difficult to discover the true fact unless that 
person was willing to cooperate fully and freely with the 
SEC. Otherwise the Commission could do nothing. The 
Staff emphasised that 'a principle effect of the use of 
these foreign devices is to delay or iripede the Commissions 
investigations because of the absence of subpoena power to 
compel the production of evidence from a foreign 
jurisdiction'. 
(448) 
The Report stated that it was often 
possible and indeed relatively easy by pursuing all 
available lines of enquiry within the United States and by 
seeking the cooperation of Foreign administrators to 
establish that a violation bad in fact occurred. However 
it was not always possible to obtain evidence or 
jurisdiction over the persons involved. The Staff pointed 
out that the alternatives 'involved the laborious and 
expensive process of tracing securities and funds, and 
locating and interviewing numerous witnesses, no one of 
whom was fully aware of all the pertinent facts, '. 
(449) 
The Staff Report stated that in most cases it was 
probable that. the fraud or scheme, either originated in the 
United States or was participated in by. persons within 
jurisdiction, and thus there was always the possibility 
that action could be taken in the United States, on the 
basis of circumstantial evidence. It was also observed 
that this possibility had acted as a curb on the activities 
of some persons resident within jurisdiction. -1b ere 
corporations are involved, under Section 19(a)(2) of the- 
t25 
Securities Exchange Act 1934, the SEC after appropriate 
notice and opportunity for hearing, may by order suspend 
for a period or withdraw the registration of a security 
traded on a national securities exchange if it considers 
that the company has failed to comply with the Act and 
rules made thereunder. The Commission has used this 
section against foreign issuers, and in particular Canadian 
companies. 
(450) 
By making copious studies of the type of operations 
that are staged ±rom abroad the SEC has sought to perfect 
tecbniques and procedures that have as their objective the 
obtaining of the maximum amount of evidence within 'suppoena 
jurisdiction'. The Commission has benefited from an 
'informal' arrangement to pool information among the various 
arms of Government, and thus in any given instance the 
State Department, Federal Reserve Board, and other Banking 
Agencies, The Treasury, Post Office, Departments of 
Commerce and Defence, and the Inland Revenue as well as 
such organisations as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
and Interstate Commerce Commission, can be called upon to 
assist in obtaining evidence. There is also an ever 
increasing-degree of International cooperation, 
((452) 
which 
ý45 
the SEC considers both important and beneficial. 
However, the Chief Regional Administrator, for'New York, 
which of course deals with by far the biggest proportion of 
domestic and international securities business, 
considers that nominees are still a major problem in the 
effective enforcement of the present laws. 
(454) However, 
The Regional Administrator and his Assistant', 
(455)informed 
the present author that the nominee problem only becomes 
serious once the investigation has been started; there is 
generally no problem at the outset as unless there is 
knowledge of the identities of at least some of the 
participants or reasonable suspicions the enquiries would 
never be commenced. 
(456) The Regional Administrator and 
bis officers, thought that, the primary sources of 
trouble, at least from their point of view were the 
Swiss= Banks, and a number of developing financial centres 
in the Far East. The view from the SEC in Washington 
. 
was slightly more pessimistic'bowever. The Head of the 
Office of Market Surveillence, directly concerned with- 
ý, 
i 
ýý{ 
the detection, and enforcement of the anti-insider-trading 
laws, (457) stated to the present author that 'nominees 
and foreign institutions acting as nominees are a serious 
and insoluable problem'. 
(458) 
The same problem, as that 
pointed out in New York, was voiced in Washington, that is 
that with nominees abuses and improprieties are generally 
not detected in the first place and thus an investigation 
is never-even considered. Certainly the Commission did 
not have the resources to go 'nominee spotting' in the 
absence of any suspicions. 
(459) 
It is not without interest that at least two senior 
attorneys in the Division of Enforcement, stated that 
because of the 'political-sensitivity-of foreign nominees' 
the Commission had in the past bad to behave unduly 
diplomatically. It was the very countries which afforded 
the greatest opportunities for nominees and their 
principals, that the State Department was particularly 
cautious about upsetting. It would seem that the most 
viable solution would be through strengthening 
international cooperation and the fostering of treaties 
directed to mutual assistance in such cases. 
The then Chairman of the SEC, the Hon. Ray Garrett, at 
the London Conference on Insider Trading, in the Spring of 
1975, stated that nominee registration had ceased to be a 
problem in the United States, and in the context of foreign 
nominees was rapidly being resolved by cooperation. 
Professor Loss broadly agreed with thisc460) This would 
not seem to be the view however, of the staff of the SEC, 
both at its Head Office and at the main Regional Office. 
The Staff Report, of 1958, concluded that although. the 
existence of violations of any laws administered by the 
Commission was a source of serious concern, when the 
number of possible villations involving foreign nominees 
and banks were compared with the total volume of securities 
transactions the figure was minute. 
(461 
The Staff stated 
that 'because of the relatively minor impact of the problem 
upon the capital and trading markets' of the United States, 
'we believe that any legislative proposals designed to 
prevent such violations which would. seriously burden the 
securities industry ... or materially interfere with the 
international. flow of securities in and out of the 
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United States do not appear to be warranted at this 
time'. (k62) As with other questions that involved 
jurisdiction the Staff Report emphasised that 'The 
basic difficulty inherent in national sovereignty 
cannot be solved by domestic legislation short of 
legislation which would materially and adversely 
affect international commercial intercourse'. 
(463) 
w Given 'the political and diplomatic considerations, the 
Staff thus recommended no legislation and this was 
endorsed by tbe" Commission itself. 
Although the Staff Report did not-consider domestic 
legislation either desirable or feasible, it did make 
suggestions as to how the problems could be practically 
reduced, and these are still accepted as valid today by 
the Commission. ('64) The Staff Report pointed out that 
as far as persons within jurisdiction were concerned, 
the matter was purely one of domestic enforcement and 
thus improvements in this would inevitably assist in 
foreign transaction cases. In this respect the 
availability of injunctions against persons, particularly 
professiondls in the securities industry, and disciplinary 
procedures could be used with great effect. The Staff 
further thought that an obligation should be placed on 
brokers and dealers to report immediately to the SEC any 
substantial order from abroad. This would not of course 
catch transactions placed through American based nominees, 
but this was-thought not over serious as there would 
then-be participants thus within jurisdiction. 
(465) 
The 
Staff considered, but rejected on the grounds of being 
too burdensome, a suggestion that before accepting. a 
foreign order, a broker or 'dealers should secure from 
the client an agreement to consent to service and to 
cooperate fully with the SEC. It was also thought that 
this would be politically objectionable. 
(466) 
Perhaps 
the most significant recommendation was that the United 
States authorities should assist 'in the development of 
international cooperation', particularly with regard to 
the exchange of information, and: that meaningful mutual 
assistance treaties should be entered into to assist in 
enforcement. 
(467) 
The Staff Report emphasised that it would be 
desirable to enter into such a treaty with Switzerland as" 
soon as possible, this was not then feasible howeverc46g) 
ý'. 
After some considerable negotiations and the carrot of 
supplying American war planes and entering into a 
favourable dairy produce agreement, the Swiss Government 
signed a treaty of. mutual assistance on legal affairs with 
the United States in 1973, which was not however ratified 
until June 1975.. Under this Treaty the Swiss Government 
has introduced amending legislation to allow, on request 
of the United States. Authorities information to be given 
in the prosecution of criminal cases and in instances of 
tax evasion. There is still considerable doubt as to 
exactly"what the treaty will allow, and the Guardian 
Newspaper stated 'it is unlikely that the treaty will 
enable the American Authorities to clean up all the 
wheeling and dealing conducted by their citizens within 
Switzerland'. 
(469 
The Staff of the SEC would also seem 
to be sceptical about how far this treaty will practically 
assist them, 
(470) 
although the Chairman was most 
enthusiastic about this development at the London 
Conference on Insider Trading in 1975. There have of course 
been similar treaties with other countries, such as Canada 
and the Philippines which have worked reasonably well. 
There has been criticism of the techniques employed, by 
the American Tax Authorities, in particular, such as the 
infiltration of undercover agents. and the retention of 
local informants in other countries, mostly in. the Carribean, 
and it seems likely that a similar. approach, to'that 
adopted with Switzerland will be adopted with other 
countries, and*the matter be placed on the 'cleaner' basis 
of bilater6l'. treaties. 
(471) 
Given the significance of the nominee facilities provided 
in particular by Switzerland, it might be advantageous to 
briefly examine the relevant Swiss law and procedure on 
this matter, paying particular attention to the provision 
of information to external regulatory agencies such as the 
American SEC or Metropolitan. and City of London'Company 
Fraud Department. 
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(I) BANKING SECRECY LAWS IN SIdITZERLAND 
The importance today of Switzerland as a major 
international financial centre needs no emphasis here. 
Apart from the country's political stability and 
geographical accessibility, it has attracted a significant 
proportion of its clientel because its banking institutions 
observe,. i)nder law, a well nigh impregnable shield of 
secrecy and confidence. In recent years there has been 
considerable contioversy between the Swiss and the United 
States Government and to a lesser extent the EEC, concerning 
the formers lack of cooperation in tracking'down tax 
evaders and those allegedly using the Swiss banking 
facilities for improper purposes. Whilst there can be 
little doubt that the Swiss facilities are used for 
nefarious purposes in certain instances, 
(472) 
much of the 
controversy 'stems from distorted accusations, compounded 
by misconceptions of professional standards widely 
observed in Europe'. 
(473) 
Whilst the Swiss banks maintained a degree . of 
secrecy 
common among financially developed countries,. this was 
placed on a statutory basis in 1934, ostensibly to 
protect clients of the institutions from the German 
Gestapo. The bankers duty of secrecy in Switzerland has 
many similarities with that operated in other countries, 
including the United Kingdom, 
(474) 
and is, by no means an 
unusual featur1e of the duty of secrecy that a bank in 
Switzerland, or indeed anywhere else, will generally 
refuse information about its customers to foreign or for 
that matter domestic regulatory agencies, in the absence 
of a specific statutory duty so to do. However as 
Professor Hans-Peter Friedrich, has pointed out, 
(4' 
the 
duty as conceived and operated in Switzerland is 
particularly strict and has certain additional aspect's. 
In Switzerland-there are no statutory provisions generally 
allowing the Federal and Cantonial authorities, such as 
in the case of tax evasion to demand information. -('+76) 
Naturally there is no obligation to supply foreign 
agencies, particularly tax authorities 'w'ith such 
information. (47? ) Whilst Swiss law does not admit of 
general exceptions to secrecy, there are nonetheless a 
ýý ii 
y I i 
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number of public policy exceptions. where it 
has been 
breached. For example the criminal procedure codes of 
most Cantons require the production of records and 
evidence in the case of criminal prosecutions. 
(478) 
Thus disclosure of banking information is required in 
the case of criminal prosecutions and also in such 
matters as inheritance, bankruptcy and debt 
collection. `479J -r` 
Thus the Swiss banks will generally only have to 
provide information when the allegations amount to a 
crime, recognised by Swiss law. 
(480) 
'As Professor 
Hirsh, of the University of Geneva pointed out at the 
London Conference on Insider Trading, this is the 
problem with tax"evasion and insider trading, as neither 
of these 'abuses' are regarded as criminal matters 
c4-81) 
Furthermore the Swiss Courts and judicial authorities 
will closely analyse allegations from both domestic and 
foreign authorities to ensure that such amounts to a 
recognised crime at Swiss law: 
(482) 
The common law position has been statutorily 
reinforced, by Article 47 of the Swiss Banking Law of 
November 8th 1934, as revised on March 11th 1971. 
Professor Friedrich states in an article of this area of 
the law, 
(483) that it was thought that customers should 
be afforded penal as well as civil remedies in the 
event of a wrongful disclosure of information, by a 
Swiss'bank. In Professor Friedrich's view monetary 
compensation `might not be sufficient 'where for instance 
the banks action had resulted in the taking of criminal 
proceedirigs against him'. Article 47s 
(484) 
as revised 
provides that, 
Whoever divulges a secret entrusted to him in his 
capacity as officer, employee, mandatory, liquidator 
or commissioner of a bank, as a representative of 
the Banking Commission, officer, employee of a 
recognised auditing company, or who has become aware 
, of such a secret 
in this capacity and whoever tries 
to induce others to violate professional secrecy, 
' shall be punished by a*prison term not to exceed 
six months or by'a fine not exceeding 50,000 
francs'. (485) 
It is however stated that ' if the act has been committed 
by 'negligence the penalty shall be 'a fine not exceeding 
Ill 
30,000 francs'. It should be noted that this is a crime 
of strict liability. 
(486) Furthermore the violation of 
professional secrecy remains punishable under Article 47 
ever after termination of the official employment 
relationship or. the exercise of the profession. It is 
however provided that Federal and Cantonial regulations 
concerning the obligation to testify and provide evidence r 
to the Government authorities remains. 
The Swiss Criminal Code in article 273 also contains 
provisions of söme interest to this present discussion. 
This article primarily concerns 'wirtschaftlicher 
Nachrichtendienst or industrial and economic espionage 
but does have a wider significance. It provides that, 
'A person who, through searching, secures a 
manufacturing or business secret in order to make 
it accessible to a foreign agency or to a foreign 
organisation or to a private business enterprise 
or to their agents, a person who makes accessible 
a manufacturing or business secret toa foreign 
official agency or to a foreign organisation or 
to a private business enterprise or to their 
agents shall be punished by imprisonment'. 
Bank secrets apparently are included in the term 'trade or 
business secrets'. In a memorandum to the Senate 
Sub-Committee in the Amendments to the Securities Acts in 
1959, The Office of the General Counsel to the SEC stated 
that 'it is clear that Article 2? 3... could operate to 
prevent not only the bank's releasing information about 
transactions but alsö any spying by a third person to 
obtain the information'. 
(487) Professor Friedrich, in bis 
article, 
88) 
cites cases where employees. of Swiss banks 
have been convicted and sentenced for violations of this 
particular article. 'The problems presented by the 
provision of information within the scope of Article 273 
to foreign regulatory agencies, has recently been shown in 
the prosecution of Mr. Stanley Adams by the Basle authorities. 
It appeared that Ihr Adams, who had been an officer of 
F. Hoffnann La Roche et Cie, A. G. had passed on certain 
information to the E. E. C. 'Commissions Anti-Trust Office, 
about the prices of vitamins produced by his employer, 
and which eiere directly relevant to the EEC competition 
and fair trading rules. The company in conjunction with 
the Basle Canonial prosecutor instigated criminal . 
!I 
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proceedings against Hr. Adams and be was remanded in 
custody, for inter alia violating Article 273. The Swiss 
Government under Treaty with the EEC had agreed to observe 
the EEC's competition and fair trading policies, and the 
EEC Commission thus immediately sprung to the defence of 
Mr. Adams who incidently had derived no monetary gain 
through the episode, and had informed the Commission solely 
out of 'a feeling of public duty. After a cons;. derable 
amount of diplomatic activity, Mr. Adams was released on 
bail, put up by the EEC Commission. In August 1976 the 
Basle Cantonial Criminal Court convicted Mr. Adams, in bis 
absence, 'and sentenced him to. a twelve months prison 
sentence, which was however suspended. He was also ordered 
to pay £1,000 cösts and banned from. the Federation. 
(489) 
It emerged from this case that the officers of the E. E. C. 's 
Anti-Trust Office had not entered Switzerland for sometime 
for fear of being arrested themselves as accomplices to 
the violation of Article 273. Obviously this is all highly 
unsatisfactory and does not augur well for cooperation in 
the field of securities-regulation. 
There are also other provisions in the Criminal Code 
that are applicable to this area of the law, 
(490) but of 
particular significance are Articles 41 and 49 of the Code 
of Obligations which provide for civil recovery where property 
is wrongfully used, anda bank secret, in Swiss law is 
considered as intangible property such as would be 
comprehended by these articles. The Swiss authorities have 
in recent months been far more active in the enforcement of 
the banking and currency latiýs, than has been the case in the 
past, 
)and 
it would be fallacious to consider these 
provisions in any way academic, as the prosecution of 
Mr. Adams has proved. The Swiss banks are generally 
meticulous in the observance'of these laws and the 
obligations of secrecy, and the Government has not been 
over-concerned-about interfering with such, given the 
undoubted revenue that the promise-of silence attracts. 
(492) 
The Banks and the Steiss authorities have in a number of 
" instances flatly refused assistance and information, even 
when litigation has actually been started, 
(493) 
and 
acquired a reputation for seeking to protect their clients 
confidentiality to an extent that is openly aggressive. 
Of course the client can always waive the duty of secrecy, 
but naturally it is often the client concerned who most 
wants to preserve it. Furthermore the duty of secrecy 
extends to all information about customers, and not merely 
to identity. 
In addition to the legal protection that is afforded, 
the Swiss. banks have devised an elaborate set 9f procedures. 
to ensure the depositor that his identity and account 
details remain confidential and secret. This additional 
safeguard involves the use of 'pseudonym or numbered 
accounts'. Instead of the client being identified by name, 
the client and his account are identified for all purposes 
by false or assumed names or a set of numbers. 
(494) xs it 
is impossible to open an account with a Swiss bank unless 
the identity of the account holder is disclosed to the 
bank, these accounts are not anonymous. As Professor 
Friedrich points out it would be-perfectly possible under 
Swiss law for an account to be opened by an agent for an 
undisclosed principal, and thus the true identity of the 
client would remain concealed from the bank. 
(495) 
The 
Swiss banks as a matter of practice generally require a 
declaration that the person disclosed as the account 
holder is beneficially entitled to the money and property 
therein, and indeed the Swiss law is not too helpful to 
beneficial owners without legal title. Thus Professor 
Friedrich stated that 'although it is theoretically 
possible for banks' to accept'assets from unknown persons, 
it must be said that Swiss banks are not readily prepared 
to do so, indeed Swiss banks will never really accept 
large sums on these terms'. 
(496) 
The Swiss banks in their 
booklet on Swiss banking secrecy, entitled 'the truth about 
Swiss Banking' state that 'when a numbered account is 
obtained under false pretences a responsible bank 
peremptorily closes it and tells-the owner to take his 
business elsewhere, preferably out of the country'. The 
Swiss banks have of course their own reputations to consider, 
and by according the facilities of a numbered account 
ob, cUously forego considerable protections, their general 
management services lose the ability to refer to the client 
and seek instruction. 
(497) 
k 
The Swiss banks have been increasingly criticised in 
recent years and have sought to justify their positions 
and ethics. In a letter circulated by the Swiss Bankers 
Association in 1957, 
(498) it was emphasised that member 
banks should not engage in activities in the USA on 
behalf of their clients which would be violative of American 
laws. Similarly in 'the Truth about Swiss banking' it is 
stated that the Swiss banks have 'too much at stake to wink 
at unethical professional conductor engage in practices 
that are not compatible with the laws of their own or 
other countries'. 
(499) 
Furthermore the-Swiss have pointed 
out that only a relatively small proportion of accounts 
are numbered, and moreover a very high proportion of the 
accounts in Swiss banks belong to residents of the 
country in any case. Of course there are a number of 
banks and institutions that are outside the more respected 
groupings of banks, and the Swiss Bankers Association, 
has publicly requested its members to apply pressure on 
the smaller banks and houses to conform to the 'proper 
approach' to securities transactions involving foreign 
countries. 
(500) 
There has been increasing pressure on the Swiss to 
reconsider their position however. The mutual assistance 
treaty with the United States, has already been mentioned, 
and it is known that the EEC Commission would like to 
come to a similar agreement, 
(5°1) 
as would many European 
countries individually. It was even suggested that the 
Swiss banks should relinquish their numbered accounts and 
ultra secrecy before their currency should be admitted to 
the European' 'snake'. The Bankers Association, issued a 
statement in defence of the present system, and it would 
seem that no immediate change is likely. 
(502) 
Of course for a British subject to legitimately open a 
Swiss bank account, it is necessary for him to obtain 
Exchange Control permission, from the Foreign Assets 
Office of the Bank of England, generally on application 
through his own domestic bank. This Office will only 
give permission where it is for legitimate commercial 
reasons, and then reluctantly. However it is generally 
accepted that these regulations would not stop anyone 
13'ö 
who was particularly determined to obtain the facility of 
of a Swiss bank. 
Finally, before leaving this part of the discussion, it 
is interesting to refer to the method of obtaining 
disclosure of noninees and banks which has been used in 
the United States on several occasions and in Canada. 
This is essentially effected by applying pressure upon 
the banks branch office or property within jurisdiction, 
or by threatening cancellation of the banks right to 
continue trading in that country. In the most recent case, 
in the United States, involving the Swiss Credit Bank of 
Zurich, a Federal District Court ordered the bank to 
transfer $ 150,000,000 and $ 200,000,000 to its American 
branch, or else the Court would cease all its assets in 
the United States. 
(503) 
The Federal Court also demanded, 
and in effect obtained, information concerning certain 
transactions carried out by the bank. 
(504) 
It would be misconceived to think that Switzerland is 
the only country with laws protecting banking secrecy and 
restricting the disclosure of information about principals 
trading through financial institutions. There are a, 
number of other countries which have similar, and in a few 
cases more far reaching provisions. 
(505) 
There have been 
cases where it has been discovered that banks, protected 
from disclosure, in one country have acted as agents for 
banks similarly protected in another country, who are in 
turn acting for an undisclosed principle. In such cases 
the problems are insurmountable, and indeed detection in 
the first instance would only be by chance: Obviously the 
key to these problems is international cooperation, but 
given the fact that for any real improvement there would 
have to be virtually worldwide agreement, it is likely in 
practical terms the problem of offshore nominees and the 
foreign nominee. will not in the foreseeable future be 
solved. 
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DISCLOSURE OF INSIDER'S INTERESTS 
(I) COITION LAW DUTIES OF DISCLOSURE 
Although insider's self-dealing: is vitally connected 
to the problem-of insider trading, 'given the confines of 
space it is only possible to give passing reference here 
to the relevant law. 
(506) Promoters, perhaps, the 
arch-insiders, are clearly in a fiduciary relationship 
with the company, which obligates them to observe a 
strict duty of disclosure 'as to every thing that it is' 
proper for the directors to know in order that they may 
form a fair judgment of everything material to any 
transaction' involving him. 
(507) The fundamental 
principle that equity will not allow a fiduciary to 
place himself in a position where his interest conflicts 
with his duty(508) applies to company directors and other 
corporate fiduciaries. It has been held that the 
'trustee-like position of a director' vitiates any 
contract which the board of directors entered into, on 
the company's behalf with one of their number . 
C5o9 
In 
Aberdeen Railway Company v Blaikie 
(510) 
Lord Cranwortb L. C 
applied this principle and held that to validate the 
transaction it was necessary to obtain the authority or 
ratification of the general meeting after full disclosure. 
Otherwise the transaction was voidable at the company's 
option. 
(511) 
The structures o, f the common law were also 
reinforced by disqualification provions in articles of 
association of many companies. 
(512) 
The common law position has, however, "been'substantially 
modified by legislation. 
(513) Under section 199 it is the 
duty of a director of a company 'who is in any way 
interested in a'contract or proposed contract with the 
company to declare the nature of-bis interest at a meeting 
of the directors'. In the 'case of a proposed contract the 
declaration is to be made by the interested director at 
the meeting of the board at which the question of entering 
into the contract is first taken into consideration, or if 
the director was not at the date of the meeting so 
interested at the very next meeting of the directors after 
he becomes interested in, the. transaction, It is provided 
that for the purpose of. section 199 a. general-notice 'to 
the effect that he is a member of a specified company or if 
firm and is to be regarded as interested in any contract 
which may after the date of the notice be made with the 
company or firm', shall be deemed to be a sufficient 
notice. However. it is provided that 'no such notice 
shall be of effect unless either it is given at a meeting 
of the directors or the director takes reasonable steps to "Y 
secure that it is brought up and read at the next meeting 
of the directors after it is given'. 
(514) 
Any director 
who fails to comply with this duty of disclosure is 
liable on conviction to a fine of £100. - This is of 
course a grossly inadequate sanction as was shown in the 
Lowson affair, where repeated violations of Section 199 
were discovered by the Department of Trade Inspectors, 
the result of which enabled Sir Denys Lowson to net a 
profit of some , 5,000,000 by inter-company transactions 
in which he was personally iznterested. 
(515) 
It is, however, provided in Section 199(5) that nothing 
in section 199 is to be taken as prejudicing the operation 
of any rule of law restricting directors of a"company 
from having any interests in contracts with the company. 
Thus the effect of this provision is to limit the scope 
of exemptive provisions, that were common in the past, in 
articles of association. Furthermore in addition to the 
rather derisory criminal penalty failure to comply with 
Section 199 will automatically remove any protection 
otherwise provided by exclusion provisions in the articles, 
and bring the basic equitable rule of avoidance in the 
absence of . 
full disclosure 'and ratification into effect. 
It should be noted that coiapliance with Section 199 does 
not of itself have a validifying effect on the contract, 
it is purely negative aimed at limiting the effect of 
exclusion clauses. 
(516) 
It should also be noted that 
disclosure under Section "199 is to the board of directors, 
and not to the general meeting. Moreover, from the wording 
of Section 199(2) it would appear that only those 
contracts considered by the board, of . 
directors need be 
disclosed, and it is not without interest that the 
Institute of Directors in their memorandum of evidence to 
the Jenkins Committee stated that contracts were very 
rarely considered by the boardo(517) 
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The term 'interested' is not defined, and although 
there have been a number of decisions examining similar 
provisions in articles of association none are particularly 
authorative so far as Sectidn 199 is concerned. In the 
case of disqualification 'provisions the Courts interpreted 
the word very narrowly(518) whereas under the general law 
an 'interest' arising by merely holding securities as a 
trustee has been sufficient to require disclosure. 
(519) 
An agreement with the company for the allotment of 
shares would seem"to be a sufficient interest, 
(520) 
as 
would the issue of debentures. 
(521) 
It-would seem 
preferable as a matter of policy that the term should be 
construed widely. 
(522)... .. " 
Under Section 199 the 'nature' or the interest must be 
shown and this would invariably mean that the extent of 
the interest must be disclosed. As has already been 
indicated under the general law some quantification of the 
expected benefits would have to be disclosed, although as 
Lord Radcliffe has emphasised 'the amount of detail must 
depend upon the nature of the contract or arrangement 
proposed and the context in which it arises'. 
(523) Lord 
Radcliffe continued that 'if it is material to their 
judgement that they should know not merely that he has an 
interest but what it is and how far it goes, then he must 
see to it that they are informed' . 
(52 ) teilst the 
disclosure as to the nature of the interest must thus be 
full and frank, this is qualified by the facility of a 
general notice. The Inspectors in the Lowson affair, 
emphasised on a number of occasions, 
(525). 
that in the 
circumstances of that case where interlocking directorships 
a general notice was insufficient where it related to a 
personal interest in any transaction, as it-would appear 
to the board that it was the fact of the common 
a directorship that was being disclosed. The Inspectors 
also pointed out in the type of transactions involved in 
that case only 'a full and specific declaration' with a 
reasonable amount of other relevant information would have 
enabled the other directors to form a proper view of Sir 
Deny Lowson's personal involvement. This affair certainly 
underlined-the importance of Section 199 in the regulation 
of insider trading, as if it had been complied with, the. 
, ý; r ýi 
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manipulations of Sir Denys and his associates, which 
facilitated his insider trading would have been detected 
and hopefully obviated. 
Apart from Section 199, Section 16 of the 1967 Companies 
Act, 
(526) 
lays a number of 'additional matters of a general 
nature' as oposed to the specific requirements of sections 
17 to 20-regarding the affairs of the company on which 
information is required to be given by the directors to 
the shareholders in the annual report. Section 16(l)(c) 
requires stipulated details to be given-of the parties, 
nature and extent of 'any contract with the company in 
which a director ... bas or... had at any time in the last 
financial year... directly or indirectly, an interest, 
being in either case, in the opinion of the. directors, a 
contract of significance in relation to the companies 
business and in which the directors interest was 
substantial or material'. 
(527) 
The Act does not however, 
define or indicate what contracts are of significance 
and leaving such 
_a 
crucial determination in the hands of 
the directors inevitably reduces the impact of Section 16, 
as a disclosure mechanism. 
(528) 
The editor of Gore Browne 
points out that the limitation of the disclosure 
obligation to material interests is narrower than the duty 
imposed under Section 199, 
(529) 
The Council of the Stock 
Exchange in Notice Tumber 84/71 
. 
ha , sought to clarify this 
area for listed companies. 
(530) 
Section 9 of the Listing 
Agreement requires listed companies to circulate with the 
annual directors report certain information, inter alia 
paragraph (h) states that 'particulars of any contract 
subsisting during or at the end of the financial year in 
which a director of the company is or was materially 
interested and which is or was significant in relation to 
the company's business', must be given. The Council of 
the Stock Exchange in their notes, state that they have 
considered it desirable to 'establish stricter criteria 
for determining what contracts should be disclosed', and 
thus all companies whether incorporated in the United 
Kingdom or not, 'are accordingly required to disclose in 
addition to any contracts so required by law any contracts 
or arrangements, 
(531) 
which would be required to be 
14t 
disclosed if section 16(1)(c) were applicable 'with the 
Stock Exchanges interpretations'. The Interpretive notes 
state that a contract shall be deemed to include an 
arrangement and a contract with a subsidiary of the company 
shall be taken into account as if it constituted a contract 
with the company. 
532) Moreover a contract of 
significance' shall be deemed to include any cgntract or 
number of contracts, whether related or not and whether or 
not the parties thereto are the same in each case, in which 
the directors interest is or was material and which in 
aggregate represents in amount or value a sum equal to more 
than 10, ö of the company's total, purchases, sales, payments 
or receipts as the case may be, or in the case of a 
capital transactions including those a principle purpose 
of which is the granting of credit, more than 1% of the 
net assets of the company. Where the company has. 
subsidiaries comparison may be made with the purchases, 
sales, payments, receipts or net assets of the group on a 
consolidated basis!. The term 'interest' is under the 
Councils notes to be interpreted mutatis mutadis as in 
sections 28 and 31 of the 1967 Companies Act. Thus it 
will extend to the interests of a directors spouse and 
infant_children. 
C533 
Thus for listed companies there is 
an amalgam of both statutory and contractual disclosure 
obligations in this respect. It is open to question as 
to bow far the Courts would accept the Stock Exchanges 
interpretation in construing Section 16, although it 
would seem likely that the Courts would at least take such 
into consideration. 
C5345 
The Listing Agreement makes it clear that in cases of 
doubt reference should be made to the Quotations Department, 
and it is expressly stated that some modifications may be 
required with regard to foreign companies. It is also 
provided that in complying with the requirements of both 
the section and the listing agreement the 'particulars 
given... must be sufficient to constitute a fair disclosure 
of the nature and extent of the contracts and arrangements 
but subject thereto and the provisions of the Act 
contracts and arrangements need not be dealt with 
individually if"they are substantial in number. 'Whilst 
the interpretive provisions of the Council are to be 
welcomed they only emphasise the dificiences of the 
drafting and limited conception of the 1967 Companies 
Act. They can hardly be an effective substitute for 
properly drawn up laws. 
(535) 
Under Section 16(1)(d) where the company is or has been 
a party to an arrangement whereby directors ark or were to 
be enabled to acquire benefits through the acquisition of 
shares in or debentures of the company or any other 
corporation specified details must be included in the 
directors report. Furthermore, section 23 casts a duty 
upon directors, reinforced by criminal penalties, to take 
reasonable steps to ensure that the required information 
is included in the report. Whilst the information in the 
report is given expost.. factoit is most important in that 
the particulars are actually sent to shareholders., and 
not merely available for inspection. It is arguable that 
an insertion in the directors report of material interest 
would in itself be a sufficient, 
äisclosure for the purposes 
of the general rule. 
Provided that the statutory obligations are observed 
there is nothing to prevent the inclusion of specific 
provisions in the articles of association, limiting the 
directors duties of disclosure, or indeed for that matter 
increasing such. In practice such provisions in articles 
vary enormously. 'At their narrowest they provide that the 
interested director shall disclose his interest to the 
board, shall not be counted... in quoram and shall not 
vote'. 
(536) 'At their widest they enable an interested 
director to attend and vote just as if he was not 
interested'. 
(537) It is invariably provided that if the 
articles are complied with, the transaction will be fully 
binding upon the company and the director safe from the 
secret profits"rule. 
(538) 
Although there are of course a number of other provisions 
in the Companies Acts directed at self--dealing, 
(539) it is 
of interest that the White Paper on Company Law, Reform(540) 
considered that there were areas where the combination of 
a fiduciary duty, and the duty to disclose were 
insufficient protections from - abuse . 
(541) 
In the White 
ý' 
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Paper, the Government stated that it was its intention 
'if possible to legislate in respect of situations where 
directors seek to syphon off profitable business to their 
private advantage'. To this effect, Clause 45, of the 
Companies Bill 1973, provided that no person shall act as 
a director of a company which controls another company, if 
he or another member of his family is interested in the 
equity shares of that other company or a subsidiary of 
that other company. A person violating this provision 
would have been liable to a sentence of two years 
imprisonment or an unspecified fine, or both. Although it 
was provided that a person would not be guilty of such an 
offence if he could establish that he did not know at the 
time that he or a member of his family was interested in 
shares in the manner referred to or that he had become 
aware of the fact not more than fourteen days before that 
point in time. 
(542) 
The provisions in Section 28 of the 
1967 Companies Act would have applied in the interpretation 
of this Clause, although control would have been separately 
defined in Clause 45(5) as existing where the other 
company or its directors were accustomed to act in accordance 
with the directions or instructions of the other company or 
that the other company is entitled to exercise control over 
one third of the voting capital of that particular company. 
whilst there was a considerable amount of criticism 
directed at this provision, 
(543) the Secretary of State 
for Trade and Industry emphasised that the evil to which 
Clause 45 was sufficiently serious so as to justify the 
t draconian' approach in the Clause, and it ýas not feasible 
to allow exceptions because. it was not possible to 
separate the objectionable from the unobjectionable. 
(544) 
The same philosophy is also present in Clause 46 of the 
1973 Companies dill, which provided that it would be 
unlawful for a'company to make a loan to another company 
or guarantee or secure the loan by someone else if a 
director or directors of the . 
first mentioned company are 
interested in equity. shares of the other company to the 
extent of one'third of its total equity share capital. 
Furthermore, it is also stated that it would be unlawful 
for a company to make a loan to a person who is a member 
. 4. 
of the family of any of its directors, or of a director 
of its holding company or to guarantee or secure sucbC545) 
This provision would have extended the present provisions 
in Section 190, which presently only forbids loans to 
directors. 
The amendments to Section 199 suggested by the Jenkins 
Committee-would in large measure, have been effected by 
Clause 47. The duty upon directors to declare their 
interests would have been extended to transactions 
involving the company but not necessarily coming before 
the board of directors. It is interesting in this 
respect that the Bill did not adopt the recommendation 
that there should be a defence where the director had no 
knowledge and could not reasonably have been expected to 
have had such. 
(546) 
This is all the more significant as 
the duty to declare the interest is-not confined,. again 
as the Jenkins Committee suggested to material interests{547) 
Obviously the Clause in the form that it was presented 
would have been oppresively burdensome and uriworkable(548) 
and the provisions on general notice hardly came up to 
what the Jenkins Committee had r. ecommended. 
049) 
The Companies Bill in Clauses-48 and 49. dealt with 
directors interests in management contracts and agencies, 
and generally followed the recommendations of the Jenkins 
Committee in this respect, 
(550). 
which had already been 
reflected to some degree in Section 16(l)(c). 
(551) 
By 
virtue of Clause 48, certain management. contracts and 
the details of the persons connected with the person with 
whom the contract has been made would havh had to been 
notified to the Registrar of Companies.. The notices and 
documents would also have. had to have been available for 
inspection on the same terms as service contracts, are 
now under Section 26 of the 1967. Act. Under Clause 49 an 
obligation woi. ild have been placed on the director to notify 
the company of relevant management contracts and the 
various connections. Under. both clauses there would have 
been criminal penalties for non-compliance. 
(552) 
It seems 
likely that any future companies legislation will contain 
similar provisions as these. 
(553) 
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(TI) DISCLOSURE OF DIRECTORS INTERESTS IN SHARES 
(a) THE POSITION BEFORE 1967 
The Cohen-Committee considered that insider trading 
was both undesirable and improper and should be 
discouraged by legislation. The Committee, considered 
that the best approach and 'safeguard against improper 
transactions by directors and against the unfounded 
suspicions of such transactions' was to ensure 'that 
disclosure is made of all their transactions in the 
shares and debentures of their companies'. Given the 
fact that directors could always be called upon to 
explain the timing of their transactions once disclosed, 
the Committee thought that disclosure in itself was a 
significant deterrent. 
(554) 
It had been represented to the Committee that the 
requirement that the directors disclose their transactions 
in the securities of their companies could have adverse 
effect on the company and fellow shareholders.. If a 
director was forced to liquidate, some or all of his 
holding because of extraneous personal reasons this 
might, if publicised create the impression that there is 
bad news about the company in his possession. This would 
probably be likely to result in a number of induced 
transactions and. thus depress the market falsely. The 
same argument was raised before the Jenkins. Committee. 
Of course the argument assumes that at least a significant 
number of investors will take it for granted that the 
director is trading upon inside informatipn, whether this 
has an empirical foundation is uncertain. The Committee 
thought that the fact that disclosure was mandatory 'would 
tend to negative this false impression, and in the event 
of a misconception it would always be open to the director 
to make a statement as to the reasons for his transactions'c555) 
As a result of the, recommendations of the Cohen Committee 
Sections 195 and 198 were included in the Companies Act of 
X948. (556) Because a number of Commonwealth countries still 
retain Section 195 in their Company laws in its original 
form, and due to the fact that Section 195 has played a 
significant role in influencing-the provisions in many 
other countries it is relevant to examine, briefly the 
ý ti, 
ý(o 
original insider disclosure provisions in-Britain, which 
were amended in the 1967 Companies Act. By virtue of 
Section 195(1) every company, both public and private 
was required to maintain a register 'showing in respect 
of each director of the company, not being its holding 
company, the number, description and amount of shares in 
or debentures of the company or of any other body 
corporate being the company's subsidiary or holding 
company or a subsidiary of the company's holding company, 
which are held by or in trust for him or of which he has 
any right to become the holder, whether on payment or 
not "c557) The register did not have to include shares 
in any corporation which was the wholly owned subsidiary 
of another company. 
(558) 
In Section 195(2) it was 
provided that where any transactions fail to be recorded 
in the register, 'the date of and price of other 
consideration for the transaction' must be stated. 
Where there was an interval between the agreement to buy 
or sell and the completion the relevant date would have 
been at agreement. 
It was provided that if the director so required the 
nature of the interest in the securities registered could 
be included, but that in any case the company was not (559) 
itself to be affected with notice or placed upon inquiry. 
The register had to be kept at the company's registered 
Office, and open to inspection during business hours, 
subject to such reasonable restrictions as the company by 
its articles or in general meeting imposed, although not 
less than two hours in each day the register had to be 
available for inspection, during the period beginning 
fourteen working days before the date of the company's 
annual general meeting and ending three working days 
thereafter. (560) The right of inspection only extended 
to shareholders, debentureholders, and persons acting on 
behalf of the Board of Trade. 
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The register also had 
to be available for inspection at and during the annual 
general meeting. 
If default was made in having the register available at 
the general meeting the company and every officer in 
default was liable to a fine. of c-2,50, although if default 
14-? 
was made in complying with the recording and registration 
requirement or in the inspection or copying provisions 
" the company and every officer in default were liable to a 
fine of 2500 and a default fine of , 2. 
(562) 
The Court 
was also empowered to make an order for immediate 
inspection. 
By virtue of Section 195(10) for the purposes of 
section 195, any person in accordance with whose 
instructions the directors of the company were accustomed 
to act would be deemed to be a director of the company 
and a director of a company was deemed to hold or be 
interested in any shares of debentures if a corporation 
other than that company held them or had that . interest 
or right over them and either, that corporation or its 
directors were accustomed to act in accordance with his 
instructions, or he was entitled to exercise control over 
one third or more of the voting power at any general 
meeting. 
(563) 
Section 198 provided that it was the duty of a director, 
or a person deemed such, to give a written notice to the 
company of such matters relating to himself as may be 
necessary for the purposes inter alia of Section 195. It 
is interesting that it is provided that if the notice was 
not given at a meeting of the directors, the director 
giving the notice must take reasonable steps to secure 
that it was brought to the attention and actually read at 
the next board meeting. 
(564) 
Failure to comply with this, 
on conviction, could result in a fine of £50. 
(565) 
When the Jenkins Committee came to consider insider 
trading, the role' of disclosure was obviously an important 
aspect. The Evidence that the Committee received with 
regard to Section 195 was mixed and there was considerable 
disagreement as to the relative merits of the device. The 
Board of Trade- appeared to be reasonably well satisfied 
with the existing provisions, although it was thought that 
the register should be available for inspection by 
shareholders and debentureholders throughout the year. 
(566) 
The Committee of London Clearing Banks, took the view that 
disclosure of directors transactions other than to the 
board of directors on a continuous and, timely basis would 
be injurious in that it would encourage speculation and 
suspicion. 
(567) 
of course this was essentially the same 
reason that was raised in connection with Section 195. 
The Committee, of London Clearing Banks were also opposed 
to the extension of disclosure to employees, as they 
considered that improprieties by such were appropriately 
the concern of the directors who could take internal 
disciplinary action against such. Furthermore it is of 
interest that the Clearing Banks thought that it would be 
superfluous to only extend disclosure to senior officers 
and executives as lesser officers and employees would on 
occasions be equally in receipt of 'inside information'. 
On the-other hand the Banks were not necessarily opposed 
to the inclusion of a, statement of directors transactions 
over the last year in the annual report. 
(568) 
The Merchant banks in the joint evidence submitted by 
the Accepting Houses Committee and the Issuing Houses 
Association, took an opposite view to the Clearing Banks 
and endorsed the Board of Trades recommendation for 
extending the periods during which inspection-of the 
register would be allowed, and indeed thought that where 
listed securities were involved in the transactions, anyone, 
and not just members or debentureholders should be allowed 
to inspect the register. The Merchant Banks also thought 
that directors should be under an obligation to notify the 
company within three days and that the company should 
similarly be under a duty to, register the transaction 
within, three days. 
(569) 
The Merchant Banks also thought 
that the reporting obligations should be extended to 
alternate directors and officers. 
(570) The. Federation of 
British Industry likewise thought that the register should 
be available throughout the year, and that it should also 
. 
be publicly available, and not only accessible to 
shareholders and debentureholders. 
(571) 
Concern was expressed from a number of sources, 
(572) 
that under Section 195 a wholly owned subsidiary had to 
keep a register. of its directors shares in its holding 
company. Where the director was also a director of the 
holding company the information bad to be duplicated in 
both registers. This was considered undesirable. Given 
145 H 
the doubt that existed as to whether the disclosure 
provisions comprehended options, there were a number of 
representations that such should be expressly 
comprehended. 
(573) 
The majority of those giving evidence(574) 
to the Committee thought that Section 195, was satisfactory. 
and that disclosure of directors transactions' was the 
preferable approach to insider trading regulation. 
(575) 
Oný 
the other hand some thought that there was an urgent need 
to eradicate certain uncertainties in the application of 
Section 195 and that there was a need for simplificationC576) 
In the result, however, the Jenkins Committee was not 
wholly persuaded that the disclosure scheme envisaged by 
the Coben Committee was completely adequate. The Jenkins 
Committee agreed with the statement of policy by the Cohen 
Committee that 'the best safeguard against improper 
transactions by directors and against unfounded suspicions 
of such transactions' was to require disclosure of 
dealings. (577) Nevertheless it was thought that there was 
need for some kind of substantive regulation'on insider 
trading as well. This aspect of the Committee's 
recommendations will be examined elsewhere. The Committee 
agreed with those witnesses rho bad advocated the 
strengthening and clarification of the disclosure 
provisions. 
(578) 
+'" 
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(b) THE 1967 CO? tfii7IES ACT 
The result of these recommendations was the enactment 
of Sections 27 to 29 and 31 of the 1967 Companies Act, 
(579) 
which replace sections 195 and 198 insofar as the latter 
relates to Section 195. It is provided by Section 27(1)(a) 
that except in the case of a wholly owned subsidiary(5S0) 
and subject to any regulations made by the Department of 
Trade, 
(581) 
anyone who becomes a director(582) or is 
already a director when the section came into effect, 
must notify the company in writing of any interest 
(583) 
that he has in the shares or debentures of that company 
of which he is director. A similar obligation to report 
interests applies in the case of such a directors 
interests 'in any other body corporate, being the company's 
subsidiary or holding company, or a subsidiary of the 
company's holding company. 
(584) 
Wholly owned subsidiaries 
are not included, and section 27(13) provides that for the 
purposes of this section a corporation shall be the wholly 
owned subsidiary of another if it has no other members but 
that other company's wholly owned subsidiaries and its or 
their nominees. 
(5S5) 
As with Section 195, it is provided in Section 27(11) 
that 'a person in accordance with whose instructions or 
directions the directors of a company are accustomed to 
act shall be deemed to be directors of the company'. 
(586) 
The notification required under Section 27(1) must be as 
'to the subsistance of the declarants interests at the 
time in question and of the number of shares of each class 
of the company' or other body corporate 'in. which each 
interest of his subsists at that time'. Whilst the, 
director remains a director of the company, paragraph (b) 
of Section 27(1)-places him under an obligation to notify 
the company in writing of the occurrence of a number-of 
stipulated events. 
(537) 
These events include, the 
happening of such an event as to ' have the consequence- that 
the declarant becomes, or ceased to be interested in the 
shares in, or debentures of the company or an associated 
company, 
(588) 
the entering into, by the declarant of a 
contract, to'sell any such shares or debentures(589) the 
assignment by him of a -right-granted to him by the company 
52 
to subscribe for shares or debentures, 
(590) 
and the grant 
to the declarant by an associated company of the right to 
subscribe for shares or debentures in that other company, 
the exercise of such a right and the assignment by him of 
such. 
(591) 
In each case the class, number and amount of 
shares or debentures involved must be stated in the 
notification. Under Section 27(4) it is provided that 
there is-no duty upon a person to notify the company of 
the occurrence of an event which comes to his. knowledge 
after he has ceased to be a director. 
The Director, obligated to make a notification, must do 
so within a period of fourteen working days from the 
'relevant day' under Section 27(12). The fourteen day 
period commencing the day after the relevant day. In the 
case of initial notification under Section 27(l)(a) where 
the director is aware: of his interests, the relevant day 
is the last previous day before the section came into 
operation, or the day that he becomes a director. Where 
at such time the director is ignorant of his interest, the 
period runs from the 'day next following that' on which the 
existence of the interest comes to his knowledge 
(592) 
where the duty involves the notification of a subsequent 
event under Section 27(1)(b): the director must if at the 
time the event occurs he knows of its occurrence and also 
of the fact that its occurrence gives rise to the 
, obligation, fulfil the duty before the expiration of the 
period of fourteen days beginning with the next day 
following that on which the event occurs. Otherwise the 
duty must be complied with within a fourteen day period 
commencing' from the next day following tbät on which the 
fact of the occurrence of the event giving rise to the duty 
comes to the knowledge'of the director. It should be noted 
that from the wording of sub-section 3(b) it would seem 
that for the period to run the director must have knowledge 
of the occurrence of the event 'and of the fact that its 
occurrence gives rise to the obligation', 
(593) 
It is 
uncertain as to what this actually means, and it is 
doubtful whether it displaces'the normal presumption that 
a man is presumed to be aware of his obligations under the 
1aw. (594) Furthermore it is considered good practice for 
Company registrars to send report forms to directors on 
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their appointment, and most companies would appear to at 
least take some steps to ensure their directors are aware 
of their obligations in this respect. Confirmation by 
individual directors of the information in the register 
about their transactions is often sought as a matter of 
good practice before the Annual General Meeting. 
A person who fails to comply with the provisions of 
Section 27, or who in purported compliance makes a 
statement to the company, which he knows to be false, or 
is reckless as to'whether it is true or false is liable 
on summary conviction to a fine of £200, and or 
imprisonment for three months, and where the conviction is 
upon indictment, to an unspecified fine, and two years 
imprisonment. However, prosecutions can only be brought 
with the consent of the Department of Trade or the 
Director of -Public Prosecutions. 
(595) 
At the centre of the disclosure regime for directors 
and substantial shareholders is section 28 which define 
what interests(596) are relevant for the purposes of 
Section 27,31 and 33. As with the other provisions in 
this area of the law Section 28 is exceedingly complex, 
and most difficult to discuss other than in outline. 
(597) 
As a general proposition it is laid down in sub-section (1) 
that 'references to a person being interested in shares or 
debentures of a company, shall... be construed as not to 
exclude an interest on the ground of its remoteness or the 
manner in which it arises or by reason of-the fact that 
the exercise of a right conferred by ownership thereof is 
capable of being made. in anyway subject to restraint or 
598) 
restriction'. To this general proposition there are 
a number of interpretations and qualifications 
It is provided that where a person has an interest in 
a trust other than a discretionary trust(599) if the trust 
property comprises securities it. will be deemed that the 
person is interested in those. securities. 
(600 ) Thus apart 
from providing a director will be regarded as having an 
interest within Section 27 in securities registered in 
the name of a nominee this provision extends the definition 
of interest to circumstances in which the director has 
something considerably less than complete beneficial 
ownership of the securities concerned. 
Furthermore a person will be deemed to be interested 
in shares or debentures if a corporation is so interested 
and that corpöration or its directors are accustomed to 
act in accordance with the instructions or directions of 
that person, or he is entitled to exercise or control 
the 
exercise of one third or more of the voting power at any 
general meeting of the company. 
(601) Under Section 23(4) 
a person will be deemed to be interested in the shares or 
debentures of a company if he enters into a contract for 
the purchase of such. This provision would overlap with 
Section 27(1) (b) , although it was evidently 
thought that 
a contract to purchase shares or debentures which was not 
followed by delivery might be regarded as falling outside 
this provision. 
(602) 
Section 28(11) 'states that delivery 
to a persons order of securities in fulfilment of a contract 
for the purchase thereof by hin or in satisfaction of a 
right of his to call for delivery thereof or failure to 
deliver shares or debentures in accordance with the terms 
of such a contract or on which such a right falls to be 
satisfied shall be deemed to constitute an event the 
consequence of which that person ceases to be interested 
in the securities, and likewise so shall the lapse of a 
persons right to call for delivery of shares or debentures. 
Whether this interpretation of the consequences of a 
delivery or failure to deliver securities under a right or 
contract is correct, is open to question, and whatever one 
may think of the statutory drafting of this provision, the 
important point would appear to be that the fact of delivery 
. or non-delivery is a notifiable event under Section 27(b) 
(603) 
Subsection (4) of Section 28, provides'that a person will be 
deemed to be interested in the securities of a company if 
be has the right otherwise than by virtue of having an 
interest under a trust to call for delivery to himself or 
to his order, "wbether, the right is exercisable presently 
or in the'future. 
(604) The subsection also states that a 
director will be deemed to have an interest in shares or 
debentures of an associated company even if he is not a 
registered shareholder of the securities, 'if be is 
entitled to ... exercise any right conferred by the holding 
thereof or is entitled to exercise the control of any 
l5ä 
right -so conferred'. This could cover the type of 
situation where a person who enters into a contract to 
purchase shares cum the right to subscribe for new shares 
at a price less than the current market price and, before 
he becomes the registered bolder transfers the rights to 
a company which he controls. 
(605), 
It, is also provided 
that a director who holds a proxy. to"vote the relevant 
shares at a 'specified meeting of the company"or of any 
class meeting, or who has been appointed by a corporation 
to act as its representative 
(606) 
at any such meeting, 
will be deemed not to have an interest-in. the securities 
such as would require notification. Magnus and Estrin, 
(607) 
consider that it follows from this that the holder , of a 
general proxy would have an interest that should be 
notified. 
It is of interest that Section 28(5) provides that, 
persons having a joint interest shall each be deemed to 
have the interest, and moreover, it is expressly provided 
in subsection (6) that it is immaterial that shares or 
debentures in which persons are interested for the purposes 
of Section 28 are unidentifiable. 
Certain types of interest are to be disregarded under 
section 28. For example the interest of a remainderman or 
revisioner. under subsection (7) or a bare or simple trustee 
or a custodian trustee, under subsection (8). 
(608) 
Those 
persons who invest in an Autborised unit trust scheme 
within the meaning of the Prevention of Frauds (Investments) 
Act 1958 will likewise be excepted with regard to those 
securities from the reporting provisions. There are other 
statutory exceptions in subsections (9) and (10) which 
need not concern this present study.. It should be noted 
that so far Section 28 has not fallen to be interpreted 
by the Courts, and as academic comment is scarce it is 
difficult to estimate the exact boundaries of the various 
provisions. 
(609) 
However from the standpoint of the 
" regulation of insider trading it suffices'to say that in 
the vast majority of instances where a director could be 
considered as interested in a'transaction in the securities 
of bis company, it would require to be reported under 
these provisions. 
The power of the Department of Trade to exempt by 
statutory instrument transactions from Section 27, has 
already been mentioned. This provision was introduced in 
the Report Stage of the Companies Bill 1967 as there was 
widespread concern that the registers could become 
'cluttered up' with too much information that had no real 
significance. 
(610) Indeed the Opposition were concerned 
that the deterrent effect of Section 27 with regard to 
insider trading 'ould be weakened by the inclusion in the 
registers of information that was difficult to interpret 
and generall irrelevant to the regulation of insider 
trading. (611) There was also the danger that directors 
would quite honestly fail to comply with the law due to 
its great complexity and technicality. The Department of 
Trade has utilised its powers under Section 27)1) in a 
number of cases, which need not concern us here, 
(612) 
except in one respect. Under paragraph l(l)(a) of the 
Companies, Disclosure of Directors Interest, Exemption, 
Number 3 Regulation, (613) it is provided that a director 
need not make a notification 'to a company which is the 
wholly owned subsidiary of a body corporate incorporated 
outside Great Britain, of interests in shares or 
debentures of that body corporate or any other body 
corporate so incorporated or any event. occurring in 
relation to such shares or debentures... ' This in effect 
means that a director of a 
. 
wholly owned English subsidiary 
would not have to'disclose his interests in the securities 
of a parent company incorporated outside Great Britain, 
or indeed in any other company incorporated elsewhere than 
in Great . Britain. With the increase in trading of shares 
in foreign companies on the British Securities marketý614) 
it would seem. that there is a serious risk that directors' 
who have access to confidential corporate information 
about their parent and associated companies abusing their 
position and trade on the basis of this information in 
the United Kingdom completely uninhibited by Section 27. 
That this type of conduct occurs, cannot be doubted. 
(615) 
There is of course no problem with regard to the British 
subsidiary, as by virtue of it being wholly owned 
obviously there is no possibility for insider trading at 
least insofar as its equity capital.. The Head of the 
Quotations Department of the Stock Exchange, and the 
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Secretary to the Quotations Committee , 
(616) both favour 
disclosure of transactions in the foreign holding company 
and its associated companies as a matter of principle but 
are dubious as to the feasibility of enforcement. Whilst 
it was accepted that it might be possible to extend the 
disclosure obligation through the listing agreement, the 
Head of the quotations Department thought that this was 
"r 
unlikely as the reason behind the Department of Trade 
granting the exemption in the first place was to alleviate 
the burden on British directors as'compared with foreign 
colleagues. Whilst this appears reasonable at first 
glance, it is necessary for directors to report their 
transactions in the securities of their companies in a 
great number of countries, and thus to impose the 
disclosure obligations under Section 27 on directors of 
such a subsidiary would not necessarily be unfair or 
anomalous. It should also be noted that from the wording 
of paragraph l(l)(a) it is at least arguable that all 
companies incorporated outside the United Kingdom are 
excluded from Section 27, as the relevant provision states 
that the exemption applies 'to that body corporate' that 
is the parent company', or any other body corporate-so 
incorporated'. 
The last in the 'trilogy' of sections designed to 
replace section 195, and the relevant part of Section 198, 
is section 29. 
(617) 
This provides that, every company must 
keep a register for the purposes of Section 27, and 
whenever the company receives information from a director 
in consequence of the duty . 
imposed upon bý m by that 
section the company is placed under a duty to inscribe it 
in the register of directors interests in securities, 
against the name of the relevant director. 
(618) However 
every company is also under an obligation without such 
notification, 
"to 
record in the register, against the 
relevant name of the director the grant of a right to 
subscribe in the securities of the company to a director. 
-Under Section 29(2)(a) it must also record the date on 
which the right is granted, the period during which or 
the time at which it is exercisable and consideration for 
the grant, or the fact that there was no consideration, 
the description of the shares or debentures concerned, 
the number or amount and price to be paid for them. 
Where a similar right is granted to a director by an 
associated company, the obligation is upon the director 
to notify the company under Section 27(7). 
(619) 
Paragraph (b) of subsection (2) requires the company to 
inscribe in the register, whenever the right is exercised, 
the number or amount of shares or debentures in respect of 
which the-right was exercised, if they are regirstered in 
the directors name, and if they are not the names of the 
persons they are. It should be noted that the duty of 
inscription placed on companies under Section 29(2) applies 
to every company whether a principal or an associated 
company that grants the right. 
(620) 
The register must be made up so that the entries 
contained therein are in chronological order , 
(621) 
and an 
index must be maintained with the register. 
(622) 
In the 
case of both the duty on the company arising by 
notification on the part of the director, and in the case 
of the company granting rights itself to the director, 
the obligation to inscribe the information in the register 
must be completed before the expiration of three working 
days beginning with the day next following that on which it 
arises. 
(623) 
As in the case of Section 195(3) 
subsection (5) of Section 29 enables a director to require, 
that the nature and extent of any interest in the relevant 
securities be included in the register, although similarly 
to Section 195(4) it is provided in Section 29(6) that the 
company will not by virtue of anything done for the purposes 
of this section be affected with. notice or put upon enquiry 
as to the rights of any person in relation to the securities 
concerned. 
Although the Section makes detailed provisions as to 
where the register of directors securities interests is to 
be kept, as a 'general rule it must be kept with the register 
of members if such is kept at the registered office, 
(624) 
although where the register of members is maintained 
elsewhere the register of directors interests could, at the 
company's discretion be kept with it or at the registered 
office. Where the register is not maintained at the 
company's registered office notice must be sent to the 
(625) Companies Registration Office'as to its location. 
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The register of directors interests in securities must be 
open to inspection during business hours subject to such 
reasonable restrictions as the company in general meeting 
may iII? ose, so that not less than two hours each day are 
to be allowed for inspection by members of the public for 
a maximum fee of 5p or in the case of shareholders freely. 
It should-be noted that debentureholders must pay the 
statutory fee, unless the company waives it. As a matter 
of good public relations inspection of the register is 
allowed freely in 'all cases. Previously copies of' the 
register could only lie demanded from the Department of 
Trade, but now under Section 29(10) any member of the 
company or any other person may demand a copy of the 
register or any part thereof, on payment of 10p or such 
lesser sum as the company, which here in effect means the 
directors may prescribe, for every hundred words or 
fractional part of a hundred words required to be, copied. 
The company must cause the copy to be sent to the person 
concerned within a period of ten days beginning with the 
next following that on which the request was received by 
the company. It is dubious as to whether a person inspecting 
the register is allowed to make bis own extract. The 
practice of registrars on this point differs and although 
it would seem many would turn a blind eye to an enquirer 
jotting down a few facts, others as a matter of policy will 
not allow this. There have been cases where cassett tape 
recorders. have been used to record extracts, and even 
cameras. Although little criticism can be made of the 
relatively small fee charged by the company for copying 
extracts the main problem is that the company can delay in 
providing the requested information for up to ten days. 
This can be a serious problem where detailed information is 
required as a matter of urgency, such as by financial 
journalists or-officials. With the availability of 
photocopier facilities in most companies perhaps an 
obligation should be placed upon companies to provide the 
extract as soon as possible, but. in any event not later 
than ten days. Certainly many registrars will furnish 
photo-copies almost on. demand as a matter of courtesy. 
Under section 29(11) the register must be produced at 
the commencement of the company's annual general meeting 
and remain open and accessible during the continuence of 
the meeting to persons attending the meeting, seemingly 
whether such are actually entitled to attend the meeting 
as of right or not, as for example in the case of 
journalists. It is somewhat anomalous that the register 
is only available for inspection at the annual general 
meeting as in many instances where the register would be 
of relevance such-as in an extraordinary general meeting 
called to authorise the increase in capital for a takeover 
or other major corporate development the register is not 
required to be made-available. Of course as a matter of 
good investor relations there is nothing to stop the 
register being made available during such meetings. If 
default is made in providing the register at the annual 
general meeting the company and every officer in default 
is liable on conviction to a fine of £50. 
(626) 
If default 
is made in complying with the other provisions of-the 
section the company and every officer in default is liable 
to a fine of 9,500 and a further default fine, which by 
virtue'of Section 440(1) would amount to f, 5 a day. It 
should be noted that all offences here are triable 
summarily and the only penalty is afine. Of course it is 
possible to seek a court order where inspection or'a copy 
is refused. 
The scope of these disclosure provisions has been 
extended considerably by Section 31 which for the purposes 
of Section 27 treats the interests of a director's spouse 
and children as his own interests. 
(627) 
It is important 
to note that by virtue of Section 31(6) the extended 
obligations imposed by section 31 for the purposes of 
Section 29 will be treated as though they were imposed 
under Section 27. It is provided by Section 31(l)(a) that 
an interest of the wife or husband of a director of a' 
company, not him or herself being a director of the company, 
in the shares or debentures of the company shall be treated 
as being the directors interest. ' Likewise the interest of 
an infant child, including a. step-child or adopted child; 
628) 
of the director of the company, the child not being a 
director of the relevant company, in the shares and 
debentures of the company will be regarded as the directors. 
Furthermore 'a contract, assignment or-right of subscription. 
entered into, exercised or made by, or grant made to the* 
IGt 
spouse or infant child shall be treated as having been 
entered into, exercised or made by or to the director: 
629) 
Under Section 31(2) a director of a company is under an 
obligation to notify the company in writing of the 
occurrence whilst he is a'director, but not before or 
after such, of the grant to his spouse or infant child, 
by the company of a right to subscribe for securities of 
the'company, and the exercise by his spouse or infant 
child of such a right, stating in the case of a grant of 
the right, the same information as is required by 
Section 27 to be stated in the case of the director 
personally an the grant to him by an associated company 
of the right to subscribe in the shares or debentures of 
that company, and similarly in the case 6f an exercise of 
such a right the same information as be would have bad to 
disclose in such a case under Section 27. 
(630) 
rioreover 
an obligation imposed by section 31(2) must be complied 
with by the director, within a period of fourteen days as 
commencing from the day next'following that on which the 
occurrence of the event that gives rise to the duty to 
notify the company 'comes to his knowledge'. This 
provision should be compared with the sister provision in 
section 27(3)(b). In section 31 it is necessary only that 
the event giving rise to the duty is in the directors 
knowledge, and there is nothing akin to the phrase in 
Section 27 that he must also know that the event gives rise 
to an obligation to notify the company.. Whether this in 
practice makes any difference has already been doubted. 
If indeed it does, it would appear anomalous that the 
additional protection'was not extended to directors under 
Section 31ýwhere. the degree of complexity and technicality 
is that much greater. Any person who fails to comply with 
this section, or who in a purported compliance 
intentionally "or recklessly makes a false statement to 
. 
the company is(liajle to the same penalties as under 
Section 27(8). 
Of considerable interest is, the amendment proposed by 
Mr. J. Bruce Gardyne M. P. to the 1967 Companies Bill during 
its Second Reading. (6,32) This amendment which was 
defeated, would have provided another section, which 
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would have required directors and officers of quoted 
companies which had over one hundred members, to notify 
the Department of Trade within ten days of the end of each 
calendar month of the occurrence of any such event as is 
stipulated in Section 27. The notification apart from 
requiring details as to the event and the number of 
securities involved would have required'tbe inclusion of 
details as to the nature of ownership involved: The 
information received under this provision would under the 
proposed provision have to be published on a monthly basis 
by the Department. 
Hr. Gardyne, with the support of Mr. Nichael Shaw M. P. 
emphasised that this provision was designed to prevent 
directors, using 'their knowledge of forthcoming events 
which are liable to affect the value of the shares of the 
company to effect a bargain with a member of the public 
who is not so informed to the disadvantage of the"other'c633) 
Whilst endorsing the Governments provisions on insider 
disclosure, the Opposition thought that by the time that 
the information appeared in the register and such had been 
inspected(634) it was likely that considerable time would 
have elapsed since the occurance of the event. The much 
more timely disclosure with the wider degree of disemination 
suggested in the Oppositions amendment was thought to be a 
much greater deterrent for insiders to abuse their position; 
Mr. Gardyne M. P. stated 'the mere fact of'publication would 
be a very effective deterrent to misbehaviour by the 
small minority of insiders... who might be inclined to 
misbehave'. 
(635) 
Apart from being of assistance- to the 
general body of shareholders, Mr: Gardyne ' HI. P. thought 
that the proposed amendment would greatly assist the 
financial press in their role as 'guardians' in this 
field. (636) 
On the other hand the Opposition accepted that it-would. 
be wrong to impose a too heavier burden on the Department 
of Trade. Mr. Gardyne M. P. evidently consulted the 
American Securities Exchange Commission on the cost and 
resources involved in publishing information on insiders. 
tradings, and concluded that proposed amendment would 
definitely not place a disproportionate burden on the 
ý ý;, i 
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Department. (63? ) Similarly upon the basis of the 
experience in the United States the additional burden on 
companies was not over excessive. The President of the 
Board of Trade had expressed some support for the proposal 
during the Comnittee Stage of the Bill and the Minister of 
State stated that the Government were disposed to favour 
(635) However the the proposal, during the Second Reading. 
Minister-thought that it would not suitably fit in with 
the present bill and would be more suited to the promised 
second instalment. of company law reform. 
It should be noted that the proposed-amendment extended 
to officers as well as directors, Mr. Gardyne thought that 
'it is a little equitable to place a special burden on 
directors which is not placed on officers who may in fact 
be in a much better position to make use 'of inside. 
639) Mr. Gardyne did information than the directors are'. 
not seek to define the term 'officers' and the President 
of-the Board of Trade declined to express bis views on 
the matter. 
(6 ) Other Honorable Members however expressed 
opposition to the proposed inclusion of officers because 
of the definitional problem. 
(641) 
Mr. Gresham Cooke M. P. thought that the proposed 
amendment was 'a very strong Socialist hammer to crack 
what may2e a very small nut, wielded by a right-wing 
Tory' 
(642) 
Mr. Cooke thought that it would be preferable 
if the Stock Exchange published this information, although 
he conceded that it was unlikely that this would be 
considered feasible in the short term* 
(643) Mr. Stainton M. P. 
suggested that it was likely that a private publisher would 
soon hit upon the idea of gathering the requisite 
information and publishing it periodically. 
(644) It is not 
without interest that the City of London Solicitors Company 
in their Report on Insider Trading considered whether 
insiders transactions should be published in the press. 
This approach was rejected on the ground that the vast 
majority of transactions were totally unobjectionable and 
'publication would open. the door to troublesome enquiries (645) 
about purchases or sales which do not call for any enquiry'. 
It was also tbougbt that there would be a certain amount 
of 'induced or emulative' trading; noticeably the two 
major arguments raised before the Cohen, Comm ittee and 
Jenkins Committee and in both cases rejected. 
r 
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(c) IMPRGV"ý; P TI TS TO TIM, 1967 SCHEI 
The insider disclosure provisions in the 1967 Companies 
Act have not escaped a certain amount of criticism. 
(646) 
Apart from the complexity of the drafting there has been 
evidence that the administration of the provisions by the 
companies concerned, had been deficient. 
(647) 
Furthermore 
whilst there is much weight in the argument advanced by 
rlr. David Ennals N. P. during the Second Reading of the 
, Emoluments of Top Management, Disclosure and Regulation 
Bill 1965, that 'if the information was revealed there 
would be much less danger that people would think that 
there was any jiggery pokert'' going on, 
(648) 
the cynical 
comment of Sir H. 
_ 
d'Avigdor-Goldsmid M. P. in reply, to 
the effect that it is the very people who would think 
that 'jiggery pokert'' was going on, who would not be 
satisfied with the information disclosed still remain 
axiomatic. 
(649) 
Concern has been expressed that the information 
contained in the registers is 'practically inaccessible' 
to the average shareholder, who has nether the time nor 
inclination to check the register himself, and that a 
greater effort should be made to ensure that the 
information therein contained is sent directly to members 
with the annual accounts. 
(650) 
The Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State for the Department of Trade and 
Industry, Lord Limerick, in response 'to such a demand in 
the House of Lords stated that the Conservative Government 
was alert to this matter and were studying the problem 
in the context of their reform of company. law. 
(651) 
Of course the Jenkins) Committee abandoned the approach 
of relying solely on disclosure to combat insider trading 
and recommend substantive prohibitions. Whilst the 1967 
Act, apart from option dealings continued the disclosure 
approach, the-then Labour Government promised substantive 
regulation in their projected second instalment of company 
law reform, which through force of events never materialised. 
The Conservative Government in their White Paper 'Company 
Law Reform' endorsed the view that it was now fallacy to 
trust solely disclosure in the regulation of insider 
trading. (652) Because of the-recommendations contained 
in the White Paper for substantive regulations, the 
existing disclosure provisions would have assumed a new 
aspect, that of an aid to enforcement. In this respect 
the Government considered that it was necessary to 
strengthen the provisions to assist in detection of 
insider tradin& activity. The main defect of the present 
system in the view of the Conservative Government was 
that a director did not have to inform the company for a 
period of fourteen days and then the company bis a further 
three days to inscribe the information in the register. 
Furthermore apart from the register in the company's office 
there is no other source of public discldsure. The White 
Paper considered that the notification period must be 
reduced to 'the shortest practical period'. The Council of 
the Stock Exchange extended the offer that if the directors 
concerned of listed companies made a simultaneous disclosure 
to the Exchange, the Stock Exchange would publicly announce 
it. 
(653) 
The comments of the `;. 'kite Paper were embodied in 
Clause 17 of the Companies Bill 1973. '', 
Sub-clause (1) of Clause 17 would have reduced the 
period of notification from fourteen days to tbree(654) and 
under sub-clause (2) where the notification relates to 
listed securities there is an obligation on the director to 
notify the Stock Exchange, in the same manner as the company, 
and within the same period of time. It was further provided 
that 'the Stock Exchange thay publish, in such manner as it 
may. determine, any information received by it under this 
provision'. These improvements on the 1967 Acts insider 
disclosure mechanisms were reasonably well greeted and 
Mr. Michael Shaw M. ". considered tham a significant advance 
in the regulation of insider trading. 
(655Y 
However it is 
important to note that the insider disclosure provisions 
were not matched with the substantive regulations in Clauses 
12 to 16, and which will be discussed later on. For example 
there was considerable divergence as to the definition of 
insiders under the disclosure provision and'that under the 
regulatory clauses. Of course this divergence is not 
necessarily either novel or"anomalous as the experience of 
the United States law on this point shows. Another point 
of interest is that the disclosure mechanism for substantial 
shareholders under Section 33) although not intended or 
designed as an insider disclosure device would have become 
IGA such by virtue of Clause 12 which rendered substantial 
shareholders insiders. The object of Section 33 was and 
is of course to provide a disclosure mechanism for control 
and potential control concentrations, and not for insider 
trading disclosure. (656) Professor Gotiier(657) and 
: Professor Loss, 
(658) 
compare the situation in Britain to 
that in the United States and point out that in the latter. 
both mechanisms for disclosure are directed at insider 
trading. With the greatest respect this is erroneous as 
it neglects the role of Section 13(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act 1934, which corresponds to section 33. 
Reference should also be made, to the power, that would 
have been given to the Secretary of State for Trade under 
Clause 69 to prescribe the matters to be disclosed in the 
accounts, directors and auditors reports, and the annual 
returns under statutory instrument. So far as the 
directors report is concerned the matters to be covered 
were set out in schedule 1 of the Bill. This schedule 
included details of the direc-ors interests and those of 
his family in contracts with the coripan: and' in the 
company's securities as well ; as options, and rights of. 
subscription. Similar information must also be included 
as to associated companies. 
(659) 
Furthermore Clause 69 
expressly provides that if any regulation issued by the 
Secretary of State required the inclusion in any note, 
account or report of matters relating to the directors, 
officers and employees of the company the Secretary of 
State could stipulate that it is the duty of such 
persons to provide the information to their company 
under penalty of a £200 fine in case of default. It 
would seem that the Secretary of State could well have 
sought to require the inclusion in the accounts, reports 
and annual return of information specifically related to 
insiders transactions. (660) Of course notification in the 
annual returns of the shareholdings of directors as required 
under the present law is some protection against insider 
trading as it is possible to see to what extent insiders 
bad been trading during the past year, and if suspicions 
are aroused reference can then be made of the register 
(661) at the company's offices. ' The City of London 
ßolicitors Company in their Report on Insider Trading 
considered that particulars of all chances in the register EIS{' 
of directors interests in securities since the date of 
the last accounts should be-sent to all members and 
debentureholders of the company, with the annual accounts 
and directors report. 
(662) 
As has been pointed out 
previously during the passage of the 1976 Companies (no 2) 
Bill considerable pressure was brought to bear on the 
Government to introduce the anti-insider trading provisions 
in the 1973 Compänies Bill into the proposed legislation. 
The Government, did acknowledge that there was a need to 
improve the disclosure mechanism, and acceded to the 
Oppositions request to adopt in -a modified 'form Clause 17 
of the 1973 Bill. In the result Section 24 of the 1976 
Companies Act requires directors to make the notification 
under Sections 27 and 31 of the 1967 Act within five days. 
Under Section 25, where a company that has securities listed 
on the stock exchange receives a notification under these 
provisions, relating to quoted securities the company is 
under an obligation to notify the stock exchange of that 
matter and the stock exchange is empowered to, publish in 
such manner as it may determine any information received 
under this provision. The company must'comply with this 
obligation within one working day of-receiving the 
directors notification, " and in the event of non-compliance 
a fine of ß500 and a further default fine is prescribed 
for the company and every officer in default. 
I 
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(D) DISCLOSURE DIRECTLY TO SHAREHOLDERS 
(a) THE SCHEME O DISCLOSURE 
There can be little doubt that disclosure and 
dissemination of information, is most effective when sent 
directly to the intended recipients directly. The 
disclosure mechanisms provided by the Companies Registration 
Office and the registers maintained at the company's office' 
both require a conscious effort and desire by the investor 
or enquirer to obtain the information, and in reality this(663) 
will only occur where suspicions have already been aroused. 
This area of the law relating to disclosure is highly 
complex and of a technical nature given the fact that the 
medium of disclosure here is primarily through the accounts 
and financial statements. Bearing this in mind and the 
fact that this particular area is adequately dealt with in 
virtually every book on company law, only brief attention 
will be given to the structure of this disclosure mechanism. 
The basic vehicle for direct shareholder disclosure in the 
Companies Acts. is section 1 of the 1976 Act, which replaces 
section 148 of the 1948 , ct. 
(664) 
This section .. requires 
the directors, under threat of penalty, to lay before the 
general meeting both a profit and loss 'account for the 
last accounting reference period with a balance sheet. 
The basis for these two accounts is of course the books of 
account that are required to be kept under section 147. 
Under section 148(1) the profit and loss account had to be 
'made up' to a date not earlier'tban of the meeting by 
more than nine months or in the case of a company carrying 
on business or having interests abroad by more than twelve 
months. Section 1 now requires presentation within seven 
months of the close of the relevant accounting reference 
date, 
(665) 
or ten months in the case of a private company. 
Whepe"the company carries on business abroad this period 
may be extended by a further three months. 
(666) 
Tbüs even 
under the new provisions at'the time that the accounts are 
presented to shareholders and sent to the Registrar they 
are likely to be very much out of date. 
The Institute of-Chartered Accountants in their evidence 
to the Jenkins Committee, stated that 'the primary purpose 
of the annual accounts... is to present information to the 
proprietors showing how their funds have been utilised 
and the profits derived from such use. It has long been 
accepted in accounting practice that a balance sheet 
prepared for this purpose is a historical record and not 
a statement of current worth... similarly a profit and loss 
account is a historical record. 
(667) 
Furthermore it must 
be appreciated that 'a balance sheet gives only a snapshot 
at a single moment in time'. 
6ý'3 The historical costs 
basis in corporate accounting whilst endorsed by both the 
Cohen and Jenkins Committee has become increasingly 
questioned in recent years with the rampant degree of 
inflation which works to render the traditional approach 
highly misleading. 
(689) 
This factor has emphasised the 
importance of the realisation that accounts are primarily 
directed to professional gdvisers. 
(700) 
It is specifically provided in Schedule 8 that various 
matters may be stated in a note to the accounts rather 
than in the accounts themselves. If the information is 
included in other documents such as the directors report 
such must be annexed to the accounts, and the auditors 
must report on such matters as are within the requirements 
of the accounts. 
(701) 
Copies of the accounts, the 
auditors report thereupon. and the directors report, which 
will shortly be examined, must be sent to every shareholder 
and debentureholder at least twenty one days before the 
general meeting whether such persons are entitled to receive 
notice of the meeting or not. 
C702) 
But all persons 
entitled to receive a notice must be sent the information. 
Of course most public companies, and a large number of 
private companies as an exercise in investor relations 
prepare an integrated booklet containing the, required 
information and a certain amount of voluntary information 
and explanation, such as the Chairmans address to 
shareholders. A number of companies in addition pay. to 
have the annual report and accounts or extracts therefrom 
published in the national press, again largely as a matter 
of prestige and public relations. 
The directors report in recent years has become a most 
important medium for disclosure, as it provides the 
relevant information in a much more descriptive and 
readable way. Indeed Professor Gower has advocated that 
171 
the accounts and financial information should bq 
presented in a consecutive form in narrative style and 
incorporated as an integral part of the directors 
report. 
(703) 
Under the present law Section 157(1) 
provides that there shall be attached to every balance sheet 
laid before the General Meeting a report by the directors 
with regard to the state of the company's affairs, the 
recommended dividend and the amount to be carried to 
reserve. Furthermore, as has just been stated it is also 
permissible under Section 163 to include any information 
required to be stated in the accounts in the directors 
report, which would then be treated as annexed and part of 
the accounts to the extent that it contains mandatory 
information. The Jenkins Committee was concerned that 
directors reports were becoming too formalised and 
uninformative, and that the bulk of important information 
that investors needed was often being included 'informally' 
in the Chairman: address, which was not always available 
to investors in a published form. 
(? 04) The Committee to 
remedy these problems recommended an upgrading of the 
directors report and the Chairmans statements. The 
Government accepted certain of the recommendations of the 
Jenkins Committee, with the result that the informational 
content of the report is today, in the words-of the editors 
of Palmer 'extraordinary diverse'. 
(705) 
There would be little utility in, entering into a 
detailed discussion of the content requirements of the 
directors report, as this aspect is adequately covered by 
the standard works, 
(? CO) furthermore, reference has already 
been made to the provisions in Section 16 relevant to 
directors conflicts of interests and interests. in contracts 
and transactions with the Company. 
Under Section 16 the report must state the names of the 
: persons who were directors of the Company during the. 
relevant financial year, the principle activities of the 
Company and that of its subsidiaries, and any significant 
change in these over the last year. In addition significant 
changes in the fixed assets of the Company and its 
subsidiaries, and the details with regard to the. issuance 
of shares and reasons for so doing are required to be 
stated, as well as contracts 'of significance in which a 
director is or was interested, as has already been alluded 
to. Similarly any arrangement under which a director is 
or can acquire shares or debentures from the Company or 
any other corporation is to be disclosed. 
Of particular significance from the point of. view of 
insider trading is Section 16(e) which provides that with 
respect to each person who at the end of that particular 
year was a director of the company, the report must state 
whether or not according to the register kept by the 
Company for the purposes of Section 27, he, was at the end 
of that year, interested in shares or debentures of the 
Company or of any' other Company in relation to which he 
was under an obligation to report his transactions and 
interests under Section 27. If a particular Director is 
so interested the number of shares or amount of debentures 
of each corporation at the beginning of the relevant 
financial year or when be became a director must also be 
stated. Thus it should be noted that Section 16(e) only 
requires that the total holdings of the directors 
individually both-at the commencement and at the end of 
the relevant financial year be stated. There is no 
requirement as has already been mentioned, that the report 
should disclose details of the directors actual 
transaetions. (707) The Stock Exchanges Listing Agreement 
requires companies to supply the same information as is 
required under Section 16(e) but in addition provides that 
non-beneficial interests must be distinguished from 
beneficial, and furthermore the statement 'should include 
by way of note any change in those interests occurring 
between the end of the financial year and a date not more 
than a month prior to the date of the notice of the meeting 
or if there has been no "such change, disclosure of that 
fact' . 
(708) 
It has been suggested that the company's stock 
broker should be placed under a statutory responsibility to 
report on the dealings of directors, their spouses, infant 
children and '. persons acting in concert' in the company's 
securities in. the same manner as an auditor. The brokers 
report* and a full account of all the 'insiders' transactions 
would appear in the annual report and accounts. 
(709) 
It is provided by Section 16(f) that the directors report 
must contain particulars of any matters other than those 
specifically mentioned so far as they are material for the 
appreciation of the state of the company's affairs by its 
x. -13 '. "Y 
members, being matters the disclosure of wb ich. will not 
in the opinion of the directors be harmful tc the business 
of the company or of any of its subsidiaries. Although 
information as to substantial shareholdings are not 
specifically required to be stated in the report, those 
that are notified under section 33 are 'generally included 
under this discretionary provision. The Stock Exchanges 
Listing Agreement does require disclosure of ten per cent 
shareholders of any class of voting capital, however. 
(? () 
Under the other sections in the 1967 Companies Act 
relating to the directors report, information with respect 
to political and Charitable donations must be included 
and with respect to certain companies the average number 
of persons employed by the company and their aggregate 
compensationC711) Certain companies that are engaged. in 
more than one class of business during the relevant 
financial year must state the turnover from each class and 
the extent to which 'in the opinion of the directors' each 
class of business contributed to the company! s pre-tax 
profits. Similar information has to be disclosed if the 
company has subsidiaries and thus submits group and 
consolidated accounts. 
(712) 
(b) ACCOUNTS AS A IfIFDIUM OF DISCLOSURE 
V75 
Professor Gower correctly observes that 'published 
accounts have become the lynce pin of the system of 
protection through disclosure '. 
(713) 
In recent years 
there has been a growing awareness, and not only in the 
United Kingdom, that the traditional presentation of 
financial information is deficient both in content and 
in form. This problem has already been alluded to in 
connection with 'inflation accounting'. 
There have been numerous and persistent calls gor the 
simplification and clarification of acebunting procedures 
and presentations, and for the' improvement in the quality 
and utility of financial information provided therein 
C714) 
One of the major problems has been that accounts have been 
orientated to the 'stewardship' approach which developed 
in an era when there was much less separation between 
ownership and management, than there is today. The 
stewardship approach: is based on the hypothesis that to a 
certain extent both the managers and owners are 'insiders' 
and thus require a different type and presentation of 
information than do the essentially outsider shareholders 
in the public companies of today. 
(715) 
The problem has 
been compounded by the different, and often contradictory 
informational needs of various groups to which the 
management owe a legal or practical duty of disclosure 
to. 
(716) 
Obviously a critical evaluation where diverse 
informational needs are required to be'satisfied is the 
question of materiality. 
(717) 
Also because of the 
traditional reliance in the accountancy profession on 
practical considerations rather than*in research and the 
development of a underlying science or philosophy of 
accounts there exists a plethora of princi pies and 
procedures, and a significant lack of uniformity. 
(718) 
Because the application of varying, although perfectly 
legitimate and respectable, procedures and principles of 
accounting practice, to a given set of facts can result 
in astounding divergences in result, 
(719) 
there have been 
numerous and exceedingly serious problems. 
(720) 
The 
difficulties are all the more as the directors of the 
company are the ones to decide upon which principles are 
employed in any particular case. Given this there is 
little wonder that there have been occasions where it has- 
been alleged that managements have manipulated accounting 
principles to suit their own purposes. 
(? 21) There has 
also been considerable criticism of the way in which 
auditors have performed their expected role as 'watchdogs'. 
The vital independence of auditors, and their ability 
to 
stand up to managements has proved 'defective in a 
disturbing number of instances. 
(722) 
Of courae it has 
been stated that auditors could exercise a role in the 
detection of insider trading, but this is doubtful. It 
has been authoritively stated that 'an. auditor is not bound 
to be a detective... he is a watchdog, but not a blood 
bound.... if there is anything to excite suspicion, be should 
probe it to the bottom, but in the absence of anything of 
that kind be is bound to be reasonably cautious and, 
careful. 
(723) 
Unless the matter is in some way connected 
to a statement in the accounts it would seem that the 
auditor has no responsibility, although it would seem an 
auditor should detect illegal payments and self-dealingC724) 
Even where there is a proper degree of disclosure in 
the financial statements it is possible that the presentation 
will be such that it is difficult to obtain a full 
appreciation of the information so disclosed. 
C725 
Furthermore, where investor disclosure is concerned the 
primary need is for information that will assist in 
forecasting and estimating the future dividend stream and 
risk factor. Thus it has been stated that the 
traditional 
presentation of accounts which concentrates on past 
achievements are of a deficient nature in themselves. From 
this argument, that has much to commend it, it would appear 
that accounts should focus to a much greater extent on 
projections and profit forecasts. 
(? 2°) 
As the ability to compare the relative merits of 
securities is at the heart of a market philosophy it is 
both desirable and necessary that the particular merits of 
a security should be presented in a manner uniform with the 
presentation of others. With the divergence in accounting 
principles and procedures this has not been the case. 
(72? ) 
Attempts have recently been made to achieve a degree of 
uniformity on an International basis. 
(?. 28) Of perhaps 
greater immediate significance is the development in 
Britain of a system of standard accounting practices. 
(729) 
X'77 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants for England and 
dales with the support of the other accounting bodies 
and other self regulatory agencies, such as the Stock 
Excbange(7ý0) announced its intention in December 1969 of 
intensifying its efforts to minimise the areas of 
divergence, whilst at the same time not imposing a rigid 
uniformity. 
(731) 
The Institute emphasised that apart from 
promul`aicing standard accounting practices, which would 
embody proper accounting practice, and deviation from 
which would have-to be justified, it would establish an 
ongoing research programme and 'strengthen its machinery 
for investigating and pointing to lapses from the standards. 
'The Institute established an Accounting Standards Steering 
Committee which was charged with the drawing up and 
administration of this 'quasi-law'. 
(732) 
The standard 
Accounting Practices which this body has promulgated(733) 
are much more authoritative than the old Recommendations 
an Accounting Principles that were put out by the Institute 
which were little more than advisory commendations 
representing the standard practice of the larger 
accountancy firms. Although there have been suggestions 
for the establishment of some regulatory agency to lay 
down legal rule in this area, the bulk of opinion would 
seem to be in favour of the present self-regulatory scheme 
continuing. 
(734) 
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(C ) EP ECTIVENESS O FI1W CI ÄL DISCLOSURE 
It is of course a somewhat obvious, although often 
neglected truth, disclosure without comprehension on the 
part of the intended recipient is meaningless. Professor 
Gower has commented that 'unfortunately, accounts in 
general and those of companies in particular are of little 
immediate help, except to the well instructed- who are 
least in need of protection. To the average investor or 
creditor they are cryptograms which he is incapable of 
soiving. 
C735) 
This has been born out empirically on a 
number of occasions. For instance in a recent survey by 
T. A. Lee and D. D. Tweedie, 
(736) 
it was found that 
exceedingly few shareholders had any significant degree 
of comprehension of the information presented to them, 
less than half had any idea of the usual method of valuing 
assets or even where the 
. 
responsibility for the financiol 
statements lay. 
Apart from the intrinsicly difficult concepts and 
figures in accounts the presentation of such largely 
contributes to the unreadability of such. Obviously there 
is little one can do in. connection with the difficulty of 
the subject matter as this is primarily a matter for 
investor and user education, 
C7 37ý but attempts can be 
made'to achieve simplification and clarification of 
presentation, as has already been pointed out. A number 
of learned writers have sought to distinguish between 
essentially two different types of disclosure. There is 
that type which is aimed at the unsophisticated investor 
who would be 'ignorant' of accounting procedures and 
principles, and on the other hand there is that category 
of disclosure that is directed at the professional 
investor and professional advisers who can or at least 
should, understand disc7, osure through accounting 
procedures. 
(738) 
Professor Homer Kripke on a number of 
occasions has criticised the actions of the Commission 
and the profession in trying to tailor disclosure to the 
needs of the unsophisticated user. 
(739) 
Apart from the 
impracticality and probable impossibility of achieving 
comprehensibility for this class of user, the learned 
Professor points out that the prudent although 
unsophisticated investor 'who tries to act in an informed 
way does so by Getting at least part of his information 
second band, filtered through professionals' . 
(? 40) 
Eripke castigates the view that non-professional investors 
could effectively utilise such financial statements as 
prospectuses as a 'delusion'. 
741) It should also be 
noted that-it is probable that even professionals obtain 
the bulk of their 'investment information' from sources 
other than the formalised disclosure and reporting 
provisions. 
C742) 
Kripke concludes that the disclosure 
mechanisms should be directed primarily to the 
professionals and their advisers, and thus-the information 
therein contained should respond to their particular needs. 
Thus considerably more emphasis should be placed on the 
disclosure of financial data. 
(743) b ilst this is no 
doubt logical, and perhaps desirable the extremely 
privileged position that financial advisers would be 
placed in should be noted. Furthermore small investors 
would not often have the required degree of access to 
professional expertise and advice. Whether the plight of 
the small investor is determinative of the question is 
beyond the scope of this discussion insofar as it rests 
on policy considerations. 
6 
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(d) DISCLOSURE AT THE TIME OF PUBLIC ISSUE OF SECURITIES 
The law has long recognised the particular opportunities 
for abuse and unfairness where securities are issued to. the 
public, and has required a searching degree of 
disclosure. (744) The notion is aptly-stated by Professor 
Pennington in the Investor and the Law, 
(745) 
where he 
points out that directors and promoters, in the issue of 
securities, are in a position similar to that of a dealer 
in specialised goods; 'they have the means of ascertaining 
the facts about the company's history, financial condition 
and prospects and distribution of powers to control or 
influence the conduct of affairs of the company' and thus 
it is not unfair to impose such a duty of disclosure. 
Furthermore as States have a vital interest'in preventing 
the diversion of scarce capital into false or 'unworthy' 
enterprises most countries have+ not been slow to enact 
provisions dealing with the disclosure of material 
information at the time of issue. 
(746) 
Obviously it is not possible to deal with the various 
legal and extra legal disclosure requirements- with regard 
to the public issue of securities here. It is only 
necessary to point out that under the Companies Acts and 
the requirements of the Stock Exchange searching disclosure 
is generally required as to both the nature of the proposed 
investment and the interests that insiders might have 
therein. (747) 
It is important here to mention the 'so called' 
Unnumbered Directive which relates to the contents of 
prospectuses published on the admission of securities'to 
the official lists of a Stock Exchange of a Member of the 
European Economic Community. 
(748) The E. E. C. 's Commissions 
Explanatory Memorandum, states that at present the 
disclosure requirements when securities are to be granted 
a quotation on a Stock Exchange are 'sometimes considerably 
different in content and in legal basis, from-one member 
state to another'. 
(749) 
Thus in consequence 'issuers 
provide information which varies remarkably in both quality 
and quantity, and the protection afforded to the investor 
in this respect 'is not everywhere the same. ' : lith the 
increased freedom of movement of capital already achieved 
under the Directives issued under Article 67 of the 
Treaty of Rome, it is hiUhly. desirable that there is at 
least a semblance of equ;, lity of information in the 
Co; umuni ty. 
(75C) 
Without a degree of equality the 
informational imbalances produce a situation not unsimilar 
to that where-insider trading occurs. Of course any 
investor who decides to invest in a foreign country must 
accept that the degree of disclosure may be different to 
that he could expect in a domestic situation, indeed the 
nature of the foreign market may. be entirely dissimilar. 
Furthermore given the . 
divergence in language and possibly 
in accounting procedures(751) the disclosures that are 
made may not be over helpful. 
The Commissions Explanatory Memorandum comments that 
'the incomplete and differing nature of the information 
which the public receives concerning securities constitutes 
a 'serious barrier' to the movement of capital between 
member states, and prevents full advantage being taken in 
the operation of the capital markets of the abolition of 
exchange restrictions which has already taken place. 
(752) 
In the Commissions mind 'the capacity of the markets is 
often seen as the basic reason for their narrowness and 
instability', and a harmonisation of disclosure would 
therefore facilitate the' markets and increase the flow of 
capital. It was also found by the Commission that the 
present imbalances of both disclosure and enforcement 
distorted the choice of stock exchange to which companies 
directed their applications for listing. 
Whilst accepting that the proposed harmonisation of 
requirements would not eradicate different standards in 
practice, and that in any case the standard imposed by 
the Directive fell short of that already required by the 
British Stock Exchanges, the Commission thought that there 
could be little doubt that overall there was advantage in 
their recommendations. The Directive provides that*a 
prospectus checked by the appropriate authority must be 
published in'all cases before a security is admitted to 
the official lists of a stock exchange. 
(753) 
It should be 
noted that the Directive comprehends only official stock 
exchange markets, as it was thought that to step beyond 
this on a Community wide basis would be impractical given 
the diversity of other markets. Moreover, it should also 
be noted that the provisions apply to all corporate issuers 
seeking a listing and not only domestic corporations. 
The Explanatory Memorandum states that 'the 
prospectus... must contain all the information which, 
according to the particular nature of the issuer and the 
securities in question is necessary to enable the 
investors and their investment advisers to form a well 
founded opinion on the net worth, financial situation, 
results and prospects of the issuer and also on the rights 
pertaining to the securities for which the application for 
admission to quotation is made. 'The Commission make it 
clear that this is the standard that the appropriate 
regulatory authority should apply in determing the 
suitability of the prospectus. It is not without interest 
that the prospectus should not be so simplified so as not 
'to provide such details as to allow professionals to have 
full knowledge of the fact when advising the public or 
taking investment decisions on their bebalf'. 
(754) 
`2o 
this end the Directive provides that Member States should 
ensure that the admission prospectus contains in an 'easily 
analysable fork and as comprehensible as possible at least 
those items of information listed in the Schedules' to the 
Directive. 
(? 55) 
Whilst the word 'harmonisation' has been 
used it would appear that in this instance the Commission 
is more concerned with achieving a degree of 'substantial 
equivalence, which is essential if the public is'to have 
confidence in the prospectus. 'The stipulated provisions 
in the Directive for inclusion in the prospectus are of 
course the minimum criteria and there would be nothing 
to prevent a Member State requiring additional information. 
Moreover, the form of the prospectus is not prescribed, 
and this is thus in the discretion of the relevant national 
authority, although Ehere is a duty to ensure the prospectus 
is easily readable. 
(756) 
Obviously of critical importance is the relevant 
national agency charged with the administration and 
supervision of prospectus disclosure. ýTlbe' 
whilst making it clear that this body can be of either a 
public or private nature, emphasise that it must have 
adequate powers to demand additional iizforraation and 
enforce the requirements. 
(757)-'It 
is of interest to note 
,..,,: 
that Article 1? provides that every important new event 
arising between when the prospectus is finalised and the 
commencement of dealings must be notified in a supplementary 
prospectus, similarly checked and published. In" the 
Explanatory TNiemorandum, the Commission make it clear that 
only events that would be likely to influence the public's 
evaluation of the securities need be included in this 
provision. `758) 
y 
Where securities are to be admitted to several lists, 
in different member states, the authorities of the 
countries concerned' are placed under an_ obligation to 
co-ordinate with each other, and obtain equality of 
disclosure and siraiiltaneous release of such. 
(759) The 
European Stock Exchanges have already reached agreement 
on the potentially troublesome question of suspension, 
where a particular security is listed in more than one 
country. It has been agreed that where any stock. exchange 
upon which the relevant security is listed in the country 
in which the company is registered, suspends the quotation, 
for any reason, all other Stock Exchanges in the E. E. C. will 
suspend dealings in that security for a period of forty 
eight hours. During this period of time it would be 
possible to decide upon a concerted course of action. The 
European Stock Exchanges also have a number of informal 
agreements to the same effect with Exchanges such as the 
New York Stock Exchange and Jobannesberg Stock Exchange, 
outside the E. E. C. 
C -0) 
The Commission also thought that it would be desirable 
to establish a Contact Group within the Commission, which 
could assist the various national agencies in their 
interpretation and administration of the Directive and 
ensure a degree of uniformity. The Group would consist of 
representatives of both the national regulatory agencies 
and the Commission itself, with a secretariat provided by 
the Commission'. This would appear to be an embryo 
Euro-S. E. C., as the Group apart from agreeing upon uniform 
policies would be charged witb advising the Commission on 
further matters germain to the Directive and the protection 
of investors. 
The information required to be contained in the 
prospectus under the Schedules is reasonably searching. 
I ö5 
`Ehere are, however only a feti"1 provisions that are of 
interest to this present discussion. Schedule A, 
Chapter j, paragraph 2.6 requires information as to persons 
who are directly or indirectly alone or jointly with other 
in control of the company, and the extent of their holdings. 
'Furthermore information must be included with regard to 
persons holding twenty five per cent or more pf the capital, 
provided that such are known to the company. Mention must 
also be made of the holdings of ten per cent or more held 
directly or indirectly in the company by other corporate 
or natural persons, whenever such are general knowledge. 
Under Chapter 6 of the Schedule, the names, addresses, 
function in the company, principle activities performed 
outside the company, including directorships and functions 
performed in relation to other companies, of the new 
members of the administration, the director and , 
supervisory organs of the company, as well as the other 
persons who assume the management of the company at the 
highest level and the founders and promoters-of the 
company if it has been formed in the last five years, 
must all be disclosed. Furthermore the interests of the 
directors in the company as well as management 
remuneration over the last financial year must also be 
included in the prospectus. Options granted to all 
members of the management and supervisory organs as well 
as the staff must be stated, as must information relating 
to loans and profit sharing schemes. The nature and 
extent of the direct or indirect interests of the 
directors and managers and the persons they may represent 
in transactions which are unusual in their character or 
condition, effected with the company over the previous 
financial year and during the current year must be specified. 
Similar information is required under Schedule B with 
regard to the issue of debentures. Whilst the disclosure 
provisions related to the public issue of securities are 
an important factor in the regulation of insiders trading 
in the securities involved in the issue, they are by no. ' 
means an effective protection where insiders are determined 
to abuse their position. A good example is the rights 
issue by the National *Group of Unit Trusts Ltd., 
engineered by Sir Denys Lowson, and which will be 
pýýý; 
.ý, 
.ýý; 
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. ý; .: ý', 
(761) 
referred to elsewhere. tthhere insiders are prepared 
to make profits by trading upon the basis of inside 
14 information they are likely to ignore the related 
disclosure obligations, even though this compounds their 
wrongs. Of course where insider trading is not itself 
unlawful the failure to conform with the disclosure 
obligations is of great importance, and provides a means 
} 
of legal enforcement. r-f 
Apart from the disclosure obligations at the time of 
issue there are certain substantive provisions that 
should be mentioned. It is provided under Section 50 
that where a general prospectus has been issued 
applications cannot be converted into binding contracts 
until the beginning of the third day after the issue of 
such or such further time as may be stated in the 
prospectus. Thus there is a minimum of three days between 
the issue of the prospectus and the opening of the. 
subscription lists, which enables potential investors to 
obtain the information and appraise it, with professional 
assistance. There has been controversy as to whether a 
period of three days is sufficient to reduce the advantages 
that insiders and those privy to the issue have by reason 
of their advance knowledge, and information. 
(762) 
Under 
Section 50 subsections 5 and 6, applications for allotment 
are not revocable until 'the expiration of three working days 
after the opening of the subscription lists. 
(763) 
The 
object of this provision was to curtail the practice of 
stagging. 
(764) 
'Although stagging, similarly to insider 
trading, is not illegal as such, it is regarded as 
objectionable, 
(765) 
and is often related tb activities that 
are expressly unlawful. 
(766) 
Where the issue is over subscribed it is for the 
directors to determine the allocation and allotment of the 
shares. The method of deciding this is wholly in the. 
discretion of the Board or Allotment Committee. There is 
of course room for abuse, but abuse is unlikely given the 
degree of publicity and the disclosure of allotments. 
(? 6? ) 
Furthermore paragraph 3 of the Stock Exchanges Listing 
Agreement requires that a company mir, t notify the press the 
basis of allotment of the securities in the prospectus and 
other offers, and in the case of excessive offers such 
187 
notice is to appear not later than the morning of the H 
business day next after the allotment letters or other 
relevant documents of title are posted. Paragraph 10 of 
Chapter 1 of the Stock Exchanges admission of Securities 
to Listing provides that preferential treatment on 
allotment must be approved by the Stock Exchange in advance 
of the publication of the prospectus and must normally be 
"r 
limited to ben per cent of the amount of securities offered 
and then only to shareholders or existing and past 
employees. 
(E) CORPORATE DISCLOSURE - THE RELEVANCE 
1 S9 
Disclosure is of course a vital aspect to the 
extra-legal regulation of business life. Justice (763) 
Frankfurter writing in Fortune nearly half a century ago 
remarked that 'the existence of bonuses, of excessive 
commissions and salaries of preferential lists and the 
like may all be open secrets among the knowing, but the 
knowing are few. There is a shrinking quality to such 
transactions, to force knowledge of them into the open is 
largely to restrain their happening. Many practices safely 
pursued in private lose their justification in public. 
Thus social standards newly defined gradually establish 
themselves as new business habits'. Whilst directors and 
corporate insiders naturally do not like this aspect of 
disclosure, and the social restraints that it places upon 
them, 
(769) 
there are few who would try and justify the 
removal of such provisions. 
(77°) 
In recent years company managements have become 
increasingly aware of the importance of fostering good 
relations with the providers of capital, the labour force, 
the suppliers and the consumers. It is today accepted that 
the comment of Fir. A... 'J'uke the Chairman of Barclays Bank 
that 'we do not want the public to discuss our affairs, we 
would much rather they did not. The more information that 
we give them the more they will want to discuss our affairs 
and that is what we do not want', 
(771) 
is a luxury that 
few can afford. Certainly the financial press is astute 
to detect 'undue reticence'(772) and organisations such as 
Social Audit have 'badgered'-companies tardy in this 
respect. Indeed, even the Stock Exchange acknowledges 
financial advertising as an important channel of 
communications. 
(?? 3) 
James Derriman in his excellent book, 
(? 74) 
emphasises 
that corporations must accept the impact of good investor 
and financial relations if for no other reason than the 
fear of a takeover, and a 'sell out' by the existing 
members. 
(775) 
Certainly the regard that managements pay 
to shareholders during a takeover bid is normally far in 
excess. of that generally paid. Derriman points out that 
because of the complexity of financial information and the 
ýýýýýý, ýý ýj 
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possible lack of expertise in companies in the field of 
public relations, companies have misguidedly neglected 
this important aspect to disclosure rather than place 
themselves in the hands of outside experts. Another point 
that should be born in mind is that the disclosure here, 
is more than the mere supplying of information, and 
emphasis is placed on the establishment and furthering of 
relationships. Thus it is part of financial relations, 
that the disclosures made should be tailored to the 
particular needs, of those with whom the relationship is 
intended to be built. 
Derrinan also points out that there is in relation to 
shareholders a-negative as well as a positive 
responsibility in the provision of information. The C? 76ý 
company should disclose both good and bad information. 
Of course it is obviously in accordance with the fostering 
of good public relations to disclose good information, 
but it is hard to pursuade business men that it is in 
their own and the company's interest to disclose bad 
information. In the long term if the position gets worse 
everyone will know anyway, and if things improve, premature 
disclosure could harm the corporations recovery prospects. 
The point of difficulty is where the commercial 
considerations should give way to the interest in full 
disclosure. Indeed it is possible to argue convincingly 
that disclosure of bad news may not be in the interests 
of the shareholders as a whole. Suffice it here to point 
to the great confusion of conflicting interests. 
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(F) DISCLOSURE AS A SANCTION 
Whilst no attempt has been made in discussing the 
British disclosure system with reference to the regulation 
of insider trading, to point out the various aspects to 
disclosure enumerated at the outset to this Section, it 
is respectfully submitted that disclosure devices aimed 
at the mere provision of information, or to the assisting 
in enforcement of a specific norm are quite obvious. What 
the above discussion has not thrown too much light upon is 
that aspect of disclosure which utilises the effect of 
disclosure as a sanction. It is this third aspect which 
will be discussed here. 
Because of the widespread dissatisfaction with the 
traditional criminal penalties in the case of corporate 
violations of the law, 
(777) 
attention has been focussed 
on the development of a new type of sanction. 
(778) 
Given 
the importance of corporate image, which has already been 
alluded to, 
(779) 
attention has been given to the use of 
disclosure as a sanction for criminal violations of the 
law by corporate bodies. 
(* 80) Of course the notion of 
public disgrace as a sanction and as a deterrent has a 
history dating back to the beginnings of civilization. 
Certain punishments were specifically directed at this 
the 'stocks' and ' 581) goal, p: iilary' are two obvious exampl.. 
The trial process and the stigma of conviction are also 
weighty sanctions in themselves. 
(? 82) There are also a 
number of recent examples of Magistrates being given the 
power to publicise the names of offenders, generally in 
the field of social regulatory offencesj'particularly in 
the context of adulteration of food and drink offence-sP 
8 
Disclosure of conduct can also be utilised as a sanction 
where there has been no violation, of a legal norm, but 
some other kind of norm, an obvious example here is-the 
use that the City panel on Takeovers and Mergers has made 
of nublicity. 
(784) 
, 
Perhaps one of the most difficult aspects of the use of 
disclosure as a sanction is the quantification of the effect 
and result that such may have in any particular case. 
Obviously in certain cases adverse publicity could result 
in pecuniary loss, and this would more likely be the case 
ii ý. 
Iý 
ýýi 
ýý 
1. 
ýi 
where the disclosure cast aspersions on the product of a 
person or corporation. 
(787) 
It is also possible that i1 
disclosure . could have an adverse effect on the price of the 
company's securities. It should be noted that in both 
these cases, at least where companies are involved the 
effect of the sanction is to penalise the company as a 
whole, and those responsible for the viölation Mould 
probably be unaffected. Certainly disclosure can result 
in pressure being brought to bear 'on those responsible for 
the violation, possibly by the shareholders, or, indeed the 
Government. Pisse writing in the Melbourne University Law 
Revier, 
(? a5) 
considers that-the main advantage of formalized 
disclosure as a sanction is the effect that such has on 
deterrence and therefore prevention. If the only effect 
of such a sanction was to cause some kind of economic loss, 
indirectly it would be preferable to impose a loss. directly 
and clinically through the imposition of a fine. ihe wider 
aspect of disclosure is that it hits company's and most 
individuals greatest asset, namely their self-ivespect and 
prestige. Whilst prestige, -at least in capitalistic 
societies, is tied up with material wealth, and the ability 
to produce wealth, the two are not and hopefully never will 
be entirely synonimous. Thus in the case of Sir Denys Lawson, 
whilst the widespread almost vulgar disclosures of his 
abusive conduct hardly scratched his estimated £200,000,000 
wealth, 
7a7) his prestige was shattered. 
(788) Of course it 
is true that where there is a criminal conviction or 
determination of liability automatically, at least in those 
systems that operate 'open justice' there is an important 
disclosure impact on the convicted person. Here this factor 
will be additional to the legal penalty prescribed by the 
tribunal concerned. It is debateable whether a formalised 
disclosure sanction, as for example suggested by Fisse. in 
bis writings, 
(789) 
is either necessary or desirable in these 
circumstances. Certainly in the case of a determination of 
a tribunal which does not have the authority to require 
financial or legal penalties or in the case of a disclosure 
of a warning or suspected state of affairs before any 
formalised determination then it would seem that disclosure 
is the most effective extra-legal sanction. 
.. ... -y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It has been said that 'this power of publicity is of 
particular importance in the area of... white collar 
offenders rather than by underprivileged people and 
members of devient sub-cultures ', 
(790) 
Surely this is to 
identify wealth-and prestige too closely. It would seem 
fallacious to maintain that a sense of social responsibility 
and social self respect is any lesser in the poletariate 
than it is elsewhere. Whilst it is misconceived to apply 
external moral ethics to any particular society, particularly 
in retrospect, it'is a fact that where a society becomes 
divided into classes the first grouping in the hierarchy 
almost inevitably assumes for itself rights and privileges, 
hardly reflective of a social responsibility or conscience. 
Where the dominance of the 'aristocracy' is not by force 
or a resented force the surprising factor is-the extreme 
benevolence that the 'under-classes' view the-'misdeeds' of 
their social superiors. Indeed there is considerable 
empirical evidence that social pressure and disclosure as a 
social sanction is all the more effective in egalitarian 
societies, contrary to Fisse's remark. 
(791) It is perhaps 
true that the effects of adverse disclosures in the case of 
a corporate official or 'white-collar' employee might be 
more visible but it is very much open to question whether 
there is any more real damage than in the case of a 
'blue-collar worker' or someone lower on the social scale. 
The distinction would seem to be in the type of crimes that 
the two sections of the community, commit. It would be a 
reasonable assumption that more 'fraud offences' are 
committed by so called 'white collar' employees that 
'blue collar', but this is due to the first category having 
a much greater opportunity to commit this type of offence. 
The ordinary factory worker is hardly going to have the 
opportunity and ability to pledge securities without 
authority, falsify accounts or probably indulge in insider 
trading. Whether such 'offences' should be treated any 
differently to the more general crimes of theft, rape and 
assault is a question for the penologists. 
(792) 
There is probably weight in r isse'. s comment that 
disclosure is not too relevant in the context of 'devient 
subcultures', but this is because 'devients' are by definition 
not a party to the social mores and ethics of their culture, 
ýý {i `i 
ý; i ý'ý 
;. ,ý ý, ý i': 
, ýý 
I- iV 
unlike the underprivileged who will be whether by force 
or acceptance... Furthermore there is a need to qualify 
exactly what is meant by devients in this context. 
(793) 
As has been pointed out above perhaps the most 
significant utilisation of disclosure as a sanction or 
social regulatory device is in the case of transgressions 
of non-legal norms. This is of course of great interest 
from the stand point of the regulation of insider trading 
in Britain. In this context there is the additional aspect 
of disclosure acting as an educational or moralising 
factor. dhilst legal norms can be used to this'end(794) 
by virtue of their dependence on formalised enforcement and 
forensic determination, and also the fact that legal norms 
generally must represent the minima of moral value in that 
context, the educational potential for disclosure in the 
case of non-legal rules is that much greater. 
Thus disclosure in the present context has a number of 
significant aspects, risse comments that it can be used 
'for the possible primary purpose of lowering prestige, 
inducing monetary loss, rinducing government intervention 
and for the possible supplementary purposes of warning, 
moralising and nofifying prospective criminals of penalties, 
imposed upon convicted crininals'. 
(? 95) Of course it is 
the multiplicity of influences that a disclosure can 
create, which makes it a perilous tool in the hands of a 
regulator. At the London Conference on Insider Trading in 
the Spring pf 1975, the then Chairman of the American 
Securities Exchange Commission stated that the Commission 
were for this very reason reluctant to publicise cases and 
investigations that were not brought before the Courts 
where there was a proper system of appeals. 
(796) 
This 
approach was all the more important where professionals 
engaged in the securities industry were involved, as the 
effect of a disclosure could unjustifiable be ruinous. 
The Commission were also concerned about exposing a person 
to overwhelming civil litigation, by their disclosuresC797) 
Where disclosure is consciously intended to have a 
sanction effect, there are a number of problems that should 
at-least be'indicated here. Firstly it may be difficult to 
pursuade the relevant recipients'of the disclosure that the 
object of the information deserves losing a certain amount 
f3 
las 
of prestige. It is important to realise that in most cases 
it will not be necessary to make a general disclosure and 
it will be sufficient to give the information to a particular 
agency or body. 
C798} 
The problem of obtaining the desired 
reaction is all-the more difficult where the publishing 
agency is operating from outside the group that the 
intended recipients are in. Thus the membership of a 
particular professional body as a general proposition wil? ` 
be more inclined to accept the indictment 'of one of their 
numbers by their own disciplinary body than they would 
that of a Magistrate or civil servant. -This is particularly 
the case where a specialised type of activity is involved, 
the full implications of which might reasonably not be 
fully appreciated by an outsider. 
(? 99) 
An interesting case 
illustrating this is that of R. v Greenstein and Green, to 
which reference has already been made. The defendants who 
bad indulged in 'stagging' and who bad submitted cheques 
without sufficient funds, contended that their acts were 
not dishonest and that what they had done was widely 
practised in financial circles. The same point was made 
by Mr Brian Neill Q. C. for the defence, and also the Tines. 
The Midland Bank Manager for the Ilford branch had actively 
assisted them and had not-considered the operation illegal 
or objectionable. 
(800) 
On the otherhand Judge Alan 
King-Hamilton Q. C. thought the operation was 'a gross abuse 
of the banking system' and '4ispicable', and his decision 
was unanimously affirmed on appeal. Whilst the actual 
conviction was based on 'obtaining property by deception'., 
the Head of the Frauds and Bankruptcy Section of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions considered that it was the 
'stagging' that was the 'true crime' and although the 
underlying law on this had existed some considerable time 
'it had to be adapted so as to create a special offence'. 
(8O1) 
It is seriously open-to question whether the general'opinion 
in the City would consider that stagging should be regarded 
as a criminal offence involving reasonably long terms of 
imprisonment. This is not to say that there would be much 
public sympathy for Mr Green and his brother-in-law. 
The problems are even greater where the object of the 
adverse publicity is a person with some prestige and a 
prior good reputation. Where the object of the disclosure. 
ý",, 
is a person of power, who does not have to rely in any way 
upon the persons to whom the disclosure is made, the 
sanction can be of dubious worth. where the object of the 
adverse disclosure is a corporate person or institution 
there are psychological problems and difficulties of 
identification and responsibility stemming from the complex 
(802) The persons nature of corporate personality and image. 
to whom the disclosures are made may not of course be 
willing or able., to adopt any approach or retaliatory action 
against the object of the disclosure. Apart from the 
possibility of sympathy the recipients might have business 
or social connections with the object of the disclosure, 
that in self interest he is not prepared to sacrifices(803) 
or indeed of which. he is under a duty to others not to 
imperil. 
Another difficulty is that of phrasing the disclosure so 
that it has the desired effect. ibilst advertising 
techniques are of some relevance, there is a great 
difference in the nature of the disclosures. For example 
a good advertisement. sbould make it abundantly., clear what 
it is desired for the recipient. to do, obviously in the 
present context this would be impractical and probably 
undesirable. Wisse considers that it would be wrong to 
merely publish the facts of the case, as where such are 
complex as they almost inevitably would be in commercial 
cases, the intended recipients would either not take the 
trouble to read the presentation, and if they did, they 
most likely would not understand it. ;! hilst the present 
author appreciates the danger here, in the majority of 
cases, certainly those involving simple cases of fraud or 
insider trading it would seem sufficient to merely set out 
the essential facts, and either expressly declare what is 
wrong with the conduct in question or provide a sufficiently 
recognizable indication of such. This is the course adopted 
for example by the City Panel on Takeovers and Mergers. 
In such cases the inference to be drawn from the facts is 
quite obvious, and a matter for the individual recipient. 
j"Jhere the facts are particularly confusing or of a 'technical 
nature an appropriate, yet fair explanation can be given. 
Likewise where the conduct disclosed is not patently of an 
objectionable nature, and thus- the disclosing agency is 
k')% 
primarily concerned with educating the recipients a 
sufficient explanation should be provided. 
Another problem of some importance is where the object 
of the disclosure or those in sympathy with him attempt 
to harness the publicity machine against. the adverse 
publicity directed against them, or indeed against the 
disclosing agency. There have been numerous cases where 
this bas'occurredca04) The person attacked hasrcertain 
significant advantages over the court or Tribunal 
responsible for the original disclosure. He will-not be 
circumscribed by the costs or methods he can employ, and 
there is no obligation on him to explain technicalities or 
indeed make a fair presentation. Furthermore the person 
concerned can fasten upon what aspects of the case would 
seem to afford him the greatest opportunity of obtaining 
sympathy and support. Indeed there is nothing to prevent 
quite irrelevant counter allegations being raised so as to 
cloud the issue and attract support. One cannot either rule 
out complete fabrication. Obviously it would' be unlikely 
that a Court or Tribunal or indeed any official body could 
effectively engage in a campaign to vindicate itself in the 
face of such tactics. The cost alone would be prohibitive. 
it might be urged that there should be statutory provisions 
that the subject of such a disclosure should not engage in 
counter publicity, but apart from the profound definitional 
and enforcement problems, this would probably be objectionable 
on constitutional and civil liberties grounds. 
Associated with the multiplicity of aspects that disclosure 
as a sanction can have, and which has already been discussed 
there is the fact that the disclosure sanction is 
unpredictable in its results and, could have unlimited 
repercussions. It is a fundamental principle that in the 
absence of overwhelming other considerations of a public 
nature a man should not be subjected to punishments 
unreasonably in excess of his wrong doing.. There is a point 
where the punishment can itself become unjust and thus 
" self-defeating. Obviously the effect of disclosure will 
vary with the nature of the information,. the character of 
recipients and the time and place that the event occurs. 
Unlike other criminal punishments the disclosure sanction 
is inevitiably: 'part and parcel' of the social environment 
IS 
of its point in time. What would be wholly unacceptable 
for a trade union official to do, might be merely shrugged 
off if done by a slick City financier. 
Rourke writing sometime ago in the University of Chicago 
Law Review, commented(805) pointed out that from the 
stand point of deterrence it was of importance that others 
could see the extent of misfortune that had befallen the 
recipient. "of the punishment. With disclosure because of its' 
uncertainty and essentially indirect repercussions tha true 
extent of the penalty would not be appreciated by outsiders, 
, who might 
indeed consider that the person concerned has 
escaped very lightly. This has certainly been the case with 
the Takeover Panels. use of disclosure and also that of the 
American Securities Exchange Commission. 
(806) 
It is also extremely difficult to predict in advance how 
the media will treat a particular disclosure. If there is a 
large volume of important current news the media may only 
. 
devote scant attention to a serious abuse whereas when news 
is scarce considerable attention to a relatively minor case. 
Furthermore the press will be concerned to concentrate more 
on the emotive and sensational disclosures. There is also 
the danger of bias in the media and unfairness of 
presentation and commment. 
(8G7) 
Moreover, it is important 
that the object of the disclosure should not be allowed to 
present his case before the disclosing agency presents its 
release, as it is always more difficult to attack by 
refutation in this context. 
(803) 
Whilst it is true that because of the problems alluded to, 
and also no doubt a degree of ignorance, there are few 
instances throughout the world where disclosure is formally 
used as a sanction. 
(809) 
This is not to say that it is of 
little significance from the point of, view of this thesis, 
as it has certainly been utilised in cases of insider 
trading. In Britain the regulation of insider trading, by 
the press., the Take-over Panel and in the recent year or 
so through Department of Trade Inspections has operated 
almost solely upon the basis of disclosure as a sanction. 
Whether this has been adequate or not is to be doubted, 
but the importance of the topic remains. It should be 
noted that the Courts on a number of occasions have alluded 
to the punative effect of disclosure, particularly with 
regard to loss of reputation. 
(810) 
c1c" 
(G) DISCLOSURE' Or INFORMATION TO EMPLOYEES AND THE 
QUESTION OF EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION 
(a) DISCLOSURE OF I-ITYORl1 DTI ON TO EMPLOYEES, U! N IOI\TS AND 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTI 1`; TS 
Company law has paid scant attention to -the 'rights' of 
employees-and the position of such in the corporate 
structure. 
(811) 
So far as disclosure of information is 
concerned, the traditional stewardship approach, 
12) has not 
provided the type of information that employees require, and 
there has been a serious breakdown in the'flow of information 
about the affairs of the corporation in this respect. 
(813) 
Furthermore 'according to an old saying 'knowledge is power' 
and excessive publicity could result in a shifting of the 
balance of power which the law seeks to maintain so that 
the relationship between managenent.. and... owners. is change ýlb14) 
Given this last factor that information can effect the 
power structure, the question of employee disclosure and 
obviously that of employee participation in management is 
politically highly charged. Because of the nature of this 
topic and the uncertain state of the future law, it is to be 
hoped that the rather disjointed discussion that follows will 
be excused, at least with regard to its presentation. 
11bilst the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 has been 
repealed by the Trades Union and Labour Relations Act 197 
; 15) 
it is worth briefly mentioning the disclosure provisions 
which it enacted, but which were never inplemented. 
(816) 
Under Section 56(1) it was provided that an employer was 
under an obligation to disclose to the representatives of 
registered trade unions 'all such information relating to 
the undertaking as is in the possession of the employer or 
an associated employer' and is information without which the 
trade union representative would be 'to a material extent 
impeded in carrying on collective bargaining with him', and 
that it would be in accordance with good industrial relations 
practice for the employer to-disclose such information for 
the purpose of collective bargaining with him. This was 
subject to the restrictions of Section 158, which excused 
the employer from the disclosure obligation in certain 
circumstances. These included inter alia where disclosure 
0 
would be against the national interest, a legal requirement 
or confidence, or the disclosure would be prejudicial to 
the interests of the employers undertaking for reasons 
-other than those connected with collective 
bargaining. 
(817) 
In addition Section 56 provided that the employer need 
not supply the information where its compilation and 
provision would involve such time and trouble so as to be 
out of reasonable proportion with its use for `the purposes 
of collective bargaining. There were prdvisions for the 
union representative to appeal against such an assertion 
by the employer to the National Industrial Relations Court, 
under Section 102. The Code of Industrial Relations 
Practice, in its provisional form asserted that meaningful 
negotiations could only be conducted upon the basis of 
adequate information, and to this extent the employers 
were commended to supply all information reasonably 
relevant to the negotiations that they may be engaged 
upon, and to supply all information that is given to 
shareholders to the union representatives. It was 
specifically stated however that 'management is not obliged 
to disclose certain kind's of information, including 
information which would be of advantage to a competitor'.. 
?; hen the Commission on Industrial Relations came to 
report on disclosure, because of the multiplicity of 
different factual settings, it only recommended broad lines 
of disclosure, sugcesting that companies and unions should 
reach agreement on the more specific aspects. Nevertheless 
the Commission did indicate certain guidelines for the 
sort of information that they considered should fall within 
the ambit of proper disclosure. These guidelines are 
mainly concerned with information orientated to employment 
and pay and thus do not concern this present study. 
However the Commission did state that the information made 
available to members and to the public at the Companies 
Registration Office should also be supplied to union 
representatives, furthermore long and short term labour 
prospects should also be disclosed. The Commission also 
thought that investment and merger plans should be made - 
available. No doubt certain of this information would have 
been price sensative and of a non public nature. Of course 
t 
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exactly how the provisions. and guidelines would have 
worked in practice is an open question. Certainly the 
provisions directed at enforcement were weak, and the 
rights to information were restricted to registered trade 
unions. 
(819) 
-" 
The Trades Union Congress on a number of occasions has 
underlined the significance of proper disclosure to the 
operation of a viable collective bargaining machinery(, 
820) 
and its recommendations on disclosure found favour with 
the Labour Governtent which came into Office in 1974. 
The Government sought to replace the alnost universally 
criticised Industrial Relations Act by a four pronged 
approach. This was the enactment of a Trade Union and 
Labour Relations Bill, an Employment Protection Bill, an 
Industry Bill and an Industrial Democracy Bill. As at the 
time of writing only part of this programme has been 
completed, it is difficult to estimate the eventual impact 
of this approach. The Employment Protection Act 19? 5 is 
(821) 
a complex statute, but relatively uncontroversial. 
Concentrating purely upon disclosure the Act -places an 
obligation on the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration 
Service, (AC; AS)(822) to 'encourage extension of collective 
bargaining machinery' which of course includes that of 
disclosure. It would seem that under this provision a 
trade union could require recognition on the question of 
financial planning by a company and associated companies, 
and thus the disclosure would go far beyond that normally 
associated with labour questions 
c823) 
Under the terms of 
the Act, 824) there is an obligation on employers to 
disclose to the unions in writing information covering all 
items of collective bargaining for which the union is 
recognised and under the wording of the relevant provision 
it would appear that the union could seek recognition on 
almost anything. The only restriction! is that the 
" information should be such as would be 'good industrial 
relations practice to provide' and would if not provided 
materially impede the unions effort in collective 
bargaining. This provision although slightly wider than' 
the old Section 50(1) has much in common with it. In 
section 18 of the Act the qualifications on the rights to 
disclosure formerly found-in Section 158 are reproduced 
with slight modification. There is an appeal in the 
event of a refusal to disclose to the ACAS, which as has 
been seen is charged with facilitating disclosure to trade 
unions, and then there is an appeal to the Central 
Arbitration Committee. Exactly : bat information will be 
within the scope of these sections awaits the finalisation 
of the ACAS's Code of Practice. It would seem likely that 
it will go beyond the recommendations of the Commission on 
Industrial Relations report on 'the Disclosure of Information' 
in 1972. however'it should be remembered that this Act is 
only concerned with disclosure in the context of collective 
bargaining, and although thus having a greater width of 
application it is by no means as far reaching as the 
information that will have to be made available under the 
Industry Bill and the proposed worker democracy legislation. 
A much more radical and far more controversial approach 
In is that found in the industry Act of 1975- 
(845) 
August 1974 the Labour Government published a :! bite Paper 
entitled the Regeneration of British Industry., 
(826) 
the ai: s 
of which was to lay out the Governments views on bow to 
accommodate the variety of interests now acknowledged to 
exist in British Industry. The essential feature of the 
proposals was to forge a jartnership relationship between 
the Government and industry. The instruments of this new 
relationship are the National Enterprise Board and Planning; 
Agreements. A fundamental facit would be the much freer 
exchange of information between the relevant Departments of 
State and private 
, 
industry. 
(S? 7) Although it is not 
possible to enter into a discussion of the nature and role 
of the N. E. B. it should be pointed out that it will assume 
the ownership of all present and future Government 
Shareholdings and facilitate developments by taking equity 
positions. The possibilities for abuse and insider trading 
are obvious, 
(. 28)both in the context of the Government and 
also members of the administration. Whilst the N. E. B. will 
naturally have considerable access to price sensative 
information the Department of Trade in a Consultative Paper 
emphasised that the NEB would not be involved in the 
negotiation of planning agreements and would not be given 
'inside information' by Government Departments. 
(829 
Of primary interest from the stand point of this tbesis* 
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is the 'planning, agreements' which whilst not being 
contracts as such, through statutory provision will have 
a number of legal aspects, such as will enable both the 
Government and company to rely upon such. The Bill 
contemplates that there will be consultation between the 
Government and companies, leading to an agreement about 
plans for the future three years. In an attempt to 
harmonise and advance the Governments and industries 
policies and aspirations the Government will have funds 
available to assist the plans. 
(830) 
The planning. 
agreements are primarily intended to involve 'major and 
strategic firms in key sectors of the manufacturing 
industry and selected other. industries of particular 
importance to the economy'. 
ý8ýl) 
It was also stated in 
the White Paper that employees and their representatives 
should be consulted in the procedure leading up to the 
agreement, and that for this consultation to be effective 
it would be necessary to supply the employees and their 
representatives with the appropriate amount of information. 
The Government stated that it would require employers to 
disclose information relevant to the planning agreement 
except where such would be contrary. to the interests of 
national security. 
(832) 
. 
The result of these proposals was the Industry Bill, 
which introduces a number of significant changes into 
British company law. 
03: ) 
Attention will here be given 
to only those aspects relevant to disclosure and insider 
trading. The Bills provisions with regard to the 
disclosure of information are considerably more 
controversial than the proposals in the White Paper in 
that the basically voluntary approach is abandoned. 
Clause 20 provided that if it appears to the Minister 
that any person is carrying on in the United Kingdom a 
manufacturing undertaking that makes a significant 
contribution to a sector of an industry which is important 
to the national economy or any substantial part of the 
economy or industry be could order that such a company or 
his subsidiary is to be subject to the disclosure 
provisions of the act. This order would however be 
subject to annulment by resolution of either the House of 
Commons or House of Lords. Under Clause 21 it was 
cr 
'provided that for the purpose of obtaining information 
which is in the Ministers opinion necessary for the 
appreciation of the future plans of a company to whom an 
order has. been made under Clause 20, -the Minister may by 
notice require that the company or its subsidiaries 
furnish him in such manner and in such reasonable time as 
is specified in the notice, with such information relating 
to the undertaking in the United Kingdom as'th"e Minister 
may require. The type of information that would be 
comprehended within this power was detailed in Clause 21(2), 
and inter alia included future merger and aquisition plans, 
and other categories of information that could be of a 
price sensative nature. Moreover under subelause (4) the 
Minister could require the provision of information with 
regard to estimates as to the state of facts that will 
obtain at a future specified date. These Clauses did not 
engender over much criticism, but great objection was taken 
to Clause 22. 
This Clause provided that 'not later than at the end 
of a reasonable period after a minister has received the 
information specified in a notice under Clause 21 it shall 
be his duty ... to serve on the person furnishing the 
information a further notice requiring that person ... to 
furnish to a representative of each of the relevant trade 
7 
unions 
x34) 
within such reasonable time as may be 
specified in the notice the information required to have 
been furnished to the Minister. 'It was however, stated 
in Sub clause (2) that a Minister will not. require such 
disclosure if he considers that to furnish such would be 
undesirable in the national interest or that the 
information could not be furnished without contravening a 
statute. Under this provision when the Minister serves the 
initial notice on the person concerned that person must 
furnish immediately to the representatives of each of the 
relevant trade unions a notification that the employer has 
been served with such a notice, and the employer must send 
to the Minister a list of those representatives on whom he 
served this notice. It is also provided that before the- 
Minister determines whether. the information should be made 
available to the unions he must give the employer and the 
union representatives an opportunity to make representations 
2o5 
to him. Under the terms of Clause 23 a person upon whom 
a disclosure notice has been served could appeal to an 
'appropriate Committee' within a period of twenty eight 
days. This Committee was empowered under the Bill to 
direct that the. person concerned should be released. from 
the duty of disclosure, if they were satisfied that the 
information had been communicated to that person in 
confidence, or that the disclosure would seriöüsly 
prejudice the interests of the undertaking. Where the 
employer made an application to the Committee he would 
have been under an obligation to give the union 
representatives notice of this and of the Committee's 
decision. 
It should be noted that the Bill made no mention of 
'planning agreement' disclosure, and' such agreements were 
only referred to in Clause 14 in the context of financial 
assistance. The Government played this aspect of the new 
approach on 'a very low key', 
(837) 
although it was 
emphasised that trade unions could negotiate agreements 
individually with corporate employers for additional 
disclosure. 
Of particular interest"is the provisions in the Bill 
on confidentiality. Clause 24 provides that. information 
shall not be disclosed '1, ritbout the consent of the person 
furnishing it except to a government department for the 
purposes of the exercise by that department of any of its 
functions, to the appeal committee set up by the minister 
for the purpose of hearing and determining appeals under 
the disclosure provisions, the Manpower Services Commission 
and various other Government labour agencies, and in 
connection with the investigation of ,a suspected offence 
under the iict. 
(837) 
This provision applied to information 
that had been supplied to the Minister in consequence of 
a notice served under the terms of Clause 21, which-has 
not been'at that time supplied to a trade union tinder 
Clause 22. Thus the information under these provisions 
ceases to be of a confidential nature at the point in 
time when it-is supplied to the trade unions,. although 
it might arguably remain confidential and within the 
restrictions of Clause-24 as regards the Minister. It 
was provided under Clause 26(3) that in the case of a 
violation of the confidentiality provisions on summary 
conviction there is a 'fine of : 200 and or a term of 
imprisonment not in excess of. three months, and in the 
case of a conviction on indictment two years imprisonment 
and an unspecified fine. In the case of other violations 
of the other provisions of the Act the Clause provided for 
a fine of £400 and a default fine of £40. Among these 
other offences was the knowingly or recklessly furnishing 
a false. statement. In all cases. it was provided in the 
Bill that any proceedings can only be brought with the 
consent of the Attorney General. 
Under Clause 24(3) it was provided that the preservation 
of confidentiality, 'does not apply to any information at 
a time after a person has been convicted of an offence under 
Clause 26(1)a' which deals with the failure to furnish 
information to the Tiini ster, but not the making of a false 
statement which is prescribed under Clause 26(1)'0". Peter 
ýýýiilsher writing in the Sunday Times states that 'this as 
far as I can see removes the last rag of confidentiality 
from anyone who has been convicted of refusing to give 
information ... the T'iinister and his officials are free once 
such a conviction has been recorded to publish to the 
world... any data they have previously culled from the 
unfortunate firm involved'. 
(a98 
'ihilst numerous industrialists bad already accepted the 
need for greater disclosure of information to their 
empioyees, 
(839) 
and employees had themselves become aware 
of the importance of this matter, 
(840) there was considerable 
opposition to the Industry Bill. 
(841) Among the more 
rational attacks on the Bill was that of the City Capital 
Markets Committee, which issued a memorandum on the Industry 
Bill. The Committee were concerned at the breadth of the 
disclosure provisions and thought that a lot of information 
that : could be required under Clause 21 (2) was of a 
'confidential and price sensative nature'. Apart from the 
danger of unfair competition, the Committee were anxious 
that disclosure of certain types of information, the value 
of which]ay in their confidentiality, would result in 
misappropriation. or at least destruction of a corporate 
. asset without compensation. Given the 'legions of civil 
servants' involved in the progress the Committee was 
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sceptical as, to the Governments promise that the information 
would remain confidential. 
(842) 
Indeed the Committee were 
concerned about the improper utilisation of price sensative 
information by persons both inside and outside the 
Government. There was a need for a provision analagous to 
Clause 13 of the Companies Bill 1973, which will be 
discussed elsewhere. The-Committee and also the Stock 
Exchange 
(843) 
were concerned that the disclosure of price 
sensative information to trade unionists would in effect 
make such recipients 'insiders'. Furthermore Given the 
fiduciary position of directors, it was -contended that under 
both the law and the Stock Exchange Listing Agreement, there 
would be an obligation on the directors to disclose 
information of a material nature to the shareholders at least 
simultaneously to the provision of it to the trade unions. 
The Stock Exchange had sponsored an amendment to-Clause 24, 
which would have required the information disclosed to union 
representatives to be likewise, and at the sametime, under 
statute to be disclosed to the shareholders. The Stock 
" ; xchange thought whilst being of benefit to investors, such 
an obligation would remove the 'insider responsibilities' 
from trade union representatives. 
(844) The Government 
rejected this proposed amendment. With respect it is 
submitted that the stock Exchanges argument was valid, and 
the present author has taken the liberty to submit similar 
evidence to the Committee on Industrial Relations on this 
point. In a letter to the author, from the Director of 
Corporate Liaison at the New York stock Exchange, it is 
stated that 'the New York Stock Exchange has always taken 
the: position that material disclosures of significant 
business developments be broadly disseminated so that 
shareholders and prospective investors can assess the 
merits or demerits of investment on the basis'of all the 
facts relating to a. company's business. 'It followed 
that as a matter of practice the Exchange would impose a 
trading suspension if material information had been 
disclosed to various groups; as for instance trade 
unionists, in the absence of 'eneral disclosure. 
(845) 
In the words of the Director, it would be of critical 
importance that the disclosure to trade unionists and 
shareholders was simultaneous '... so that investors and 
employees, who may also be investors... would be on an 
equal plain'. The Director of the Office of Public 
(846) 
information of the Securities Exchange Commission, 
and the Director of Information of the National Labour 
Relations Board, 
(847) 
confirmed that the. New York Stock 
Exchanges approach was the correct one under both 
American law and practice. Another problem pointed out by 
the City. Capital Markets Committee, and the Stock Exchange 
is that in certain cases there may be some twenty or so 
independent trade unions to which disclosure may have to 
be made, and even then there will be workers who as they 
are not members of a trade union will not have the 
advantages of this disclosure. 
(848) 
The Government whilst maintaining that the disclosure 
provisions would only be utilised in the case of companies 
: here there was already a planning agreement voluntarily 
entered into, or where the Government had been asked to 
take a financial interest in, on a number of occasions 
intimated that the provision of information would effect 
ehe traditional control of the corporations concerned. 
(849) 
apart from this there is the fundamental point succinctly 
stated by Peter 'rtilsher in the Sunday Times, 'civil 
servants and Ministers are bound by the Official Secrets 
.: cts... and by a set of specific if slightly ramshackle 
safeguards in the Bill itself... ' but with regard to 
disclosure to trade union representatives 'there appear to 
be no safeguards whatever.. -. there are no*sanctions to 
prevent such a representative who may of course have no 
connection other than his union position-with the company, 
from passing on the information to a competitor, foreign 
Government, extremist political fraction or come to that 
his own stock broker in the form of a large personal 
order'. 
(850) 
The problems of conflict of interest are 
acute. In a large number of cases the information might 
refer to the provider of the informations dealings with 
another company, the employees of which, perhaps being 
"embers of the same trade union as that of the representative 
to whom the disclosure was made. Although the union 
official was given the, information in relation to the 
provider of the information, where that disclosure bears 
upon the interests. of fellow trade unionists in that other 
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enterprise can he puss it on or act upon it in protection 
of those other employees. The problems are obvious in a 
takeover situation, or perhaps generally in a competitive 
environment. From the wording of the provisions and the 
observations in Parliament it would seem that the intention 
is that the union official is to have a complete 
discretion to use the information as be will, once it has 
been disclosed to him. b ilst there has been'little 
evidence in other European countries that worker directors 
and representatives have utilised confidential information 
improperly, it has to be noted that trade unions are 
significantly stronger in the United kingdom and are of 
themselves a powerful political force. Disclosure under 
the mandatory disclosure provisions is not to employee 
representatives as such which night be expected to have 
the immediate interests of the particular workforce and 
thus the enterprise at heart, as well as feeling'a degree 
of loyalty to the company, but to representatives of the 
relevant trade unions which are, or at least have 
allegiances to an essentially outsider body.. Both the 
Conservative and Liberal spokesmen advocated disclosure 
only to some intra-corporate representative body. 
(851) 
It is not without interest that the Confederation of 
British Industry, before the controver-3y really developed, 
sent its members guidelines on the handling and disclosure 
of internal information. In the self-interest of member 
corporations the Confederation recommended that 'company 
information policy groups' should be formed, which would 
be responsible for the internal flow of information. The 
guidelines recommended that all information that was 
relevant to employees desires and wishes, subject to 
considerations of competition should be disclosed, although 
this should not facilitate the premature leakages of 
confidential price sensative information. 
052 
The Council 
of the C. B. I. strongly urged members not to give privileged 
information to selected groups or representatives, in the 
absence of a general disclosure, even if such persons 
agreed to observe confidentiality. 
055) 
Because of the pressure brought to- bear on the 
Government a more concillatory"approach was promised, the 
Paymaster General, ' Vx. Dell M. P. stated that provided 
1. o 
greater employee disclosure was accepted, the Government 
would take a fresh look at the arguments relating to 
confidentiality and insider tr3ding. 
(854) 
in the result 
after significant and somewhat trenchant battles in both 
Houses the disclosure provisions in the Bill were modified. 
By virtue of Section 28 of the Industry Act, 'for the 
purposes of obtaining information which in the opinion of 
either of the Ministers is needed to form or to further 
national economic policies, or needed for consultations 
between Government, employers or workers on the outlook 
for a particular sector of the manufacturing industry, 
including the outlook for the major companies in that 
sector, 'may serve a preliminary notice on the company or 
companies concerned, provided that the company is carrying 
on in the United Kingdom an undertaking wholly or mainly 
engaged in manufacturing, that the undertaking makes a 
significant contribution to a sector of such industry 
important to the national economy or a substantial part 
thereof, and that it is desirable for the purposes of 
obtaining information of that description that the companies 
or company concerned should provide the Government and a 
representative of each relevant trade union with any such 
information relating to the undertaking. Under subsection 
three the Minister must lay before each House of Parliament 
that he has issued such a notice, and it can be annulled 
under subsection (8) by a, resolution of either House. The 
preliminary notice must inform the company that unless the 
relevant information is given to the Minister and a 
representative of each relevant trade union voluntarily he 
will consider making an order under Section 28. The Section 
also has provisions for the notification of the trade unions 
and the sending of a list of such to the Minister as was 
provided in the Bill. After a period of three months has 
elapsed from the serving of the preliminary notice the 
Minister can declare that the disclosure provisions apply to 
the company or companies in question. However the Minister. 
can only make such an order if it appears that the company 
will not voluntarily provide him and the unions with the 
information. As under the Bill there are provisions 
affording rights to be heard by the company and the 
authorised representatives of the unions before the making 
-a<< 
II 
of the order. Section 30 which details the categories of 
information within the scope of Section 28, largely 
reproduces Clause 21 of the Bill. Nevertheless, there is 
an amendment of extreme importance, contained in subsection 
(5), which provides that 'nothing in this section shall be 
construed as enabling a Minister to require information 
about the. details of know how or of any research or 
development programme'. 
855? 
The provisions in Clause 22 requiring disclosure to trade 
union representatives were enacted in Section 31, but again 
with some significant amendment. It is provided that the 
Minister 'shall not require information to be furnished if 
he considers that reasons of national policy or special 
reasons apply. 'Reasons of national policy are defined to 
include where it would be inimical to the national interest 
or in contravention of an enactment. `his largely 
reproduces the exception contained in Clause 22(2). In 
addition however, is the category of 'special reasons'. 
ibis comprehends information obtained in consequence of a 
confidence, where disclosure would cause substantial injury 
to the company, or to a number of employees. The appellate 
procedure laid down in Clause 23 is enacted with slight 
modifications in Section 32. The important thing to note 
is that the report of the Advisory Committee on whether 
there should be disclosure or not is only advisory, and in 
no way binding. The provisions relating to confidentiality 
and offences in Sections 33 and 34 respectively are the 
same as the provisions in the Bill. 
Whilst the amendments, particularly those relating to 
the circumstances where a preliminary notice could be made, 
seemed to have a salutary effect on the criticisms of the 
Bill, except from the left wing of the Labour party, it is 
to be doubted whether the degree of protection of confidential 
information is. much altered. The simple fact remains that 
there will be an increased number of civil servants and 
trade unionists in receipt of at least some 'insider 
information' and particularly in regard to trade unionists 
there is no clear delineation of the responsibilities that 
attach to this situation. The dangers are obvious. 
2ý3 
(b) E: ýLLOYE E PARTICIPATIOI3 III I'iA TAGEIENT. AND INSIDER 
Ti : DI1TG 
The question of employee participation is one of 
extreme importance, legally, politically, socially and 
economically. Whilst participation has an important 
bearing on the regulation of insider trading(856) because 
of thq great volume of discussion and materials it is 
unfortunately necessary to discuss the matter only in a 
superficial manner here. 
Employee participation is one of those misleading 
terms which has a variety of meanings, and standing alone 
without qualification only serves to confuse. It can 
refer to employees actively themselves participating in 
management, or through elected or nominated representatives, 
or merely being consulted on certain issues, or possibly 
only having certain rights to information. 
(35? ) 
yo matter 
what sort of model is adopted there is inevitably a greater 
degree of disclosure either to the employees. themselves 
or their representatives, involved and thus a greater risk 
of insider trading. Where there is direct participation 
in management with employee nominees on the board of 
directors or on a supervisory board the danger becomes 
acute. . -i'here is also the additional feature that 
the 
advent of increased participation in management imposes 
another supervisory aspect to the conduct of insiders 
within the corporate structure. 
There is of course considerable experience and legal 
development on employee participation and. code termination 
on the European Continent. 4ihilst, a detailed discussion 
of the various laws, particularly in West Germany, the 
Netherlands and certain Scandinavian Countries would be 
highly beneficial from the point of view of obtaining a 
comparative , aspect to this important area of company' law, 
it is with regret that it has been decided, for 
: considerations of space to omit this. What is of some 
interest is the apparent absence of provisions in the 
various European laws relating to increased employee 
disclosure and participation in management,, of restrictions 
on the use of such information thereby acquired. 
058) 
There are certain provisions in the general law imposinF 
liability for improper use of confidential information, in 
most countries. On the other hand it would seem that there 
has been little evidence of abuse of these rights, with 
regard to insider trading. 
The question of employee participation in the corporate 
structure, and the increase in the information provided to 
employees generally and their representatives, has assumed 
great importance in the last couple of years. There has 
been an almost universal realisation in the United Kingdom 
that it is both legitimate-and desirable for employees to 
be more meaningfully involved in their corporate employers. 
she point of difficulty has been as to exactly bow this is 
to be accomplished. 
One particularly troublesome question is however, what 
duties a director who is essentially a representative of the 
employees or the relevant trade union should have to the 
company, -and non-labour interests, where the model of worker 
director participation is applicable. The Trades Union 
Congress and the Labour Party's Report, the Community and 
the Company, 
(859) 
consider that the 'worker directors', 
which both have advocated should be introduced on a 
mandatory basis, should have their duties and responsibilities 
specifically defined, and' should not be under the general 
fiduciary duties of the ordinary directors. The T. U. C. 
has emphasised on a number of occasions that the information 
that is acquired by the union representative on a board of 
directors, would be-useful for the purposes of collective 
bargaining. However it would seem that if this is going 
to be the norm, the law would need to be ? ltered or at 
least clarified. 
(860) The City Company Law Committee in 
its report on employee participation, 
(861) 
was most critical 
of the suggestion that 'worker directors' should be afforded 
a special position with regard to their corporate duties. 
The Committee. claimed that 'it would... be regarded as 
unthinkable by a continental jurist that employee members 
of supervisory boards should have different duties, 
responsibilities or liabilities from those of other members 
Whilst it was acknowledged that a trade unionist serving* 
on a corporate board might often be confronted with 
conflicts of interest this should not justify a release 
from his duties to act bona fidi in the best interests of 
zys 
the company and to observe the general duties of a 
director. 
(862) 
The Stock Exchange in its comments to the 
Labour Party's report on 'the Community and the Company' 
considered that it was 'unacceptable that a certain class 
of director should receive special legal status'. 
(863) 
The Labour Party in this report, however, stated that apart 
from the basic duty of advancing efficiency in the 
corporation, worker directors should bear certain fundamental 
fiduciary duties that all directors bore. The, Report 
commented that 'such'a duty implies that they must not 
profit from their office by the private 'use of inside 
information gained in the boardroom and must not impart to 
third parties confidential information'. The Working Party 
which wrote the report, continue that 'even their right to 
report back to their workers would no doubt have limits in 
respect of trade secrets the dissemination of which could 
injure the company's competitive position'. There is no 
mention however, of Price sensative information that is not 
a trade secret and it is unfortunate that the. Norking Party 
did not. go into this problem further. 
(864) The duty upon 
worker directors to report back information that comes into 
their possession, to their constituents is a matter neglected 
by most writers and commentators on the subject. If 
employees are to be properly protected and appraised-of the 
true state of affairs of their corporate employer, it would 
seem that a high proportion of so called 'inside information' 
might under this criteria be legitimately disclosed to them. 
Now that it is generally accepted that employees in a 
company have in many respects an interest. in the company 
as great as the majority of investors it is possible to 
argue that the disclosure rights of such should be at 
least equal to those of investors. 
The recommendations of the Labour Party's Report on 
employee participation and the informational rights of 
employee representatives, read on conjunction with the 
recommendations made by the Working Party on insider 
trading regulation presents 'a strong possibility that 
worker directors would find themselves in an intolerable 
position with regard to the information that they acquire. 
The Working Party recommended. iii effect that all persons 
with price sensative information, are to be regarded as 
insiders. This is qualified by the fact that an insider 
would under the recommended provisions only be-liable if 
he uses the information for the purpose of dealing to make 
a profit or avoid a loss, or that he communicates the 
information to another with the intention that the 
recipient might engage in dealings, or where there are good 
reasons for supposing that he might. 
(865) 
If a worker 
director or representative was placed in possession of 
material price sensative information about the corporate 
employer and he considered that it was his duty to inform 
his constituents which might number some 40,000 employees 
it would be at least reasonable to assume that some of the 
recipients of the information might arrange any investment 
intentions that they might have with regard to their 
corporate employer, accordingly, and thus at least on a 
literal construction of the law, as recommended by the 
Report, expose the worker director to liability under the 
anti-insider trading provisions. There are of course a 
host of other examples that could be given. 
The Labour Party's Working Party did deal, to some extent, 
with the objection that a worker director in one company 
night communicate information to another worker director or 
representative in another corporation which would injure the 
competitive position of the first company, either directly 
or, through the trade union. The Report observed that 'we do 
not believe that the sense of responsibility of those who 
meet in a working mens club would fall below that of their 
critics who often converse after dinner in their London 
r 
Clubs with directors from other companies. 
86o The Report 
also pointed out that worker directors no less than other 
directors, and probably even more, would be interested-in 
the viability of the company and its future. However, where 
the employee representatives are nominated or representative 
of f-a trade union then it has to be accepted that there is a 
natural and strong allegiance to the essentially 'outside' 
interests of the union and its membership. 
(867) 
In dealing 
with union allegiance, at the level of worker directors 
and regional officials the strong political element has to 
be considered. Indeed in Germany there have been cases 
where the employees have actively campaigned and voted out 
of office their union representatives in favour of a 
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representative fron among themselves. 
(865) 
The employees 
have in such cases evidently felt a lack of sympathy between 
their own best interests, as they see them, and those 
advocated by 'worker directors' with certain 'outside' 
interests. It is obvious that a union nominated director 
has a 'duty', perhaps an overriding duty to his union and 
it would be fascile to think that the interests of the 
union and the particular company will alwaysI or even 
generally coincide. 
(869) 
It is of some interest to refer to the provisions in 
the industrial Democracy Bill of 1975, which was a private 
members bill, introduced by irr-Giles Radice i1. P., and which 
was drafted with the assistance of the T. U. C. The (870) 
relevant provision was contained in Clause 1(2) of the Bill. 
'A director, nieiber of a supervisory board or merriöer of 
a management board shall observe the utmost good faith 
towards the company in any transaction with it or on 
its behalf and act honestly in the exercise of the 
, powers and discharge of the duties of his office, and 
in particular shall not make use of any noiZey or other 
property of the company or any information assigned 
by him (871) by virtue of his office to gain directly 
or indirectly an improper advantage for himself at 
the expense of the company'. (872) 
This provision was obviously intended to cover 
considerably more than insider trading, and covers a 
large portion of the traditional fiduciary responsibilities 
of directors and officers. It is dubious how much further 
this provision would have taken the existing law. It (873) 
would seem in essence merely to restate the existing lab. 
The impact of, this provision on insider trading would, it 
is submitted have been minimal. Firstly it remains to be 
seen what the words 'information assigned by (probably, to) 
him' means. This would seem to import that information 
must be given rather than taken, and that there has been 
a conscious assignation by the corporation through its 
appropriate officers. This fundamental uncertainty is 
highly undesirable in this type of provision. Secondly 
in view of the unfortunate experiences of the Australian 
Statds with their similarly worded section 124(2) of the 
Uniform Companies Act 1961, the 'words gain directly or 
indirectly' would seem to refer to the gaining of the 
> g. 
ý1 
advantage; rather than the use that the information is put 
to. This would seem to limit the provision to cases where 
the insider obtains the advantage directly himself, and 
not 'indirectly' through his spouse or associates. Whilst 
this may seem rather confusing the Australian provision 
was construed as to be inapplicable where the insider 
allows his infant children to trade, or, trades on their 
behalf, or his spouse or his associates, 
(874) 
'Because 
of these difficulties, and the fact that it was possible 
to evade Section 124(2) of the Australian provisions by 
interposing another corporation between-the issuer of the 
securities and the insider, the 13, ustralian States amended 
their section so as to provide that the words 'directly 
or indirectly' appear immediately before the words 'use'. 
These provisions will of course be discussed more fully 
elsewhere. 
{'urthermore, and perhaps a greater deficiency, -is that 
Clause 1(2) only prohibits an insider as defined in its 
scope, making a personal gain, and not allowing someone 
else to gain by bis passing on the information or dealing 
on their behalf. The danger of 'tipping' and 'leaking' 
confidential information is likely to be a much greater 
danger in the context of worker participation than worker 
directors or representatives directly indulging in direct 
insider trading themselves. It would seem reasonable to 
assume that most trade unionists and people likely to be 
worker representatives would not normally have equity 
investments themselves. The problem is all the more acute 
as many persons do not appreciate the dangers of passing 
information of this nature on, to others, *and would not 
necessarily consider that it was wrong. The Cohen Committee 
r ý-7 
made this point. 81 The Clause only covers the situation' 
where the insider makes a personal gain at the expense of 
the company. This is obviously a far too narrow approach, 
although rather anomalously the Jenkins Committee 
recommended this approach. 
87d It would be exceedingly 
difficult in most cases of '. pure' insider trading to find 
any corporate detriment, of a. tangible nature. Furthermore 
most systems of law that cover insider trading view the 
insiders gain or corporate detriment as alternative basis 
for liability, not complementary. 
2t, 
Furthermore the Clause leaves open the questions to 
whether the information must be material-or not, and 
whether the insider must actually intend to use the 
information to provide himself with a personal gain at 
the expense of his corporation. Again these are serious 
defects. Finally and perhaps rather interestingly, it 
is submitted that apart from these other points the 
provisions would have absolutely no application to 
insider trading, as for liability to be predicted the 
advantage must be improper. Disregarding what the' word 
'advantage' might mean in this context, 'insider trading 
is debatably not regarded as improper, at least under the 
law as it now stands. Thus it would seem that the mere 
use of information for personal private speculation in 
securities would not be prescribed by Clause 1(2). 
The Labour Government although in favour of employee 
participation in management, 
($77) 
were anxious to 
consider what approach would be the most advantageous 
; 87S) 
and to this end appointed a Committee of Inquiry under 
Lord Bülloek. 
(879) 
The Committee was instructed to report 
as quickly as was possible, 
(880) 
and it'delivered its 
Report in January l977. 
(831) 
Obviously this is not the 
place to discuss the recoxmendations of the Report other 
than with regard to insider trading. Both the majority 
and the minority of the Committee recommended employees 
participation in management and the Committee's observations 
on insider trading must be seen in this light. The Committee 
accepted that both sides of industry were concerned about 
the question of confidential information, and noted the 
danger of insider trading. 
(882) The Committee thought that 
there should be a clear statement of the basic duties of 
directors, and that all directors should have the same 
duties and liabilities. Specifically on the question of 
insider trading the Committee stated that, 
'there seems no reason to exempt any director from the 
duties concerning secret profits or any law which is likely to be enacted regulating insider trading. No 
director should be able to use information received in the boardroom for personal profits'. (883) 
The Committee thought that it was vitally necessary for 
worker representatives on board of directors to be able to 
' Cc 
report back to the employees and -make soundings before 
decisions, although it was considered unwise to make 
this a specific legal duty. ' The Committee acknowledged 
that the ability of worker representatives to report 
back to employees and trade unions might create problems 
of confidentiality. The Committee thought 
, 
that at 
present the label of confidentiality was too readily 
applied . and that- the new management structure which they 
proposed should embody the ideals of openness. On the 
otherhand the Report accepted that there was a category 
of information which should legitimately be considered of 
a confidential nature and among such was certain types of 
price sensative information. 
It is not without interest that the Committee felt 
that worker representatives would in most instances be 
able to sufficiently report back to their constituents 
without disclosing specific confidential information. 
It was also pointed out that worker directors would have 
an obvious interest in not intentionally damaging the 
commercial facilities of the company, by making rash 
disclosures. The point was also made that trade unionists 
and worker representativew were already used to dealing 
with confidential information in the context of collective 
bargaining. The submissions of the T. U. C. that 
confidential information should not be defined in 
legislation and the normal law of confidence should apply 
was accepted. The Committee thought that it was 
undesirable to make any real attempt to lay down in 
legislation areas of confidentiality as so much would 
depend upon the facts, and the strength of the contention 
that a particular project directly effected existing 
employee interests. In essence the Committee endorsed 
the Swedish practice where the Chairman and the worker 
representatives would informally come to some agreement 
as to what areas should be reported back to the employees. 
Apart from -tbe question of statutory provisions 
increasing the informational expectations of employees 
and their trade unions, and the promise of mandatory 
participation in management, many trade unions and 
employees individually have sought a greater degree of 
involvement in the framework of collective bargaining. 
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Indeed the trade unions have been opposed to the concept 
of participation in management, in the past, and still in 
many cases are today, because of the inevitable impairment, 
at least in theory, that joint responsibility of employees 
in the decisional process brings. T'Iany collective agreements 
contain provisions analagous to the so called 'Pilkington 
Clause' which provides 'prior consultation will take place 
before any change in working practice, methods or payment ° 
is implemented, should the -change result in dispute 
between the management and the union the practice shall 
revert to what it was... and the change-shall only be made 
subsequently should it be agreed upon through existing 
negotiating procedures. 
(884) 
The Commission on Industrial 
Relations Report on the Disclosure of Information, 
emphasised that unions frequently obtained considerably 
more information from their employers than would be 
available in the company's reports, for the purpose of 
collective bargaining. 
(885) 
Indeed the Secretary of the 
: association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial 
Staff, stated in October 1; '72 that he bad asked a hundred 
of Britains largest companies if they would give the 
union advance notice if there was any danger of a 
takeover, or if the company was going to make a 
substantial investment in another company. 
(886) 
particularly interesting development is that of the 
creation by the South ; ales Branch of the Transport and 
General porkers Union of an 'Observation and Disciplinary 
Tribunal' the objective of which is to observe and report 
on management conduct. The Tribunal will evidently, where 
appropriate attempt to call persons before it and 
administer reprimands and recommendations, and in the 
ultimate there would be the sanction of industrial 
action. 
(887) 
The problems of the protection of employees 'rights' 
and the dangers of the provision of privileged advance 
information are most acute in the case of a corporate 
takeover or reorganisation: It'is now generally accepted 
that workers representatives should be brought into the. 
plans at a relatively early stage. 
(888) 
Certainly there 
have been a number of recent cases where unions and indeed 
the employees as distinct fron the trade unions have played 
`ýýý2 
}. a significant role in the eventual determination of the 
merger or takeover. 
(889 
There would seem to be an ever 
increasing trend to recognise and afford at least the 
protection of disclosure to employees in this situationc89°ý 
Whilst many would be prepared to accept a greater degree 
of involvement on the part of employees objections have 
been raised to the reorganisation of corporate structures 
along the-line of the dual board system as widaly found 
and required in Europe. Of course as a matter of practice 
in all companies there will be a division between those 
directors who exercise executive responsibilities and 
those who do not, and are included on the board in an 
advisory and supervisory capacity. The primary criticism 
of the European models of codetermination in the British 
context is the mandatory aspect. It is certainly 
misconceived to think of increased employee participation 
solely in the context of the dual board system as. (891) 
participatory models can be devised with a unitary board. 
Nonetheless whatever model is eventually decided upon, the 
problems of inside information, and its dissemination and 
use remain. 
It is of some surprise to find that the Trades Union 
Congress has not made a formal statement on insider trading, 
'altbough the Congress would obviously consider this to be 
one of the problem areas which will need to be tackled at 
some time in a companies Bill. 
(892) The T. U. C. takes the 
view that the information which would confer an advantage 
for securities dealings on an insider basis, would only 
rarely be disclosed privately to negotiators in advance 
of the public. however,. as has been shown above, there is 
today under the present law and procedures considerable 
opportunity for union officials and shop stewards to 
obtain confidential price sensative information. Indeed 
by virtue of their position and involvement in the 
enterprise employees are in the nature of 'insiders'. 
Demands by union officials and others that employees should 
be afforded rights to examine the corporate books and 
records to detect managerial incompetence or imprudence, 
have been faced on occasions, by the argument that apart 
from the directors, and then not all of such, the workers 
probably know just as much about the affairs and fortunes 
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of tike company as anyone else. whilst there is no doubt 
some truth in this it would seem misguided to maintain 
that an ordinary production line worker at Fords, is in 
a position analagous to that of a senior executive, 
professional adviser or director. It is probable, and yet 
no reflection on the employee, that even if be was given 
access to earnings estimates, and the like he would not 
comprehend such. 
(893) 
On the other band the production 
line workers are in certain instances afforded a semblance 
of 'insider. status' . For example new models of cars and 
new design variations are displayed and-explained to the 
workers at Fords, 'on a confidential basis'. It is of 
course interesting to note that advance knowledge of 
industrial action by a union or group of employees might 
well constitute 'inside information'. 
There can be little doubt that in some instances certain 
employees will have direct access to price sensative 
information by virtue of their position, and as a general 
proposition the more senior position that they occupy the 
greater will be the occurrence-of this 'insider status'. 
. 
ýhus in the Courtline collapse whilst there is little doubt 
that the announcement of the financial crash of the company 
came as, a complete shock to the vast majority of its 
employees there were a number of employees and indeed 
'travel agents' either in the 'know' or at least so placed 
to have made an educated guess. The Takeover Panel has bad 
to face unusual cases, where employees who would not 
normally be. considered to be insiders have been able to 
avail themselves of their 'privileged' position. The former 
Deputy Director General of the Executive, and Head of the 
Stock Exchanges Membership Department, Mr. Basil Dennington, 
informed the present author that in one particular enquiry 
into an alleged leakage of inside information, the Stock 
Exchange and Panel found that the employees of a small 
Midland company were alerted by the managing director coming 
to work one day in a suit and bowler bat, and his going off 
to lunch in a hired car with-two other directors. In actual 
fact the lunch was in connection with negotiations for the 
finalization of a very favourable merger. Certain of the 
more astute employees evidently invested and made a 
substantial profit on the basis of this. The 'Takeover Panel 
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took no action - perhaps understandably. 
(894) 
It is not without interest that the T. U. C. and other 
have commented that 'in as much as the development of 
disclosure of negotiations in advance of the public would 
lead to less secrecy in business it would also lessen the 
opportunities for misuse of privileged information'. 
(896) 
It is true that there comes a point where the information 
is so widely known that it could be said to be fairly 
within the public domain, but it would seem that the T. U. C. 
is not necessarily concerned with this. Merely td increase 
the number of persons with access to material price 
sensative information before public disclosure is at best 
to invite trouble, particularly where the use that such 
information is put to would be wholly unregulated by law or 
any self-regulatory regime. 
The Trades Union Congress has not given any guidance on 
the handling of inside information, and denies that its 
own officers would in any appreciable number of cases ever 
have possession of such. In a small survey carried out by 
the author(897) it was found that the trade unions sampled, 
were either ignorant of what insider trading was, or 
considered that their officers and members would be most 
unlikely to ever acquire inside information. Indeed some 
trade unionist appeared resentful that they should be even 
asked whether they operated internal procedures with regard 
to confidential info37mation. In no case was it found that 
the Trade Union was adequately aware of the dangers and 
bad taken any real steps to impose restrictions on the use 
of such information by its members or offi; cers. 
(898) This 
approach is disturbing and shows a lack of true 
responsibility, or at least understanding. 
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THE REGUL. TION O INSIDER TRADING IN THE UNITED STATES 
On Ail RICA 
The present author has Great reservations as to whether 
a discussion of_the topic of anti-insider trading regulation 
is feasible without detailed reference to the great wealth 
of experience in the United States of America, and for that 
matter, elsewhere'. It is thus with great reluc;, tance that 
the three chapters that the present author bad originally 
written on the American law has been excluded almost in 
total, and a further two chapters on anti-insider trading 
regulation throughout the world have been omitted, save 
for the law in Canada and Australia. Apart from the great 
advantage that comparative analysis can afford to the 
drafting and administration of such laws, given the 
internationalisation of the securities markets, a know edge 
of the relevant law in other countries is often vital. 
. ýowever, it is not, and cannot be, the purpose of this 
? resent study to provide a text on the whole area covered 
by anti-insider trading reýulation, 
ýlý 
nor a practical 
guide, even on the few aspects that it does comprehend. 
The regulation of insider trading in the United States, 
both with regard to legislation and common law development, 
and also through self-regulation, has attained the highest 
form of development in the world. No legislator or lawyer 
required to consider the problem of insider trading, could 
afford to ignore it. The concepts of materiality, privity, 
scienter, causation and damage, are the same in virtually 
all forms of anti-insider trading regulation. The statutory 
short-swing profits rule attempts to provide the benefits 
of predictability and automatic application, albeit at the 
expense of fairness in some cases. The contihuous 
disclosure regime, and provisions designed to ensure 
disclosure of insiders beneficial interests in securities 
are similarly the most effective provisions in operation 
in any system of securities regulations. Fortunately the 
present study does retain two sections, which in the present 
authors view are probably the most important factorain 
effective anti-insider trading regulation; that is the 
definition of insiders and tippees, and the system of 
market surveillance and timely disclosure, (2) It is 
tCf. 
regretted that in raising these issues, otber. extremely 
important questions arise which cannot be pursued here. 
It is hoped that the reader will fully appreciate the 
problems created by such an approach and excuse the 
inevitable unanswered questions and unexplained references. 
It is of course true that a vast amount of material has 
been written on the regulation of insider trading, and 
associated matters in the United 'States, and it recent 
years a number of works have also appeared describing 
insider trading regulation in certain European 
countries. 
(3) 
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(1) VIHO ES AN INS JDER 
Unlike in the case of Section 16(b) there are no precise 
definitions of who is and who is not an insider under the 
relevant principles-of Rule 101b)(5). 
(4)Indeed 
under 
Rule 10(b)(5) the relevant question is not so much whether 
the particular person, who it is sought to make liable is an 
insider, whatever such a term. may mean, but whether there 
has been an abuse such as is within the scope of the implied 
liability created by the rule. A prior catagorisation is 
irrelevänt and dangerous. However, in the nature of things, 
it is. necessary to determine what kind of person and 
situations are most likely to be within the provision. 
Generally under the Federal Securities laws responsibility 
Bows from control st'atus, and this is as good a starting 
point under Rule i0(b)(5) as anywhere. However the imposition 
the so called abstain or disclose' rule- is not matched A. 
perfectly to control status, as is the recapture liability 
under Section 16(b). Whilst directors and officers are 
al-,,, Ost certain candidates for responsibility, as are 
substantial shareholders, 
(6) 
beyond this, little can be 
5 ü2. d with the degree of certainty generally accepted as 
desirable. Consistently with common law decisions, it was 
z0cepted in the Texa's Gulf Sulphur case that, corporate 
ployees can properly be regarded as withth the scope of 
tinsider= responsibilities under the rule, 
(8) 
In the, 
pistrict Court, Judge Bonsai stated 'if - an' employee in the 
6 nurse of his employment acquires secret information 
relating to his employers business, he occupies a position 
of trust and confidence toward it, analagous in most respects 
ta that of a fiduciary, and must govern his, actions accordingly. 
(9) The SEC in its Pre-Trial Memorandum was even more explicit, 
'any corpdrate officer or employee who in . 
the course of his 
duties has been entrusted with knowledge of a material 
undisclosed fact becomes with respect to that ifact an insider. t 
(10) There is no indication how , 
far this approach extends 
-through tthe corporate 
hierarchy and might well comprehend the 
most menial of employees. 
0 
Commissioner Budge has, however, commented that normally the 
SEC would not pursue -'rank, and . 
file employees or persons 
outside the companu such as an analXst or: -reporter who 
learns of inside' information: -. 
tii 
Judge -Bonfsalt s test' = 
was expressly endorsed and applied by the same. Court in 
r pss v Licht 
(12)and 
would accord with the statements on 
insider status in other cases, and would- thus represent'the 
i aw with regard to employees. 
The bulk of federal cases dealing with insider- liability 
yn recent years have spoken in terms of 'access -to -insider' 
Information' as the appropriate determinant of status, 
The first authorative ennunciation of this ap 3 roach was by the 
Commission in the Matter of Cady Roberts 
(13 
- whichwas 
endorsed by the Courts in Texas Gulf; 
k14) 
the obligation of 
4ns _ders rests on two, principal elements, first the existence 
oT a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, 
tc information intended to be available only for a_ corporate 
.. u: pose and not for the personal benefit of -anyone, and second, 
the inherent unfairness-involved whore a party takes ., advantage 
of such -information knowing it' i's unavailable to those with 
. 111o3 he is dealing. ' This test can be applied to anyon-e, tlý }' the determination resting on the question of, acces's 
and unfairness. 
(16) 
Thus an 'insider' is a person who because 
ox his position -ar intimate association. with a. corporation. 
,, as a 
greater knowledge of the financial affairs o'f the ' 
, Corporation 
(17) ]n practice the access test-inevitably 
results. in certain catagories of person. by the very nature of 
their position being regarded as insiders, and paramount among 
such will, of course, be the traditional insider. relationships. ' 
However, ' these 'by no means exhaust the classes of person 
upon whom there is an' obligation' , this much was em hasised 
the Court of Appeals in . Texas 
Gulf Sulphur, 
(18. ) 
by 
-Tt is important to note the shift of. emphasis that the 
t access test' brings about. - In -effect the 'inquiry is redirected 
to- the 'type of information which. can be considered, of a 
suf L icient privileged status., to produce -liability, . where, 
there is an access relationship. -It is -the individuals :',; 
relationship with the information, and a particular and unusual 
type of information, that is critical, and not the individual's. 
relationship with the corporation, although of course the 
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latter relationship will bear upon the former. Thus the 
definitional problems are transported to the determination 
of what constitutes insider liability information. For 
instance, Bromberg comments 'trading by persons with 
undisclosed material information is generally a violation 
of Rule 10(b)(5)'. 
(19) 
Exactly what degree of 'access' to 
this category of. information is required for applicability 
of the Rule,. is open to question. . 
Professor Bromberg 
comments that 'probably something more than possession of 
the information is necessary ... probably it means possession 
intended to fulfil a corporate purpose' of the company to 
which the information relates. 
(20) 
The concepts of access 
and possession are difficult to apply and lend themselves 
better to academic and jurisprudential- discussion than to 
cold application and administration. 
Although lomically the access test is capable. of finding 
insider status even though there is no relationship with 
the corporation, , 
'as a practical matter' the test is only 
applied upon some basis of a relationship giving access 
with the corporation,. and thus a corporation-individual 
relationshi-ro is necessary. 
(21) 
Thus two categories of 
potential defendant emerge, firstly, the defendant who 
acquires 'liability information' because of his position, 
the traditional insider and the category of person who are 
within the scope of the generally accepted principle that 
'those in power should not make. use of confidential 
information for private gain', 
(22) 
and then secondly the 
other defendant who merely comes into possession of inside 
information not. necessarily because of any position that he 
might hold. This latter category is preferably designated 
. 
that of 'tippee-insiders'. 
(23 
Obviously in practice there 
are numerous cases where it is extremely difficult to decide 
whether a given individual is properly to be regarded as 
within the category of primary 'access insiders' or the 
secondary category of 'possession' insiders. 
There-is a particularly, troublesome group of persons 
who. do -not fit in with any great harmony to either 
category of insider. There are persons who, whilst not 
i 
retained or employed with a particular issuer, 
nonetheless are in a position to receive 'inside' 
information. Among these persons are investment 
consultants, management consultants, financial advisers, 
lawyers, accountants, public relations advisers, and a 
host of others, who whilst not traditionally conceived 
as insiders, might well be insiders through access or 
possession. 
(24)-Although there has been virtually no 
judicial or administrative discussion of the exact status 
of these persons la. r'gely because the discussion has centred 
more on the nature of the information concerned, and whether 
such is properly to be considered inside information, it 
would seem that these persons are more generally regarded 
as coming within the second category of insider. There are 
indications that the Commission has become alert to the 
desirability for clarification in this area, and has in 
recent years been increasingly more prepared to file 
complaints alleging insider abuse by such persons. 
(25) Thus 
it -,, would seem that whether these categories of 'insiders' be 
regarded as 'access insiders' as are traditional insiders or 
as 'tippees' their liability will still be predicted upon 
Rule l0(b)(5). 
: batever liability is properly placed upon insiders, 
particularly of the traditional type, it could easily 
be evaded if those persons immediate family were not 
accorded the same treatment. 
(26) The problem here is to 
avoid the erection of a liability structure of imponderable 
dimensions. The Commission has long considered that 
'intimacy' with the source of the inside information demands 
restraint, lest the uninformed be exploited. 
(27) Thus to 
the ends or eradicating the essential unfairness of 
insider trading the Commission will attempt to subject 
trading by insider's wives or husbands, near relatives and 
business associates to the same strictures as the insider. 
lhether the spouse or associate is to be considered as an 
insider, properly so called,. or a tippee-insider, is 
debatable. Furthermore, where the insider is himself 
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only a tippee, it is open to question whether the spouse 
or associate of such would be caught, as such is in effect 
a tippee of a tippee. 
(28ý 
As to the liability of tippees 
themselves, this will be discussed later. The Court of 
Appeals in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case treated purchases 
by the defendantts. wives as though they had been,. made by 
the insider himself , and simply dismissed any alternative 
argument as tunrealisti ct. 
(29) 
In another case a 
plaintiff sought relief against members of an insiders 
family for their transactions, alleging that they wlore 
both insiders and tippees. 
(30) 
Thus although there is 
very little law on the question of dealings by members of { 
insiders and tippees families, it would appear accepted, 
as in the case of section 16(b) that dealings of a spouse 
or unerancipated child, and probably other close relatives, 
ni11 be treated as those of the insider. The New York 
Stock Exchange has stated emphatically that members of 
insiders families and their associates are reg, ax`ded by the 
public as insiders themselves and 'while this assumption 
may be unjustified in many cases, it is a fact of life 
which those in a position of leadership and responsibility 
cannot ignore. 
(31) 
Whilst this extension of liability 
does create problems, particularly given the uncertainties 
as to the primary liability of insiders, it has to be 
remembered that the Courts are applying broad equitable 
principles and 'there is no need to become entangled in 
a semantic classification to establish liability. If an 
insider analysis is inappropriate, a tippee'approach will 
reach the same result. 
(32) 
It is thus necessary to 
consider the much wider area of tippee liability in some 
depth, before any notion of the scope of possible liability 
is obtained. 
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(2) . TIPPE': -'S AND THE PROBLEM OF THE SECUIRITIES II:. rDUSTRY 
(A) SECURITIES PROFESSIONALS AS INS TDERS - AND . TIPPFES 
if it is impossible. to . estimäte' with. any 
degree of 
accuracy, how much insider trading' goes -, än, 
it is all the 
more difficult to. express . any view as to the' extent of 
t_ppee trad-ing.: An anonymous Arnes i-can stockbroker writing 
under the' name " of - Brutus ,- has' observed =there are numerous 
psychological -reasons , why persons give _tip3': 
to. each other- 
guilt, friendship, insecurity, reciprocity. are all (33) dpub f ul 
" good reasons. It is. +t aCif the ex i ent of tipping of 
inside information is, anywhere near' the proportions suggested 
in the v: ritings . o'f -Professor Manne.. 
(34) 
Manne considers 
that it is probable that a market for: the exchange of 
valuable information operates on a large scale in' -the United 
States' . 
(35) 
ýIherever securities markEts exist it would scorn 
rumour and; 'significantly, educated guesses, which are often 
the -close cousin of insider 'tips'. play a major role in 
th, e determination of individual . investment 
dec is. ions q' 
(3o ) 
From the moral point of view there is great difference in 
an insider properly so called,. who has been entrusted with 
access : to certain. information abusing such in his personal 
transactions, -`and the position of someone who merely has 
the infor: iation placed into his hands., *. a distinction in 
many vJays -similar to the thief and the. receiver , of stolen 
' property.. In cases involving _breach: of-. trust, a person 
assisting the trustee in the violation with knowledge or 
reasonable grounds for suspecting an abuse, will be placed 
in the same position as. that 
! fiduciary. 
(37) 
However, 
where the conduct of the non-Fiduciary falls short of 
'knowingly confederating in the breach' or assisting with 
knotirl, edge' then there would be no such liability on the part 
o, E the non-fiduciary. Similarly under Rule 10(b)'(5)', Zoss 
has' commented that "to hold "tippees liable -under Rule 10(b) (5) 
when 'they hod no reason to suspect that their informant was an 
insider nii ht result in an unreasonable entrapment of the 
innocent... ' (38). 
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"part-icularly -troubl-esome -aspec-t -to' any- -concept- of 
tippee . liability, - 
is. the 
-pos. 
iti. on of.,. tho_se persgnp whose 
function or activity inevitably exposes them to the 
receipt of material, price' sensativ. e införmatiorý, ., -There 
are - obviously , many in the securities : industry. itself- who 
are - constantly in receipt. . of- inside . 
information; - and . in..: 
most cases not through an 'access-, -. relationship'-as suchoý 
The ratio alitation- of the- law in this area- has been, slow 
and- of a; def iclent. nature,., so that- substantial; . 
uncertainty 
exists both at. to : the : parameters and- extent, of liability. 
There is an obvious public- interest, in the, mos t"- 
: efficient and sensiblh-allocation of: scarce. capital_ 
resources to--particular enterprises, and, of-vital. 
significance here, is the question of disclosure, -as-has 
already been seen. The disclosure- regime in - p'rac t-ice,., and 
many contend. in aim, is and should be' directed primarily 
at the -securities: prof'essiohal, rho- functions asý a-. conduit 
and. ' dviser to the- providers 'f capital, and, invo tors. 
G ven-- this factor, and the role of the* securities: '. _ 
professional as an advise= and. thus (searcher . _for -in-forma±on' 
.. it is uridoubbtedly'. the -fact that . person 5, -engaged_. 
in,. -the; 
-. secu. rities industry are likely at any given.. time'to.. be, 
iri direct and indirect receipt Qf considerably more 
lnf6lM tion, ' with a. much higher thresho'd''of" intelligibility 
than' -the, ordinary investor. " -This is their very., : Pais on. d' etna 
`3g) 
Apart' from the securities professionals legitymate quest 
, for investment information; ' he is fgceci 'with a' number of 
other areas of po'ssibl'e conflict, " For'ä variety of treasons, 
among which is' to -increase the avai}'abi'lity- of infäimat-ion, 
securities fir; ns and investment bankers 'often have "n'om i! nees 
or representatives 'on the, board's ' of corpdr'ato 'issuers , -'with 
which' they might have underwriting *agreements'. '- Furthermore 
there ' is an increasing trend for' inves'tm'ent mehagers' and 
institutional 'investors to recognise -thie respdnsi-bilities 
of their large holdings and to " beco^, ºe -involved with corporate 
., 4 
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management, 
(40) 
4'Jhilst-many securities houses appoint 
'outsiders 4 to these, ; ýositions-(4 
) their nature hardly 
alters.. As far back as. 1958., Lehman Brothers directors 
and partners , held 170 d rec'torshi. ps in 128 listed 
con, oanies,. with assets of aver $100,642,000,000, 
(-42) 
'This centralisation ofimportant directorships 
concentrates in one group of men, maximum access to- 
inside information, maximum power to use inside information'. 
. (43) This. would . seem to be by no means an unusual situation. (44. ýSecurities. 
professionals also obtain inside information 
ýh ough_ their dealings as underwriters and corporate- advisers 
even where, there is. not formal board rep res-entation. 
Cora ercial banks-, by reason of their very function, - 
are in possession of information as to the finances of 
heir. corporate clients, and are thus in a- position to ý- 1t 
äe considered an t insiders 
t4'ý 
Given the inevitable 
possibilities of access and possession. of inside 
_n+'ormation, there are considerable potentialities for 
conflicts of interest. Securities professionals and 
Banks perform a multiplicity, of roles, and apart' from 
direct investment management and investment advice, 
such will have deal. ings with other corporations, to all 
of whom there will' be varying duties. of either disclosure ('46) 
or non-disclosure. In addition there is the' 
possib, i. lity of misapplication, of the info`rnatlon 'by the 
securities firm and its officers directly for their own 
personal interests, ' 
Where there is any 'privileged' access"or possession 
of inside inform. ätion and also a 'duty- "to advise' on 
nvestments, there will be 'a conflict of interest. 
Securities'professionals giving investment advice under 
the Commissions suitability, rules and the Iso-called' 'shingle theory', 
_ are 
bound. to obtain current basic 
information regarding the security -. o. and although some 
customers will independently-determine to purchase or 
7 jý 
r 
sell specific securities and will not reuest or desire 
the adtice of a, broker o: o the. broker would* appear, to be 
obliged to reveal to the customer information known to 
him about the security which might. reasonably be'expected 
to affect the customer's decision '... t 
(47) 
In. seeking 
out and providing vital investment. information, tr both 
lay and professional investors and their advisers, of 
vital. importance is the investment analyst. At ä1l 
l. evels of the industry there are. both real and. theoretical 
fundemental conflicts and a. profound uncertainty' as- to 
what sources oi'information can be . 
1egitimately. utilised 
and to. what extent the resultant information can be' 
capitalised upon. Obviously, as in other 'shadowy areas' 
of ; the law, this results in undue advantage toI the 
unscrupulous. Although'the vast majority of the so-called 
ttips'. which float around the customers rooms of brokerage 
offices are worthless' 
(4$+ 
professionals engaged in 
the securities 'industry are in 'a far better position to 
evaluate such than the, ordinary investor.. ý Furthermore, 
persons engaged in the securities industry are better. 
able to utilise the privileged information, and to do so 
in a mannerthat is either difficult or impossible to detect. (49) 'The ways in which professional advisers. and. analysts 
will utilise privileged information are, of course, 
multifarious. Information can be included 'in intrafixm 
reports and arket reports., incorporated. into general 
investment circulars, utilised directly in the management 
of portfolio investments, and rdirect . notification 
to special 
and selected clients. Given the significance of commission 
earnings on institutional investor clients, securities 
firms would appear to give such preferred 'treatment. 
During the Senate Hearings on_ Stock Exchange Practices 
the use of 'priority lists' by brokers was found tö be 
reasonably widespread.. read.. 
51) yp The. Chief' Examiner, Ferdinand 
Precora, 'though t 'iha't ' such might be used f. ör "mutual " 
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backscratchingt by insiders. 
(52) 
Although Professor 
Männe has fastened upon such as supporting his notion 
of a scsphisticated' exchänge'mgrket of insider, information, 
-'there are perfectly sensible and -unobjectionable . reasons 
, for such lists: Obviously 'a securities' house with many 
thöusands, ý perhaps' millions; " of - clients spread 'over=-a 
"viidegeographical. area, - could not hope to 'inforth' all 
simultaneously of significant corporate developments: (53) 
Provided *"clients are made äw: are that the firm does 
operate 'a preferential list or an alphabetical list, - 
then "the practice is' acceptable-. 
(54) ' Professionals in 
the securities business have not, -in the past, been loath 
to utilise privileged inlormation personally,: 'nor trade 
on the basis 'of expected market impact of their ovin 
releases (55 
Turning now to the question of 'regulation-, 
the first-case to indicate--that ä professional engaged 
in the securities industry could be liable as an -ins-ider 
or' tippee under-Rule 10(b) (5)' was the Comrnissionts, 
disciplinary 'action in the matter of Cady- Roberts -&--Company.. (56)' 
The facts of this case 'have already been alluded - to 
in the prior discussion of-deputizationo The proceedings 
were brought 'ag'ainst Cady Roberts itself and Gintel-, one 
of ' its partners, for -alleged violations of Rule 10(b)(5), 
and also ' soction 17(a-) 'of the 1933 Act: In the result-, 
both defendants entered into a se'ttlement' with the 
Commission that the record would show the facts 'äs 
bt'ipuleted by the Commission, provided 'that. the- only : 
sanction that 'was 'administered was not -greater than a: 
temporary suspension of Gintel 'for not more* than twenty 
days from the Neer York Stock Exchange: '=' The Commission 
-seized the opportunityt for -emphasising that' Rule 10(b) (5) 
and'' section '17 (a): were 'broad remedial provisions designed 
'to' protect 'investors, 'and the requirements of -these 
provisions were" not" precise and technical as those of- the 
common lat, s; but tigere intended to prescribe' all ' deceptive 
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and manipulative, practices, The SEC. found the mis- 
repres_entation in the : affirmative . 
duty, todisclose 
. 
material information ... traditionally imposed on corporate 
insiders, particularly officers, directors and controlling 
stockholders. 'Until this opinion,. it. was not clear whether 
a mere -non-disclosure would be considered a misrepfesentation 
under the Rule.: Whilst there. were decisions imposing upon 
brokers, the duty to make a full disclosure when dealing 
on their-own account; this was based on an implied. 
representation,. 
(58) 
similarly, those-cases where brokers 
have been held liable for failing-to disclose material 
information when effecting transactions. for insiders, 
(59) have been based on-conspiracy and aider and abettor 
notions. Thus the Commission extended the affirmative 
obligation upon (insiders' to disclose material, non-public 
information considerably further than any other: previous 
decision on-Rule 10(b) (5) liability. The SEC emphasised 
that the obligation was equally applicable to exchange 
and face-to-face transactions. 
ý60) 
Although the 
defendants had cited a number of cases indicating that 
some form of privity was required for liability, the 
Commission considered. that this was not the case in 
adm ni, trative actions. Chainiian -Cary stated 'the absence 
of-. a remedy by-the-private litigant. because of: lack of 
privity does- not absolve an insider. from responsibility. 
for fraudulent conduct. ' 
(61)The 
Commission further 
emphasised, that ", the obligations imposed under Rule-10(b)(5) 
were in no way .. limited to persons. occupying a 
*fiduciary 
status. 
(62) 
It was also confirmed that the . rule applies 
to bath" purchases and sales of securities. ,. 
`As has already been observed,.. the Commission in. the 
present case considered that the duty rested uppn, the 
' existence of .a relationship giving . access to. information 
intended to be available for only : acorporate purpps. 
e and 
the "inherient unfairness involved. where a par't': takes . 
advantage of such information, knowing it is unavailable 
2`ý 
to those with whom he is dealing. ' 
(63) 
Applying this, 
the-SEC considered that Gintel's close relationship with 
--the corporate insider should subject him- to. "the, same 
duties- and responsibilities as were applicable, to the 
insider himself. 
t64 
The duty, enounced- by- the. 
Commission was r 
that insiders must disclose material facts 
which are known to-them by virtue. of- their 
position, -but 
which are known to persons 
with whom- they deal and which, if known, 
-would affect their investment judgement. Failure-to make disclosure in these 
circumstances constitutes a violation 
of the anti-fraud-provisions. -If on the hand disclosure prior to effecting a purchase, 
or sale would be improper or unrealistic 
under the circucnstances, we believe that 
the alternative is to forego the transaction. -' 
Thus here as Gintel was in the, same position as the 
insider-director, he eras, precluded fror, dealing without 
disclosure, and this 'prohibition extends not only over 
his own account, but to selling for discretionary 
accounts and soliciting and, executing other orders. ' 
The-SEC left open the question of unsolicited orders 
however. - It is important ; 
tö note, that the Commission 
considered that the transactions were still objectionable 
even though the broker had no direct 
. 
interest, therein, 
This is obviously. logical, as othenvise, great, possibilities 
for evasion would arise. Moreover, brokers and professionals 
in the secuw ities, industry have a very 
, 
real -interest in 
the money. that they, make or. save, for their Clients.: 
This has. a direct. bearing on the retention and attraction 
Of. clients, and thus on. iccmmission earnings and prestige, 
and possible increased access to privileged sources of 
. nfci ration. (65) 
The 
, 
deg endan is argued that the Commission were 
contending for disclosure of 'adverse factors. disclosed 
by hi; s. analysis' which would, create uncertainty and 
confusion as 
_ 
to the duties of 'those. whose profession 
. 
it was 
to acquire and analyse corporate information, 
Z42 
The Commission did, not really answer this, but did 
admit that in certain carses 'there may be a question 
as -to the materiality and, significance. of some corporate 
facts and. as to the necessity for -their. disclosure : 
under particulars circumstances. "'Furthermore, 
Chairnan Cary pointed out that in the present 
. 
case . 
the, 
relevant information had not been the product of an 
indepth analysis of public information, " bü t was obtained 
from an insider in breach of-his-duty to the corporation. 
In case's of doubt, 
_ 
the SEC underlined the 'fact that the 
broker always-had the choice of refraining-from the 
transaction or reccmmendationo In- the present case this 
course would have been perfectly 'feasible as disclosure 
by the corporation was imminent. Of course, the difficulty 
with -placing such 'a disclosure obligation on professionals 
engaged in the securities industry, is that unlike 
--insiders properly so called, they are -not generally in a 
posit-ion to influence the corporate decision and machinery 
to effect disclosure. Indeed, as -one -learned- commentator 
has' -remarked, ' in many cases disclosure by the 'broker 
of confr. dential- information would involve his participation 
in- the - insider's breach of duty to his corporation-, ((06) Whilst "the simple disclose or abstain rule. provides 
a-very good general 'princilpe, in certain instances-it 
could impinge upon the proper functioning of a broker 
and his duty to 'his =clients. -In . -the present case' 
"Ginte'l claimed that he had already decided to off-load, 
Curtis-Wright shares ,. and -had already, commenced 
-liquidation before -receiving the inside informations' 
Furthermore "he contended that the h"ad -a fiduciary duty 
to these 'accounts. -to. continue -the sales 'which -'overrode 
any obligations to unsolicited purchases on. t1e exchanges. 
-Chairman Cary rejected the argument -that the di 
es 
subsequent'-to =the -receipt of the -inside information were 
merely gart of --the prior-programme-of - liquidation, 
as-the sales previous-to the 'txppingt werd both 
moderate and- relatively' ins'ignificant; - - 
2, ý. 3 
Furthermore,. Gintel had 'gone short' both for his wife's 
account and that of another-'mysterious investor'. 
Whilst- he unquestionably occupied a fiduciary 
relationship with his. clients, this-could-not justify 
violations of the . 
law, and the Federal Law. was here 
supreme. Thus the Commission stated that 'on-these 
facts, clients may not expect of a broker, the benefits 
of his inside information at the expense of the. public 
generally. ' 
- Although.. the Commission had accepted the settlement 
of the complaint, the opinion did discuss the, question 
of sanctions. Chairman Cary thought that this would 
depend upon 'all the surrounding circumstances and the 
state of mind, of, the participants'. -Whilst there was 
no evidence-of a'preconceived plan' the SEC. considered 
that there was no question that Gintel's conduct had 
been deliberate, in that he knew what he was doing, 
although it was accepted that the insider probably 
thought that the information was already public, 
The Commission considered that Gintel had acted 
spontaneously, not considering the possible . mplicaticns 
of his actions, and there had been nofopportunity for 
Cady Roberts & Company to exercise any internal- 
. supervision.., nor 
for Gintel to give proper consideration 
and deliberation to his responsibilities. In. the 
result given. the fact. that Ginter had been fined $3000 
.. 
by. the. New York Stock Exchange,. the. SEC merely suspended 
him-in accordance with the offer of settlpiDent for 
twenty days, (67 ) 
Although the Commissions decision"is unexceptional, 
apart from the- moderacy of the sanctions applied, the 
- cpinion" . gave only scant-attention to the reasons for 
finding Gintel.. liable. Gintel's. liability was. obviously 
justifiable on the notion that. both he and the insider 
formed a single 'economic unit' with identity of interest, 
or upon the notion that the. tippee`in point was a broker 
with extended responsibilities to the market. - 
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However; Chairman Cary, after finding that the insider 
1 could not deal without disclosure, added that 'by logical 
sequence' nor could his tippee. -What rationale for'the 
' chain of 'liability -the' Commission -based this"upon, was 
left unarticulated. It is conceivable that-the Commission 
were in 
actual fact speaking of a liability based upon 
'unfairness' rather than'upon predefined relationships, 
and thus because of the novelty and momentus aspect of 
the rationale, it was considered prudent tb leave -the 
rationale obscure. Although the Commissioners -did refer 
to 'special relationships with a company' that would 
give access to, inside information; what' factors ' detexmined 
such were ignored, and after all Gintel1 was a mere 
business associate of the insider, 
(68) 
and occupied 
º no relationship at all with the corporation. Thus it is 
hard to escape the conclusion that this factor was- of 
critical importance to the finding of liability. - (69) 
The relationship was created by the knowing receipt 
of inside information in unfair circumstances. This is 
supported by the comments of Cary, made elsewhere, when 
he"was, 'summarising' the rationale of the decision, ' so 
the. Commissionts action was based on the obligations of 
insiders not to'take advantage-of the nonpublic 
information that was disclosed for a cotporate purpose, 
and not to give "a one-sided advantage through this medium 
in trading, transactions. 
(70) 
It is important to note 
that the Commission ih this case thought of Gintel"as 
an'insidert - and not as a special subcategory of insider 
having obligations different in nature from the real 
insider, the director. 
Given-the vast extension-of liability in-this. case 
and the conceptdal. uncertainty " there -was obviously vide-- 
spread'diss'atisfaction in the industry. The learned 
writer in the Yale Law Journal 
(7proffered 
three 
-guide lines-for brokers and- prof essionahs in-the industry, 
on the basis- of-the Cady Roberts decision. 
2ýý 
Firstly, the broker should decide whether the information 
is true or "is merely rumouir or opinion; secondly, is it 
information which, if 'disclosed publicly-, would be likely 
to' have a significant effect on the market pride of 'the 
securities; and thirdly, is. the. information already 
aväiläble,, 'to even some extent, to the public. Iý : hds 
often been said "-that the vast majority of tips that float 
around the customers- rooms of the brokerage offices are 
worthless. t _(72) Thus it is 'necessary for ; the 'receipient 
to separate the chaff from the wheat. With regard tö'the 
determination of materiality, .: the broker must decide " 
whether viewed in retrospect, the particular piece, of 
inf ozrria tien he has received would 'have been price sens'itiva, 
standing alone, or possibly with other pieces of Information 
similarly obtained. The-market and any particu-lär 
i nve-stment decision therein will. not in the most part, 
be determined or primarily i of lüenced ' by a single 
identifiable event, but a concaternation of circumstances, 
prejudices, and emotional factors apart from . 'known' 'and 
'unknown'' informs ation. Hardy writing in 1923 -stated 'all 
this news and all these factors and rumours and--tips' 
which are poured into the 'financial hdpper' have a 
certain infiuence on the minds of traders and investors, 
causing them 'directly or indirectly to buy or sell" J73) " Of course there will be cases such as the Texas' 
Gulf Sulphur mineral strike. where it is patently obvious 
that the market' and the vast majority of individual 
trans-ac tions therein are 'influenced by a single 'identif . able 
event. In most instances the securities professional 
receiving possible 'liability information' : is * truly on a 
knife edge, as if he makes a false determination that the 
information is 'tain ted' and thus 'rejects it, il it Is 
later found -to have been unobjectionable, 'he will be hard 
put to exdaln his position morally and legäl'ly to his'clients, 
particularly those having discretionary accounts... 
7r 
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Furthenore, in the. vast majority of instances this crucial 
decision will. h4ve to be arrived at almost instantaneously 
as Gintol'. s was in the Cady Roberts case. There will* be 
precious little chance for verification of the .. information 
or itsstatus, Indeed the broker possessing thi, s. type-of 
.: 'information 
is faced. with the choice of. seeking. outside.. 
advice. and possibly being held to have tipped inside. 
information, if such' the information proves td be, or'. 
having to share with : others profitable investment information 
if it proves -to be useable, or failing to, seek, verification 
and thus. substantiate allegations of unreadonableness. 
. "; 
1; öreov. er, if the broker is considered to have. a. duty to_-. 
investigate. the source and status of the znforriation, 
nice questions arise as to what lengths he should. go 'to 
in 
. 
determining whether the 'information is -traceable to an 
insider. Of course, there are occasions where although the 
broker is aware that the information is of a privileged. -nature 
he is unaware of the exact source and circumstances-of 
disclosure. For example, an American broker has. statedi 
that he.. received good 'tips' from the, neighbour of the 
mistress-. of an insider; , 
indeed he ýrrites, 'tips from-the 
bedroom-are the, only tips that I believe, ' 
(74) 
In practice 
it would. seem that brokers and -prof es. sionals in the 
industry are not as reluctant to be influenced by tips-as 
one might -. consider, when reading the 'pronouncements of. the 
industry organisations. 
(75) 
Furthermore, it would seem 
that such will delight in carrying. the account of an insider, 
as even -if there -: is ; no direct tipping, the trading , orders 
of the -insider iwiUU. provide a mine of useful guidance, at 
least for a cynic. Reference has. already been made to the 
story of ' Large Phillip'. and even Hardy. comments that it is 
customary. -for. 'abroker-who sees. inside orders coming 
-through to advise certain clients "in accordance "therewi. th, 
without necessarily disclosing the actual source. - (76) 
Brutus describes how one of his 'favoured clients' 
who id a small investor, works for a large mutual fund and 
has 'access to big information'. - 
2ý-7 
(77 ) 
The anonymous broker States that 'he follows his 
coat tails putting his own managed people into the same 
stocks'. 
(? S) Of course, brokers, and professionals are 
not sblely benevolent in their utilisation of, inside' 
information and are just as likely to use 'it for . 
their oven 
or associates dealings. (7a) 
The. obligation upon brokers to'check-, out, ' their. 
in.. o aton and sources, as well as' their clients,, is. not kt 
as onerous as it might at first appear. The New York 
Stock Exchange, as well as the other national securities 
exchanges require each member firm to possess and keep 
up to date rela. t. ively complete sets of data on the business 
connections of their clients, and spouses of such. (80) 
The 'know your client' rule is a particularly 
important one from- the point of view of market surveillance 
and the SEC's suitability rules, and. reference will be 
: ade. to it elsewhere o' . 
Of course, the question as to *hethor the information 
is' reliable or' not will almost inevitably merge with that 
directed towards. materiality., and in both instances of 
crucial importance will be the circumstances in.. ýrhich the 
information was -received. 
ý8Z} 
The third question, that 
is-whether the information has been sufficiently . made 
publicly available, -so as to eliminate-the question of 
unfairness, will be a difficult one for the. tippee, äs he 
will not be in a position of such intimacy with the 
corporation to know whether the information has been. 
released. other than by the morýe'obvious media, nor will he 
be aware of the issuers disclosure policies.. Another 
serious problem in this field is where the brokers decision 
to trade or recommend is in large, measure the -sole result 
of his own analysis, and the information, that he receives 
is merely confirmatory. ' Obviously these is. a strong. public 
interest in, not unduly penalising analysts in. this s.,. tuation 
and there' is. a, valuable aspect- to the, onccuxagement of 
efficient and. honest analysis. The. Cady Roberts decision 
left open how these cons-. 1-d-0-rations were to be, balanced. 
ýý 
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The spate of rhcent cases 'following. up° the Cady Roberts 
decision have. had a tremendous impact on the American 
securities. industry and nat ira. lly the law on ihsiderý 
trading. The vast increase on SEC enforcoment in this 
controversial area 'was marked by the commencement of 
administrative action for alleged violations of 
Rule 10'(b)(5), , against the Nall Street giant Merril' 
. Lynch, by the Commiss ion 
ts Division of Trading and Markets.. (83) 
The action-vas brought against the. firm, and no-less 
than fourteen of its officers and salesmen, not to 
men Lion some fifteen-institutional investors. 
The Commissions staff alleged that the stipulated 
officers and salesmen of. Merril Lynch during the period 
between June 20th and 23rd'. 1966 disclosed. mhteria"l ' 
nonpublic information about Douglas Aircraft Company' 
and its earnings, which it had obtained ih connection 
%wýwith an underrrriti_ng of Douglas°. debenture stocke 
It was further alleged that certain of, the customers 
of -Mlerri71 Lynch after receiving' this information sold 
and in . certain instances., went' short, prior to the 
public ., 
disclosure of' the information. Moreover, ' the 
Staff. contended that during the. relevant time Merril 
Lynch. effect on behalf of. o. the_r customers purchaser, . 
of . 
Douglas stock without disclosure, of the relevant 
information. The Staff : then also charged independently ,. - 
the institutional investors for' 
. bbtaining 
the material 
nonpublic information from-Merril Lynch and then dealing 
upon -the basis -of such, without. making proper disclosures 
thereof. " In connection with these. transactions Merril 
Lynch received consideration. in. the. . 
form of . 
customers 
'give-ups' and, -commission from' the execution of ". the . 
transactions.. The firm' offered. a, settlement. of the. 
complaint, " which --the-Coýmmission; accepted. .., Under . th-i*s, 
Merril Lynch" 'agreed to" the infliction of carta-in -. 
-. penalties. -, which included public censure, fifteen and 
twenty-one days suspensions. of two branch offices',.. 
suspension without pay" -of ce'ztain of-ficers, . ranagers". 
24r-)- 
and salesmen, and internal disciplinary action. 
The Commission cited the Cady Roberts decision 
, and -the-. Court of Appeals decision' in the= Texas Gulf 
Sulphur case for the pýöpbsition' that it-was- a 
, violation of Rule 10(b) 
(5) 'for an- intidor to-tip 
information to a. non-insidei'o ' The 'SEC rightly; 
considered that the unfairness was'aggrivated by the 
eelected'disclosure to'`somb blienis, " whilst at the 
same-time effecting contrary transactions for other 
clients -without disclostire. 
(85) 
It is not without 
interest that in addition 'to 'the ponalti es 'already 
mentioned; - under the terms of 'the'settlehent-Merrii 
Lynch agreed to adopt a statement bf - pölicy designed 
to insulate any-confidential ihf drin tion that its 
corporate finance and undervirit ing department might 
"' receive from personnel in the 'advisory and trading 
departments of the firm. The rum " -also promised to 
use its best efforts to insure prompt disclosure of 
information that it might learn in an undcrv: riting. 
Perhaps of potente ally greater 'significance- than 
the case against the brokers, was the alieg-ation made 
against the fifteen institutional investors. " The 
jurisdiction of the SEC. in these cages-was -based upon 
-: sec-tion 15(6)7. which perm-its' the 
Commission -''to proceed 
administratively against anyond assdc' äted" vrith" a 
broker-defiler - or -who might' b'e ds'soci"ated'with such in 
the future. A number -of 'th'ese 'l'a`rge' -funds 
the 
maintained that 'because 'of 'thee-r -fiduciary =rosponsibilities 
, to their clients to 'use the fund resources to"the best 
of; their ability, once they hear' di 'inside information 
they are bound`to"act theretipön"in the"best-intorests 
of the fund. ' -'As one - fundraanager . stated, -'apparently. 
wetre dammed' if irre, dö anb we'r`e 'dammed if je don't,, ' (87') 
Al though the SEC dropped its' action against two 
of the funds, the action was continued against -the 
remaining thirteen. 
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It appeared from the SEC's investigation 
. that-. the information 
had, been conveyed by personnel 
in. " the. underviriting - department, - 
directly to -several 
institutional salesmen`, ývho; then -. contacted " the. ' funds 
and, imparted the inform, ation.. in specific- ternso'. 
Subsequently several cf'the defendants discussed 
the information at a luncheon.. The SEC's Hearing 
, 
Fxaminer. found that twelve of - the. respondant - funds 
had traded with,. actual or constructive knowledge 
that the " information that they had received -from 
Merril Lynch was material, price sensitive and of a 
non-public nature. 
(E9) 
The Examiner expressly 
,. held that the scope of-Rule 
10(b) (5) was much greater 
than more access " insiders and comprehended . -those 
who obtained inside info ima tion through an-Insider. 
.. 
''Here the information had been given to Merril Lynch 
as_a managing underwriter-and not for the personal 
benefit. of the firm or its-clients. - The Examiner 
made much of the essential -unfairness of this, and 
stated 'one who obtains possession of material 
; non-oubli c information which he has reason to 
believe 
.. or to 
know emanates- from a corporate source, and 
which by itself places him in -a pos"it3. on superior 
'to. 
other'. investors .. ". is -within- -the " purview " and 
restraints of the anti-fraud provisions r" ßg9... 
The acceptance by the -Hearing %Examiner" that 
:.. -constructive -knowledge is sufficient, at. 'least in 
administrative -proceedings confirms. the view-. that 
.. 
there is -a duty upon a recipient of information 
to . check, its status and source. 
(gl) 
The Examiner 
; dismissed the. -action against the -final fand .- the 
r .. 
Dreyfus -Corporation ton the grounds that the decision 
to -sell , 
had been "taken by someone not. in possess ion 
of inside information. "" " 
As the primary questions of law were ones of 
first impression and of great importance the Commission 
granted a review of the Examiners decision of its 
own motion. - 
2ý ý 
(02) " 
In the result the Commission affirmed the 
decision 'of the Hearing Examiner and imposes a 
sanction of. public censure. 
(93). 
The, CEC accepted 
the point raised 'by the Division of Trading and 
Markets to. the effect that the potential. -for abuse 
and cons-equent7 a. l damage to the, m. arke t in the -case 
of . tippee. trading by the large investment funds -was 
far : more serious than ordinary 'incidents of insider 
abuse, because. of the sheer size of the trärisactions 
involved. 
(94) 
The, Hearing Examiner had. based his 
. 
finding, of, liability on the actual 'or constructive 
knowledge on the part . of. 
the defendants that' the 
. 
inf. omation, was non-public and had eminated from an 
insider in violation of a corporate purpose, and 
thus improperly; 
. 
The Commission approved. this 
additional factor of knovwledge, on the grounds that 
without an, appreciation that the info ,m ation 'had been 
improperly obtained, there. is no, real. olementý of 
unfairness. In the case. of a traditional insider or 
a ; person in-an access relationship with an issuer, 
it can 'be. taken for granted that the recipient: of 
, price sensitive 
information -will. know that, he should 
no't trade on the basis of such, because of his 
relationship with the. corporation.: There is no. 
necessary implication that an" outsider recipient 'of 
information will appreciate that it-, is material, 
non'-public information obtained in' breach: of, a fiduciary 
obligation or in. violation, o, f:, the co'rp. orate purpose. 
. 
Tn the w,, rords, of, C, ommissioner., Smith,, the recipient 
, must 
know or have reasoyi to . 
kno'; r, that, the' material 
non-public inform, ation became available to, them. in 
. 
breach of a duty owed 'to the corpoxation. In essence 
this.. is. similar, to the common. law notions of liability 
for 'those assisting in' a: breach of a trustee,. or, 
fiduciary's duty,. which has. already been mentioned. 
-J""4r 
', ý, 
zsz 
.i 
Thus - although. it has been maintained - that --the 
present approach 'amounts to .a -substantial -modification 
of the access test. as-'laid down in the -matter of 
Cadv Roberts & Company, and in subsequent court cases, 
giveri the : fact that 'those cases were concerned 
with the -liability of -a 'person in an access. relationship 
where such 'tipped' inside information- and not the 
liability of' the recipients there of, 'it -is dubious 
Whether this view is Justified. - All 't'hat the present 
decision does is- to emphasise the true criteria, ' that 
of- unfairness, more clearly. 
(96) 
It would seem-that 
in the case . 'of tippees, the - in-f ormation must be. provided 
through an insider properly so called. -Whether there 
must 'be a relationship with the issuer as such; ' would 
appear highly dubious. Although General Counsel Philip 
. Loomis. considered that such. was necessary at the 
Financial Analysts Federation Conference in. 1968 . on 
Corporate Disclosure and' Insider, Inform. atiori-, -it. would 
: seem enough that the tippee appreciated or. should have 
appreciated, that he was obtaining inside information 
in* breach of -a corporate purpose. There remains. the 
problem of the recipient 'of privileged information who 
does not have an. appreciation that it conies -from an 
. insider or who has no. relationship with theý'ingider0 
Ifr the net is' cast so as to catch either . 'of* these 
s'ituat ions-, there would be a substantial' uncortainty 
as to the limits of liability'.. ' '. The Commis's'ions statement 
would . certainly. be wide enough to catch the tippee 
who, whilst appreciating -that'the infoniant was' a'n 
"insider, had. no relationship. whatsoever lriith'-h-im or 
the 'co-rporat'ion, {97 It -'is important to appreciate 
tha't' the present case. was an- admi'nistrative'. pro. ceeding 
purely within the jurisdictioin of the Commission, 
" and thus- the SEC was able to . fashion' a -r'emed'y.. "-. that of 
public censure to fit the expanded notion of responsibility 
for liability information. 
, Z- -. >'S 
The Commission affirmed the, supremacy of the 
duty. to abstain or-disclose under Rule 10(b) (5) 
over the existence : of possible fiduciary' duties at 
state level to utilise' the information for the= 
benefit of the' clients' or fund investors-p However, 
given the', extended änd''väguer standard of liability 
laid down in'the present opinion recipients of. 
information are placed in' ä dangerou's'-position: -To 
escape a suit at State - Law , 'it would appear that 
the degendan uld have to e, tablish' all' the- 
elements of 'a Rule 10(b)'(5) 'action'ägäinst- himself , 
on the assumption that he had -trädedo -Obviously" 
.. this is a'scant protection, and poor guideline'fbr- 
a busy professional to apply in the determination 
of whether the information is useable : 
(gß) both' 
Cady Roberts and the present proceedings were= 
administrative, and at `least in the" context of, " 
privity in Cady Roberts, the SEC pointed out 
that 'differerit considerations might pertain 'in civil 
suits before' the courts, * Of course the Commissions 
proceedings did have the imbortant -aspect of identifying 
potential' defendants., 'a most useful factor in. 'tippee 
cases, 
(99 
and" in the present case -a 'number. 'of'. ' 
private civil suits were commenced : ag'ainst the'- 
-defendants. , 
(100) 
The most'interestirig "for 'the'' 
present discussion 'was that brought ' b`y-'the' Fin'ahc"ial 
Industrial Fund, "(101) against "both M-erxil' Lynch 
and McDonnell . Dougla3 Aircraft Gorporatiän, 1the 'issuer 
of the relevant securit-: Les. ' . lthöugh the 'facts `of 
the case are complex, 1 suffices here to 'co'mmen`t t 
't1iat the 5inancial -Iridhistrial Fund had been a 'substantial 
market purchaser of Douglas stock immediately'-prior 
to " the announcement -of the low 'dividends-`and 'cuts in 
estimated earnings', which had- a substantial-impact- 
on the market price and resulted-in-16s66s of' 
$2., 000', 000 on 'sale, for the pldiritiffo ' The `äctiön was 
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based- on Rule _10(b) 
(5). and alleged that the cirporation 
and underwriters. had not made, a- prompt, disclosure* o. f 
the information: : The District Court . of' 
Colorado. 
submitted the case to the jury, on the basis- -that. *. there 
would be a yiolation, if the information. was withheld 
from the market, .; so as 
to -facilitate the redemption 
of outstanding debentures and the . marketing.. of new 
shareso The jury found liability and'assessed damages 
at $.: 700,000. and the Court sustained the verdict.: and 
rejected the -defendants motion for retrial. (1o2) 
District Judge Doyle, considered that both the 
issuer-and Merril Lynch as managing underwriters were 
in. possession of 
, 
the material information in question, 
and. _thus as both had made. -optimistic forecasts, 'both 
were 'equally obligated to correct the misapprehensions 
that existed' at the time the .. plaintiff 
dealt: 
However, the Court continued, t that the duty of 'Merril 
Lynch to 
. 
disclose to the public in these circumstances 
s ;? iss -clear than that of Douglas. This is not. to 
say, though that no duty existed for Merril. Lynch. ' 
In v, ievz of the. demonstrated complicity 'between the': 
two, 
--and 
: considering the -fact . 
tbat Douglas glas a 
large corporation Living- in close proximity to the 
public, and Merril Lynch occupies a. -similar-position 
and is. or should be acutely . aware of 
the consequerlc. es 
of "nan--disclosure, it cannot be said that. it owed no 
duty to reveal the,, facts - that this Evas. -up: to:. - 
Douglas as 
, princ 
: pal. Merrill Lynch did-, -after-all 
communicate the facts internally. and. priv. atelyi . 
If its first. duty was to Douglas,: and we doubt. this, 
it would. and should have.. terminated the -relationship' 
as underwriter. , (103) 
The unfortunate 
. state 
that 
.. 
the American Jaw w has 
arrived -at; is shown by examining-. the. cons e. quenc, cs of, 
the Merril -Lynch-, settlement and: the, «statement of : -policy 
that 
. 'they 
were there. -required.. to" adhere . 
to with- t1e. 
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present case. Uhder the statement of, policy. the firms 
underwriting department may well have information 
that it : is- obliged to keep, -insulated from the, trading 
and advising-dopartmcnts, thus the firm-might well be 
trading and advising transactions. in, securities about 
which its underwriting department has material- ° 
. non-public 
information about. If ; the firm discloses 
this, information, to all its clients, it . will 
incur 
liability Rule 10(b)(5), and.. on the other hand if it 
does not disclose . 
the inf, ormatipn general ly to , 
the 
public,. it . may well 
incur civil liability to all those 
trading- in those, securities, . particularly if it has 
made selected disclosures or dealt in any way itself. (104) 
Of course the. crucial factor is the degree of 
disclosure. The filternative, as suggested by judge 
Doyle, is for the underwriter, caught in such a conflict 
to resign from the underwriting. But this would not 
relieve the firm from possession, of the inside 
information, nor the obligations it had assumed with 
regard. to such. Ideally the broker should insist upon 
timely disclosureand failing this 
., 
disclose the 
information itself. i Of course, the broker, wiýl, npt 
the ina ; good.. position to disclose-of its own motion 
and runs the risks of making an'.. incomplete or. misleading 
release in view of its incomplete, information... 
. 
Furthermore, the broker would probably be liable to 
the corporation for, breach of_. confidentiality-, unless 
there 
. was "a 
federal preemption of the sta-e law. 
When the case came . 
before. - the. Court of. Appeals 
for , the Tenth Circuit. the decision below as to the 
liability. of- . the. issuer was. reversed., , and' 
thus the 
. question, of, 
M c r: "il. "Lynch, 
's involvement 
. and;. 
duties was 
not. b, efore, thb court. . 
Thq. court. of Appeals, ; was 
careful. tQ. point. out. that it was not expressing, any 
.. view on 
insider trading or the duties of di; closure 
that Rule 10(b). (5) placed upon the underwriter 
05(a 
and-brokers in such situations. 
(105) 
= The next case-in-this developing f"ield; --'of '"any 
significance, was the Commissions aciminis"trative -' 
er: of--Faberge Inc-. - --' proceedings in the Mat. " (lOb)- 
The SEC's- staff pursuant -to--an investigation 
found -that the-Executive Vice 
President--of Faberge 
learning of the companies reduced earnings informed 
än-' employee of - a- securities - house, --who'- in 'turn 
--passed-the information on to-"a- securities. -ana-lyst-in 
Anchor Corporation, which-was a- registe-red-'broker-- 
dealero" Anchor -managed -a -fund holding "100,000-Faberge 
% shares. The analyst contacted the -portfolio -managers 
"- . disclosing the information and the fact- that' it came 
fron -the Executive Vice President. - The-fund immediately 
-started selling off its holdings, but managed only to 
-. dispose of 9,800 before- the news was released. ". - 
The Vice President} in a telephone conversation with 
an analyst in V1. E. Hutton & . 
Company,. another- brokerage 
firm., indicated- that the corporation--had made. -a--loss, 
and äf-ter the conversation. the analyst--contacted -a 
research analyst- ä-t Investors D"i vers if ied. -Services , 
(. I, D 0S. 
)--informing him-of-the 'news' and- its . -sourced 
The -Hutton analyst-then sent- an- ' inter-of f ice. -wire' 
to -all the firms. branches-, -stating that- Faberge's- 
management.. thought that a -loss-was likely-and- that 
the-firm recommended immediate- liqu-idation. "of" Faberge 
holdings -prior to -the- public . -announcement", and 'a 
similar message was put- on the Aut-Ex-wire-to- -- -- 
institutional - clients.. A- Hutton branch-manager, 
-receiving the -wire, - immediately- contacted a-ýfund-- 
manager- of-another- investment, bank-who -sold-out also. 
On. --receipt of -the, Einformation,. an 1. D: S. "-analyst - contacted 
another fund which- I. D. S. acted--äs- investment- adviser 
to, 
-and recommended -off-loading.. some* 369., 800 Faberge 
-shares, - The fund-"-"manager- confirmed, -, '. he-. informat-i*on 
with-the -management of Faberge, obtained authorisation 
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from his superiors and immediately sold out.., 
A registered firm of broker-dea, lers,, D0J, _ 
Greene, 
were already. suspicipus... about Fabgrge's financial 
os ition and had; älrjaad t py starte .. d to. sel_l, tivhen... u 
partner. contacted, and obtained the. _nevis of 
the losses, 
but, after this, greatly increased.. the sales drive. 
Similarly,,. the. president of Spectrum_Research,. after 
contacting Faberge. t_s. 
_ management, 
liquidated the.. firms 
entire holding of Faberge securities. Th., _various defendants made. offers of. settlement _under.. which 
the 
. record would show the facts as,. al. l. eged by the Commission 
and the defendants would accept the . SEC 9 s. _ censure.. The Comnissi on accepted . this 'to avoid. protracted. . 
proceedings although the SEC Was at_ pains to point. 
out:. the `gravity of the violations,, and the., serious'. 
impact that such had on, the integrity of the securities 
markets and investor confidence in. such, (la7) 
Cf 
. particular 
into: rest is the Commissions 
observations . with regard-to. Anchor and.. I. D. S , who has 
passed on the information to recipients who-had, not. 
dealt with that firm. 
. 
The Commission considexed that 
the use of other brokers was irrelevant. as_to, 'hold 
otherwise would. lead to complex. reciprocal. arrangements 
and in. effect would . puh:. a prpmium on fprm over substance. ' 
The violation of Rule 10(b) (5) lay in. the. passing on of 
the information whether the.. tipper, traded personally 
or not, . 
The Co, nmission has been alert. to siml ar 
violations by0oother professionaý. s ; engaged in the securities 
business. 
(l ) 
,. 
.., 
In. shaairo et a? v Merril Lynch ,. _a civil action was 
com7enced against Pier±il . 
Lynch, 
., 
its 
,. employees , and also their t'ading tippees, in the District Court. for. South 
New York seeking damages -for , 
failure to.. disclose. material 
inside information that was. in , heir: pQs. session. relating 
to earnings forecasts of Douglas Aircraft Corporation. 
? -59 
The case* came before District Judge Tenney, on a' 
motion by the' defendants- for judgement on the 
pleadings, and on'the-plaintiff's motion to maintain 
the action as a class-action. 
(109) 
During'the time 
that the defendants were in possession of this information 
the', made substantial sales of Douglas securities, on 
the Nevi York Stock' Exchange, and Merril Lynch received 
commissions and give; -ups for executing transactions"' 
for clients in these securities. At the same time* 
the 'plaintiffs made purchases of an unspecified number 
of shares on the New York Stock Exchange, and thus they 
cohtended that the defendants had defrauded them by' 
withholding material inside information which if it 
had been disclosed would have either d iscouraged'the 
plaintiffs from purchasing or would have at least 
reduced the market price of such. Obviously the' 
determination of the plaintiffs motion was dependent 
upon a- finding by the Court that there was a viable 
course öf' action disclosed in the "pleadings. 
X10) 
The 
learned District Judge in a penetrating discussion of 
the requirements for liability Under Rule 10(b)(5)' 
found 'that the defendants who were trading on an 
essentially anonymous market wereobligated to disclose 
'" the'information in their possession to all potential 
inve`stors' trading in the'same market including the 
plaintiffs and members of their proposed classo4 (111) 
The Court considered' that the duty was owed to 
all purchasers in Douglas stock between he time of 
theviolative transactions and the adequate dissemination 
of the informatione-In the result the learned Judge 
dismissed both* ino tions , 
(112) 
and this was äff irmed 
by the 'Court of 'Appeals for the Second Circuit. -- (113). 
The Court firmly applied and endorsed the 
'abstain or disclose' rule 'laid down- by the, same Circuit 
-in' the Texas Gulf Sulphur case. 
25! ý: ) 
in that case it was stated ! anyone in possession of 
material inside information must. either disclose it 
to the investing _ public?,. or- 
if he is disabled from 
disclosing it ... must abstain from trading in or 
recommending the securities concerned while such 
information remains undisclosed o' 
(114 )ý 
As in the 
Texas Gulf case-(115) the Circuit reaffirmed the 
statutory purpose in imposing the obligations, -'it is 
to protect the investing public and to secure fair 
dealing in the securities markets by prompting full 
disclosure of inside information so that an informed 
judgement can be made by all investors who trade in 
such markets. ' 
(116) 
The Court also approved the 
statement in Radiation Dynamics Inc, Go? drýuntz 
(ll? ) 
that the ' essential purriose. of Rule 10(b) (5) ... 
is to prevent corporate insiders and their tippees 
from taking unfair advantage of the uninformed outs . 
dero 4 
In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Court of Appeals 
remarked that although 'Darke's tippees are not defendants 
in this action, ' and thus 'it was not necessary to 
decide whether they acted with actual or constructive 
knowledge that the material information was undisclosed, 
their conduct was as equally violative of the rule as 
the conduct of their insider source and ... it certainly 
could be equally reprehensible. ' 
(118) 
The Court in the 
Shapiro decision followed this approach and held, the 
non -trading tippers %,, rere liable as well as the tippees. 
The Court of Appeals rejected, as-had District Judge 
Tenney, 
_ 
the argument of the tippees that they were in 
no ppsition to d. -i. sclose the 
information and should thus 
be exonerated. The Court considered "that if this was 
the case they should have abstained from trading. 
Circuit Judge Timbers stated 'Since ... the selling 
defendants knew, or should have known, -of the confidential 
corporate source of the revised earnings information, 
and they knew of its non-public nature, they were under 
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a duty non to trade in Douglas stock without publicly 
disclosing such informationoj- 
Another significant and important series of 
proceedings, both administrative and court, -relevant 
to this -discussion, ' have arisen from the Lum affair. 
In SEC v Lun Inc. et al, 
(119) zt was alleged by-.: the 
Commission that C'hasins, the senior executive of 
Lum Inc. had received-earnings estimates which showed 
a sharp drop when compared with earlier forecasts. 
Chasins then communicated this information to Simon, 
a registered representative of Lehman Brothers, 
. who 
in turn conveyed the information to-Sit and Jundt, 
tv. °; o senior officers- and portfolio managers in Investors 
Diver-. 11-: ied- Services, (I. D. S. ) The funds nanaged 
by I. D. S. immediately sold off Lum securities, 
The Commission, apart from naming these individuals 
as defendants, also na-ned- Lehman Brothers in the 
complaint, for failure to adequately supervise its 
employees and also on the' ground of mspondant superior. 
It became apparent that a strange relationship existed 
between Lums and Simon, and that there was an - 
'arrangement' under which Simon was given advance- 
access -to* privileged information, not so -that. he 
cculd pull his lärge -investors out- in time, because 
their respectite holdings were too large, but -so as 
" not to appear startled by important develppments to 
the clients. Thus Chasins contended his disclosures 
- w^,, ere in confidence and bona fidi, and certainly not 
for investment purposes. District3 Judge Tyler considered 
that at least in administrative proceedings a negligence 
standard of responsibility was- appropriate, and 'it 
is evident that Chas in' owed -a primary or fiduciary 
duty "to the investing public not to tabuse his position 
as an insider in- possession- of confidbntial -corporate 
inform, atibn by -disclo'sing'' it to someone- who might use 
it for personal purposes. 
(120) 
As the disclosure 
2c1 
was not for a corporate purpose, and Chasin had not 
behaved reasonably, he was properly liable for 
violating Rule 10(b)(5) . The.. Court was totally 
unimpressed by Chasins argument that the information 
" . had . been disclosed in confidence, as by disclosing 
it he had placed Simon 'in an untenable position .. o s 
if Simon denied that anything was wrong at Lum's 
he v'ould be misrepresenting the situation; if he 
disclosed the information, he would be guilty, of 
violating Rule 10(b)(5); if he said nothing, he 
would either appear to be, ignorant or to be hiding 
something,. and. in either event would be jeopardising 
his relationship with his. client. 'Thus Chasin 
would be liable for the foreseeable consequences 
of his dereliction. Furthermore as the corporaticn, 
Lum was in a position to control the activities of 
its executives, -the Court, considered that Lum should 
also be liable for the actions of Chasin, and that 
the negligence of the executive would be imputed 
to the corporation, The Comm ssion had not 
sought to imposeºliability upon Lehman Brothers as 
it had the corporation upon the basis of section 20(a) 
ý"rnich. places liability upon persons in a control 
relationship-to the wrongdoer, 
121) but on the 
basis of vicarious liability. The Court rejected 
this, and held that section 20(a) was the. relevant 
basis for any imputation of liability. In determining 
whether the standard of reasonablo, or; goodfaith 
supervision had been eXerc. ised'by. Lehman Brothers 
within Section 20(a) the Court was impressed with the 
fact that Lehman's had forbidden their officers to 
accept directorshipq in the issuers of the securities 
in-. which they dealt, and had a compliance department 
. charged with. general monitoring responsibilities, 
The Court was unable to suggest any. tangible precaution 
that Lehman Brothers could have taken to have prevented 
unauthorised casual leaks of information or the 
personal and informal contacts that its officers 
2 C2 
might have. In'the result the Court exonerated 
Lehmans. 
The Co; . mission --accepted - 
an -offer of settlement 
by I. D. S. under which I. L. S. agreed to the -imposition 
of an necessarily accepting 'the 
""- 'allegations of the SECe Furthermore, under he 
terms 
of the settlement I. D. S. had to accept an 
internal compliance programme, which was annexed 
to 'the Courts order. 
(122) 
A particularly sigriificai t financial scandal 
involving considerations germain to this area of the 
law, is that-relating to the Equity Fundi 
t" Corporation of %inerica, which was allowed to cheat 
to American public out of some 2400,004=0000 
tilthough a considerable amount has boon written 
on this affair, attention will here be focused purely 
to ins upon tho sa aspects relevant insider and tippe e 
trading. 
(123 ) 
An e zlployee of the Equity Funding 
Corporation ap proschod the New York Insur: nce 
Com iss offer's office of Investigation, and 
the 
leading analyst in the company's' securities, a Mr. Dirks, 
'and gave evidence that the Corporation was engaged 
-who! --sale fraud, with the aid of I. B. t. 's computers. i n-- (124)" 
After a s-x -day preliminary investigation, 
Dirks--passed this information and' his suspicions on 
to a"number of-other analysts and securities houses. 
After- a further eight days he' then-approached the 
management of , Eg4x ty Funding and received enough 
to confirm his 'suspicions. After another six days 
Dirks reported' the matter to the SEC's Regional office 
in Los Angelos, and on the 'following 'day tovtho Now 
York Stock Exchange. The'*Stock Exchange which, had 
been the "läst to be notified'; suspended trading, 
'but' the- market -price had 'already dropped $12 during 
the 'relevant period. - 
2G3 
The next day the SEC suspended all., trading, throughout 
the United States. It was then discovered that the 
Executive Vice President of-, Equity Funding had sold 
24,475 shares, 80,5' of his holding, the day. before 
the Stock Exchange - suspension; on. the same day 
the President had 'placed an order to sell his 50,000 
shares. Moreover, another firm to which Dirks had 
made selective disclosures had similarly sold out, 
whilst others which had not been given this information, 
while aware of the general rumours, had not cold 
and even in some cases purchased. Indeed, Hayden 
Stone Inc. had actually published recommendations 
for'the purchase of Equity Funding stock. 
The Commission almost immediately 'f iled a 
complaint. socking an injunction and ancillary relief, 
including the aopoin tment of a ne%l board oý i: r= c tors, 
Guditors and the appointment of an internal invdstigaltor. 
" 
(125) 
Tn addition some Men ty two persons were indicted 
for conspiracy to defraud and violate a number of 
provisions in the securities laws, in particular Rule 
J lO (b) (5) . 
(126) The New York Stock Exchange also 
filed- disciplinary charges against Dirks: alleging 
violation of the Exchan ets rulas and 'just and equitable 
principles of trade'. 
127 Disciplinary charges 
were also broiüght against Dirk's firm, for' failure 
to adequately supervise him. 
(128) 
In addition the 
corporation , ant --into bankruptcy. 
T ese proceedings were, however, only the tip 
of the iceberg; as Bloo enthal describes a host of 
class 'actio is' ý%ere brought against Equity: " Funding 
Corporation, its insiders and a number of persons 
- and" fintus. ' 
(129) 
Alt'hou h certain of the. actions 
have reached settlement, 
ý1' 
0} the bulk are still, 
before the courts, - and' a plan, of'corporate- reorganisati on 
under' Chapter X. of tý} eE nkruptcy Act is. currently 
bef'or'e the Court. 131 One . case that has been. ý. Q 
ZL4 
decided; however, and which is of significance. from 
the. Point of view of the present. discu ssion of 
liability of securities professionals under, 
Rule 10(b) (5) is, t) U32) t of Je£feries L. Company Inc. 
v. Arkus--Duntov. " Jefferies, a firm of brokers 
sued the Executive Vice President of Equity. Funding 
Corporation, ' to rescind sales . ma, 
ýe by the insider 
and to enjoin the, negotiation of the checks received 
in connection with the transactions. The defendant 
denied that he know of the frauds, at the time of.. the 
sale, although he. ad,: iittFd that he knew of certain 
investigations and the inquiries of Dirks, and. guessed 
that the stock would soon be suspended. District 
Judge Gurf ein thus decided that it 'eras unnecessary 
to prove that the insider actually knew of the frauds, 
and.: tl-le circumstances coupled with his virtual sell out, 
which was not part of a prior pattern of liquidation, 
established that he was aware of the true situation o 
District Judge Gurfein observed that whether the 
defendant knew of the frauds or not 'he vas- sufficiently 
alerted inside. the corporation during the, week preceeding 
the*sales,. of-the charges and investigations, and the 
imminence of suspension of trading to make inside - 
information a factor forbidding- the sale by him of 
his Equity Fpnd'ing securities o 
(133) 
This appears 
to hold that, unsubstantiated, rumours are sufficient 
to be regarded as. -inside. information; although -in, the 
present case the rumours turned out to be-true', the 
obvious question. arises as to the position- of the 
defendant: if the information eventually proved to, be 
false, at least in part. ' Logically' the abuse is 
the same whether' the rumours; turn. out to. be true. or 
false, It As also of soFne interest, that 
- -the. 
Court 
by a novel -reasoning -process considered 
that the, 
'brokers had* standing . to. -. sue -under Rule "l0(b)(5) 
as when they, sought to deliver the-. securities to 
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another fixen and were met with a refusal to* accept 
delivery, --and as . they, had already issued cheques, 
to the-defendant they were in -the position of-an (134 
-) enforced purchaser. 
Given this attack on tipping and tippee8, trading 
both-by -the-SEC and the Courts; the problems facing 
professionals in the'-securities, industry are of very 
great ýilr ensions. -Furth'ermo're, apart from the. fear 
of administrative action, which 'is very powerful 
indeed, in ' t1 a-t such can' deprive a professional 
of his career and livlihood,. with the relaxation of 
the privity and causation factors there is : the 
" possibili" y of almost unlimited' civil liability, 
l: oreover the uncertainty of their position is all 
the more because a large part of the law in this 
area has been the result of settlements which are 
not prosedents and from which there is no appeal o 
The Ar e=ican Secur-fit es Industry has sought to 
. extract itself or at least delimit its burden under 
the anti -insider trading law by . resort 
to certain 
non-legal expedients and. procedures. 
The most important procedure and solution 
adopted in the American industry and 'largely . followed 
in other countries, - 
(135) 
is that of segregation 
of functions. This approach has'been referred to 
by a varie ,y* of 
*more colourful names such as -the 
'Chinese Vlall t. the Bamboo Curtain' , 'Dont tell 
your partner technique4 and thq 'water tight 
compartments approach' * in all, the central notion 
is the same. That is, those functions that. 
obtain-material inside inforºnat. i on 
. 
are " to be kept 
distinct, separate and - °leak proofs from those 
functions 
. 
d. c. aling' and recommending securities in 
the-- same . 
house -or firm. 
(136). 
In many securities and investment banking houses 
the principle of segregation is reinforced by a 
policy that the firm will not make any recommendations 
zýý 
in securities which it is likely at some time to 
be, in, possession of inside information about. 
The object here, is to avoid the embarassing 
-- si tua tion' where the firm, although different 
departments of such, is r'ecominending securities 
for purchase-while possessing information indicating 
that such would Joe misguided, or . vice versa. 
To further prevent conflicts certain. houses operate 
a trestricted list' which is a, modified 'no 
recommendation= approach, and involves- . 
the 
insertion of securities on a list, which are then 
excluded from the recommendations and investment 
activities of the izm. where a member of the firm 
"- receives material non-public in-forma tion upon such. 
It is of some interest to examine thQ statement 
of policy that Investors Diversified Services gras 
obliged to acc ant and impliment under the. terms of 
its settlement with the SEC of its enforcement 
action against it. The policy makes it very clear 
that it is 'completely unlawful to trade or make 
recommendations 
. on 
the basis of: privileged information, 
ether about the corporate issuer or the market in 
that security. - The policy does -indicate certain 
types of information that should be considered 
material as a matter of course-such a, s ý . 
earnings 
estimates, but apart from this. emphasises. that the 
inform ation must be tested against s materiality, 
public äva ilabil ity and r6liability. In'_ paragraph 5 
of the-policy' I. D. S. underlines the fact that 
'it is not the policy öf `I. D. S. to, allocate brokerage 
in consideration of the--furnishing, of material 
inside information, and 1. D .S. employees in' 
recommending-the allocation of brokerage-. tä broker- 
-dealers should-not give: consideration -to any material 
inside informatiön furnished by any broker-dealer'. 
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In all cases employees and officers of I. D. S. are 
forbidden to utilise -inside information either 
personally-, for the, fii7n, or for outsiders'='un'less 
there is a disclosure of the -information and 
sufficient disseminati oh-: " It is made very clear "in 
paragraph 7 that no officer or 'employee of I. D. S. 
has-any obligation whatsoever to investment 
companies advised- by ED . S. or in1d ividüa1 clients 
to utilise inside 'information-'in violation of the' 
federal law on'their behalf. Under the policy 
a senior Vice'President '6f I. D. S. ' --is charged with 
the administration of : the internal compliance 
programme and constant sürveillänc(j and guidance 
is placed in the companyt s1 aw office. 
(137 } 
-The various' procedures set up how v r, ' are 
themselves not free from difficulty. Or example, 
the fact 'that apart'icular security, at a senpitive 
time on the market, has been placed upon"a firm 
t stop list' , might be very material. ins-ide * information 
in itself. Furthermore, this type of "approach is . 
of dubious value, purely `-frc: m the. enföfcement point 
of view. Mrs 'John 'Wing, the Vice President of " 
A. G. Becker 8 Co. Inc.., -at a"serriinä. r on compliance 
programmes, referred to a case Where' an analyst' in 
his firni had picked u'p' some 'ins'ide information and 
reported it''to 'the- cömpl, iänce officer, 'aft'er already 
'putting the- relevant : sectiritie% up- for sale. - 
The" compliance- officer 'considered that''the inform ation 
was unuseable -and -held the scI1-: orders. Evidently 
another firm had received ' "th'c 'same -information and 
irrere going- ahead 'with' a programme of heavy selling. 
The firms 'c'lients' merely transferred their accounts - 
and orders' tö other "f±IM-s o7 The or'igin'al f i= was, 
reluctant' to- " approach others - to warn : them of the 
danger, and- in' the result the American Stock Exchange 
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had to suspend trading, but after substantial profits 
had been made. 
138 Another problem with the `stop- 
? ist' procedure-is that it is only of any relevance 
if applied in. advance, and if the firm finds that. 
it. has. boen dealing on advising whilst in possession 
of inside information 'with one foot in the grave 
you dont feel too keen on going to the regulators 
or-drawing, too much. attention to yourself. 
(139) 
It would seem to-be accepted that if the compliance 
officer or personnel charged with monitoring these 
matters, does detect a possible abuse, there is an 
obligation upon such to-report the matter to the 
regulatoyA authorities. 
(140) 
and thus there is an 
incentive even inside firms operating compliance 
procedures to keepthe internal-regulators relatively 
in the dark. 
(141, 
-Another problem for securities houses where they 
are in possession of inside info-mat on, is the 
completely unsolicited enquiry or order, Here the 
firm is truly in a -dilemma and one for which there is 
no -easy solution, whatever course the firm chooses. 
to operate they. will be a good candidate for liability 
to someone_or other, or at best stand to losing the 
client 
(142) 
Furthermore, to afford any hope of 
protection it is important that there is no violation 
of the segregation of functions, and here where there 
are common directors, given the general imputation 
of knowledge to the corporation or firm at this 
lovel, the integrity-of the procedure is dubious 
in the extreme. 
(143) 
Nonetheless, such procedures 
. are regarded as the best. approach 
by the industry, 
(144) 
-The self-regulatory agencies in the United States 
have. also -endorsed the segration approach. The New 
York Stock Exchange in one of its Member Firm Educational 
Circulars 
(145)state, 
4 every director has a fiduciary 
obligation not to reveal any privileged information 
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to anyone not authorised-to receive it. Not until 
there is fui1-disc losure of such , data .. o is a 
director released from the necessity-of keeping 
information of this. character to: himself. Any 
director of a. corporation who is a partner, officer 
oy M, should recognise that or emplee of a member-fir 
his first -responsibility--in this.. area is 'to the 
corporation upon whose board he serves. Thus a 
member firm director must meticu-1ously 'avoid arijr' 
d'isclosüre of inside information to. his partners, 
employes of the firm, his customers or his' research 
or trading departments. " The Circular malf: e-s' it. 
clear that the same principles' should apply -even. where 
the - member *f irm officer or employee is not "a director 
but: merely an adviser to, a company'. The Circular 
addds' ' that t`should any matter require consultation 
with other personnel of -the 'organisation -adequate 
measures should. -be taken to guard the conf-iential 
nature, of the information to prevent xt's mIA>use- tk. 
" or outside the member organisations lt has been . 
doubted how : yell' this particular, Circular is. observed 
or accepted' by `the firms. ' 
(146., ) 
The Stock Exchange 
has- also issued another: Circular 
(147) 
which was 
designed ý tb ý ca11, member. firms attentio'n to ! their 
resp. onsibi'lities' concernI ng the circulation of 
unsubstantiated -införmatibn". and 'situations-. "involving 
rum'our's 'and, in-side, Iriformati'on-.. '' The IN1e%4 York Stock 
Exchange fastens upon -Rul'o -. 435 as the. basis of its 
jurisdiction . to-"'regUl"ate this reä`. ' . The Rule 'provides , 
'No member, 
-member, organisation or: allied " 
me,, Tber therein,, shall circulate "in . any . manner rumours of a sens'a'tional character, 
which- -cnight' reasonably be expected : to "'. 
of-feet market. conditions , on 
the, Exchange. 
Discussions of 'unsub'stantiated information 
publiishý! d ' by a' 'widely " circulated . public media is not prohibited when its source 
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" and unsubstantiated nature are. -also 
,,. 
disclosed. 
, 
Reports shall be promptly-. 
made to the exchange of any 
circumstances which give reason. -to- 
believe, that . any rumour or unsubstant- iated information might have been originated 
or- circulated for the -purpose of -- 
influencing. prices in lis, ted, securities. ° 
. 
In the Circular the. '. Stpck. Exchange. ernphasis. ed 
that whilst. this- did not cover everyone associated. 
r. ith. me«ber organisations-, the_., xchange considers . 
that observance of, the, provisions of this . 
rule. is, 
crucial: to the maintenance of good and. fair business 
p. rec Lice, as reouired . under. 
Rule 401, and also just 
and equitable principles., of trade. The Circular 
recommends that' menber firms delegate to senior 
officers the duty to receive reports from members 
and emplcyees of the firm about inside, information 
and rumours, to -comply with rrºember 
f isms, duty of 
supervision under Rule 342, and this official would 
be responsible for informing the Exchange and insuring 
that there was jo misuse, of the information, in the firm. 
In. the last, couple . of years considerable 
doubt 
has arisen as to whether the . segregation 
principle 
is -. anything- more than a .4 snarQ and 
delusions 
. 
from 
the. standpoint . of 
legal 
. 
liabilities. Even . 
if it is 
assumed. that the principle might serve to. "establish 
there . 
iias no tipping. of; inside inforrnatign , oir 
misuse 
of such for. inv. dstn nt .. purposes ,. 
thc. 
"-questi-on-,, 
arises 
as to whether it can protect the f-irm against ac. tions 
by. -the firms clients; , 
in that. under. the. general law 
of . broker-client relations in. the. 
United 
. 
States there 
is an implied obligati-on an the professional to make 
full disclosure of al: l, information. that he knows or 
should reasonably know that would. materta'lly effect 
thc--*. ialue of the. -security 
in question.. 
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In the case of Black & shearson a Hammi 13. & Company, 143) 
a senior 'west coast' partner of the large 
Wall Street firm' of Shearson Hammil was a promoter, 
chief finance officer director, adviser and under- 
Writer of US/ ICON' The same--partner was also responsible 
for deciding that the firm would -make a market 'in 
the company's securities, and underwrite a"ne%% issue. 
1r 
He placed a large amount of the now securities with 
his personal clients and took up 10,000-himself-. 
The firm made what turned out to b6-false and exaggerated 
statements' about this company as part o the sales 
programme. The director--partner was aware of these 
statements', and had in his possession inside information 
that would have shown such to be false. However, - 
true to the segregation' principle' he did not disclose 
this information to those members off the fi rar! making 
the statements. When he realised that the company 
was doomed., he immediately' off-loaded his ov: n securities 
and those of his personal clients on inter alia other 
clients of Shearson Hämrnill. The plaintiff customers 
of the firm vwho' had bought the securities brought an 
action in the California State Cöurts alleging that 
by making purchase recommendations whilst the film 
was in posses'slon of information that showed such-to 
" be erronious, the firm had'violated their common law 
fiduciary duties to them. The firm argued that because 
of the federal law, despite the accepted fiduciary 
duties owed by Abrokers to "their 'clients,, the firm was 
under a higher duty not to disclose the information, 
The Court considered that the director"pärtner's 
silence did not absolve the 'firm from 'liability to 
its customers, In the Courts view the law was that 
deliberate and possibly negligent' nion--disclosure' df 
material. facts by brokers constituted fraud, the more 
so where affirmative and false representations had 
seen made. Whilst accepting that the performance 
of multi--roles in the securities industry had beneficial 
aspects, the Californian Court 'stated that the ' of icer- 
director's conflict in duties is the classic problem 
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encountered by one who serves two masters. It should 
not be resolved. by weighing the conflicting duties,, 
it should be avoided in advance ... or terminated 
; hen it appears: ' 
(log) 
Thus, the custcmer. is not 
to be__de? rived of his protection merely because the 
broker for personal reasons-indulges in raore_ then one 
activity. Martin Lipton and Robert Maur in their 
penetrating article on the 'Chinese Wallt consider, 
that the decision-on its facts was undoubtedly correct, 
as the director-partner had not disclosed the inform+ation 
out of any desire to observe segregation,, but merely 
to serve his own and chosen clients personal ends. 
15C)- However the statement of the Court, 
" 
and the 
refusal of the state court to accept that the federal 
law. under Rule lC(b)(5) pre-empts the clients remedy 
goes considerably further than the facts of the case. p 
and it is not without interest that the Court 
awarded raunative damages. Obviously the decision 
raises profound uncertainties about the `integrity 
of the 'Chinese Wall. ' solution. 
The situation has not been clarified by the* 
recent -litigation, very much on the same facts. in 
Jecond Circuit administering the Federal Law, 
In Slade v Shearson Hammill Company, 
(152) 
an action 
was brought against Shearson Hammil. l on the grounds 
that as investment banker to Tidal Marine International 
Corporation, it had come into possession of material 
adverse information about the, issuer, yet nonetheless 
" 
the firm continued to, . promote sales of the corporations 
securities to brokerage customers, Shearson Hammill 
sought summary dismissal of the action on the grounds 
that, it, did not have. possession of the informätiön 
"J 
contended, -and 'that as a matter of law even if Shearsons 
corporate finance department had k6own this ' non-public. 
information, it was precluded from using it to prevent 
the solicitation of purchasers by its retail sales 
force until . the information was made publiCr 
(153) 
" 
., l 
U. 
_T 
D3 
District Judge Carter considered that 
''it is true that an investment banker may 
? not reveal inside information obtained 
pursuant to a confidential investment 
banking relationship to its retain 
customers through its brokerage 
organisation, but the defendants were. 
wrong to contend that tan investment 
banker once: it receives adverse inside 
information,, may not prevent its . braking organisations from soliciting 
customers on the basis of public 
information which, because of the possession 
of inside information, it knows to be 
false and misleading. 
In support of this the Court referred to the t abstain 
or disclose) rule as laid 'down in the Texes Gulf 
Sul. Shur case. The defendants cantenced that the 
application of this rule to brokers -would create 
substantia-?. unfairness to those brokers who happen to 
chance upon inside infoimation o However, District 
Judge Carter pointed out that Shearson Hammill had 
voluntarily entered into transactions involving. a. 
conflict of duties and must thus suffer the. financial 
consequences of such. The same judge later retreated 
from his Chard line' approach, and in a separate 
opinion certified for review the case to the Second 
Ci rcult, accepting' that the Texas Gulf Sulphur test 
might not always be' apposite in the case of brokers o 
Furthermore, the courts'd-ecision had not, made any 
distinction between solicited purchases and unsolicited 
purchases where the broker was in possession of 
inside information. --0 
1 The importance of the case was now becoming 
appreciated by the securities industry, and-even tile 
Financial Times commented'that if correct, the decision 
'would require ä complete restructuring of the securities 
industry by making it impossible'- for- any broker to also 
"c-arry out investment banking services, 
ý1ý4ý 
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Before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
apart from the. parties. three separate amicus curiae 
briefs were submitted,, by the SEC and two major 
investment bankers. ' : In the' result, the Second Circuit 
t side stepped t the central -issue, that- is. whether 
there was an obligation on-investment, bank_ers, and 
"Nr 
brokers in'possession of inside information. -to disclose 
such to their clients or generally, or to-abstain 
entirely from conflicting roles 9. by remanding the 
case to the District -Court' fir further trial of the facts. 
Shearson' Hammi ll contended that as a' f i-rm it had 
made no recommendations, ätout the securities, and this 
vas its practice where. there was an investment banking 
relationship with the issuer-in question: The 
recommendations that had been made were, personal ones 
of the particular salesmen involved, made. on the 
basis of their own knowledge and analysis. 
. 
It 4ol3ovied 
that given the 'chine; e wail' that the f irr, had erected, 
there vas no violation of the' abstain or disclose' 
rule. Indeed it. vas argued that the rule - as . 
interpreted 
by.. the District Court, would result in unduly, favouring 
the clients of the firn by withdrawing them. from the 
market, because. of the, inside information.: Salmon Brothers 
in. an amicus brief thought that Shearson Hamrlil"l were 
misguided in trying to establish that' the-, salesmens 
ecommendations were not properly to. be regarded as. 
those, of the firm, and. thus '. once it is accepted that 
'a, 'salesman's recommendation is in the minds of -retail 
customers, - a recommendation by the firm, Shearsons 
attempted reliance on the Texas Gulf Sdnhur -principle 
and the ', Chinese Mall'. is seen to be misplaced 
" .1 
(155) 
salmon Brothers thought. that the. Federal Law could not 
have been 
, 
intended -. to allow. the type of : fraud , in 
Black v Shearson. -Ha mjll with 'impunity, _. 
and' the proper 
solution eras: merely to prohibit -salesmen -recommending 
securities-'inthe; 
_-f. 
irmvs investment banking 
_clientel. 
Z-7S 
The problem in the present case was that Shearson 
. äammill were atremp ting to extract. their. salesmen 
from the position that they had -got- into themselves 
b; y violating the firms 'no recommendation' policy. 
The policy was a vital supplement to the 'Chinese 
Viali t. Salmon Brothers were also mentl oned 
in their 
brief that to guard against recommendations by 
salesmen which might run contrary to inside 
information possessed by-the firm, a restricted list 
technique was used, As no reasons were ever assigned 
to the inclusion of a security on the list, the 
investment bankers considered' that there wLas no 
signalling effect. SGlmon Brothers amicus brief 
also critic Lsed the failure of the District Court 
to distinguish between solicited and unsolicited 
orders. Paine i ebber in its brief was critical of 
the vie-ors of Salmon Brothers, in that such vndu3: y 
favoured an investment banking function as against 
the retail securities house. in essence mine Vicbber 
thought that the primary and- sole - solution. %wwes the 
erection of a- 'Chinese Lall', and that restricted 
lists and other such expedients could not do otherwise 
than appear as signals to investors. The firm 
observed. that in its own experience- 'the mere. -act 
-oft withdrawing the recommendation will as -a, practical' matter inevitably-be taken by the customer as a 
sirnal that the firm has come- into possess'iöri -of 
inside information contrary: to the recommendation. ' 
The commission in its brief largely-supported 
the decision- of the' District Court, and the riction 
that Rule 10 (b) (5 )' prohibited any recommendation 
by a br ker.. which is. contrary to material inside 
information about the security known by him personally 
or by his firm. -the brief suggested that such 
'a conflict problem might be . avoided if securities 
firms required their salesmen 'to 'refrain from 
reccrrmending any security of an investment banking 
client, 
(156) 
In the Commissions view it was the 
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affirmative representations and, recommendations 
. made 
by Shearson, Hammill which created the -obligation 
to disclose. 
_ 
On the.: other hand the Commission in 
no was'. supported the contention that such a . view, 
meant? that a: broker's clients were entitled to the 
. privilege. of 
inside information as against ! the mar: cets 
.., here 
. 
the firm got 
- 
itself into this position then 
there shoi1d' be. 'coinplete disclosure or a willing 
acceptance of the resultant liability. Whore there 
was no aL Ff i -M, ative recommendation 
then the SA, -, 
as. - drd - the other am i cus curiae briefs, thought that 
the 'Chinese i'Jail' would protect the firm, from the 
. market at 
least. With regard, to the firms duty to 
its 
. 
vl 
ients the Commission suggested a species ol. 
r rv s 
t1. 
L1.1r 
list. 
procedure -wlr :.. '. 
in 
1 
o-, eta ii 
founts 
to 
a no-recommendation proc, edur'e. The Coy, in, s s:. on 
-am a` the integrity of suc: z d pe . ever, pha-9 iced that ý. es ,- ex 
d. e hcý " 
., on 
the camp. j. ete non-disclosure of the reasons for 
: °_ncluding the parti_pular security on the restricted 
'-ist.. Furthermore, as soon as the firm enters into 
ýn" -., vestment banking relationship with a company 
. as ,a matter. of.. cour'ae, no recommendations should 
be 
made. even before there is, any receipt of privileged 
information. 
_, 
Thus true to its position in the Merrill 
Lynch proceedings and the. settlement thereof , the 
Commission has in large measure supported the 'Chinese 
.: 
1t7a). 11' approach-. The tionourable Ray Garratte, - then 
Chairman of_ the SEC,. at 
. 
the London Conference on 
insider. Trading. in. April 1975 -affirmed the Commission's 
-view 
that the- . Chineýe +Ia1h' on the whole worked 
viel'l and are, the best practical 'solution to a problem 
that admits . of no single }universal rule. 
-' Pro_f-essor Loss, viould' appear to take the same -line, 
although he freely. admits that neither the SEC nor 
indeed -the industry has ' fully . 
thought . the matter 
through -ye. tt . 
(151) 
and the -uncertainty. has not 
. -been ., 
lessened 
. ýby_ 
the approach of the Second Circuit, 
J, 
v. 
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merely remanding the" oroceeding . 
back to the District 
Court; an approach which 'se. ems . almost 
des tined. to 
end in the usual .I settlement° . 
Professor Loss " has 
observed that he, -would doubt whetherthe. IC-hinese 
Wall' approach . would protect a firm. only a 
couple ; of partners, ... as 
there- would in 'such a. --case,, 
if one partner had inside information, and; the-other 
without being told,, traded' or rEgommqnded.: 4 l suppose 
that we could all agree that probably the information 
wou14 be imputed 'to. that other partner. < 
(15`9 )ý 
.. 
It would also see; that consTiderat ý_on of public policy 
would not allow a securities firm to deal. on its 
own. account whilst -in possession -, off, pýivi'_eged 
info. nmat-ion merely be asserting internal segregation. (log) 
Of course some houses and banks. have adopted 
the 
. safe, approach 
in this uncertain area, of.... . 
physically separating the inves tmen t, barýl; i ng service 
from the retail service, in 'separate corporate en ti. ti es. 
. 
It is interesting that professor Loss, considers ' 
it would be impossible and undesirable to at tempt 
to devise ü- single ccdi. fied regulatory approach. -in this 
field-, 
(160) 
The decisions- of the Commission in its 
administrative, and enforcement' proceedings and 'the. 
recent civil actions: against' Shearson Hammill 'have' 
emphasised that where a. duty to disclose arises,, 
'then there must 'be full - disclosure . -to' 
the market. and 
not just clients, -. 'and'. certainly not just selected . 
cl tints. 
(161) 
: The Commission has also been'. keen 
to place 'strict responsibilities. on profession'al's 
engaged in the securities industry to. ' police ' compliance 
with, the 'law and. 'fair trading' 'practices by. 'their 
employees and subördinates. .. 
(162Reference' 
.. has 
already been mad'e. --to the considerations -that. the:. 
Commission, ' and on occasions 'the Courts', -hav'e' paid 
to -the degree, 'of--'supervision 'cxerc: ised: by- 
and, superiors, . where- thd. question '. of: 
liabi'li'ty has 
arisen under -section 20(a). 
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lt has been state=d that `failure of the controlling 
person-to maintain and diligently enforce a' proper 
system of surveillance 'and internal supervision and 
control-cdnstitu-tes participation in the, misconduct 
and the -violation will, be, deemed to have'-been 
committed, not. only by the contro1l-ed -parson, -but a: lso 
by the controlling person who did not perform his 
duty to ý3revent its' - 
(1-03) 
Thus, -internal compliance 
procedures have become an important -factor -in -the 
regulation of the American securities- 
industry. --From the point of *view of in-house 'compliance, 
supervision and in the question Of fixing liability 
under rule. l0 (b) (-5) brokers and. inves t-:. en t bankers 
. are placed in an exceedingly difficult position as 
to how far research staff 'and analysts should be 
encouraged or permitted to search for investment 
_n fo. at ion,, If the analyst obtains inside information 
the con"' is t of interest problem almost . inevitably 
arises, to which as has been seen there is nä ready, 
or at least unexpensive, solut: ion; '. on the other hand 
b_dker-s are under a legal -liability. to , properly research 
and . investigate the securities; they recommdnd : under 
the . 'shingle'" and suitability theories::: 
(.... ) 
The- dile,. nma of . the analy. st is acute, -as was' seen in. 
,. he recent proceedings against Bausch- and Lamb., -- 
An analyst in this) --f izm,, as -a. result of. a conversation 
with. the management. of a' certain issuer, revised his 
own profit estimation. It was 'not certain vLhether the 
ana, l: yst. was actually given inside' information,. 'and. 
there . was every reason to assume that the revision. was 
due ,. to his: own perception and skill, . The issuer.. then 
contacted . the analyst* 
`and, : asked him whether: he was 
recommending -invdstmerit on, the basis of his. revised: 
fo ecast, %, i4 ich. he denied o *. -The, corporation 'then. 
discibsed to him, 'that. the 
. 'cärporation 
Is : own, revised- 
estimation w, ýs. largely c-onfirmatory.: o£ -his own, ' and-. 
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on the following day the corporation published its 
revised figures. In the interim it was alleged that 
the analyst passed on. his . ovwn original. estimation 
to 
institutLonal clients, and. in consequence of . 4he 
sales by such an action was brought against the firm 
for $6,500$000. 
(165) 
In. - add it . on , 
the SEC brought 
analyst complaints against the firm, its . chair=man, 
the analyst 
and several recipients of the information. 
(16 
. tit the time of 
'writing the proceedings have. not been 
concluded, and it would seem.. that in all probability 
both actions will be, settled. - However.,. np_ matter 
what the eventual outcome both.: emphasise the precarious 
position of th6 analysts and: the, recipients. - of 
his 
information. ... 
"Jith the prospect oll'almost unlimited civil 
liability, and strict administrative sanctions 
overhanging the industry, natural and great . concern 
has been expressed as, to the position . of anaI"ysts. (167) 
Furthe. rnore, given. the: fear of a s. ecu. ritles 
law violation', the, uncertainty. is having a, 
detrimental . effect_ on the 
flow of corporate , 
information, 
As Weeks and iýicCornia. c write in the Cleveland. State 
Law Review,. 'the : alternatives open to. insiders:: and 
the corporate issuers have. seemingly polerised, ", themselves, 
at least in'the minds of. -some. businessmen, to: either 
telling. nothing toý anyone- or shouting even thp. most 
insignificant ' bit of . corporate nows.,. 
fron the proverbial 
ops. ' .- 
(168) 
Corporations, are. alert, to. the house. tops, '--- 
' dangers* of leaking inside information and thus. incurring 
tipper liability, and. have. thus in certain ýnstances 
cut: the supply-of information, not" s'pecif ically mandated 
by:.. the- law br.. self--regulatory , agencies. This is of 
course, extremely serious:, given the obvious. inadequacios 
of the legal disclosure requirements arid, the notion, 
most 
. clearly enounced. 
by:.. Homer. Kripke,.. that disclosure 
should primarily be directed at, the, professional. 
(169) 
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Indeed, Chairman Cohen of the SEC has been obliged 
to admit that 'whilst the Commission opposes-" 
selecrive disclosures, the need and desirability 
of such 'in -the. -view. of the industry was. 'occasioned 
by the inadequacies of the legal. disclosure . regimen (170) 
However, in view of certain decisi. ons<_ both 
of the Courts and the SEC p 
(171 )-. 
corporations,., 
have been most reluctant to facilitate and--provide 
selective-interviews and conferences with members 
of the industry and representatives from. the large 
institutional investors. 
(172) 
- On-the-other hand 
a General Counsel of the SEC, and, -former Commissioner 
Phillip Loomis, has stated that 'corporations should 
continue to meet analysts and answer. their. questions 
in an appropriate way'. However, the General 
Counsel-qualified this by the observation"that' 
'your ordinary work as. analysts ... does not . 
" involve slinking around trying to get this kind 
of information and act an edge on somebody- und' make 
a quick killing on the market. 
173) There tan 
" be little doubt that-direct contact between 
management and professionals in the securities.. 
industry is highly valued by the. sbcurities industry 
as ameans riöt only of obtaining bp to date information 
and background data, but also insight as. to. the 
significance of trends. and developments. . -There 
is 
considerable' evidence. that securities houses-the 
world over actively encourage th1eir'members and 
employees to' develop such- contacts an im uts.. 
(174) 
Bot h -the national securities exchanges1175 
d" 
th'e. 
Commission (176) consider -that, public-corporations 
should operate an ! open door- policy' -in. their, . 
-relations- rýiith -analysts ; financial journalists., 
shareholders -and others interested in the company 
as an investment. - Obviously "where there*. is "a degree 
of, -contact. and- discussion'. between cor. 'porate, -insiders 
ZSt 
and the industry, there are problem areas and 
nice questions of demarcation. For example in the 
Bausch and: Lamb case, did the analysts own 
estimation become privileged when he had 
confirmation of. its accuracy from the corporation? (177)'. 
Certainty of the . estimation 
is: -at least 
in the nature of. inside informat-ion, and givos 
it an. additional dimension. General Counsel" 
Loomis, has '. stated that= where the.. corporation is 
aware of' t e3regious errors' in., the estimatiäns 
of, analysts there is desirability in the. corporation 
calling--the analysts attention to such.. 
(178) 
Another. problem is the identification of exactly 
what information an analyst or professional. acqu . res 
can be properly regarded . 
as of ai iabi. 1i ty mature. 
Con's i: '. erahle diversity of opinion, here exists, 
or example the.. General Counsel to . the 
Com 1 . ýýSian 
has said that the, test is not' one of public: 
disseminaci. on,. as much informati. bn. is.. not ' su, scept'ible 
is this expedient, bu"ý 'is: this confidential 
--information which. the: company Wouldn't give to a 
person who came in and asked fo'r it? . 
Are they 
-slipping 'it 'to this particular analyst because 
" they expect s. o ething in: return?. 
( 179) 
. The' General 
Couhsel. also' thought that* as. a basic, rule where 
. an analyst stumbled on.. information. he v; as not 
necessarily ; nreclud: ed., from using it,.. and this 
" included. accidental 'eiesdroppingt..., .. 
lap) 
" On-- the ., other .. hand . it. was, made . -c te'ar' - 
in the Investors 
M'anag'ement prb'ceedings that information obtained 
by= industrial espionage än4 bribery was within 
the rule'-s' scöpeo3. The, self-regulatory, organisations 
and the Coit'mission . 'consider th. ýit in. this. -, area 
: 3preiiention is the best . cure! and . prof. essidnals 
_- -shou? d " ct Vel}ý seek to. discourage insiders . giving 
'" them privilegod- ir. forcr. ationo 
zsz 
On the other' hand the Financial' Analysts Federation 
has advised corborätiöns- who, consider 'that they 
are' being unduly- pestered by''certain--analysts to 
report such to their: employers and then,, -failing 
correction; the Federation 
(181) 
The Nevi Yo±k 
--r Stock = Exchanges Company. Manual -provides 
that 
'a company.. should not give. information to one 
inquirer which 'it would . not give 
to another. 
Nor- should ; it 'reveal införrnation it would not willingly 
-give to the press for publication. ' 
(182) 
. 
The A; mericän 
. 
Stock Exchanges Company Guide, 
' : "; hilst. recommending an open-door policy, ' states 
that runder no circumstances should disclosure of 
material information or corporate developments 
be made to an individual or on 
.a 
selective basis 
. to analysts,. stockholders or other persons, 
unless such information has previously been. fully 
disclosed. and disseminated to the public. 
_(183) - Empirical evidence and cpmmon sense would 
tend to show that the e high, precepts are not - always 
-followed' either by the 'analyst, or broker, or the 
corporation. 
(18 ) 
The American Financial Analysts Federation 
mindful- oz 'the. crushing liability that - can befall 
its members and their firms for violations of the 
Federal laws in this area have. established an 
-Inside: Info'xmation Committee. which, has . aid 
down 
a number' of guidelines, bvhich have been -accepted 
by the British Society of 'Investment Analysts. 
-(185) 
.. 'llhilst th'e rules-, emphasise that ideally 
there should be. equal acces's to information, 
in practice. there-'can. not be. equa]. it'y 'in. the 
possession and . comprehension . 'of . 'such. 
The, guide- 
lines consider that inside information. is only 
that category 
. of . 
inf orma ion 'which is mva. teria 1, 
specific, non -public. '. -, received directly from 
those who obtained information as a result of a 
Z$3 
present or past special confidential relationship 
with thq; company'. Furthermore, the Federation 
were concerned that only specific existing facts, 
events and circumstances should -be regarded as 
inside information; whilst earnings forecasts 
would be within this category mere beliefs and 
rumours would not be. The Federation also makes 
it clear that it considers that the corporation 
at least an eoua' responsibility to ensure that 
there is no leakage of privileged information as 
analysts and other professionals have in the 
industry in assessing its nature, Nevertheless, 
the Federation underlines the fact that it is the 
duty of the analyst to obtain information and 
analyse such to assist in the direction of investments. 
The analyst should not however seek, and should 
not be given, information that the corporation 
would not be prepared to publicly release. 
Thus in the words of Chairman, Casey, t It seems to 
me this process of private meetings and discussions 
between ; corporate officers and analysts is 
substantially risk free so long as it con s, ists of 
providing links in, a chain of analytical information 
and public disclosure is made of anything of, s. harp 
and immediate significance which is communicated. i ((186) 
It is interesting that the guidelines 
consider that Rule l0(b)(5), does not prevent action 
resulting frcm the evaluation of-non-public 
-information received from an insider, no one part 
of which is specific , material 
information, even 
though such a conclusion if communicated by the 
company would be material. This-is aimed. at, the 
'mosiac' notion of materiality, which is of course 
of particular significance in the case of analysts. 
It follows from the Federations guidelines and 
their consultations with various officials and 
J 
.)t 
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members of the Commission that where an analyst 
uses 'info "m ation available to -the public to 
perceive- an- important' corporate- development, --it 
would - not be unlawful' to` Vse - the '`result'ant 
information. -'- For -example, ' in the Texas -Gulf Sulphur 
case, - an -analyst- might 'reasonably- have inf erred 
from'reports-and accounts disclosing Texas Gulf 
Sulphur had incxegsed 'i-ts 'investments in- Canada, 
that something of '-significant impact -had occurred 
-or was -about to "occurs 
X187 
To penalise this 
would be--to attack-the superior analysis and skill 
'of the' individual- concerned and would, at ä stroke, 
deprive competent analysis of its-ras-ion dlelklre 
and-motivation. ' The Financial Analysts Federatipn 
" and -the Courts have -accepted that the most that 
can be hoped for is equality, and then only a -' 
theoretical-equality at that, Of access to information. 
There 'will obviously be disparities in the interpretation 
and -analysis of such, --and- 'indeed in the speed of 
-communication and receipt 'of such. 
ý 1ý8 } 
Vihethe-r"--thhe Federations view that "syn thes-ised' 
public and 'inside can when `taken "as a whole al (hough 
'; perhaps --be'ar ng 'al? -the 'indica "of" inside -inforMation, 
nonethel-e-s-s -be used with " impunity, -ý is at best-- 
doubtful. - - 
(189) 
"" Whilst James- . Lorrie 
'in, his submission 
1 
to "the Secretary of =the `Treasury"-on- the development 
of s 'publ-ic ý po"lzcy -for' thej' Ameri can securities markets, 
emphdsised -'that "the-'-information which analysts- seek 
-is, not ffaterial by any'-. reasoriäble -Teg-al''def nni, tion 
of the, rather th'e'y 'seek -nm'all clues which when 
analýs'ed 'percep'tively -"and ' prom'ptl'y, ' cä'n 'be -used to 
"predict-the future -of "corporations maore completely 
-than -a mass 'of ' ünref i'ndd' public inform atVon 'c-ar 0 
"' -He '-thought 'that' his " was'=' e's'sential-1' 'information of 
a private -nature'' and that 'public- pöli-cy' should 
not 'genera'1"ly'-pr'ohibit exploitation of pr'ivate- 
information, as this would diminish the quest for 
such, and thus effect the efficiency of the securities 
market. ' 
(190) 
It is likely however, that where 
ass 
the inside. element is of any appreciable independent 
value in. the synthesis, liability could be predicted 
for utilisation, of the resulting conclusion. 
Whilet guidelines are of practical value to 
analysts and other professionals in this area of 
the law, it is important to bear in. mind that such 
can of their very nature appear as a 'snare. ' in 
that they imply a greater degree of certainty 
than may in fact exist. Both a former. General 
Counsel to the Commission, and a Chairman, have 
issued this warning, specif}cally with regard 
to this, particular aspect of Rule 10(b)(5),, 
(191) 
Profound practical problems arise in the area 
.. 
of fixing civil liability upon analysts who have 
utilised privileged, information for the purposes 
of their recornm-end ations and analyses. Logically 
it is difficult to select the appropriate -plaintiff 
absent any insider closer relationship with the 
issuer than a mere -tippee, 
(192) 
There is also 
the problem of identifying the violation and 
establishing the constituents of. liabiýity. 
(193) 
As wvith. tipping generally, it will be much harder 
to identify the persons actually trading on the 
basis of inside information than in the case of 
an insider properly so called. , 
Furthermore, there 
are the multitude of ways, many easily camouflaged 
in which an analyst or professional could utilise 
the, i lll. cit information, 
Another problem. area that has arisen in this 
field,, is that of. the analyst or. professional 
trading. on the basis of his o%, vn or his firms 
recommendations or transactions in particular 
securities. The leading case. on this practice 
is. SEC y Capital. Gains Research Bureau, 
(194 ) 
where the Commission brought. an action. under 
the Investment Advisers Act 1940, section 206, 
zýý 
to enjoin the defendants from advising clients 
to purchase securities held by the investment 
adviser Iii%rithou t disclosing the latters 
proprietary interest. The'defendänts evidently 
acquired the* securities 'immediately prior 'to 
oublication of the- recommendations and sold 
: immediately 'thereafter. Both the District 
Court and the Court of Appeals for the* Second 
Circuit found that the` failure öf 'the adviser 
to* disclose this cödld not be regarded as a 
, 
'fraud or. deceitt in the` legal sense of the word. 
The Supreme Court disagreed with' this and found 
liability. The Supreme Court left open the 
question of whether advisers trading for their 
ov. n or their firms account in the securities - 
upon wfiich they made recommendations 'presented 
such 'a conflict of interest that it should'be 
specifically outlawed, rather than there boa 
more duty to di sclöse such. Juätice 
Moore in a strong dissenting opinion, considered 
that tnon-disclosed facts indicate no' more than 
that the respondents personally profited from the 
foreseeab? 'e reaction to sound and-impdrtia]: 
advice', and there had been no breach of any 
fiduciary duty. Justice Moore thought that'the 
po'siýion would 'be different*where 'there' had 'been 
failure' tö disclose a bribe made in c'onnect'ion 
with the recommendatl6n" 'or advice. *"' 
(196). 
ti particularly interesting 'proceeding "by the 
Cömm? ss ion is that ' in SEC v Campbell . 
(197). 
The Commission c]. ained that a finar cial'analyst 
and ' journalist' ,' and his' son who was 'an editor of 
an ýnves tment j oürnal ,' had' purchab ed "s ecüritios 
in advance of f ävourable . recommendations' in ' their 
articles1 on : 101' occasions with regard to-the 
fathers s co'lucnn, and on 5 occasions with regard 
Z87 
to the son's paper. In at least 58 instances there 
-were price rises of 
between 80-90% by virtue of 
the published articles, and in all cases the defendants 
sold the securities v:. thin a week of the publication. 
The Commission charged the defendants. with violating 
their duty of ' confidence' - to readers by. not . 
d, isclosing 
what. they viere doing, and furthermore that they had 
not disclosed the situation to the persons from whom 
they acquired the securities. The Commission sought 
an injunction against both the father and the son 
and disgorgement of their profits. In. the result 
an agreement was reached between the defendants and- 
the SPEC under which a 'consent' injunction against 
further securities law violations was agreed upon, 
and Campbell. paid into court some $. 5,000. 
The Commission . had originally claimed. 
$. 2,5,000. 
(1g8ý 
The case's- importance lies in it being the first 
proceeding in which the SEC has sought to impose. 
liability for the misuse of 'market information' t (199) 
something which shatl be discussed further 
later-ono A number of actions were commenced against 
Campb, cll and the newspaper publisher responsible 
for the publication of the articles, alleging violations " 
of Rule 10(b)(5), 
" (200) The actions were consolidated , 
and the publishers moved for summary dismissal. 
The Court of Appeal. for the Ninth Circuit, in . 
agriement with , 
the District Court, considered that 
the appropriate basis for liability with-regard to 
the publisher. was -section . 20(a) and not respondeat 
superior. This, being the case the-Courts determined 
that the publishers should be exonerated for their 
goodfaith and in the circumstancesiadequate supervision 
of Campbell. ' District Judge Mctvicelas, for the Court 
of Appeals, considered that a significantly lesser 
standard of internal superyision and surveillance 
was required in newspaper offices than in the case 
k' 
I-__- 
z1as 
1 
of brokers, and other professionals: dealing direct-ly 
With the public. 
(201) 
The-'appropriate standard 
in the present case was-one 'amöunting more nearly 
to culpability4; and-as this had not-been breached 
the publishers -were entitled to sumrmnary, judgement. 
With regard to - the individual- defendants the c-ase : 
continued; and was at the time of- writing still, 
before the courts. 
The Commission has sought to tighten ' up . significantly 
Observance of, the-law -in this: area by newspapers - 
and their staff.. For example, the SEC has laid -a 
complaint against the "Nall 
y Street Transcri ptt 
ä? leging violations of the federal laws, and in 
particular failure to register as an investment 
ac. vi 'se _I'. 
(2.02) 
Similarly proceedings are pending .. ý. 
against Media General Financial Daily,. 
(V3)  
against " 
I he Commission has also become alert -tc the dangers 
df printers and their employees trading on the 
basis 
of information in documents they are required to 
prepare, 
(204) 
Att'Ontion, has also been -given to the 
provision of-privileged information to public and 
financial public relations officers -in corporations. (205) 
The Board of Directors of -the'Public -Relations 
Sodiety of America in 1963 issued an interpretation 
on its 1959 Code of Ethics, - which, apart from 
underlining ' th"e 'importan'ce of strict compliance With 
the" federal laws, in Rule 8 expressly forbids -the 
exploitation, -of --inside information, - end 'under Rule 4 
places an -obligation on the financial public relations 
officer to ensure -prompt disclosure of all-material 
developments ." 
(205) 
. 
JS. 
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B, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AS INS I)ERS AND TIPPERS 
The impact, of. institutional investors and managed 
funds in this ärea 
_ 
of insider and tinpee trading, as 
can be seen from the various cases and administrative 
orocecdinfis is significant. Funds Managers, as arc 
other ' rofessibnals . 
in the industry, are undenr a 
fiduciary *responsibility to the funds and investors 
that toy serve to manage their resources in their 
best economic interests. Another significant 
consideration is. that with the concentration of 
control and economic importance of the institutional 
investors, many are in control and possibly access 
relationships with the corporations in which. they 
invest. 07) In(, Iced, in recent years the United 
States Government and Congress, hast become increasingly 
concerned about the c'. imensi on; ofi nstiAlit nna? 
COI tro over corporate s su orS ý 
(203) 
,. nci PrCV 
s ions 
have been introduced to amend the 1; 3 Act to 
. regxui: re 
frequent disclosures of portfolio holdings } 
and transactions by institutional i. nves tors o 
(2 001 
There are a number of reasons why private individual 
., shareholders have become suspicious of the pourer 
-and. motives of these large funds, but a significant 
factor has been the selfish and abusive practices 
of a. number of institutional investors and the 
consequent repercussions that their actions have 
had on the integrity, and thus confidence of the 
market. 
(210) 
The SEC has expressed groat 
.'.. concern about' the dIsi ]. aus ionment of the small 
investor., 
(211) 
but at the same time has been 
unable to prevent the increasing exodus of such. 
Viriti_ng in the Virc nia Leer Review, James C. Sargent 
underlines the fact that in large part this 
disillusionment has resulted from the abuse by the 
(212) 
-institutions o-L inside irrformation and 
furthermore, 
. 
'this probler relates to the ability 
Z90 
of large investors to sit down and talk with corporate 
of: Eiciai s about the corporation' , and -get the right 
s an, %,, jars 
(213 
Ina r . i. nv ý 
. eckLorses in mutual fand ý: ed _ 
entrust their capital at least in part on the basis 
that : the fund will hive' the_ benefit of superiýýr 
and ket facilities, and this includes 
ý, 
(214) ' 
privileged access to information. Given the 
economic  oýý; er of the funds and institutional' investors 
they would certainly* ap; 6eär to' be in a"pösi. tiori more 
readily, enabling then to coax infox;; ýational details 
from corporate managements which are not generally 
available. indeed in the Lums Inc. case, the 
Chief Executive of Lums gave the anal; st orivi icgcd 
in f, ýx; ti. on so that he coU d 'smooth out'tze 
ins `! tuti. ons =. The industry has maintary ned 
in the east that tinsiAe informat? nn is*dif± icult 
t: hand iG, it is' over-ra. ted both as to the ami oünt 
;eC? k. nd its useful ess. It is not significant 
ff ac 
". or in the mranagenent of mutual funds. ' 
In particular the industry has pointed to the ýdiff icoolt-7 es 
of evaluation. 
. 
However, ' these are no different 
than in the case of other tippees, and the funds 
Jndi. nstJ. tut i oral. investors have the benefit of 
professional advisers and analysts to assist then 
in this. Furthermore the 'industry does not deny 
that its funds and managers do'have contacts'laith 
corporate issuers of a dimension that ordinary' 
individual investors. do not, and have been, accorded 
2i 
preferential access to information' on occasions. 
7) 
It is the factor of inequality, and not * necessarily 
the economic `advantages that it might provide, 
that has con Itrihuted to the disillusionment 'of' the 
small investor. 
(218 } 
Of: course,. where the 'fund does 'receive privileged 
inf ormati'n, under 'the `decided cases' the 'duty to 
onVserve the f'eder'n law of 'abstain or discloset 
1l 
predo minates over any fiduciary duty that the fund 
m ht have at state i aw -to utili so the information 
for -the max: Lmi_zation of its investors and clients 
oro l ': its. 
Because the funds are, thus in effect 
locked in, when they receive inside informatiop, 
there is some evidence that such have placed 
pressure on corporations to comply with the timely 
disclosure obligtions. As a general rule however, 
insti tutl_ona?. investors both sides of the Atlantic 
have . been cionspi cuously unconcerned about the 
management of the corporations in which they choose 
to invest their large resources. The general approach 
has been to 4 sell out' if the fund's managers are 
. about 
i cal about the ability and competence of the. 
is suers imanago en t, rather than tc take a stand against (<ý 9) 
suchQ though there have been instances 
%,!;: ere -institutional Investors have in t/erVºC: ned 
directly in : ianacement matters and thhrovrn their 
nst ap particular policy 
(220) the general i 
approach is that epitimised in the words of Angus 
Murray of. the Prudential; 'we prefer backdoor moral 
pressure and. persuasion. It is better than shouting 
from the rooftops. ' 
(221) 
However, given the fact 
that because of the dimensions of their holdings, 
and increasing pressure from a variety. of sources, 
there is evidence to suggest that institutional 
investors are becoming far more responsive to the 
suggestion that they should recognise the manägoment 
obligations cast upon there by the sheer size of (222) 
their investment. 
in the United Kingdom there has been a 
particularly -interesting development in this area, 
and this the creation and, development of investment 
Protection Comraittees by the large institutional 
investors. It is through, these committees that the 
funds have been able to eý: ert a . not. inconsiderable 
292 
pressure upon corporations , and -it is- thus of' some 
importance to-discuss this in some detail. 
The approach of the com-Zittees- is apt'imis: ed 
in the statement of the Association of Investment 
Trust Cbrnpanies', that throughout its h_-story, r it 
has consistently sought t to -es tablish the-rights 
of shareholders both, in -accordance -with the rights 
laid down in the companies, documents, and also 
the rieht to have a say in the performance - of the 
companies in . -, hich they hold shares. 
223 ) 
However, none of the committees have been in the, 
forefront of. those calling for increased investor 
protection under the laej, 
as they prefer to 
influence the climate of thought rather than seek 
Government 
(act on or -legal provisions -to 
remedy ý. 
abuse. ' 
) 
On occasions the Committee s will 
unite together in one concerted effort aga: ins ,'a 
parti. cu t. ar cor aorati on, as was indeed the case in 
the recent Rank. Organisation Affair, there 
vrith the express support of t: Äro Gordon Richardson (22°) 
the Governor of the Bianr of England. . 
71here there is a combined. effort on a particular 
management, it will be most diff icu! t to resist it. 
The Association- of Investment Trust Companies, 
ani the investment protection committees -of 'the- 'Association 
of Unit Trusts;. the National Association 
of Pension Funds and the British Insurance Association (227) 
operate under a cloud or secrecy. --Richard 
Spiegelberg points out -in The City Power v ithout 
Accountability, that what is 
'seen 
of. -instituti oral 
involvoment in corporate management- is only the tip 
of the iseber , and very much more -occurs. 
behind. the 
scenes. 
(22II 
Obviously the institutions-have 
an 'interest in -not being seen -to 'rock -the boat- too 
'much' and `appear' to be concerned -about -the - position 
of 'the 'company as this . would directly effect, the 
Z3 
market and thus their investments, which are in 
man%i instances 'v: Lrtually locked. into the company. 
Thus the ins ti-tutions and committees - have generally 
assiduously avoided any appearance of- t associating t 
with management and appearing too deeply involved (229) 
The Committee with- management policies. x 
will, however, in certain circumstances call the 
assistance of outside bodies, such as the. Stock 
Exchange, and on occasions the Confederation -of, 
British, Industry.. Of particular interest' was the 
pressure that the committees b rdught to bear " on 
the management -of Ue%%man- Industries to appoint an 
outside merchant bank to investigate and 's`port 
. upon certain proposed dealings involving -the directors 
. arid corporate assets. Many- fuel, however, that on 
the whole the investment proteec Lion-. c. ommi ttEees have 
been too. prepared not to push a shareholder grievance 
and attract publicity. 
(230) 
. 
Un. ortunately the Association and 'Investment 
Protection Ccm: -ri ttees have not at least publicly 
sought to . make a ddtenSined stand against malpractice 
' and inside. z trading. Indeed in the British Insurance 
t\ssocia. t: i^. n's -Investment Protection Committee's 
report in the B. 1. A. 's 1974 Annual Rep rt, the' 
Chairman-- of -the Committee-, Mr. Peter. Bell', specifically 
denied . that. the committees and instJ tutions 'were 
. in any way `concerned or responsible for the conduct 
of companies 'and their managements. The other 
. Co: mm'i ttees have on -other occasions made similar 
stater ents. The 'Nationa. l'. Association of Pensions 
-Funds which manages' ovzr 3,500,000,000 'in particular 
has been crit1cised. for its denial that 'it has, any 
public responsibility. 
(23J. ) 
= 'ButL. i, n" fairness,. despite 
" these discl'ainers, the -commi t'tees have none uheless 
interve; ied in practice. 
X232 1.1. z. Bayley, the. 
Secretary of the Investment 'Protec'tion -Committee 
ý9ý- 
of the :" , Iational-. Associationr. 'of,, Pension Funds,. :. 
informs the present : author that " if- 'the -Committee 
detected insider trading, which "in : no *case it- 
. 
"had, it Would . report 
the -matter 'to- the 'trustees 
. of 
the appropriate fund and to. the Stock- Exchange 
or Take-oýrer Parcel; '(233) 'In their merioranhm: 
of evidence to the Department, of Trade and Industry 
on Company Lawv . 
Reform in 1973, the National. ' 
Association of Pension Funds supported any. move 
to curb the. use of inside infomm, ation, but'. -at. the 
same time pointed out the, practical difficulties 
.. of enforcement. . 
The Investment Protection 
Committee. of---111h6 Pension. Funds further . 
thought 
that members of 'the Stock Exchange should be. 
discoiAraged fron executing orders which they consider 
might be based upon inside info m. ati-bn. : In' this 
respect the Committee thought that a mandatory 
disclosure by brokers df tl. l orders executed ten 
days or less f: di the announcement of a merger 
ör.. 'takeover at least inhibit abuse, if. not actually 
prevent it completely. : -(234) t. tr. _J .W. 
Melville, 
_. The Secretary of the British Insurance Assdciation's 
investment protection committee, con'sid'ers. that. 
the . 'committee would support . the observations of. 
'the Casty: Panel on . Takt--overs and Mergers. with regard 
. 
to inside trading, and-- would . 
in! principle 'at.: least 
support the provisions An the Companies Bill 1973 (235) 
Both. the. Association of Investment Trust 
Companies and -the -Association. of Unit -Trusts. would 
take. a similar approach. 
(236 ) 
Whilst. J"ro Bayýey, the Secretary. of the : Investment 
Protection Com, ittee of. the National Association of' 
Porlsion. Funds; considdrs 'that .. 
' funds.. are. exceedingly 
vary of the- possibility of becoming . 
insW ers., and I 
view -it as' neglinible, and .. thus . no . pecial-. proc. edures 
. are required,, 
'- . 
237) 
.....::., .... _y 
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On the other hand it would appear that institutional 
investors are- in a ; ýosit. i. on to acquire ; privileged 
informa1ion, indded some have representative hon-- 
executive directors on the companies in which 
they are invested. 
(038) 
ý'" `' Whilst the institutions 
and the committees are adamant that they do not use 
inside- inf-ornatioh for their own purposes improperly, 
there a±esurprisingly little-precautions against 
possible abuses. The Associhtion of Investment 
Trust Companies has no written rules of conduct 
for its members covering the impro? er use of inside 
information, although it would appear that there is 
a-well understood rule that- improper utilisation 
of such information would be a serious violation 
of the principles for which the Assoc i a. tion stands 
for, 
W9) 
The same situation pertains with 
regard 
to the investment 
protection ommi t l, ". ees 
ünd ne bership of the National Association of Pension 
rinds and British Insurance Association. 
(240) 
The Association of Unit Trust managers has, however, 
got quite an imoressive' code of conduct. Vihiý. st 
this' code does provide against self dealing, 
supervision over employet', s and the preservation 
of confidentiality, 
(241) 
'it does not deal with 
insider trading as such. It should also be noted 
that even the investment protection committees, 
do not häve formalised rules on the improper use 
of information acquired in furtherence of their 
functions, Of courses bearing in mind the sort 
of person usually found on these COmmi ttees it is 
taken, -probably with s6-ne justification, fox granted 
th'. t at least intentional' abuse would be most 
unlikely. - The Associ-at. on of Investment-Trust- 
Companies has observed that 'there has aDWays been 
since the Association was formed in: 1932, an"accepted 
code of conduct -that members-, of- committees - formed 
by the Association, do not use any information 
Z96 
of. an. inside nature which they may gain. as m. embers 
of such a committee. 
(242) 
Furthermore, in the 
case. of special committees of the Association 
where members 'come into possession, of confidential 
information, they are off the market until the 
scheme,., or matter is published' Evidently, 
this Rule has never been broken in the history. 
of the \ssociation,. and it is this trust-that 
enables companies and their advisers to consult 
the Association fully and freely., 
(243 ) 
It is of course Lure that in both the United 
Kingdom. and the United States there are laws regulating 
invesbaent companies and unit trusts, which, are 
of. some relevance to the question of insider abuse. 
However, at least as far as the British law is 
concerned, there are no provisions specifically 
relevant to inside t: _ 
(244) 
and general r adiný, . 
regulation is. outside the scope of this study. 
The British Stock Exchange and Take-over Panel 
. 
have not been slow to acknowledge. the dangers in 
this area howlover, -and have sought to 3ntröduco 
a degree of regulation. Under General Principle 10 
-of the City Code on Take-overs and. Mergers , it in 
pra_vided that 'during the . course of a 
take-over or 
mgrger transaction, or when such is in contemplation, 
. neither of , 
the offeror, or offeree company, nor any 
their respective advisers, shall furnish information 
to some shareholders which is. not available to all 
shareholders. However, this is qualified by the 
fact that 'this principle shall not apply to. tine 
furnishing of infornation in confidence by an off erde 
company to a , 
bona fidi potential offeroe. or. vice 
versa, nor to the issue of circulars by. members of 
the Stock Exchange 
. Who- ara_ associates of any -party 
to the transaction,, to their own investment clients 
provided such. issue shall previously have been 
I 
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approved by the Panel'. Obviously this general 
Principle aims at equality of information, but a 
number of problems have arisen in its practical 
administration and the Panel. have promulgated a 
Practice Note of some interest. 
(245) 
11 particular problem has been corporations 
-holding-, or approaching the Executive for permission 
to hold, briefings for selected shareholders, and 
in particular institutional shareholders. The Panel 
has expressed some concern about these meetings, 
as 'whatever the intention at the outset, there is 
a strong possibility that fresh information will. 
be forthcoming at meetings of shareholders at 
which directors of comcanies or their advisers 
(2406) 
express their views during a takeover or merger'. 
Apart from the inequality that this would create 
the information disclosed would not be covered by 
the standards imoosed under Rule 14 of the Code on 
disclosures. The =anel considers that nonetkieless, 
these meetings and briefings are not 'precluded' 
provided that certain stipulations are observed. 
These are, that the meeting should not be held 
until the offer document has been published, and 
the offeree company's directors have had an opportunity 
to publish their views, that all the shareholders 
should be invited to attend the meeting at least 
three business days before such is held, although' 
in certain cases of urgency, the Panel in its 
discretion might accept a press announcement and 
invitation, that the news media should be invited, 
and that 'if at the meeting any material new' 
information is forthcoming or significant new opinions 
expressed, a circular giving details should be sent . 
to shareholders immediately thereafter' or in certain 
an immediate press announcement made, at the Panel's 
discretion. In both cases the Practice Note emphasises 
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that the board should have the same responsibilities 
for this information imposed under Rule 14, as with 
other disclosures. If the information disclosed at 
such a meeting cannot, in accordance with the 
{ Take-over Codes criteria be sufficiently substantiated, 
Ii 
such as for example a profit forecast, the issuer 
must formally retract the statement in the release. 
The Practice Note also emphasises that the 
same considerations apply to disclosures by the 
parties and their associates through the television 
and radio, media. It is emphasised that generally 
the takeover or merger should not be discussed by 
the participants through this medium because of 
the complexity of the issues that will be involved 
and the kind of presentation that is usually 
contemplated. Where new information or opinions 
are however expressed, the Panel again underline 
the need for circularisation of shareholders, and, 
where necessary a press release. 
E The Panel does not consider that brokers 
associated with the participants in a takeover or 
merger transaction should. be prevented from 
circularising and advising their own investment 
clients. However, the Practice Note points out 
that this does not extend to the communication of 
information which has not been made publicly available 
'brokers should bear in mind the essential point 
that fresh information. must not be restricted to a 
small Group. 'Thus such circulars should not 
contain any statement of fact or opinion derived 
from information not generally available; in 
particular profit forecasting, unless and only 
to the extent that, the offer documents contain 
forecasts, should normally be avoided'.. 
Furthermore the Practice Note requires the brokers 
associated status to be specifically disclosed. 
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Although the Executive can give clearance for 
issue of such circulars over the telephone, where 
there is any doubt a draft copy should be supplied 
in advance, and in all cases a final version must 
be supplied to the Panel. 
The practice Note and the Code itself is 
of course, only applicable to take-over and''merger 
transactions and thus in no way effects the ability 
of corjjorations to bold selected briefings, as many 
in fact do, on a variety of other matters. 
Furthermore, where the meeting is a 'consultation' 
with such groups, as for instance the investment 
protectiQn committee's of the institutional investors 
the application of the Practice Note and Rules are 
uncertain, even in a take-over situation. 
(247) 
. SO I 
(C) SEGREGATION OF BROKER--DEALER FACTIONS ON THB 
. STOCK EXCHANGE = 
(a) SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Öbviously. those at the centreöf the securities market 
are in a privileged -'position with regard-. to the-acquisition 
of 'market information' . and in the-'ability to'. ädt upon 
such. 
(248) 
To appreciate the position of those persons 
from the standpoint of insider trading regulation, -it is 
of course necessary to consider the role- az d . functions 
perfoxmed by such within the cöntext-of the market. 
Nonetheless, it is impossible to adequately enter upon a 
discussion of the structure and organisation of the 
securities markets in the United States, let alone 
throughout the world, given'the dimensions of this present 
work: 'However, it might be illustrative to briefly 
examine the position of the worlds largest, securitiös 
exchange, the New York "Stock Exchange. 
(249) 
The New York 
Stock Exchange; ' as does the other American Stock-Exchanges 
operates a 'continuous action market'. 
(250) 
This market 
in 'round lots' for listed securities is`not unciintrived 
because of the presence of tie 'specialist: ' 
(251) 
The Wall Street Journal' has graphically stated that 
'the specialist 'is 'at the guts of the market system, ' 
(252) 
and Leffler in his leading work on the American Stock 
exchangeshis stated that 'his work is central to the 
maintenance of a'free and continuous-market in the 
' (253) 
securities in which he*acti as specialist'. 
` 
_- 
A specialist is a -member of the Stock Exchange 'who 
may act' as a broker 'or'"a dealer'; and thus' is vitally 
different to the British. jobber. The'specialist'in his 
broker capacity'will execute .: orders on behalf of other broker' members':; of , the exchange. -or! :a commission . basis. 
' 
In thost-cases these will be limit orders, 
(254) 
and this 
provides a useful-expedient for freeing brokers to trade 
elsewhCre on the market'*- -rHis -second and more complex 
role is that, of dealer or principal for his town account, in the securities for which he keeps a book. _.,.. 
In. this 
capacity-the specialist buys -from the public when there is an offer to sell, but other public bids are not' 
available, and sells to the public when there are no 
3oZ- 
other, *sell bids- forthcoming- from the market. - ---Thus in the 
words of Leffler 'he maintains a, market- purchasing stock 
at a higher price than anyone else is willing to pay at 
the' time, ` and by- selling- stock- at-. -a- lower -price than 
anyone. else is willing- to . 
take at that-, time. ' 
(255) 
'The objective of:, this*is. to provide a,. continuous and 
orderly, market *with a real degree_ of . 
fairness; -,: c266) 
in that at all times he is circumscribed-by the. rules and 
regulations of the stock - exchange. ' . 
ý"Jhilst performing 
,,. this role; the specialist, without directly-seeking it, 
earns his-profit. 
257) 
The Congress in the legislative programme of the 
New Deal' were only too well aware of the possibilities 
of abuse that could resultfrom the combination. of broker 
and. dealer functions in the same person.. 
(25$) 
. 
However, 
the pressure brought to. bear by`the securities-industry 
was-so great that the Congress placed'the controversial 
issue in"the, hands of the SEC. Under section 11(b) 
of the 1934 Act, it is provided that national stock 
exchanges can cgntinue to have odd lot dgalers and 
specialists, but subject to such ruleq. as the'Cot . scion 
may. prescribe. However, it is also provided that 
'if under the 'rules and regulations of the Commission 
,a specialist 'is permitted to act as a dealer, or is, 
. 
limited to acting as a dealer, such. rüles änd''regulations 
shall restrict 'his, so. fär as practicable to 
those reasonably necessary to permit him to maintain 
a feir end orderly market. 'Moreover, although this is 
not self'-operative in the absence of Commission rules, 
the section goes on to provide that whether there be 
rules or not, 
'It. shall be unlawful fora specialist or an 
official of the Exchange'to-discloseinformation 
in regard, to orders. placed with such : specialist 
which is not available to. all members of. the _ Exchanged to-any person-other'--than--an official 
of the Exchange,. a representative. of the - .; Commission pr a specialist who may be acting for such specialist. ' 
In 'addition the Commission-is -given power to-require 
disclosure to all- members -of the ewchange--of all orders 
placed with "specialists ; ýünder such-rules and regulations 
3 a"3 
.. r t-r- ýJ ..... a :, J 
as the- Commission '-may ` prescribe' as necessary or-appropriate 
in-the public 'interest. - It ' is' also` provided --that- it' is' 
ünlawfül' for' a"specialist -acting 'as' a-- broker to7 effect on 
the-- exchange- any tränsactä. on-; '-except' upon' a market or a 
limited -price order. The Commission 'under its- mand-ate 
; in Section 11(eß of - the 'Act'-inv'estigated- the feasibility 
-of -complete segregation' of broker' dealer functions; - 
reported' in 1936 'that'the main problems 'grow out bf the 
dealer activities' of specialists ý 'Although a -specialist, 
like any 'other broker, is not allowed 'to- act 'as' a-'dealer 
in a brökeräge -transaction; at' least not'-without- full 
disclosure 'and consent, critics of the system in'aintazn 
that ! this. - prbhibiti-on is insufficient and- that''the- 
incidence of specialists dealings upon-the market''in 
general' afid upon 'execution 'of -customers 'orders in'': ' 
j particular, renders it "essential that they 'be -prohibited 
' altogether from acting as a broker and dealer: 
(259). 
Thus ' äs `Loss puts ' it, the basic 'issue is whether or 
not the supposed advantages öf the* present -system justify 
the possible risks- of abuse', generated by a lack' of " 
" -e (260). The' economic--benefits 'and- the segregation. 
stability argument of the present scheite are-open to 
question, if not-doubt. '-(261. 
) 
" The, criticisms--made by 
the C'ömr. ýission 'of -the present -system are -worthy of- 
. attention. 
Firstly, the-Special RApo'rt"cönsidered'that-ä-- 
specialist had ` the' benefit of-special knowledge-and 
superior"bargaining"power in'dealing with-the securities 
in which he kept' a book*"' Apart from `not -paying, commission 
'by virtue- of"his presence: -on `the floor; `he-'is" in- a 
position to act"more expeditiously than'non-members' 
' on thew basis of 1 iformstion effecting `the market .. ý- 
' 
(262}' 
_Vlhilst' 
the- specialist'is tied"to his -trading 
post; 'this'very lack-of nobility-keeps-him-in continuous 
and intimate" cöntect'': 4ith'the' riärket for', the"secuities 
.. -which 
he. handles and enables him to become familiar-with 
the effect of periodic seasonal and occasional phenomena, 
on the_ prices thereof*. '-: . 
Moreover, 
w and' 
perhaps- most. " 
significantly the specialist is in possession of very 
material information relevant to the market, by reason 
of his own dealing intentions and- through. the orders 
entrusted to hire for execution. " The Commission also. found 
that 'frequently a specialist knows, or can ascertain, 
. the source of a large. order-,. particularly if he. maintains 
. personal contact with. 
the officials or principal stock- 
holders of-corporations in the 
. 
securities. in 1"ihich he 
specialises, or if he. can identify the brokers acting for 
them'.. The $EC added that whilst it . had. been con tended 
that the information obtainable . fro _ 
the, specialist's 
book was of little practical assistance as. the relevant 
orders relate to only a small. proportion 01 the market 
it does allow the specialist to judge market trends, 
and the. relevant figure for market impact will, , 
be the 
floating supply of securities,, as the Commission recognised, 
'such orders, while not indicative, of the . 
trend over long 
periods of time, do indicate the immediate sensitivity of 
the market for the stock which the speciafist.. handles'. 
Moreover, although the specialist . 
is unaware, ih theory 
. of already existing orders in ttie market, in the possession 
of other specialists, he does occupy a pivitol position 
in the market and will have knowledge. of the sources of 
orders and the volume -or, orders. Indeed, the practical 
advantage-gained by professionals with access to tle 
market floor itself, with regard to detectin trendy and 
information, has long been recognised. 
(263,. 
It has 
also been said"tha t according. to the rule`tht'a'broker 
cannot act both as `, principal and agent in the, same 
transaction, -. a specialist. is bound to. execute his 
-customers orders before he can trade. for his'own account: 
The impact of this rule is however substantially lessened 
b the fact that the bulk . of the . 
specialists' orders will 
ibe limited price orders, and thus. apart from'deals on that 
particular price,. there is. no such restraint or; quäification. (264) 
The Commission also found considerable opportunity 
for specialists to. manipulate. the market to their own 
ends, 
(265)' 
On. theother hand the 1936 
. 
Report` did"acInöwledge 
that there were persuasive economic arguments-and those directed towards market stability 'did nöt'support the 
3os 
retention of the basic structure. In conclusion the 
Commission tentatively thought that the best practical 
expedient would be to require the ; Mock Exchanges to 
eliminate the grosser aspects of the multifunction of 
certain categories of member, through their own rules. 
The Commission, by the legislative programme of 1941, 
did however admit that the alleged benefits of"rthe present " 
system had not been proved and that given the essential 
conflict of : interest, legislative segregation might be 
desirable. (266) " The other studies ' and reports prepared 
by the SSC have been largely inconclusive . on the advantages 
and detriments of the specialist system. 
(267) 
The rules 
adopted by the Stock exchanges at the behest of the 
Commission are aptly illustrated by those of the New York 
Stock Exchange. Rule 103 of the Rules of the Board of 
Governors of the New York stock Exchange provides that 
if the Exchange finds 'any substantial or continued 
failure by a specialist to engage in a course of dealin :s 
for his own account or assist in the maintenance, so far 
as is practicable, of a fair and orderly market, the 
registration of such specialist shall be subject to 
suspension or cancellation by the Exchange. By virtue of 
Rule 104 no specialist is to effect on the Exchange any 
transaction in securities in which he is registered, for any 
account in which he, his member organisation or any 
participant therein is directly or indirectly interested, 
unless such dealings are reasonably necessary to permit such 
specialist to maintain a fair and orderly market. The 
holding of puts, calls and other options in the securities 
in which he is registered is also prescribed as such 
transactions, with others, are not considered to be of a 
nature required in the maintenance of a fair and orderly 
market. -(268) Any participation by the specialist in a 
pool trading in the securities in which he is registered 
is also prescribed under Rule 105, and comprehensive 
records are required to be maintained under the same 
rule. 
(269) 
" Despite the impact of such rules, there have been cases 
involving specialists where great abuse has been present. 
3cx 
For example, in the matter of Re and Sugrasse, the 
Commission found that a specialist and his son 'took 
advantage of their pivotal position as specialists to 
rig the market for securities in which they were effecting 
massive illegal distributions on the exchange' . 
(27C) 
Indeed this case triggered an SEC Staff investigation 
into the Rules and Regulations of the American Stock 
Excbange, 
(271) 
which was exceedingly critical of the 
Exchanges supervision over Specialists, and in particular 
the relationship 'of many specialists with corporate 
insiders. In short, the Staff found a`serious breakdown 
in the self-regulatory mechanism. 
(272) The Commissions 
special Study of the Securities Markets I"sarkets considered 
that the conflicts of interest were 'tolerable, but only 
under a re ulatory system which contains effective. 
controls'. 
273) The Special Study was also perturbed 
about the lack of adequate capitalisation that specialists 
possessed and the possible detrimental effects from the 
market's standpoint of competition. On the other hand 'the 
absence ofL competing specialists makes an effective system 
ý 
of regulation and surveillance particularly. important '. 
(274) 
Under, ti .e surveillance -procedures op crated by the ; ew 
York Stock Exchange specialists are required about eight 
times a year to submit to the Exchange details of their 
dealings for unannounced one week periods selected at random 
by the Exchange. These figures and studies of price 
continuity, spreads in quotations and depth, are examined 
carefully by the Exchange to determine the specialists 
effectiveness in maintaining a fair and orderly market. 
In addition the New York stock Exchange and the American 
Stock Exchange maintain an on-line pripe surveillance 
programme based on trading data supplied by the Exchanges 
computer which are linked to the stock tape.. This 
programme monýtors all trades reported on the tape throughout 
the market, and when the price movement of a particular 
security exceeds pre-set norms, the computers automatically 
alert the surveillance staff. In addition the. Ploor 
Officials operate immediate 'on floor' surveillance. 
(275) 
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The Special Study of the Securities Markets concluded 
that on balance the specialist system should be retained, 
although there. is a need to. tiahten up the degree. of self- 
regulation. After- consultation with the Exchanges . the SEC 
promulgated Rule. ll(b)-l. which . 
is a set of regulations 
aimed at providing a comprohensive cote with the self- 
regulatory rules.,. for specialists. The rule 
emphasises that specialists1should. only deal as principals 
where-such is necessary for the. fair and orderly-functioning 
the the market. " It 
is affirmed that Stock Exchanges. can 
register their member as specialists with regard to.. specific 
securities s , lout only jf their rules. observe a minimum set 
of safeguards. These are inter alia. that such . hould have 
an. adequate capitalisation, should undertake to. deal , on 
his own account to assist in the maintenance of a . fair . 
and orderly market, and will indeed only deal as principal 
in-such instances, and that when acting as broker,; observe 
the normal rules relating to brokers. -In short, the 
Commission made the. existing rules of the New York Stock 
Exchange, to (which reference has already been made, a 
national condition for the registration of specialists. - 
The main deficiency prior to " the intervention of-the SEC 
was that the Stock. Exchange rules were. inadequately 
enforced, and administered by the Exchanges.: In.. this 
respect, of particular interest is Rule 11(b) which provides 
that the Commission may institute proceedings to require 
cancellation or suspension of 'a specialists 'regis*ation 
if he engages in transictions which are*not necossary"for 
the preservation of a fair and orderly -market. "0 Id tie' 
'words f th'e Commission this' `plac'es maximdm "rel'ianco . 
on the self-regulation aspect, 'by requiring Exchanges 
Rules'-to 'spell out the basic 'specialist obligations and 
provides ä inedns'. for "di'rect 'enforcement by -the Commission 
when necessary. ' 
. Whilst the present * regulatory framework' 'no} doubt, goes 
some considerable way to eradication' of 'abuse, '-sig'nificant 
potentialities . for improper *dealing's -by s'pecial'ists and 
their privies., remain. 
t 
3c 81 
), - II 
A specialist etill ' enjöys -substantial: advantages -and` privileges 
iri- his "trading position, and most"irnportant is'-the information 
that he can glean `fröm his ' 'böok: '"SOecialists "are `äl-so 
likely "to have d,. '. privileged" relationship 'with the 
corporate issuers for'whose" "securities `they 'are registered. 
.... The New York Stock Exchange ts Company Manual 
(279) 
 phasises that specialists a's 'they -äre ' charged with the 
rpairiter ance of "a' fair and orderly market In the' con. pany's 
". shares 'rAUst'rnaintain 'proper liaison with the company's, 
officials'. Properly 'conducted, such liaisonicould 'fo'ster 
a mutually beneficial und"erst"and"ing of 'thd -pröbiems 
'encountered by, -both. - 'Thus the specialist will' almost 
inevitably be` in a- privileged posltionvas'to - the - 'amount 
of information' that is -disclosed concerning the"-issuer. `(280) 
The Exchange considers that the " exchange ' of "ini o ºº'ätion 
between' the " specialist, - and- the corporation in whose 
- securities he specialises, ' is--botti natural --and desirable. 
(2$1) 
The Comp'any's IAanuäl warns., -however, that 'there -are points 
beyond which it iviould be " improper for " the company' to - go- 
'in giving information to -the 'specialist-t""and -this would 
comprehend: such--matters - as" -advance': 'inf öianation relating 
to take-overs- and- mergers-*', -Införmation«-that - thQ -Company 
would 'give to -'analysts " and, "'investment' advisers' would 'be' 
within _ 
the vategory. of ' information that the corporation 
should pass on to the specialist. It is . obvious nonetheless, 
that certain specialists are 'allowed to ' have 'ä 'much 
...::... (282) greater degree of 'access, and become in effect 'insiders. 
Apart from, privileged märket information and privileged 
inside information, the specialists. own transactions and 
"Y 
intentions with regard 1o'his own account, are material 
pieces of 
.. ", 283) - ,. "_. ý ý.. .. ".. .. -.. _ "ý.. . "ý ... p information., 
A -learned writer in the New York University Law 
Review. doubts whether self-regulation by the Exchanges 
will ever be an adequate protection. in this pazt&cular 
field, and thuis he would 'advöEat"e 'ttýe "utilisation"of '" 
Rule lO(b)(5) by both the Commission and the investing 
public in private actions. 
(284) 
In view of the recent 
decisions there would appear to be little doubt that a 
3c 
specialist _would 
be. liable -under 
Rule . 10(b) 
(5) for. the 
misuse of . corporation information, The only real problem 
-fix liability: 'upon him, is whether this . would . extend to 
where he'. used market. information, such äs _:. that given. to 
him through. his, - ' bodk!.. to.. trade. The. Special Study :. 
referring . to insider trading cases such.. as. in the 
h 
_gý" : Qf'. 
C : may Roberts, remarked -. that . 
'. although : the . content 
and quality of.. floor' informätign., ':.. may. be, different, 'from 
the . infothation , and, advantages noted. 
in.; these., cases, '_the 
principle . remains the. ' sane. t 
85 
... 
The. problem with.. ' 
the- specialist, is that-- the. general:, I abstain or disclose' 
'test;. is " iriappropriate.,. as . the specialist will'. not. 
be In 
a positiön, to effect disclosure, unless . of course 
he.. ' 
alerts-the Stock Exchange's stock listI department. and.. 
places bressuire on . the, corporation' to.. 
disclose material 
corporate infor; nation, end yet on. the other: hand'.. a-. 
specialist cannot abstain-fron, trading ' on his.. own account 
if. he -is-'to fulfill : his role in maimtaining:: stability 
. continuity in -the' market. 
(286) 
Moreover,. a; large amount 
of what might' be- appropriately, called, 'market, information 
might not be susceptible to. disclosure,. It. vioüld . seers 
that the only... correct.. approach'. äffording . any degree of 
" certainty; '' is'" for': the specialist as- soon as . he comes. into 
p"össession": of inside information, ' and at least certain 
" types. 4f market information, to alert: the' Stock:, Exchange 
. and the Floor. Officiäls+ 
; ssoc'i. ätedý. with . the - problem-- of.. segregation and . the 
special'i'st- 1s 'that " of' the. floor, Trader oný certain American 
Stock-Ekchangesa Floor' traders .; and,. * registeredittaders 
'-" " are in" essence --professional investors and speculators whn 
trade on their own-- account with the full benefits . of .. 
"E change membership, ',, 
(287) 
The- -ftoor-'traders . have.. no 
aallegiences-ýand no- professional responsibilities except 
those provided- for, 'in the Stock Exchange. rules. o' ::;... 
Generally toe, floor''traders still. ' be concerned. soIely. with 
maximising -his--own personal profit on -the, bas-is- of short 
term- 'speculative= trading: - Although `6ccasionally"-such- will 
3VO 
assist-with, the,. clearance". of . "'. blocks' on the., -Exchange 
.. and might operate -a small. . 
brokerage' function. '_ .. Floor:. . 
t äders may.: also '. be used.: by . member firms ' or 
individual 
members to deal on - -their. behalf .. so ; -as 
to conceal their 
identity on ' the market.: ".: The Senate. Committee oný; Stcck 
Exchange Practices: ' pointed-_ out the.. _significant.. actvantages 
that. this type . af. -investor ; has over other investors., in 
the markets. -. « Namely, . by'virtue of his access - to--theFloor 
oft the -Exchange..:.. -. he. has ý the advantage, of instant---,. 
information concerning the 'technical position, of:. the. market. ' t28$ )ß 
. All, -the: ' arguments against excessive... trading _ 
by 
. the specialist. för his own accoupt., are appli able.; with 
increased force. to' trading- by " . Floor -Traders.; c 
289); 
The -original draf is of-. the 1934 Act -would. have., completely 
outlawed floor. trading, but, in the result--the 'butt! : was 
pansod to the SEC. Under Sectiop . 11(a) the. ' 
Commission is 
-empowered to xegulate.. and prohibit floor trading by. members 
of. Stock_ Exchanges, * for. , members. own - or,., discretionary 
accounts, to such- extent as' the Commission: may; 'consider is 
necessary. 'for a fair and orderly, market:., in. - listed  
securities..: -: 
{290 
:. The. Commission_ has_ expressed concern 
about-. the advantages that, f loor. . 
traders., and.. exchange 
members possess over, the -public., investor. 
291' 
.. The.. Specia1 
Study, of.. the. securitips Markets considered,, that; -Fioor: 
Traders. possessed, at' leaatjour significant . advantages. 
Firstly, rapidity of response to.,. information; ; secondly, 
immediate' reception,. of... publicly. _ annpunced, 
information 
:; 'which-. effects. , market activity., with regard,. 
to, particular 
securities; thirdly,.. contact_Withother gxperts,. and the 
ability to see . what .. such.; are,, 
doing_; on the , 
Exchange Floor 
arid.. fourthly, a _. 
feel 
.. of. 
he m arke; ., 
based on : continued'. -12 
;. resence :. ad bto9? 
) 
%A pn_, o serya ý ý. npther. _ 
important; factor 
is-, -that, persons' on thp market., Canty observe transactions 
occurripg-. some, time.; before,. they'- appear, on,, the tape and 
are. publicly; d-isseminatedo The. Special Study; confirmed 
., 
the general view of the. SEC- and;. its staff. that. Floor. 
Trading ývasy ini ical to the public. good and- should ,. therefore be gradually abolished. Of course the Exchanges had been 
alert. to the criticisms of the-practice and had attempted 
StL 
.. to regulate at least certain aspects of the advantages 
that,. these members-, possessed. For Example, the Exchanges 
formulated the.: ' frozen, stock rule= whereby ins and outs 
yvere not allowed, : on.. the; -same 
day.. Furthermore,. rules 
were promulgated to;. prevent members. -crowding round or, (293 
- -dominating" a particular- trading post. It was open 
". - -. to-. question however, as to: how adequately these rules 
wore. -observed. 
(294) 
- In. the result the -Commission adopted 
Rule. lla-l(a) which. goes a considerable way to eradicating 
.; 
the -. potential for abuse. -, 
This rule " provides- that . no 
member-of a national securities exchange whilst on. the 
floor, of sucht? 
95) 
shall initiate directly or, indirectly 
any-transaction"in any listed security for an account in 
which that member has an interest or a discretion at the 
time.. of the execution, This does not apply in the case 
of regiptered specialists or" odd ; 
lot., dealers in, the 
securities in which_. they are registered, an arbitrage 
transaction, --a, stabilising transaction under. Rule 10(b)(7) 
. in- the case of. a distribution of securities, or any 
ttansaction ", made with prior approval of the floor Offficial 
to permit such member, to contribute. to. the maintenance 
-of-a fair and orderly market in such: securities'. 
Under Rule lln-l(b)7. any. transaction effected in conformity 
with a., plan designed to eliminate those floor. trading 
activities which". are not beneficial to the market and 
which, has, been. approved and declared effective by the 
-SEC swill; be : exempted from the. prohibition- in , 
paragraph (a)' 
Most, of.. the National- Exchanges.. now. have 'plans. ' effective 
under this provision. 
(296, 
The result, ofthese provisions 
and the subsequent implementation of regulatory plans 
and mechanisms by the various stock exchanges places floor 
traders like specialists and brokers under something 
approaching fiduciary standards of behaviour. 
Apart from the question of segregation of functions of 
specialists and floor traders, the question of segregation 
is of importance throughout the American securities industry. 
The Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Inc. on Security 
,i rkets advocated segregation of 
brokerage and dealer (29? ) functions in all cases. The Congress was also 
4 
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favdurably dispösed to a legislative provision-requiring 
"' -completecsegiegatiön, -However; the pressure- fromýthe 
securities' industry 'vias" so -greatý-thät--it Evas='considered 
potentially. ftoo'disruptive -to. "force. =succh--a provision 
througho "The'-Congress- instead ordered the SEC to report 
upon the issüe: 'The Com Missions' -report on the-feasibility 
{ and Advisability of the- Segregation -of Dealers., and-.. 
Broker Functions, emphasised -the' fundamental --difference 
between the duties-of persons ' acting. -as "ä-° broker- which 
wereI of' a fidüciäry nature and*-'those-. of'-a- dealer -where 
tnere7is 'ho 'such-''duty*- Under the-. law -there is 'considerable 
" -latitude' for the 'exercise of -both ' functions- in the 
same person-, although of: -course, when-dealing as. a 
broker it-- is necessary for full 'di'sclosure and the 
clients consent' to be obtained' -Where -the broker- wishes 
to- trade -on his: own account with-' the client*'.. Furthexmore, 
in addition, to the general anti-fraud provisions; - 
such' as 'Rule 10 (b) (5) and section . 17 (a) t of. ', the' 1933 Act, 
there are a- number of specific- provisions regulating 
broker-dealers ' particularl' y those dealing'-in the "- 
over ý-the-ýcountet market', 
(298),.., 
.. ' 
" The SEC': in its Report of 1936 "considered - that a 
lack of r PArPna$i nn' t4n c . t.;. rA- o%-C - ., L....,. .C 4-1- . 
a 
I" 
r 
----" -ý ýýý... výwv. ývs" "uý \NiVVV\+\lb. LVG". Vl QJJ'4 Vl I4L' 
'fiduciary relationship inherent in-the brokerage-function. 
'Nonetheless the -Commission'thought" that statutory' 
segregation, 'vr s' premäture - and -'impractica1.299). -. 4. - 
The question of segregation' in the. * securities-'. -industry 
has-'not 'been raised subsequently -in any meaningful " 
f0= X300). .. r_.. L ...:. ... 
"'' 
'3ti^ý 
(b) SEG? 3EGATICN IN THE UNITED KTNCQCA1 
It will be assumed that the reader is conversant with the 
" basic facts of the jobbing system on the British 
Stock 
Exchange, and thus attention will only be given to., those 
aspects which are in marked contrast to the American 
system and are. of some "interest . 
from the standpoint of 
insider trading. ", 
(301) 
Under Rtile, 22(1) of the Rules 
. , and 
Rggulations of the Stock Exchange 'every member or 
applicant for election or re-admission shall declare 
whether. he proposes to act as a broker or jobber or that 
he is not-engaged in active business, and whether he is 
associated with a firrl' .. The distinction on the British 
Exchange between the two functions-is of paramount. 
importance. 
(302) 
A jobber is a specialised, dealer of 
stocks who. buys and sells on his own account, and a broker 
-acts as a mere agent dealing on behalf of another$ 
The Stock Exchange has emphasised that 'in Britain the 
essential freedom of the market is provided by a group 
of traders, operating within the market, who stand ready 
to buy or sell securities as principals at their oven risk ... 
the British Stock Exchange system does not attempt primarily 
to"match up public buyers and sellers, but all transactions 
`are,, carried out.. by jobbers, who by their-constant readiness 
to buy. or sell for their own account provide a constant 
flow of business that is needed to ensure freedom of 
; dealing. ' . 
'303 ) Both Brokers and jobbers and their firms 
are independent of 
, 
each other; and as-no member may perform 
the same role, both are complimentary to each other. 
The two classes-of members by tradition deal and 
. 
negotiate with-each other. only at arms length, and. the 
prices are made. by the. jobbers in-open competition-with 
other jobbers keeping a 
. 
book in-that particular security. (304) t ... 
ý"Even-when"two 
brokers agree upon a particular 
..., transaction or where there are matching orders,, the 
securities are invariably 'put through' a jobber's books, 
so that 'justice can be seem to have been done'. 
(305) 
Whilst jobbers under Rule 91 of. the Stock Exchanges 
:. Rules and. Regulations are bound to deal with brokers of 
.. their Exchange, brökers are hot bound to deal. on. behalf 
3t r 
of his client. on the- stock- exchange-, - and= he- is at liberty 
to go outside the -stock- exchange. However, exce t- with 
regard to country brokers -and overseas exchanges 
306) 
the broker may not -execute - an order with a snort -member 
': unless. he has, previously offered the business- on the Exchange 
on the`"sarne terms -. -as, those that he --proposes- to deal with 
-the non-member. 
(307) 
Asa general rule a'broker should only 
deal off therExchange where such is to the advantage of 
his' client. - A' broker may not-trade with «another . broker(308 
) 
or have a partner--who is a jobber. 
(309) 
Furthermore, 
'except as a registered option dealer, arbitrage-or--dual 
-capacity jobber/shunter, no'member or authorised' clerk 
can'carry. n business in the dual capacity of-broker and 
jobber. ' `310) Further it should'be 
noted that'1business 
as brokers and jobbers shall be carried on- by"'firms and 
corporate members, and therefore no member may carry on 
business in the capacity of a broker or jobber as-a-solo 
trader, 
(311") 
and under Rule - 84 (l) all bargains : must be 
-booked in the name of- the firm or company 
"" Of particular-interest is rule'27, which. provides that 
any member or candidate for- membership of the -Exchange, 
-must obtain the consent of'the. Council of the-Stock Exchange, 
where-- he wishes- to be a principal . or- employee in any other 
business, other- than 'that of- the Stock Exchange, or a 
member of the Management and/or the Advisory Board' of a 
Unit Trust, or' a shareholder in a management. company, 
except' as*a minority holder of' securities which are dealt 
), ' (312. ) : 'er is in s any-"way - interested in under Rule 163-(1)1' 
'in any other concern-whose business-either directly or 
indire'cily, '- or- through - a' subsidiary; includes" that- of dealing 
in securities*'or'3n acting"as'an issuing house"or-merchant 
" banker, except 'as the holder- of -a minority of 'securities 
permitted ' to be dealt with under Rule " 163 (1) . It is further 
provided . that for- the purposes of determining whether a 
member wishes-to become ä 'principäl-or-employee of'any 
othbr' business, - 'the term principle 'includes 'an . owner of a 
business or a- partner in a firm, ' or the -benef-icial owner 
either as a sole or majority, shareholder- in: a'company, 
and' any shareholding- "of the wife. of the -candidate -: or member 
3t 5 
!i 
or of the member's 'partners and '"their 'spouses"; "shall *be 
regarded as that of the m'ember' or Candidate himself: ' 
However; ' it is provided that 'the terra 'employees' will not 
include 
.a 
person merely receiving a directors fee "or, other 
kind of fee, -but it would'"comprehend d director'holding a 
service agreement: Under paragrapli2)'of this -rule an 
obligation Is' 'placed -upon the' member or candidate to seek 
the prior consent of the Council where that' person's 
"wife 
wishes to engage: in 'any' of the above-mentioned -activities. 
(313) 
Thus it"can be seen that there is a substantial degree of 
segregation in securities professionals who are-members of 
the Stöck"Exchange. Of course, "those securities dealers 
who are not members' of the Stock Exchange "do perfoxn; ' -a 
dual role. 
Member firms 'are prohibitdd -from dealing for' mos It 
categories of associated members or admitted' clerks of another 
firm without first obtaining that other fun's written 
consent; and associated membdrs and admitted'clerks are 
under an obligation to disclose their status and the name 
of their «firn to the other, firn " through which they seek to 
deal under Ruler 8'4: ' Recently the'"scope of this- rule'"has 
been expanded so as to comprehend principals of member (314) 
firms,,. all'associated members-and clerks and all employees. 
In the notice adopting this,. extended.. rule . .: it was emphasised 
that It covers 'not -only dealings through member firms, but 
also dealings-'through outside houses.: The Council also 
underlined, the responsibility of member, firms *to ensure 
that -their. internal -regulations . covered such transactions 
executed "through other f ixms `or 'companies. 
The vast majority of_British stockbrokers and jobbers 
possess-and administer internal house, rule q, which are 
315)-" actively encouraged by. the Stock. Exchange, . .. and also 4. (316). by the City Panel on Takeovers and Mergers. Although 
. the Stock Exchange is-not-opposed to-the publication. of 
theserules, "( 
17) 
member organisations, as are-the. American 
-securities houses, are most reluctant to. allow. public 
; disclosure of such. . The-degree of investment banking activity 
and corporate. advice of; British Stock Exchange member 
organisations are engaged upon is, of course, in the main 
significantly less than the extremely large American 
3ºG 
-I 
ýI. 
securities. houses, Thus the Takeover Panels study and 
guidelines on confidential info .. ation is more specifically 
-diregted. to merchant banks, although it is interesting 
that two leading stockbroking firms were consulted during 
its preparation. Whilst it is open to question exactly 
how -far the Panel's guidelines apply to member f irres, it 
would seem that at least. the lar er organisations. consider 
there of general application. 
(318 
Byway of illustration, Phillips & Drew have rules which 
inter alia forbid partners and ernployees, z dealing in securities, 
in any. instance ; to the prejudice of clients, and in particular 
where . 
the . firm -possesses confidential 
information about a 
. particular company 
to which the firm acts as broker, or is 
in some other way connected. These rules are incorporated 
as terms of employment. Furthermore, it is standard practice 
to, quiz any order from a known insider which appears at all 
suspiciol4s. 
(819) 
Similar rules are found in most firms 
and member organisations. 
(320) 
Furt hermore,. asa basic 
proposition, most. firms require their members and employees 
to deal only through the firm and this subject. themselves 
to internal supervision... Under the new Rule 64(2)d, it is 
provided that. 
' -a firm shall make such provisions in its internal-regulations as--will ensure that, 
.. each , of its members; . admitted. clerks. or employees, is under. an obligation to have obtained 
his firm. Is --approval* before instructing any, 
. other firm... to deal for him, , or.. 
for any J. , unlisted company in -which he has an interest;,, and that-each employee'is'under an-obligation- 
to disclose-,. -the -. nie of his.: own firm".. to . any., :.. other firm to which he proposes to give 
dealing instructions 0' 4" 
Not all ' member- organisations have fo=alised and written 
internal : procedures, and--among such, are certain of the more 
prestigious tf irms. 
(321) Whilst this is justified-by the 
member orgAnisätion by reference to flexibility, many 
including the' Takeover Panel' 
(322') 
consider- that this 
sacrifices the -necessary- degree -'of certainty -and " he 
Educative effec of - thich -o ' employees 
323 ) ton and others. 
There are-, however, -a significant number--of organisations 
which, are- -less*' than, enthusiastic for-'this. - degree, of 
S17 
self regulation, particularly in regard to insider trading. 
(324) 
A very important' role' performed -by a number of brokers 
is that of acting as broker to listed' companies 
; 325) 
Brokers performing this function-will, -on a number of - 
occasions-, ' be in - possession of privileged information, even 
though most--companies are wary about exactly "how jnuch -access 
. 
they afford, because1of - the- obvious possibility that-the 
broker might utilise the information - for--investment purposes, 
unconnected' with a'valid=corporate purpose. 
(326). 
Somewhat 
-paradoxically company- brokers - are"also regarded with some 
circumspection 'by other professionals, and- investors because 
'they have an axe to grind with their company . clients' and 
thus might" not be sufficiently objective!, -or indeed reliable. 
(327) 
Thus many member organisations expressly 'dry to 
avoid becoming too closely identified with a particulär 
corporate issuer, and by and large this function 'is 'hot ass 
remunerative as it might at first appear. 
, 
With regard to conferences with corporate managements, 
and visits, the general approach would seem tobe that where 
the. interview . is with tte broker qua' a stockbroker, then 
'everything you are told or. shown 'is fair 'game for 'investment 
and ! recommendation. ' 
328) Whilst it would 'seem that most 
brokers would not violate an express confidence, many would 
feel at perfect liberty to utilise. inferences and indications 
which might in truth amount to the. - samething. ' 
It is also . of 
interest that at least one very experienced 
city editor considers that there is a substantial degree of 
abuse in Britain by, members of stockbroking firm's of market 
information. Mr. Richard -Lamb, Editor'bf'`the'City Press, 
had informad the present author that in his opinion ä number 
of senior members and officers of'stockbroking films trade 
_in. significant proportions 
in advance and on-the basis-of (329) 
market impact of their firms recommendations and analysis. 
Because of a number of factors the jobbing"'section of 
Stock Exchange membership has. greatly contracted in recent 
years, which has, of course, had an impact upon. competition 
and:, the. capacity of the market. 
(330) ' The market`'häs become 
increasingly less able to deal with the size and'diriensions 
f 
3i8 
" of institutional trading on terms that are readily. acceptable 
to 
t 
to the institutions. As-the Investors Chronicle aptly 
states, -, 'the fundamental trouble is. that"the jobbing system 
arose to, meet the needs, of private investors. dealing;; in 
shall.. and often untidy amounts;. The dif£erent, needs.. of the 
institutions who 
"noiv . 
dominate the market are being met-. by 
the brokers. - but not the jobbers. 
(332), 
Furthermore, . the 
smaller, or, more marginal the-market, the . 
less realistic is 
the valuation placed on shares, particularly,. inactive stocks. 
(333). All this has tended to focus an in. creasing; amount 
of attention on, the: British-over-the-counter markets,. as 
such. they are. 
There are, of course, 
.a 
number of public companies 
which, either by choice or circumstances, have not thought 
it. necessary' to seek listing on the Stock' Exchange. 
With the recent contractions and '"viss'isitudes'" of 'the' Stock 
Exchange market, there would appear* to' be' an evergrowing 
number of companies seeking finance'outside the Stock' Exchange, 
often with the active support' o' 'investm'ent bankers such 
as 1.4 *J. H. Nightingale &' Compan y, ' whö" act' As market makers 
on . 
the North i mericän pattern . 
334) Securities 'dealers 
who are not members of ' a, recognisedi Stock Exchange-, 'or 
recognised Association of Securities dealers; under Section 1 
oof the Prevention of Frauds (irivestmýents) Act '1958 ' and 
who has been granted a licence to deal' in' secürities''by the 
Department of Trade, are at liberty 'to 'deal "in ' any"'securities 
within the United' Kingdom as''either principal' or -agent. ' 
The, va. riou. s, recognised Associations of 'Securities' Dealers 
also allow their mernbershiip `to' tr"äder in' all''secUrities, both 
listed' and''ünl seed, Members 'of'* the Stock 'Exchange -under 
Rule. 163 (2). 'are* at 'liberty ' to' deal in unlisted securities 
provided the obtain the consent of the Stock Exchange 
Council. 
(335 
Until comparatively y receritl the over-the- 
counter market was by comparison with the London-and 
Provincial Stock''Exchänges insignificant. With the apparent 
" rise of the overuthe-counter market the Stock Exchange 
has . 
naturally become"very concerned; and' has fastened -upon 
the. arguinent , 
that such will 'fragment the, securities --market 
3tß 
. and 
thus create severe regulatory 'problems. 
(336) 
.. 
The 
, 
Federation Internationale des, Bourses de Valeurs-, - .' 
at a, conference. in, Madrid . 
in. 1973;.. expressed' concern 'about 
fragmentation.. of the . markets  'and passed a notion : 
deploring 
it. Suggestions have -been. -made 
for the development of. an 
European -over-11. he=couhte. r market, which. the Stock Exchange 
has similarly deplored and castigated, as, irresponsible' and, 
if., accepted , necessitating: the. establishment of a European 
Securities Exchange Com.. ission. 
(337) 
.. 
Perhaps the, rnos. t significant development' in .. 'this area 
has. been. the establishment of the Automated: Real-Time 
Investments Exchange. Ltd. or ARLL, This organisation 
was,, established and_ largely financed, by the Accepting Houses 
Committee who were anxious to devise a more satisfactory 
and indeed lese expensive means of dealing, in large blocks of 
securities than, through the medium. of the Stock' Exchange. 
The system was, based 9n, the New. York ' Instinet system, with 
certain.. important . modifications! 
(338) 
The Stock.. Exchange 
obviously. concerned about the implications of the creation 
of such., a. system, : after extended negotiations, had an 'offer 
to purchase, the _ system . 
tse i, turned down flatly. by the 
ommittee. 
1ý39) 
The Bank ofY England, rather Accepting Hous2s. C 
lukewarm. -about the creation of ARIEL, decided not to allow 
trading' of gilt-edged securities on the system. 
(340) 
The. Stock Exchange Council has refused to allow*-brokerage 
. and jobbing fixms to use it. The Council has stated that 
'at. present it is concerned with principles', and'on. this 
basis the Stock ; Exchange opposed the establishment of ARIEL 
on three grounds.. Firstly,. they considered that the'. fairness 
and integrity. of :: the. securities markets. in the.. Lnited. Kingdom 
. was 
basedion, the segregation of broker and"dealer functions. 
-Secondly, the fragrnentalisatJon of. the_securities markets 
: with. 
its adverse effect on, liquidity would upset the. price 
-mechanism.., Thirdly, the fragmentation of the securities 
markets . would create. problems with 'regard . 
to supervision. 
On this 
, 
last point. , 
the Council of -the. 
Stock. Exchange considered 
that ARIEL ' had '. no sanction _ over subscribers and . as 
the 
system could, comprehend:. unlisted issuers, there., may well 
be little supervision of the companies having securities 
' 3w 
traded on th'e, system. 
(341 )... The Stock Exchange has also 
disallowed the ARIEL. system the Use= of' the -important -E change 
Telegraph Financial-, - News, ' Service -tape, : and ° attempted, to- 
adjust it's commission rates, so ; as- to lessen-the, -appeal of 
the . new system. . On . the other, hand 'ARIEL: has . declared-. 
that, 'tough commercial . ompeti tion! 'will be broug t: 'to " bear. 
X342 } 
Given the significance , of.. the ARIEL., system and, the : fact . 
that,. at least the' Managing . Director'. of-' the system, considers 
that I the market of 'the "fu tune may - be- an . -international - 
communications network ýiid: not a' single geographical 
loc'ation'. or trading, ' floor, or even - a" series of trading 
exchanges : linked. together . by-: a communications - network, t. 
(343 ) 
it 'is necessary- to ' examine' the present - system in -some"- little 
detail. 
(344) 
..:, 
' In " the.. Words ' of the ARIEL management; ARIEL t enables 
subscribing institutions-to deal in stocks and shares-directly 
and, anonymously. With. each other ... institutions, can deal 
more cheaply becausb transaction fees are lo,. -wer.. than. comparative 
stock -exchange comm. commissions and na jobber's . turn .' is 
incurred. ' 
. 
(34.5) 
Each 
- subscriber is connected by, a 
! terminalt . which 
consists'. of a teleprinter screen, a- keyboard, and:, 'a*: printer, 
to. the . central- computer situated 'at ARIEL's''head -Office. ' 
All des. sages and. co iunicaiions. appear on the screen. -and are 
also' printed.. out in: peimanentform. . If a-«dealer in.. a subscribing 
.. institution wants to., purchase 10.; 000. I. C. I. shares: at "217p. 
. he types, out -these.. details, suitably codified. into. 
recognised 
abbreviations;. after' activating- _his .: terminal by Asignin6 in, 
through 'a secret, code... After these-details-'he adds the 
word 'buy' .. This Will be-immediately transmitted to the 
.. screens . and ''printers/ of all. other - subscribers ,. and. also -stored 
in the central computer which in-effect keeps 'a book! -on 
each', security in - the. system. If-: a. subscriber. wishes-to sell 
he can. respond by typing-'out the same details, - but. with the 
sufffice- =sell.. This will-. similarly*. appear on. all terminals 
. activated, ' The* central-'computer *-Will- then automatically match 
the two -transactions . 'and prepare -a contract note. - The system 
does allow dealers to' negotiate' anonymously with each -other 
by 'transmitting : varying bids - to' 'sell. -or buy, and-, a. subscriber 
32 L 
who wishes to -deal " disoreetly- may sign zin arid - scan -the - rrecords 
of bids - stored in the central- computer, ý"without'-broadcasting 
its interest in the particular -security.., - Unaccepted -bids 
are automatically erased--'after' a specific period ---of, time. 
The shareholders of the --system, which are- the . members 
of the. -Accepting Houses' Committee, : and'-the management. are 
diplomatic as to the . aspirations of ARIEL; "'" The Managing 
Director, Colin Leach '-has ' pointed, out 'on '" a -number of-occasions 
that-* it -is -only contemplated that -the'. system. -Will take some 
10% of'. -institutional business, which, is about. 74.5% of-Stock 
Exchange', business, and" that. the --institutions will-still' 
require the analysis and research-facilities provided by 
Stock Exchange member 'organisations. 
(346) 
Furthermore ja 
-recent survey- of ARIEL tran'säction prices- " shows - that most 
deals were executed at the -middle - market- price on . the Stock 
Exchange so that : it'-Would 'seem that- the Stock- Exchange is 
= 'still important for"-determining prices: 
347)_ 
It should also be noted `that --it is-possible to: -retrieve 
from the " central computers' information- on any-security in 
the system, such . as the-current . price , ränge of both'"buyers 
and sellers, the aggregate volume and price range of bargains 
made'--in -the current month- and preceeding -mon"th, " and the size 
and : price of the last dour' bargains -executed " on the system. 
At present ARIEL trades. almost -'exclusively "in -listed securities 
of some standing j but -it* is, understood that - if "a" suf f icient 
demend- among the subscribers, to introduce -unlisted securities 
to the -; system , was 'apparent, then' ARIEL would -be -prepared 
to do-*this. 'The Managing- Director made it -clear-: -ghat there 
is no : 'question . 'of'ý ARIEI: -'att'empting*""to '. impose any ' additional 
disclosure requx. rements - an such issuers, and "n any case 
[ the : systen " was * not -a public market, but one essentially-of 
professional' investors: 
348 Moreoverg as-the-number of 
subscribers is 'relatively small #- -amounting -in ": all to about 
70, there exists-a 'degree of confidence 'and .' trust. 'among 
the 'dealers . 'not' generally -'found on -markets "" öf this' nature. 
' `, The ýmänagementt-of ARIEL are -sceptical -and: critical.. of 
. -the Stock Exchange'"s -as'sertioris .. that the siys. tera £ra mmentalises 
the present securities market.. Certainly the. present . 
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" indications suggest that the -amount - of .. 
transactions. - that 
AR7. EL; has : attracted from the Stock Exchange would : hardly 
Justify the, Council's allegations. 
(349) 
Indeed, 
Mr. Leach, the Managing Director,, of ARIEL, considers that 
the system improves the. self-regulatory scheme, in . that 
, 
there is a greater degree : of , competition, now 
trarjsactions 
that would have been conducted. _ outside. 
a. formalised. market 
are passed through. the ARIEL system,, and. also all ... transactions 
on the system are recorded,. printed : out,, and. - then., at, a. "later 
date, transferred to microfiche:. This last factor would 
seem, to -be of some 'significance . 
as the tStock , 
Exchange: does 
not provide this"facility- under its current prop edures . 
And 
evidently ARmL "has'keen able on occasions to supply .. important 
_transactional 
data: to the. City Panel.. on, Takeovers and Mergers. 
Whilst. the Managing Director of ARIL informs the 
present author that it would,, of course ,. be feasible. to 
manipulate the automated market there has. been no evidence 
of ., 
such or any " other fraud. 
050. 
The staff of ARIEL is surprisingly small, numbering only 
..: 
twelve_,. persons, six _ of . 
whom, are technically qualified.... 
Out of this staff., three persons., currently a computor",.. 
expert,:. ark -ex-jobber and a technical assistant, ,, operate 
the 
. 
transaction room. - This room, is : inter. alia responsible 
for the market surveillance-functio, n,: Here, the; screens, are. 
at, least;, in *theory, continually. watched I and there. is always 
, the facility. of reproducing communications " 
fron, the ; computer 
records or compiled. computer printouts., .. 
Whilst the, 
Managing Director considers. -that it would be technically 
,., quite 
feasible to, introduce an automated stock-: watch programme 
on the. American Rattern; with built-in trading", parameters, 
there., would - be very great. practical problems in,: determining 
what such.: should--bai,; given the' shapes,. and . volume: of trades 
and the : nature of the market. Furthermore; the, Stock 
Exchange, as has already been pointed ou t, 
": 
will not allow 
*, 
the ARIEL. system access, to Stock Exchange. prices, which, 
, could naturally be., o. f :. great utility hereo Thus given these 
considerations, and the 'rel. atively.. lo%t . 
transa. ctional turnover, 
the. management does. not at. the present, consider , there is 
any justifiable alternative to the current approach. 
3Z3 
p 
ý/ 
It is also of interest that the Managing Director does not 
contemplate ' any significant. - increases in staffing 'in.. the.. '. 
foreseeable future, The " system -has -obvious and close' 
connections with the -Acceptinh- Houses Co, =ittee-, " and . 
has 
co-operated with -the Takeover Panel.: "*Vlhere the Stock Exchange 
suspends trading in-a Particular-security, the 1ARIEL 'system 
will follow suit 'provided that it Is aware of the hold ö 
Generally 'the system has to rely upon one of its subscribers 
to alert the transaction röom: - , Certainly' in the _erid-. 
the . 
management- would -hear of the- hold, "'and if a subscriber had 
dealt during --the period where *trading had been 7-suspended. in 
'a 'listed 'security, ARIEL would investigate the circumstances, 
and would' probably apply . 'pressure' on. the institution. 
concerned to-make an offer-of recission, = 
351) 
" As the ARIEL 'system' is, ' still comparatively* small it is 
possible for the transaction room. -to adequately survey. the 
trading- -and' the management -does exercise a considerable 
" amount of caution'and restraint about admitting new subscribers 
to'the system, There have been occasions where applications 
-have been refused. The system also places considerable 
emphasis on the fact that all'subscribers admitted-to trading 
on ARIEL must have a reasonably* large indemnity policy', . 
coved g a' multitude of' potential. problems.; This itself 
serves to delimit the number and type. of applications,. 
th`roiügh''both' the availability. and expense of insurance.. ' 
A significant surveillance funct'ion' . is also provided by. the 
fact' that -subscribers are keen to identify and alert the '352) 
transactions- room-as' to the presence of suspiciotistrading. 
Under the influence of the Accepting Houses Committee 
ARIEL has adopted strict internal 'codes of* conduct for* its: 
staff members, ' These provide,; inter; alia that 'ä member' of 
ethe 
. staff can dealin ''any shares only 
'with the. 'advance: ' 
permission of 'a director, and violätiön'"of this rule would 
result. in instantdisrniss"al, '*. ' VThe'Direct'ors however, simply 
rely upon each others integrity. It should be pointed out 
that . apart from, 
the Mapaging Director; the 'other directors 
are nominees of. the' shareholders " thiat` is 'the `merchant` banks'. 
" .L The. Managing. Director has'inföimed -ttie present author 'that 
there has been a pröblesl with the leakage of information 
132-+ 
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ARIEL. transactions and prices 
(353) 
to the Stock Exchange 
in particular. , By scanning -the. records in. the Central 
Computers, it was -discovered that whenever, the : management 
was infoimed :: about a -possible. -leakage of information, a 
particular institution had. at about the same time pressed 
the -I quote' button : on . -its 
terminal which provided details. 
of all bids _ and 
deals -, in. the particular security -concerned. - 
Of course; whilst the various institutions trade. in complete 
anonymity, : the. 'system can always identify such through their 
code numbers, - In this , particular 
instance the "Chairman of 
the institution concerned was interviewed, and it . was 
found 
that two. ' dealers. had; been -passing 
. 
on. ,; 
this information to a 
stockbroker, :. "Who had utilised this 'market "information' 
on the Exchange' Floor. ., 
In the"result, the two dealers 
ware dismissed,. and the institution came out of the system. 
Mir. -. -Colin Leach, the Managing Director has pointed-out that 
this particular problem could and should be eliminated by a 
greater. degree of co-operation : by the Stock Exchange Council. 
He pointed . out that., the 
Instinet, system has the New York 
Stock Exchange Tape as its basis, and the floor and automated 
markets functions, in close co-operation. 
') 
. 
Whilst the management of. ARIEL have diplomatically adopted 
a loýRw. profile,, there are plans, admittedly tentative, for 
the : system to link up with the Instinct 
-system, 
and. perhaps 
in. the future an European: -system might. become- practically 
and' politically feasibleo 
Whilst it-is-, not possible to enter upon an. extended 
discussion of the position of brokers under the : common law, 
it is perhaps worth briefly mentioning those -aspects which 
are of particular relevance to the question of 'insider 
trading and its regulation: Of course, the' 'position" of 
stockbroker, is similar to that of any 'other' agent' in lätiv9'ý355 
J 
There is no doubt that a broker is' in the pos1tion"öf -a 
fiduciary and,.. as such, Is not allowed' to make''a' secret` profit, (30ý').. 
Brokers perform an . 
important role in "providing 
investment advice for clients, ', which ran e' from""cbrporations 
and institutions. to individual clients: "' 357) Obviously 
where a broker is in, possession of ''material iris idef information 
and is either asked or is obligated to provide investment 
advice-a conflict of duties aiise3; 'as we have already'seen 
in the context of Rule 14(b)(5). 
(58) 
Whilst brokers are 
S25 
not bound to . volunteer. '-inves, 
tr ent advice to . every-, client (359)-' 
.. who 
issues, an. unequivocal instruction, there : is a 
: shadowy, -bo. rder line; not so , 
firm as the -American suitability 
rules ,, 'where, a. broker. is -apparently, under". an, obligation 
_. _.: 
to. prof fer,. his; opinion. 4"ihere the ; client : expressly or 
impliedly! 'requests , 
the --brokers. advice,, there,, is 
_, 
no doubt 
of., hi : responsibil: ity,, to . s"o,: comply.. - -Where the ; broker 
-. dues. give. advice, ; he is .. hold, to,.. thq, "fiduciary: 
duty of 
. -ensuring 
that , it,, is ; honest, :, clear and in the best 
interests of: -the client, 
0360) 
. -the -duty " in "the; ý, aw of (361) 
nd. possibly negligence mandating reasonable care ,- _-c 
. -also a contractual 
dut of care. 
X362 
It " is not. without. interest that Cooper and Cridlan 
-) in: their text ' on the Law and : Procedure of. the Stock Exchange, 
write that '! where , a. broker; -has access 
to 
, privileged 
information: about a company, and is aware-of '. circumstances 
which will effect the. value of its securities, he must 
not allow that.. k owledge_. to, operate to the disadvantage 
of his client. t .. 
7 
363) Given this', ' and't .. 
he dutY. " to use " 
reasonable care, in the provision. ' of - advice.. and prptection 
of the.. clients " financiai' -interests , it would seem' that 
.., 
the British 1AV.. is 'much. _the same as 
the statu. law,; in the 
United States which would . appear. 
to recognise the duty 
of a person. ' in a.. fiduciary position, to -utilise inside 
information for., the, best investrpent" interestsagf.; his 
.".,: 
clients , iwrespect,. ve of ", other equal duties that he 
might at. -the, same:. time, owe. 1Yhere.. the", broker is. asked 
for. his. advice-, : or--exercises. the, discretion of : management, 
.'.... 
the. broker would appear, to, be Inder,: a duty, in the United 
Kingdom at' least,. to , utilise any and all 
information in 
his pots ession.. with a degree, of reasonable' carp; in the 
advancement öfw, the. ' clients: 'best interests. Indeed the 
Head'-. of. '. the. Public. Relations. Department- of the- Stock 
Exchange. informs : the, present: author: that brokers: have 
received . le. tti_, rd. from' clients : and : their solicitors on 
f_.. bccäsions_ threatening, action. becausethe broker.. had not. 
".: disclosed.. inside.. -införmation : in' his possession or which 
". he. should : reasonably-, have:. had ; access .. to. 
(364 ) 
t. i, - 
-" ~1 I1.. 
SZ(" 
-Thus = it';, ärgitable that- even - -ire'--the-'-cas-e' df unequivocal 
-'- instruc Lions ta `-, broker, ' "ät -leastL-ras "a m-attar "of practice 
-and -business-sense, would be =wise=-to warn -the'*client of 
'the-inforcaati-on'. he--possessbs. "ý--4f'-.. course== ittwoüld not 
"-be'-necessary--either in--'law or =1n-. practice--to(-communicate 
= the--ent rity'tof--the infozrdation, <=although': it -wculd seem 
that -reasonable "cäre should-be-exercisedýboth'in-j the 
provision and --accuräcy - of " . the inf ormätion , -. and t-thus 
the, more the ý broker discloses; the--better are.. hf s : chances 
of -avoiding , liability by'movinc '-the, burden"'of --cdre and 
reasonableness -onRo the--client.. 
365) 
From the brokers --f iduciary. -position,. 'alone it. would 
- seem= than . there= 
is a duty; . to. -give . "inform ation and advice, 
' or both-with- diligence and-. in absolute ., good.: faith; 
(366) 
In - the, 'leading -case of". 'Nöcton . v-. Lord. Ashburton.,. '. Lord 
Dunedin stated that-. ' a, fiduciary position-. imposes . upon 
' the fiduciary-the, duty of-making a full änd.. not... a.. 
.,.. -. misleading disclosure of""facts---known. to. him when advising 
his . client,, ' 
1367), ' A:, violation 
"of this : standard, whilst 
" ----not founding liability' 4t'--law, -in. -deceit f 6=--, fraud .. will 
in-, every. - Instance- constitute- fraud-: in". equity- providing 
compensation- and ., possibly- recission', `(368) .. deed.. in 
certain- circumstances-. the 'ffiduciary. -duty. -will .. be:. parallel 
+. o... the -contractual- duty of - care, founding alternative 
bases''of . -'liabil-ity. - Thus - it would . appear., that-under 
this", principle -a}-. stockbroker would-, ban -, under, a. -. fiduciary 
-" responsibility-to. '-make adequate,, - disclosures, ýof.: material 
-information in. his possession. or-: which'- hehe, *sh6ul&. - have 
reasonably' acquired Indeed- as Lord Shaw:: of .. Durif ermline 
emphasised-; - once, a: f iduciäry-relationship has been 
"found,, '-it . becomes Enanifest. -that, the_ -liability of'an 
adviser upon-whom- rests'thelduty. of" doing.. things.. or 
making, ' statemen-ts - by . -which. the - other. *is.. guided., or. : upon 
ýNhich' the otherustly relies, . can' and-. does- -arise. 
irrespective : of, whe-the_r - the. %. info-rcnation, and.. -advice given, 
have- been "tendered"- innocently. or. with.. a: fraudulent intent' 
(369) 
- L: VYhilst=,, in recent years. the. Oropriety, of.: brokers 
and other prof essionals: utilising: privileged.. infoxmation 
for investment purposes has been increasingly. questioned, 
-ý, 2? 
and now it 'could hardly be doubted that : insider. trading 
is regarded : as, unethical by. the. jnajority of responsible 
opinion, it -would seem that in -the absence of an --express 
provision -in a --legislative 
enactmer}t forbidding the 
misuse. of such -information; those in a tficlcigiary ; position 
are : under- an. -obligation -to utilisq that information for 
the : benefit of- their beneficaries. 
(370) 
In England 
there is no higher Federal. Law : preempting thins. duty. 
Obviously- where brokers, act as underwriters. or perform 
-art . investment. banking " 
function, as. well as act ., as stock» 
brokers, th-e. -question arises 'as to whom., in _the event 
of 
a, conflict, does: the broker orte the highest , 
duty..,, 
In the 
, present 
discussion this resolves' itself . 
in. to "the 
proposition of whether the broker should betray ; his 
confidence to a corporate client by disclosing to his 
other clients, inside information, or whether he should 
preserve the corporationts confidentiality at the expense 
of. the investment clients. 
It was laid down very early. an-that an agent or 
fiduciary of one person could not take it on . 
himself 
, 
to become an -agent or. 'fiducd. ary of another,, given: a possible 
conflict, of interest.. Comparatively. recently, 
Lord Hammworth M. R. in Fulwood v. Hurley stated.. 'if and 
so long; -As-the agent is the- agent of one party-. he cannot 
engage-to become the agent of. another principal' without 
the -leave of the- first principal- with . whom 
he, has, originally 
established his agency. ' 
(371) 
°" Although' there. are obvious 
differences 
. 
between the position-and function,, of, an. ' 
insurance broker (372) and- a stockbroker,,, there are 
nonetheless significant similarities,, and it is of advantage 
to briefly examine, two recent- cases involving' 
. 
almost 
identical 
- , 
conflicts , of 
duties, as, those presently discussed. 
A particularly- -troublesome problem. has , 
been .: the. - 
practice of. insurance brokers .. to act, on.. behalf of, underwriters 
for' the; communication of-information-between; such and the 
assessors, -where a claim,, is made by the; insured, against 
the undertiwriters.. Thus in effect; the broker, is', acting for - 
two:. principles ; 1. , 
the underwriters and the, clients , both 
.. with conflicting interests with regard, to, this ;. information. 
32$ 
In. Anglo-African Merchants Ltd. -v. Bay 
373 ). Mogaw Jo 
condemned --the -practice,. but- as ', this - condemnation -was only 
obiter and the practice was. it-continued' 
largely uu checked, - -- In North and -South Trust-'Comp"any v. 
Berkele i 374 the'legality -'of the practice was firmly 
-before Donaldson -: J. - -who expressed surprise, that. its- - 
propriety'. had 'not'been ''questioned-- before the decision of 
Megaw J. " In'-this. case. -the insured. demanded °delivery up 
of. -the- assessors report from the : broker, - and the underwriter 
sought -an"injunction toi'prevent'the'brokers complying 
-with this demand'., ' claiming that it. -was "privileged': - - 
Donaldson -J. -'emphasising' that 'the *propriety -of , this- practice 
. -is fund amen tal: -'tö the. decision 'on'"the issues'. and that 
tKe statement- was' 'patio ' stated that- it was: -' wholly- 
unreasonäble'-'ýänd thus' a1though" admittedly widespread, 
not: 'cap'able of' being regarded as -e usage: ' , The underwriters 
whilst acknowledging -that there -Was a` possibility of abuse, 
stated that 'part of the tx ining' of-the broker is-to act 
properly- in the dual capacity, and there was no occasion 
of which -they- had*- heard of where' brokers -had: used' their 
dual-'position "improperly. '"' 
(375 )' 
However, the, Court 
doubted. this , and = 'commented ' how% - -do -you - train -anyone' to 
act Tproperly 'in 'such-'a situation? - What 'course- of action 
can possibly be adopted which -doe's " not involve -some breach 
ý% of '. the. duty to " one' : principal or the other? I yield - to 
no one- in my- admiration -for! the 'skill' and' honesty of the 
City, ' but neither: -skill hor 
'honesty can- reconcile -the 
irreconcilable: ' S376) "- ý Donaldson J. 'thought4'that the 
only reason. that' the- practice had' endured-- so -long , -" was 
the "irftegrity'- oft the brokers= end thus the resultant lack 
of publicity', - and thus*: the ignorance . -of the, f act - that 
the practice''ex'isted. '- There 'could"- V6 no-dbubt%that -the 
broker, was- the agent. o'f the'-'insured' with regard " to 
everything-donb"'". =in con"s'egberice of"'effecting": the. policy' 
and ss 'such 'ag'eht; t -the -broker- has'. 'a general- duty to, - 
advise ý and assist the) insured An''relation . to- cl'aims', and 
"in that connec'tion' tb , di s'clöse ' Ito- the'-Insured'- all relevant 
- info-rmatiön'. that M. - may be able " lawfulJy" to' di-sclose'. 
". Donaldson J.. accepted "thät ýIf'- the' broker would. 'otherwise 
7-e 
be entitled or obliged to give. the insured the information 41 
which is recorded in writing, it is irrelevant that if 
the documents "w, wore'in the possession of the underwriter 
they would be privileged from disclosure. Furthermore, 
the Court accepted the proposition that an agent could not, 
without fully informing and obtaining the consent of. 
his principal, place himself in a position where he owes 
a duty to another which is inconsistent with his duty 
to the principal, 'if he does so, -he cannot say 
to his 
principals I harre not discharged my duty to you because 
I owe--a duty-to another'. 
(377) 
Donaldson J. pointed 
t 
out-that if an agent does place himself in such. a position 
his action is not a nullity it is to be accepted as a 
fact, with all the special consequences flowing from" its 
unlawful nature. ' Thus this fact cannot provide him with 
a defence to a claim by the true principal 'for compensation 
for loss resulting from the agents inability due to the 
conflict of duties, fully to discharge his duty. to that 
principal. ' . Furthermore, the. learned judge-considered 
that 'it may provide the true principal with a cause of 
action-against. 
"the 
agent for an account and payment over 
. of 
any benefits which the agent has received in the course 
., 
of the unlawful agency. ' The Court continued that 
'If the. agent had been employed to make a contract between 
his true principal and another for whom he is unlawfully 
also acting as agent, the true principal cannot avoid the 
resulting. contract. ' If that other principal knew of the 
agency Land the transaction resulted in a sale,. the court 
will, as between the. two principals, presume that the other 
principal would have bought at. a, higher price or would 
have. sold at a lower price to the, extent of the payment 
which he unlawfully. made to the agent. '(37$) 
The next step in the Courts decision is one of critical 
importance, yet one upon which no authority was cited. 
Donaldson J. stated as a proposition that 'contained much 
that was sound'; 'if X. a third party, knowing that A. 
is the agent of P. the principall, enters into an agreement- 
i .. 
ýý3 
I 
with A*' involving duties -which'are inconsistent with those 
owed to P ;* then *in the' absence of the fully informed 
'consent of P. X acts at his peril-3' 
(370- 
and'where there 
is any resulting' conflict between Xts--interests and P's 
" interests, the law-wi'll "prefer those of P. I Thus the 
law "wil'l give priority to the- responsibilities of, the 
first agency, ' and thus the principal who entered into the 
agency or fiduciary relationship with the broker first in 
time will have priority. Therefore 
i if 'a person wished to 
have M as -a broker, -he should realise 'that Vii; "is- the broker 
already to XYZ company, and thus any confidential information 
that might be within the'responsibility of a fiduciary to 
utilise for the best investment interests of -a client, 
that M. learns through his relationship with XYZ company 
will not be available, as this relationship is pre-existing. 
The position 'is not as clear cut as- it might seer, however, 
ä`s on this -analysis, 'if the broker M. already had investment 
clients-when it entered its relationship with XYZ. company, 
it would seem that'the company is at its peril 
regard" to these. eärle , agencies; of course, 
highly unsatisfactory and whilst perhaps'- logical-; most 
undesirable. The priority rule only-operates satisfactorily 
where there are only two principals and-not where there 
are multiples. It is not certain to what extent . 
Donaldson J. considered this 'rule-was 'applicable'; - and, 
it may 'be that he thought its, correct application was 
confined to the avoiding 'of any resulting - contracts -and 080) 
accounting' for commissions- paid 'to agents. 
Perhaps a preferable, approach would be that tsug'gested 
by Donaldson Jo- that 'by treating the common knowledge of 
the underwriter and the broker 'that one could not lawfully 
give and the oth'er' could not lawfully receive the information 
as constituting -an implied 'waiver- of 'the 'implied seal 
of 'confidentiality with which 'the' information is impressed'. 
In the-present case-this knowledge could not be imputed 
tö 'the underwriters and-brokers, -as ndither knew, that as a 
matter `of `law' the "arrangernent- was "' improper.: - This'- is 'open 
to question however, as. it is a fundamental maxim that 
331 
ignorance of the lativ is no excuse, and the strong. - criticism 
öf - MMegaw . 
J; in the. previous . 
decision has already been 
.. 
alluded 
to: .. 
Thus if .. this. ; approach, was accepted as - 
the proper., one , 
since the, present -determinative condemnation of a broker 
-. acting in such a., dual 'capacity. it would: appgar., that, anyone 
entering into an agreement which might in certain respects 
be contradictory,, in. its proper perfoxmance to one already 
existing and owed to another. ' person; impliedly, as a.. matter 
of law,, vnaives -the, performance of-those obligations, which 
... arg . or might - 
be so contradictory.. Indeed -in . 
the., case of a 
stockbrokör,. companies ' will.. be aware that there. is a strong 
possibility that information passed to; such will. be.. ut. ilised 
for investment purposes.. * However, an 'all or. nothing' 
application of this rule,. could. have undesired results as, 
if it was taken that in such a case all obligations of 
-confidentiality were impliedly, waived, candour,., in important 
matters-such as underwritings, and take-overs,. might be 
substantial. y , 
impaired., 
, The Court would not accept the contention,. advanced by 
the. plaintiff that 'if knowing of Ass agency for P. X passe a 
information, and 'documents to, A. relevant to matters which 
are, the subject of that agency, X cannot cornplainv -if A. 
complies with his duty to P. to pass on, the information 
.. or 
to show those, documents to P. however confidential. that 
.. 
information or -those, documents might otherwise be, unless 
X. 
t 
has first obtained, the fully informed' consent of P. to 
. AIs.. receiving that information or those documents exclusively 
on behalf of X. " 
X381) 
Donaldson J. considered that this 
was, supported neither. by reason or. authority, and that 
. 
'it 
.. 
assumes 
. that . 
it 
. 
is ; the duty. of the' agent to . 'pass on 
to. the: principal inform, ation which he would not have obtained 
save. on. terms' that .: 
it would, be kept confidential from his 
principal. t. 
(382 } 
.,: The . 
Court: considered that . the information 
could not, be, thought of, as a benefit for which. the agent (383 ) 
was. '. ac_countable, 
,., and, 
that the contention of the 
plaintiffs. that- the information in the, assessors report was 
tproperty', "wrongfully acquired in the service of the 
plaintiff. was fallacious. - With some significance Donaldson J. 
doubted whether information, could be considered property 
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in this context, and even - if it could, it had not been. 
acquired by the broker, it was merely. in their possession. 
-However, it is -difficult to -see how one can . have. possession 
--or- custody of: information . without acquiring such, unless 
Donaldson J; was importing-'some absorption. or comprehension 
-test In. any case : the Court considered that even - if. the "-r 
information had been acquired, it had. not been in . the.. 
service of the original principal but the- underwriters. 
Whether' this is significant is open to question,, as .' 
-Donaldson J. had already -held that this was wrongful,. and 
that the rights of the second principal were inferior.: to 
those of the first. 
The Court described the fallacy underlying the plaintiff's 
argument as that the brokers. -in acting for the defendants 
had undertaken duties that inhibited the -proper- performance 
of their= duties, towards the plaintiffs, but in so far as 
they acted, for- the defendants they-. were not acting -in 
discharge of any duty towards the plaintiff, ' The plaintiffs 
" could legitimately complain-and, sue for damages-'if and to 
the extent that the' partial dislodgement of their'. hat has 
caused them loss -ör damage. - But -what the plaintiffs- ask 
"-on- thtse proceedings is to-'be allowed to' see 'what the 
brokers were keeping in their performance of their unlawful 
duty 'to the underwriters. Donaldson - Jo held that 'there 
is not warrant - for this, ' Kay and Yates* commenting in the 
mindern Law Review on the. decision, point out however,. that 
this- reasoning may not be -applicable . to the 
facts 'a s'- the 
plaintiffs claim -'arises not " from the discharging' of . the 
duty owed to them, but from the. breach of such a. duty - 
-a breach-of which the defendants had -knowledge at the' 'time 
-when the information was procurred . for theim- by. the. brokers. 
It- should be remembered that -as Donaldson J; ' himself 
pointed out, in the future. the decision woul'dd be.. different, 
-as he'-had- determined -in" emphatic- language that the practice 
was, -unlawfuli" Thus 'presumably- future plaintiffs should 
'at least- obtain their -declarations on. -the basis *of" the. agent 
as a constructive trustee of''the information. ' . 
Even if the 
information is not regarded as.. property, there seems no 
-reason to suppose that the, oquity which restrains -the.. 
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transmission of confidential information in breach of a 
confidential relationship, will not equally compel 
disclosure where the information-has been obtained in breach 
of the duty arising. from such a"relationship. ' 
(384) 
There has been no-appeal from this-decision, but after 
the obiter dicta of Megaw J. - in Anglo-African Merchant Ltd.... 
v. Bayley,. tloyds set up a special committee to ekamine 
the problem,. and subsequent to a re ort by this committee, 
proceedures have been changed. 
(3853 
The implications of 
the case are, however, far reaching, and would seemingly be 
applicable to situations where a broker. is in. receipt of 
confidential information or a merchant bank or. in cases 
of multiple directorships. Kay andiates comment that 
'a trustee acquiring information pertaining to the trust 
investments in his capacity as a company director, or a 
director holding multiple directorships, should surely not 
be able to remain silent where his second fiduciary position 
is clearly subordinate to the first. ' 
(386) 
Thus there 
would appear to be four possible solutions to the problem. 
(a) the so called 'primary rule', that is'the first 
agency agreement predominates in all respects. -because the 
duty owed to the first principal is primary. If this rule 
is the correct one, it would seem that the second principal 
might be at his peril, even though he did not know, and 
should not in the circumstances have known about the. prior 
arrangement. On the other hand it could be that he would 
have to have either actual or constructive know! 'Pdge, of tile 
prior fiduciary relationship which accords more with 
traditional-equity principles. If there is no notice, 
then the position is. not certain; presumably tho information 
should not be delivered up although the first principal 
should have a claim in damages or equitable compensation, 
as indeed should the second principal if he has suffered 
damnification. . 
(b) the agent. should be liable to both principals 
by placing himself in this position, and. that although the 
confidence of the second. principal shpuld be presepved, 
the first one should be able -to recover compensation. 
This would appear unfair where the. second' principal* had 
notice or the means of notice, and was aware of the unlawful 
ýj3ýr- 
nature of 'the situation. * If the -second 'agent' was 
not 
-so aware the -position would be the 'same as 
in (a). 
Where the second principal was aware of the situation, 
his conduct would constitute 'an inducement to breach of 
contract, and possibly participation in-breach'of. trust. 
(c) The American' Restatement of the Law of ,, Agency 
provides that an agent is under a duty to disclose, '" 
pprovided that such. -would not breach 'a duty I otted -to a third 
person. 
(387) 
' Where thid involves A conflict of duties 
and in spite of this the agent proceeds "to pact for 'the 
second principal; 'if-the second principal has knowledge 
of the 'first" age . nc , then the' second agreement-is illegal 
and unenforceable 
e38ß 
Thus'the duty of confidentiality 
to the second principal is eliminated by the rendering' 
of the second agency unenforceable. In the present''case 
Donaldson J. whilst accepting the, second 'agreement was 
unlawful, did not hold it to be a nullity however, and 
thug upheld the duty' of confidentiality. 
' (d) It is possible to argue that the relationship 
through which the fiduciary came into possession of the 
information should be the governing factor. Thus'' 
information' acquired in one fiduciary capacity cannot' 
be used 'in furtherence of' some other, relationship, at: 
least not to the detriment of thetfirst. This would 
eliminate the* problem of whether the first' relationship 
in time' should predominate or be subservient- to another 
subsequent' relationship entered into 'with or-without 
notice. . 
Of course, 'wh'ero the 4 information: is not protected' 
by' confidence then there' is no difficulty. Where there 
is 'ai 'potential conflict of interest relationship, however, 
'once confidential information 'goes into the fiduciary 
the problem crystalises and the 'difficulty of finding: a 
satisfactory solution arises. It should'be noted that 
in'the'context of'the British. Law, it'would seem unlikely 
whether the principle of internal s'egregation-or'that"of 
'the 'Chinese Wall' would- relieve' the fiduciary'from. ". . 
responsibility. 
ý-., 
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(D) TIPEING AND TIPPEE TRADING AND THE QUESTI OF 
CIVIL 'LIABILITY .. 
-Whilst 
this present study has discussed the question of 
extended insider ,. status. 
and. tippee trading largely, and at 
, 
length, in the context of the securities . 
industry, obviously 
other-sections , of-the 
community are no less effected.. 
The. Co nission recognised this point in its Reply Brief 
before. the- Court of. Appeals for. the Second Circuit . 
in the 
Texas Gulf Sulphur. 'case. The SEC also pointed out that 
the danger of, tippee trading was that. it was not limited 
to any present category of person, and outside the regulated 
. 
industries'the implications for harm it could cause were 
astounding. 
(3g9ý 
With tippees and the extended category 
of insiders,, in most instances -there are no disclosure 
requirements, and thus detection of communications, and 
_transactions, 
and the identification of participants, is 
weld. -nigh, impossible. 
(390) 
For instance it is estimated 
that in the City of London in 1967 over three million 
telephone calls,. excluding internal calls, four and a 
half million letters, and four hundred and fifty thousand 
privy e messages were made and sent on an averag bu iness 
t3921- day. . 
391} The Stock Exchanges publicity film . 
92 
shows a broker telephoning from Geneva and his deal being 
executed within two minutes, and the. Public Relations. 
office makes-much-of the fact. that the. Exchange's on 
automated telephone exchange is larger than that of most 
towns in the United Kingdom. 
(393) 
Thus the problem of 
identifying a particular communication or leakage of 
information is truly fantastic. Indeed as Painter states 
., 
tif modern electronic devices make the telephone unsafe, 
the conversation can always be held on a crowded street. ', 
or at a private luncheon or club, or for that. matter (394 
anywhere else.. In the vast . majority of cases it 
will be- impossible to. establish tippee. trading. or tipping 
other then by circumstantial evidence. For example. in 
Texas' Gulf Sulphur tipping. by Darke was shown inter alia 
by. an examination- of the alleged tippee Is ýjrad ing. bef ore 
and after the-alleged ti in took `395) Detected place, 
instances would seem to be the most extreme tip of the iceberg. 
a 
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Given' the profound 'difficuities - öf 'ddtectiön if is 
only those cases where the tippees"häve"sänne'referable 
And identifiable' connection with- the source of 'information 
that will be caught. Apart from -this, the -important-- 
question-arises as to, what kind of-tippee is to be considered 
as fairly within 'the -insider obligations. " It has' to be 
remembered that, the 'abstain or -disclose'- rule in the 
present context 'till ' invariably only leave the. -tippee 
with the choice of abstaining ur' incurring -li-ability.,. - 
As he will, rarely -have either the opportunity. or. ability 
to 'influence disclosure or disclose dir'ectly.. 
(396 ). 
As' Loss has observed 'there - is a scale . running - froren the 
Director of the Corporation X. who giv, s a'tip :. to his good 
friend in a similar position- with Corporation- Y. -'perhaps 
on an "'express, or implied ' It 11 scratch - your - back - and you 
scratch miner to the director who feels in an expansive 
mood while ' having'a-manicure, there is the studies 
eavesdropper or the briber, and on the other hand there is 
the Altogether innocent tippeeot-(39? 
); 
In-'addition there 
are' innumerable permutations of the knowledge that-the 
recipient of the 'information could have about. the nature of 
the. information. Here the range=can'-be from'those"who have 
conived With the insider in the breach- of his trust; to the 
innocent recipient who has ! no- reasonable grounds for-'assuming 
that there Would be any, impropriety in using the information. 
Then there is also the direct'tippee, the secondhand tippee 
and 'so ' On. ' It is debateable where it-is appropriate., to 
draw the- line, of'liability. Painter considers . that t it is 
doubtful whether Rule 10(b)(5)-absent a showing of- outright 
fraud or some other unusual-circumstances, should be extended 
beyond the level"of the first 'tippee. ' 398 " There-is also 
the problem 'of -how - spbcific the information should-be-and 
how 'go'ssip and rumour can satisfactorily' be -separated - from 
inside-information for the purposes of predicting liability. 
Whilst there'" has' been -a -considerable 'amount of " attention 
afforded to the securities industry 'and its receipt and 
utilisation' of such "information -- it is probable- that. - 
different conbiderations apply there, - given- the professional 
nature of the participants, -their -public responsibilities 
3 ä? 
and. 'the degree of regulation. - Outside this area there is 
substantial uncertainty. Although Commissioner Budge has 
stated 'th'at,: '. the. Commission certainly does not contemplate 
suing -every person, who- may come- across- 
inside information ... 
and that obviously persons . such as 
taxi drivers,: the barber, 
or the -caddy, who by, chance overhear -a -bit of corporate 
, news, should not 
be named defendants-- in a civil action brought 
by the Commission' ,. 
(399) 
this. is hardly.. satisfactory with 
regard to, suits brought by anyone else. 
Certainly. it would seem,, as has. -already been, pointed 
out, it is- not necessary to discover any formalised. 
relationship between an issuer or insider and- the. tippee. 
(400) 
Although the vast, majority of suits. in this: area of the law 
have only sought, injunctive, relief, in recent years there 
. 
is"a trend for a number of class actions to follow, closely on 
the tail of a successful enforcement action. - 
The first 
square holding outside the Commissions.. administrative proceedings 
that tipping of inside information is a violation. of 
Rule- 10(b)(5) was in- the SEC's, enforcement action against 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Corporation. In rthis case the Commission 
only sought relief against the, tippers and did not join 
the tiopees. The General Council-and staff Attorneys 
(401) 
sought to have their arguments on' the provisions of Section 20(b. ) 
of the 1934 Act that 
'it shall be 'unlawful' for any person directtly or 
indirectly to do any act or thing which it 
would be unlawful for, such person to do under 
the provisions of the Act or any rule or, 
regulation thereunder through or by means - of any other person. ' (402) 
With regard to--. the defendant' Drake- the Court of Appeals 
expressed the'view .. that by passing on infoxmatign, he had 
violated Rule 10 (b) (5 )., and with- regard. to defendant Coates , 
the Court considered that .' 
Coates', violation encompassed 
not only his- own. purchases; but also those pf his son-in'law, 
. and 
the customers of his- son-in-law to whom the- material 
infox'mat . on was' passed.. ' 
(403) 
Bromberg ha. s- written . that ' given the nature öf #p, f. inancial" world, an insider, who 
tips a friend should probably be charged with foreseeing 
that the friend will tell one, or two others, and the 
ý ý9 ýi 
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information will -continue to. =spread; Quite_ `conceivably 
the. tipper. will be "liable... for all trades' which -can be. ' 
traced .. to the. information -eminating from h'im', j; . 
_.. 
-The -information that. the. "two insiders: tipped:, in'-Texas Gulf 
Sulphur, varied. in its. specificity. Evidently, Darke 
disclosed that Texas -Gulf- Sulphur 'was -a- good buy' and 
gave some information on- the-original, bore hole-; ' whilst 
Coates , immediately after the first Press 're'leasetold. 
of the discovery.. , 
(405) 
. '.. The. Court' of Appeals -for: the 
: Second I Circuit, gave. no : rationale. for this. determination 
of liability, except 'the desire for' information equality. 
(406) 
'. . On referal to the District Court of South Nerv' York, 
Judge Bonsai mentioned-that-the imposition of liability 
for the. tippees " trading on the tipper 'trill be a. sufficient 
deterrent. ' 
<407) 
-This : was seized upon by the' Commission 
"who' advanced " the deterrent theory 'in' the Court of Appeal 
" in their Reply Briefe . -The SEC. also ernphasised 
I that' it 
was preferable-from the standpoint of deterrent-and 
enforcement to strike out ät the tipper, and, thus 'cut the 
tip at its source*-' . It- is certainly cons iderably"easier 
from -the enforcement point of view to= identify 'and 'visit 
liability-on-the insider-tipper. '. It has been pointed 
out by Bromberg-that ' as -a-matter of logic and policy, 
it should follow that the primary evil is not"'tipping 
itself, but trading with inside information. Tipping is 
a violation because it facilitates such. trading by tippees 
and 'given the' human propensi'y to communicate' by a long 
chain for - fur ei e' 
k408) 
r th rt ppe s, T 
Indeed on this basis 
Bromberg suggests that' it m'ay'well be'adväntägebus for the 
tipper-to still be -fixed with liability- for the trading of 
distant recipients . 'of -information, even though because ' of 
the., mutilation of. - the'- information. by. communication through 
a number of persons, ' they themselves 'are -not in - violation 
. -of. the 
Rule. (409) It may be ä sufficient' -violation where 
the 'insider -tipper. tips- in-, anticipation, ' or 'in' circumstances 
where -trading is : reasonably . to be, cöntemplated", even, though 
...,. 'the=. tipppee does " not- infäct ., trade. 
(410) ", 
f 
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Apart from avoiding the complexities of determining 
tippee liability 
(411 
holding the tipper liable comports 
with traditional fiduciary notions, in that the sipper who 
will generally. be Tan insider in the proper moaning of the 
word will thus be in a fiduciary' relation ship with-the issuer. 
There would seem to be authority for the proposition that a 
fiduciary disclosure of information belonging to his 
principal for the benefit'of-other than his principal, -is a 
breach of that relationship. 
(412) 
. Tippees-. themselves 
will also be liable for tipping. This was-established in 
the Merrill Lynch proceedings where it was laid down that 
'one who may not himself trade in securities without disclosing 
information-known to him. may not pass that information to 
others for their use in securities transactions. ' 
(413) 
Whilst it yeas quite early on, as has been seen, established 
that tippees will be liable for trading on inside information 
in administrative proceedings, the position of such in civil 
cases has remained until recently in some doubts. The Court 
of Appeals in Texas Gulf Sulphur considered that trading 
by tippee's 'with actual or constructive knowledge that the 
material information was disclosed ... certainly would be 
equally reprehensible' as that by tippers-, and`access, - 
insiders. 
(414) 
Thus the Court of Appeals for-the Second 
Circuit considered that at least morally tippees. were In the 
same position as insiders and, of course, in Ross-v. Licht, 
the District Court of South' New York regarded tippees as 
GE insiders. Whilst the idea of ire osingcivil liability on 
tippees has been criticised', 
(415 3. 
the q' uestion. was placed 
beyond dispute, as has already been mentioned by the 
. Shapiro v. t derrill iynch_litigation. ' However,. whilst the 
-possibility of tippee liability is resolved', the'. cohstituents 
of that-liability remain largely uncortain. and unresolved. 
District Judge Tenney considered' that 'theý selling defendants 
or, tippees who, the complaint alleges, '- knew or should have 
known of the confidential nature of the infokmation, are 
liable to the same extent as the insiders. '' 
(416) 
In, the Court of Appeals Circuit Judge Timbers found' liability 
on. exactly the same basis, except with the addition `of the (417) phrase -that -t they knew-of its non=public nature. e. 
3 
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Thus- these statements-: would seem to suggest that all that 
_, 
is required. - is that. - the tippee" should. objectively have-known 
of. the 'confidential nature _ 
of -the., inf orma tion. t and its.. 
- non-public quality, and that, his, liabilityis. the, same 
as that of an insider. - 
(418) 
, 
Of course with.: regard to. 
those. tippees not : in .a 
direct. relationship with the issuer, 
important considerations. of : specificity, and: reliability.. 
will feature in . 
the determination, of materiality-, to,, a; much 
greater extent than. 'in, - the, case.. -of access insiders.,; 
It has been,. - argued that where there isa chain. of " 
' com unication through a number of tippees, there-_ is.. in -effect 
a- sufficient: public disclosure, so as;. to render the ; 
information no longer of a non-public. nature. . In the 
matter bf -Faberge, the Commission categorically rejected 
this,. and emphasised that 'the information was not disseminated 
in a manner making it generally available- to the investing 
public until the issuers, press- release appeared. on the... 
-broad. tape. ' This is significant as there had already, 
been an announcement. in that-case-on the AUTEX. Tape,. 
, 
which 
the Commission discounted in view- of the -f act that. it, had 
been transmitted, oi .y to a 
limited. number of institutional 
investors. ' In the case of 'tippeer trading information, 
'in; order. to effect a.. meaningful public disclösure, of corporate 
information .: -. must 
be disseminated in a manner calculated 
to reach the.. securities marketplace- in- general through , :, 
recognised channels . of 
distribution, and public. investors 
must bei afforded a reasonable waiting period to., react to 
. the. 
information. ' Thus, the' SEC - seemed, to reject the notion 
that effective disclosure could. be made, through- selective 
commun'icat. ons.. The. Commission considered that. any other 
possibility Jwvould be to -sanction competition: for tips in 
which-. -ordinary. individual. investors, would- inevitably be at 
-a serious disadvantage. ' 
Another tproblzem that. is. ignored by the, treating of , 
the 
tipRees- position as the same. , as: 
that, of the insiders, is 
that the insider. will . 
be in a, much better position to evaluate 
the. information and determine . 
its-, reliability.. - In the .. 
Texas' 
Gulf Sulphur case, the Courts introduced a probability., factor 
into 'th'e. definition of- material. inf ormation'. ' 
_ 
This... -is _, important in the case of tippees, as they will generally 
34h 
have very little opportunity for testing the reliability 
of the information, and will not have the background knowledge 
that insiders have. Thus Bromberg considers that in the 
case of remoter tippees 'a higher probability of accuracy 
ought to be necessary as an element of the violation. ' 
(419) 
Obviously the lower degree of probability that the information 
is correct and accurate, the less harm the use of that 
information does to the concept of equality of information. 
Thus to a certain extent differing standards of materiality 
are applicable-'to access insiders and more tippees. 
Eý 
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(E) THE DEFENCE OF IN PARI DELTCTQ 
An interesting problem arises where the information 
-given to the tippee, which he utilises for trading-, 
turns out to be erronious, In such a case the question 
arises as to'whether the tippee can-sue the informant. 
The problem resolves itself into a conflict between the 
public policy consideration that tfiettipper should in all 
events be discouraged from misleading another investor, 
and the equally-important public policy principle of 
einclean hands'. There have been a number -of cases in the 
context of Rule 10(b)(5) where 'in pari delicto' has been 
raised as a defence, but here attention will only be given 
to the most recent. 
(420) 
The leading case here is that 
ofýKuehnert v. Texstar Corporation.; '- 
(421) 
The Texstar 
Corporation was negötiating a merger with another corporation. 
The defendant President of Texstar told his friend Kuehnert 
of the merger plans and of secret oil discoveries which 
" would have, when announced, greatly increased the value of 
Texstar securities. The President, because he was having 
difficulty with his colleagues suggested that both he and 
Kuehnert purchase considerable Texstar securities so as 
to strengthen his position, and also to net a profit, before 
the developments were announced. * The President emphasised 
that it was crucial to the success öf the scheme that 
ýKuehnert keep the information confidential. Without 
disclosing the information Kuehnert made substantial margin 
purchases of Texstar common stock. It turned out that 
most of'the assertions and information that Kuehnert had 
been given were false. "Kuehnert, having suffered a 
considerable loss, brought suit against the President under 
Rule 10(b)(5). The District Court for South Texas granted 
the defendant's motion" for summary judgement' on the grounds 
that Kuehnert had himself violated the rule and was 
defeated by the 'unclean hands'; maxim. 
(422) 
The Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed this. 
(423) 
The ratio of the decision was 'we think it important* that 
tippees, who present the same' threat to the investing 
public as do insiders themselves,, should be offered appropriate 
ý7'r-A 
I 
discouragement, -we conclude, that-the better- choice--is to 
leave upon persons; believing themselves tippees. the restraint 
arising- . 
from the fear of irretriQvable loss, should they 
-act upon a tip which proves to-have been untrue... Hence 
the loss must lie where it falls. ' 
(424) 
The same problem arose the following. year in fohl vQ_ 
Blair '& Company; ' 
(425) 
In this. case. a -registered 
broker told the plaintiff that he had inside information 
relating.. to a certain. * issuer, which -made. purchase of the 
securities of that company very desirable.. The: piaintiff 
agreed. and the broker executed, the transaction.. --The'shares. 
-actually 
fell in price and it was obvious that the assertions 
of the broker were false. The ýleintiff proceeded. to suit 
under Rule 10 (b) (5 ). The defendant sought to reply,. upon 
the. principles of 'unclean hands', whilst the plaintiff 
contended that these principles were not applicable. in 
the present cased He sought to distinguish the Kuehnert 
decision on the grounds that in the present. case-the 
defendant was not, an insider of tie issuer and was a broker, 
owing him a fiduciary duty of . 
disclosure. - The. Court refused 
to accept these technical distinctions between one who is 
tin 
fact a. corporate insider,. -and one-who merely claims to 
have possession of inside information. The Court espoused. 
a . 
'caveat tippee' policy that a. -tippee. taking and usng ) 
inside inf ormation,. did so entirely at his own risk,,,. 
426) 
Where a person who is a tippee claims that he is. fraudently 
induced.. to purchase. securities'on the basis of what he 
mistakenly believes to be inside information,. he-will be 
barred by the defence. xegardleps-. of, where the. information 
comes from.. The difficulty : with this case is, whilst fully 
accepting. the reasoning and approach of the-Fifth: Circuit , 
the position was. not-analagous_to thatrof kuehnert,, as a 
broker, even. if not in a. special position, has a" direct 
pecuniary interest, in? his -. clients. transactions. by. virtue 
of commissions.. Thus in- the present case the broker is 
allowed to neglect him fiduciary duties to his-client 
b'ec'ause- of the public' interest in. preventing, the use of 
inside information,, even where there is none. 
(427 ) 
;ý 
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. 
The aim of. these decisions however, in every . 
case of of 
such actions and not only. -where. a broker is involved, is 
to effectively isolate the fraudulent 'tipster'. from 
liability at the suit of his tippee.. This would a ply 
whether the infornation_ imparted be , 
true or false. 
428 
Of course, where a tippee traded to his- advantage on true 
information, he would be unlikely_to draw attention to 
his own wrong, by suit, even. if, there was a. detriment. 
The, same. reasoning as that. adoptgd in these decisions 
would presumably apply so. as to remove the tipper from 
liability. to. those to whom the tippee passed. o 
.- 
the 
. 
false 
information.. Thup. as. Gene G. Harter and Lawrence B. Ordower (4 
'the net , ... point out 
in. -the California Law Review .. 
effect is to remove the sanction, of civil liability almost 
completely from this type of securities fraud. '. 
Of. course, this das been criticised as it removes all 
protection from the greedy and gullible investor, of whom 
there must be many. Whilst perhaps not practically 
objectionable,, this is a new departure, and absent the 
question of, insider trading the law does not usually condone 
deceit and misrepresentation of this ilk. 
(43.. 
Furthermore, 
the. original tippee will only make. the. statement in the 
expectation either directly or indirectly of some reward, 
whether-it be esteem, commissions, retention of control 
or manipulative design. Indeed Circuit Judge Godbold 
who dissented in the Kuehnert. case,, and the District Court 
in a subsequent, expressly rejected the application of 
the defence-of in pari delicto. 
The District Court of South New York. in Nathanson V. 
Wels, Voisin,, 
. 
Cannon Inc, 
(ý31) 
the plaintiff contended 
. that . 
he: had received inside -information from Weis,. Voisin, 
Cannon Inc. thattvo corporations, of which the brokers 
were in. a variety, of insider relationships with, were 
about to merge. 'on very favourable terms, In fact this never 
materialised., . -In 
this 
-case 
the 
. 
Court considered that if 
... 
the prophylactic purpose . of 
the anti-insider trading 
provisions -is 'to restrict:. the use, of all material inside 
information until it is generally available to the 
ý- ý' 
investing publ-ic, t'then--the-m©st'effective-means of carrying 
out - this policy is to: nip - in the bud the" source of the 
inforiation, the tipper, by discouraging him-from making 
the initial disclosure-which is the first step-an-the 
chain of dissemination. '' The- -Court - thought that the 
central question was one of-policy and which approach would 
best serve the interests-of the investing public. Of course, 
" the Court in Kuehnert had said the same -thing -and -come to 
the converse result. 
(432) 
The-Court was -not -persuaded 
by the plaintiff's argument that the. informationreceived 
by, him could not-have constituted a fraud upon --the` public 
as there was no inside information, on the grounds. that 
- such` had ' nflt been disclosed-to the persons with whom the 
plaintiff - had, dealt, and-that his conduct with regard to 
the investing -public 'was similar' to that attributed to 
the defendants own recreant conduct, and that--whilst such 
was= a -factor to be considered it was not disposive- of the 
case. 
(433) 
On the other hand the-Court did not-consider 
that the conduct of the tippee was- not. dispositive of the 
application of defense of 'unclean handst. The Court 
adopting rauch of the reasoning of-the dissenting Judge in 
the Kuehnert decision, emphasised that the tipper presents 
a- greater threat - to the investing public than . the-tippee . 
and thus the liability should properly be fixed upon him, 
and to this -extent a denial of the application-of the 
-principle- of in pari delicto better effectuated the - public 
benefit. 
(434) 
The position has-become considerably confused however, 
i4 with the- subsequent decision -of -. the Cour of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit James ývD Brt435) in u euiL. The facts 
of this case are complex and -it is sufficient here . to 
point out that the -plaintiff alleged that. he had. been . 
fraud ilently induced by the. defendant. -to-'sell. his: securities 
to him, the defendant being a director,, in: the issuer, 
for placement in 'a trust, believing- that his shares . would 
have greater ; Value. after an announced'' merger was affected. 
The District Court of South Florida dismissed his -claim 
on the grounds -that . -'. the " plaintiff was a-coconspirator 
tl 
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with. the defendänt in an intended, act of fraud and -deceit' 
and 'that he was just as -involved in -the. fraud as - the 
defendant was. ' Thus the District Court -followed " the 
.. -Kuehnert . decision. -. On appeal toý -the Court of' Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit, - in 'which -Circuit Judge -Moore of- the 
-Second, 
Circuit'wäs sitting by debignation, --the'. -lower 
decision was a firried and . the Kuehnert decision approved. 
As -a matter. of policy the Fifth Circuit- considered- that 
it is. better' to leave' upon' the parsons . believing 'themselves 
tippees the restraints arising from the- fear. of . 
irretrievable 
loss should they act upon a tip which proves to have been 
untrue. ' ''.... .... -' 
Thus it would seem that the weight 0'f' authority is 
. behind the availability of the defence of in pari ". - delicto 
in actions under Rule . 10(b) 
(5),, in the. context of insider 
trading... At least some of the controversy. - has resulted 
, because Rule 10 
(b) (5) effects . considerably. more 
than 
just insider. trading. . To deny 'the defence-furthers the 
rule as a. remedy for deceit-and misstaterlent, to apply it 
-arguably discourages t-ippee trading. It is, noticeable 
that Other Courts, and indeed the Suprcme -Court, ' have 
disapproved of the application' of the in-pari delicto 
principle-where the suit serves ä -significant- public 
. interest. 
(436) 
.' 
" The acceptance of the principle-as-a defence or bar 
to suit., -does neglect the vital -importance 
of effective civil 
cnforcement to - anti-insider! trading. -provisions: - 
Indeed 
the insider -who disclosed--the information 'will -go' 
: unnoticed' and unpunished, even, though he-has-abused his 
corporate. trust, wither - by . passing -on 
insider information, 
or by'using "his. * insider status as". a. means of-imbuing 
his 
false 'information . with credulänce. Indeed 
in every case 
. the plaintiff ' relied on the,. false. information 
because he 
was impressed with-the status of his insider -informant. 
. Furthernore, it is--to be doubted whether the. 
desired 
. -discouragement of-: tippees using.. their 
privileged-information 
because-of the knowledge. that.; they: act- at their oýýýn risk, 
will . rarely be more than a--theoretical proposition,, 
w 
ý,. 
# {'; 
ý1ý; 
ýý ;ý 
_.. ý. 
ýý: -8 
As. we. have already.. seen the. socurities industry,. and 
indeed many investors,. are . sceptical. of: mere 
tips, 
unless from a trusted friend. or.. in confirmation of : an 
existing suspicion. . 
Indeed, the record,. in,. Ku. ehnert. v. 
Texstar Corporation shows. Kuehnert, stating;. with.. regard 
to his informant,: '. I had great faith, . 
in_ him,., he.. was a 
goad.: friend of mine., and I had. no. reason., to doubt- the man. 
I. had no.. reason., at all, to doubt:. him. . 
He. 4was... a very, very 
very close friend. ' 1. .-.. 
Similarly.. in the, Texas' Gulf 
Sulphur. case, the, tippees' who .. 
traded. were, relatives and 
close. friends of, Darke, and.: Coates. 
_ 
Thus. it. is hardly 
likely that on receiving a 'tips from such intimates, 
the possibility that they. might. be. giving false or mistaken 
information,. with. knowledge and indeed the intention that 
it. will be utilised, yiou1d, rarely. - weigh much:. in. the 
recipients mind. Of course there will be cases. -where 
the tip was innocently. mistaken or. purely negligent, but 
in such. cases it is harly likely . 
that. the. recipient is going 
to sue, probably In deceit,. his informant... At most it 
might make him more prudent in the future. - In.. the . case of 
professional advisers and brokers,. slightly 'different 
considerations pertain, but even here-it. is, most:. unlikely 
that a' professional would be disposed the . loss 
of custom by feeding investors with delibe, ately:. false 
information. Indeed under. the defence of. in . pari 
delicto 
professionals are. encouraged to perhaps take: less care 
in their recommendations, if, couched. in the form of a tip. 
Given ' the desire .. for- brokers -and- advisers to - please their 
clients-, and the over. presgnt,. threat- of., disciplinary 
action,, and . 
bad publicity, it is' opgn- to.: quest. ion-. how 
many brokers clients would, on receipt of., a-tip, be 
persuaded not to use it because.. of-the . fear.. that. '. if it is 
wrong and even fraudulent they will not obtain redress. 
There' are a -number of yet.. unresolved. difficulties-about 
the -application of the defence;. of in, pari delicto and 
doctrine - of .: 
'unclean hands which. are of . course not necessarily the . same thing.. 
For. example the-position of 
: tippee where . 
there. is no consensual . relationship between 
such and the insider, is yet undecided. It is certainly 
difficult to speak of an eavesdropper or a secondhand 
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tippee as a co-conspirator of the insider. There is an 
obvious need here for a through rationalisation of the 
law and policy considerations. 
It should be pointed out in passing, that a stockholder 
cannot recover on the grounds that other persons were 
tipped, but he was not. 
(438) 
Of course a contrary result 
could mean that where the information was bullish, an 
insider could be'liable to virtually anyone. 
Vitally connected to-the determination of insider 
and tippee liability is the question of what type of 
information will create a sufficient trading privilege 
to warrant liability. In this respect the most 
controversial consideration is whether outside or market 
information is sufficient. This is a matter of tremendous 
importance to the regulation of tippee trading and the 
possibility of an extended definition of insider.: 
35( 
(F } MARKET INFORMATION OR CUTS IDE INFORMATIC . 
The SEC in its Securities Exchange Act Release asking 
for comments on the 'drawing up of, guidelines on the use of 
non-public information, specifically asked for-comments 
on 'the appropriateness of utilising non-public material 
information directly related to the future market for a 
given security which does not emanate from-or concern the 
issuer of. those securities. ' 
(439) 
In other words this 
-relates to information which, although not -effecting the 
intrinsic worth of the corporation, -does nonetheless bear 
upon the market price of that company's 'securities. - 
Thus this type of information effects the demand and manner 
-of trading in the corporations securities rather than its 
earnings or assets. 
(440) 
' Classical illustrations of 
market information would be advance knowledge that a large 
institutional investor intends to sell out-its present 
holding of a particular security, or indeed acquire more 
of such securities, or advance knowledge that ä-particular 
security is going to be 'wrote up' in a pQnding publication. 
(441) 
This type of information can of course, be just as price 
sensetive, if not generally more so, than the traditional 
types of inside information. Indeed the practicq of 
scalping and trading on the impact of investment recommendations 
particularly in the press, has already been mentioned, 
(442) 
as has the advantages enjoyed by'floör'; traders and specialists. (443) { 
One eminent American securities lawyer, Martin Lipton 
has written that. 'a President'of'a corporation who learns 
in"än interview. with an analyst that the brokerage firm is 
going to make a favourable recommendation of the corporations 
stock, is in the same position with respect to trading 
without disc10 'sure, as when he learns that the corporation 
has made a majo±. mineral discovery. ' 
(44) 
The American 
Law Institute take a similar view and so provide in Section 
1303 of theirDraft Federal Securities Code. 
(445 )- 
Indeed it would appear that it is the better view that 
'outside facts do not have any pervading immunity from the. 
prescriptions of the anti-fraud rules.: 
(446) 
3ý Z 
On the- otherhand- the- Chaim. an -of -'the-SEC, --Ray- Garrett, at 
the London. Conf erence . on 
Insider, Trading in. the 
.. 
Spring of 
1975, doubted whether this proposition. was. correct,., and 
: thought that the. matter was still 'open to. 'qu. estioi .: 
Although 'no case. has discussed the standing of market 
information, there are numerous decisions where, categories 
of market, 'information. have been treated as inside. information, 
subject only to. the 4 criteria of materiality, without. - 
. 
discussion.. This . 
is 
., 
hardly satisfactory. ho: "rever, as there 
are a number. of ponts that still require-clarif. ication 
and deliberation. 
There is a difference 'in nature between : inside. information 
eminating from 'the. issuer., which it possesses., controls, 
.. and.. 
in. most instances manufactures, -and the. -kind, -of. information 
that is here being considered. The. receipt of outside 
. 
information 
-by a corporation places 
it in something of a 
tippee position 'with , 
the attendant difficulties, of . 
that 
status. The problem that tippees have in determining 
" reliability, evaluation and in controlling the information, 
apply in such a situation. In most cases the recipient 
of market information will have scant opportunity to disclose 
such, and where recommendations are involved disclosure 
could. be construed as manipulation,: particularly if , 
the 
` eff. ect of the disclosure was. to result in -the withdrawalof the 
recommendation. _ 
(, ' 47) Another problem-is that -mark© t 
information generally always relates to future market 
activity and thus the disclosure of such will inevitably 
prejudice the impact of. that contemplated activity. 
For example if. a large institutional investor was- obligated 
to announce in advance its intention to make large scale 
purchases, or a potential tender offergr4: was obligated 
to disclose in. adyance its. intentions, the market would 
turn against the institutional. investor or offeror and 
possibly, even frustrate the acquisition... These problems 
have already been alluded to in. the context of. takeover 
regulations, but it is important to realise here,. th4t the 
difficulties, off market information disclosure 'are- very 
much wider. In Hafner v. Forest Laboratories-(448) 
3s? > 
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an action was brought against the issuer alleging -a violation 
of- Rule . 10(b) 
(5). in its failure to disclose an impending 
4% stock dividend, to the plaintiff before it purchased, his 
securities. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
stated there was no. such violation-, but indicated that in 
certain circumstances such. conduct might be . violartive. - 
Certainly the SEC has become conscious to the dangers 
of abuse in . this. area in recent , -years; 
Although Commissioner 
Loomis stated in a Panel discussion with the Financial 
Analysts Federation in 1972; 
(449) 
that information obtained 
by brokers and dealers on their clients investment intentions 
and positions was 'not inside information, ', it' is open to 
question whether a similar view would be taken, to-day, 
at least with such assurance. 
(450). 
Under. 'Rule 144(h) 
the SEC. -requires contemporaneous,, -filing of notices of 
intention to sell-under Rule 144, ýand under this, the sellers 
intention to sell, the amount of securities to be sold, 
the market place at which the securities are to be sold, 
and the. name. -of the selling broker must be disclosed. .. 
Thus as this is a public document 'market makexs. and-others 
are provided with an access. -. to information about the availability 
of supply and the potential selling pressure on the particular 
security. ' 
(451) 
.. 
The Commission end '. also 
, the self-regulatory 
agencies have also been alert to the danger-of: persdns- 
engaged in the securities industry generating their own 
market information and utilising. it to their . owg 
benefit. 
Reference has -already been made to the proceedings brought 
against, certain-financial analysts allegedly': guilty of such 
conduct. 
(452) 
The New York-Stock Exchange has alsa 
disciplined analysts who have disclosed to others the fact 
that they or their associates are about to-publish a"negative 
or: favourable report. -on a particular security. 
(453) 
Advance knowledge of impending legislation or. administrative 
decisions, and also probably for thdt matter judicial decisions, 
has -also been 'considered inside information. 
ý454) 
. 
One of the 
_. 
most difficult problems. with predicting 
liability in this type of case is where. the 
. material outside information is used by. a non-insider.. Whilst. the SEC has been 
35'eY 
particularly-concerned about, professionals utilising-such 
information 'to gain trading- advantages"over'public - investors, ' 
X455) 
: it has also been concerned -about -the - advantages -that 
can be obtained by misuse by anyone: 
(456) 
The Courst: have 
been more ready to find liability where professionals- are 
involved -however, 
given ' the nature of -, their relatrionship 
with the issuer and 'public investor. Vihere--non-professionals 
and insiders are involved, -it has generally been thought 
that a , Court would-reject an action-on the ground's of-- 
t materiality, "" Materiäliy in-'the 
present - 
context-has-generally been associated with -'undisclosed events---wwhich 
.. have a 
significant long -term'impact 
bn the= company, ' . 
(457) 
aad of course outside information not related to the intrinsic 
value of the. issuer wöuld' not -normally - have- this' long-term 
effect. - - blith the adoption of the reasonable. investor -test, 
and the, extension of such to-speculative investors-, this 
s problem would seem to have ceased. . Furthermore, - in certain 
, instances market information can, of course, have 
longterm 
repercussions, such as in the case of -take-overs and public 
issues.: 
---Apart from the materiality problem the Courts -have 
normally only imposed an affirmative duty to disclose 
material information, or to- abstain from *träding- where _ there 
is 'a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly to 
information--intended to be available for only. a corporate 
.. purpose,: and 
-not for -the- personal benefit-of anyone. -'. - 
Generally in the case of outside information, there will not 
be this relationship with -the person utilising-the--information 
and the issuer of *the. relevant securities Given the vastly 
extended notion of-insider trading,: in-. this situation--it 
has.. been argued that this is-not'determinativef. and attention 
should ' be , given to the other constitutent of- liability, 
namely, 'the inherent unfairness'-of the personal--'exploitation 
of stich information. Where a corporate inside=, learns -of 
outside- 'information about his- s- securities,,. it 
is probable-that-his. relationship with the issuer will be 
sufficient to ground liability upon;:. The . difficulty-lays 
in those cases-where, for instance, an-Investment-house of 
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of some influence. informs a large mutual fund that it is 
going to recommend and push. the securities of a. particular 
company with which the mutual fund has no insider 
relationship. Here the law and academic comment is most 
uncertain. In SEC v. Great American Industries Inc 
(458) 
the Commission contended that "Rule l0(b)(5) placed an 
affirmative duty of disclosure on persons who in contrast 
to insiders and brokers and dealers, did. not occupy a 
special relationship to the seller or buyer of securities. 
The Court thought this ! would-be occupying new ground 
and would require most careful consideration', and the 
Court.. was not1prepared to accept the contention on the 
facts of the case!. Circuit Judge Kaufman, whilst 
concurring,. considered that it would be wrong to think 
that. Rule 10(b) (5) could not be extended to such instances, 
and at least in injunctive suits 'any 'claim that material 
facts were withheld in. a transaction in connection with 
the sale or purchase of securities, must be scrutinised 
with care, whether. or not there would have been liability 
at common law for such a deed, ' . 
459) The. trend for 
parity of information in-both judicial and administrative 
actions has continued. In the Investors Management case 
the Commission stated that the ttippees' were liable if 
they knew or had reasonable grounds to. believe that the 
information was non-public and. had. been. communicated to 
a privileged group regardless of the actual source. 
(460) 
Indeed Commissioner Smith,. whilst concurring'in the result, 
thought that liability should continue to be predicted 
upon, 
'the respondants-knowing or having reason to know that the material infönnation 
became available to them in breach of"a duty owed to the corporation not to disclose or use the information for 
non-corporate purposos .;.. and not. merely on. the notion of relative informational 
advantages in the market place. ' (461) 
Nonetheless, the Commission has continued to eliminate 
informational' disparaties' , particularly marke information 462) relying upon'the traditional unfairness factor s 
i 35ý ;. 
"- Certainly Fleischer, Mundheim and Murphy in their 
leading article' on market information "consider that the 
parity-- of information- approach in "cases where' there is 
no 'insider' relationship is too restri'ctive', -and' would 
depart significantly from any' underlying* assumption of 
competitive economy, 'that it is desirable :.. to reward 
the diligent who have acquired a superior market position. ' 
(463. Furthernoae; it is argued that the 'parity approach 
ignores the distinction between the voluntary'acceptance 
of fiduciary responsibilities and their infliction by 
the Claw. Instead of the notion of parity, the learned 
authors consider that the so-called"'fairness principles 
could be utilised as'a basis för='per; nitting the'user of 
material non-public information to shot/ that his exploitation 
of that information represented a 'leg'itimate reward for 
the economic effort by him 'or'the person who provided him 
with the information. ' This would in their vie. v strike 
a balance between the need to provide public confidence in 
the integrity of the market, whilst prombting efficiency 
of capital allocation. On the other hand Martin Lipton 
writing in Practical Guidelines for Inside Information, 
considers that the Courts, as well as the Commission, 
: have supported the parity approach and this is the correct 
rationale. 
(464) Whilst it is probably correct that the 
congress did not originally intend to'lay down a'rule of 
parity of information, with cases such as the Sp 
New *York v. Bankers Life= and Casualty Compa 
465 
n 
and " in particular SEC v. Texas Gulf , Sulphur' . 
466). this 
would now seem to be a legitimate expectation'of the market. r 
Nonetheless, it is true-that many Courts, whilst actually 
dealing with outside information, still feel constrained 
to discover some notion of insider relationship, no matter 
how artificial., 
(467) 
Givers the above discussion, it must be emphasised that 
the exact boundaries of the 'duty to disclose material 
'outside information' accepting that such a düty. 9xists, 
t are uncertain. Of very great importance is the question 
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whetter there is a duty upon corporations which fully 
intend to make a public offer for the securities of 
another, to disclose this intention when making pre- 
announcement acquisitions, or when allowing others 
in association_uith that corporation, to make 
pre-announcement acquisitions. Fleischer, Mundheim and. 
Murphy, writing in the University of Pennsylvania Latit 
Review, consider that 'it sees clear that under these 
circumstances the corporation has no obligation under 
Rule 10(b)(5), -or its : illiams Act analogue, Section 14(a) 
to disclose its plans before making market purchases' 
(468) 
It is interesting however, -that although Rule lOb-13 
only prohibits, transactions outside the terms of a tender 
offer during the currency of such, the SEC has indicated 
that the saue principle should be applicable to transactions 
immediately before such, and that- in any case such have 
to be disclosed under sections 13d and 14d. 
(469) 
The SEC in its Institutional Investors Study considered 
that the privileged communication of information to 
institutional investors concerning impending tender offers 
and the like, violated rule 10(b)(5). 
(470) 
It is uncertain 
however, whether warehousing by the potential offerer with 
others could be considered a violation of the Federal rule. 
The SEC's Institutional Investor Study thought that 
warehousinG should be regulated under a new provision rather 
than under Rule 10(b)(5)-. It has been argued that the 
plans of the acquiring corporation are valuable items of 
corporate property and should thus only be used for the 
benefit of the corporation, and not by tippees. It would 
follow that the corporation would have an action against 
-both the warehousers and also the insiders who disclosed 
the intention to make an offer. The Court rejected such 
a contention however, in Penn Mart Reality Comuan v ecke 
471) 
on the grounds that there had been no deception and 'that 
the company's insiders were entitled to negotiate support 
for the o1fer. -(472) Of course, in ac juiring - the support of 
institutional investors both in terms of financial and voting 
support, the management might be performing a most necessary 
and beneficial role from the standpoint of the corporation, 
3s 
which would not without such assistance be able to 
exploit its superior market analysis or position. 
Indeed in such situations corporations have relied upon 
directors to acquire securities in the target in 
support of its offer and objective. 
(473) 
Without the 
realisation of the corporate acquisition the superior 
analysis of the offerer is wasted, and will only benefit 
others by drawing attention to the undervalued securities 
of the target corporation. Thus in some instances 
'warehousing permits potential acquiring companies who 
cannot secure financing by conventional-means to take 
advantage of their self generated analysis that the 
target's stocks may be undervalued'. 
(474) 
Another dimension to this problem is where an insider 
of the corporation which is about to make the offer 
acquires securities in the'-Potential target corporation 
in contemplation of this event, and not for or in' 
agreement with his corporation. It would seem that the 
insider might be liable under state fiduciary law to bis 
corporation on the principles laid down in Brophy v 
Cities Service Con-an 
(475) 
it is also possible that 
he might be held liable under Rule 10(b)(5) to bis 
company on the princijles- that have already been discussed. 
His liability to anyone else other than his corporation, 
particularly to the shareholders of the target company 
who have sold their securities prior to the public 
announcement of the tender offer, is far more dubious 
however. There would be no claim under state law as 
there has been no misrepresentation, and there is no 
fiduciary nexus so as to base an affirmative duty of 
disclosure upon. It would seem difficult to find any 
duty to disclose the contemplated transactions by his 
corporation even under Rule 10(b)(5), notwithstanding 
the dicta in SEC v. Great American Industries, b ich'has 
already been alluded to. The application of the fairness 
principle would seem to allow the offerer to take 
advantage of its superior analysis, and likewise presumably 
anyone else which it considers should be allowd to profit 
3s9 
There was no allegation that the manager disposed of his 
securities to such, as in the case of scalping. 
The SEC contended that there should have been disclosure 
of this earlier transaction to the clients. 
(476) 
On the other- hand the SEC's Special Study of the Securities 
Markets 
(477) 
pointed out, that the investment by . the 
adviser of his own funds-in the recommended . security 
did 
testify to his bonafidies. 
: 
The complaint , 
is_ in the 
prior nature of these investments t- and thus, the enhanced 
" price: that they are acquired at.. 
` ?$ The Sec has stated 
that it will extend this basis of, liability to bar. 
pre-recommendation purchases by both investment companies 
.` '(479) 
and other affiliated with such, or advisers. 
The SEC has.. expressed concern that persons associated 
with an investment company can make purchases or sales 
on the. basis of contemplated transactions to be made by 
the investment company, and the disagree: ent in the 
industry about the ethics of such conduct. 
(480) 
The Congress accepted the SEC's recommendations and 
increased the, SECIs rule-making power inýthis field. It is 
now provided in Section 17 (j) of the Investment Companies 
Act that tit shall be unlawfull for any person affiliated 
to an investment company, its advisers or principle 
underwriters =to engage in any act, practice or course 
of business in connection with the purchase and sale 
directly or indirectly by such person of any. security 
held or to be acquired by the investment company.,. in 
contravention of such rules that the SEC may, promulgate' 
. 
to prevent such acts, practices or courses of business (4131) 
as are fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative. ' 
The Commission has proposed an extensive regulatory ...,.. f (482) code for this area in the. form of Rule 17(j)-l. 
This Rule 
. 
largely- conforms to the Proposed Code of Ethics 
drawn up-by the Ipvestment Company Institute although 
ther. e" are some significant differences. Given the 
critical. importance of this regulation it is worth, 
_rdescribing Rule 17(j)-1 in some detail. 
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personally, provided of-- course 'this comports -with -a 
corporate interest or purpose. This would not- of course 
exonerate the conduct of the insider who took 'advantage 
of his position to -acquire 'an unauthorised' personal 
' advantage. The difficulty with -the- fairness principle 
is that' apart from being vague, --it 'can easily blur into. 
-the, -so-called parity' principle. 
-'-As has =already been pointed out the Congress-did not 
-conceive of parity 'of 'information 'or- "probably -even fairness 
-as . the, guiding light 'to - Section 10b, . and until-the last 
few years' liability has- not * ventured . outside a -finding 
of- some 'kind of 'insider" relat1onship, invariably of a 
fiduciary or public nature'' Although recent "cases" have 
-advocated parity, like' equality, ' this' must be 'seen' only 
-as a' goal and not - necessarily ' as 'a matter-of-substance. 
'Informational inequalities will always' exist; they are 
creatures of time, distance and inequalities' of wealth. 
Informatitinel parity would be largely meaningless without 
equality in other areas; such as in comprehension; 
evaluation, -- and ability' to" executes ' To espouse 'the equality 
norm in the present context of securities rogulation 
can' at best provide an'ultimate unrealiseable'goal; 
meaningful' attainment of' which would destroy the very 
structure'that'the'principle'häs'been called' into 
existence-to`'strengthen. ' This'is'nöt to-say -that as a 
'concept: 'it cannot be 'ä' meaningful 'criteria and' operative 
guide 
Reference- has' been" made above, and also 'in' the previous 
discussion of tippee 'liability'!, `'to the profound-advantages 
open tb the professional 'engaged in the securities 
industry to both' generate and capitalise' upon` rlarket 
infoimäti'oh. Apart fröre s'calping'; , it has' been held 
that the mere 'purchase' 'of 'ä - security before 'recommendation 
may'amount' -to fraud under Rule' lb (b) (5).: -The SEC 'has 
proceeded against' a register -6d 'i vestment adviser-and its 
manager, when, it, appeared that the manager transacted 
business for' his' own' ac. count-and' that' of his 'family's, 
before recommending the security to the firms clients. 
"3Gt 
The Commission have defined the_ term. 'securities' 
extremely widely. so as to comprehend-all securities being 
considered for recommendation or for' purchase- or sale by 
the registered investment corporation.. This would also 
include securities convertible into that class. The SEC 
have also spught to specifically define they insiders 
comprehended-by the new regulation. The SEC defines 
' access. persons' to include, any, director, - officer- or 
advisory employee. of a registered investment : company, any 
partner, directör, off ic. er or advisory employee of.. the 
investment adviser or underwriter.: ". -An' advisory employee 
would ihclude any ' emplbyee of* the. investment.. company or 
adviser who is' involved, in recommending transactions by 
the investment company,. or. who obtains information 
concerning such recommcndatibns other -thanas- a regular 
client of the- adviser.. Thus this_ definition: would, include 
those persons not immediately connected to tie -formulation 
of recommendations 'as. for example, secretariat who might 
become aware of recom. nendatians through their normal work. ' (483) -'.. 
Subsection (b) of, the new rule"deals with the 
Commissions definition of- 'frhudulent, deceptive and 
manipulative devices. ' The acts and devices comprehended 
. are similar to those outlawed by Rules l0(b). 
(5) and 15c-2 
of the 1934 Act and Section 206 of the Investment Advisers 
Act of . 1940, although under. the proposed rule , 
the Acts 
and Commissions. so described will only be unlawful if they 
are perpetrated by an affiliated , person. of 
the registered 
investment company, its advisers br principal underwriters. 
It is, expressly- provided in Rule. 17j»1(b)3 that the terms 
deceptive, fraudulent and manipulative,. are not'to be 
regarded as , 
limited or circumscribed by any specific 
definitions contained in the rule., This refers to sub-- 
t section- (c). which specifically defines 
, 
certain fraudulent 
deceptive and manipulative practices or . courses of 
business 
in relation to. Section 17J. It is there provided . 
that it 
shall be fraudulent, . deceptive and manipulative within 
the meaning of that section for any access person to 
i 
ý3oz 
r 
purchase' or sell securities-. directly or indirectly, in 
which that person, has , or by reason. of that'. 
transaction 
acquires any direct : or Andirec. t beneficial interest or 
ownership, - and. t which such person -knöws is currently 
being purchased or sold by. the registered investment 
company,: or is being. considered by. such, or is being 
recor, ýmended,.. or is about to be. recommended . 
by.; an - 
advisöry e,,. lployee= of such investment- company. or., investment 
. adviser. The SEC in its, accompanying release made 
At 
clear. that the.. last situation is pnly intended . 
to - 
include 
those. situations where the advisory. employee'. s consideration 
ofa security. has' reached an t advanced stage' * and it 
would not covet for example, securities reviewed as part 
of a general Industry survey, or a general monitoring of 
the securities market. ' 
(484) 
Market information. is 
clearly. wtthin the. scope of this anti-insider. trading 
device, this -. is -made absolutely clear by the Commission, 
(4ö5) 
' Thus- there is no quest . on that the rifles under Section 17j. may cover -transactions bäsed on extrinsic information about the '. 
portfolio company rather than intrinsic' ' 
' information about the company' earnings 
and prospects. ' 
1'. 
ý' 
i'i 
ý, 
Another provision aimed' at discouraging 'insider 
abuse of 'Harket information in the present context' is 
'Rule "17(j) l(d). This provides that every access person 
other than a partner, director or officbr of 'a' principal 
underwriter which is not an affiliated person of the 
investment company or its 'investment adviser "and who does 
not' serve d5 a director or officer Of* the 'investment 
company or its adviser, must 
file' with the investment 
company: investment adviser' or 'principal unde'rtivriter, of 
which he- -is an affiliated person; -'a- 
report 
of every 
transaction in. which he has or by fieaso*n: of -such" transaction 
acquires any 
direct or-indirect belie ficia1, interest or 
ownership 
in a. security, . except' .. ranSactions 'exempted 
fröm this provision, not' 
Pater than- Un 'days''-after the 
end 0f each , quarter 
in which' the transaction 
was effected. 
1'ý 
ý, h 
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This report must state the title and amount of securities 
involved, the date and the nature. of the transactions, 
the price and the name of the broker or dealer through 
which the transaction was executed. Even if no such 
transactions have been executed, a statement to this effect 
must be made each quarter. Although these reports are not 
available to the public, they can be inspected by the SEC. 
"r 
It is further provided that each registered investment 
company, and each investment adviser, must designate by 
name, those persons who come within the class of 'advisory 
employee', and are to inform those persons of their duties 
to file reports and observe the provisions in the Rule. 
(48 ° 
In addition to these substantive requirements, the 
self regulatory approach indicated in the reporting 
requirements is given additional impact by Rule 17(j)-1(e). 
This provides that registered investment companies, their 
investment advisers and principal underwriters, must adopt 
a written code of ethics,. establishing as a minimum such 
standards as are reasonably necessary to prohibit affiliated 
persons from engaging in any acts, practices or courses 
of business which have been declared to be fraudulent, 
deceptive and manipulative. It is provided that such codes 
may prohibit access persons from dealing in securities 
'without obtaining prior written clearance from persons 
designated by the board of directors of the registered 
investment company, adviser or underwriter. If such a 
provision is included in the written code 'any person 
who effects a purchase or sale after obtaining such prior 
written clearance shall be, deemed not to b. e in violation 
of paragraph (c) of the Rule. Wo such written clearance 
would. be granted if the security in question is being 
purchased or sold by the investment company or boing 
considered for such by the investment company or adviser. 
Where clearance is refused it is provided in Rule 17j-l(e)2(i) 
that the person concerned should be able to appeal to a 
designated body of the investment company, investment 
adviser or principal underwriter. Permission can then 
only be given if the transaction 'would not result in any 
advantage to such investment company and that the prohibitions 
of paragraph (c) should not be applied to such circumstances 
ýý 
giving due consideration to the policies, and purposes of 
the : ict and Rule' . : Tritten record including reasons 
for 
refusal of permission must be kept. To reinforce this 
provision Rule 1? j-l(e)3 provides that all reports filed 
must be recorded, and such are to be reviewed by the 
investment company, adviser or principal underwriter for 
the purposes of determining ; whether there has been 
compliance with the code of ethics. Where a violation 
is discovered a, report must be immediately made to the 
board of directors, of. the registered investment: cornpany, 
and within ten days of this, the board must inform the 
SEC both of the violation and ; what action they have taken. 
Finally, it is provided that the investment company, 
adviser and principal underwriter will not be considered 
to have violated the rule by reason of the actions of any 
other person if it is established that it instituted ade. uate 
procedures and used reasonable diligence in carrying out 
the provisions of the code. 
rre-reco-zlendation transactions are also forbidden 
under the rules of the major l, orth American Stock irchans; es. 
:. i or eýýam_ýle, the ýý; etiw York stock Exchange and jLnieric,, un Stock 
Exchange prohibit their members from iaaýýin transactions 
on their ow. -in accounts, or passin the information to 
outsiders prior to the making of the recommendation, and 
even after the recommendation has been released to clients, 
Niemb`r Firm's personnel may not act 'for accounts in which 
they have an interest either in accordance with or contrary 
to the recommendations until the market impact of the 
recommendations is spent' . 
(487) 
In the Commissions proceedings against the father and 
son financial journalists in the Campbell case,. to which 
mention has already been made, it was alleged inter alia 
that there had been a violation of Rule 10(b)(5), in that 
there had been no disclosure to the persons from whom 
securities were acquired in advance of the publication 
of the favourable article, of this fact. 
(488) 
The implications -of . this com, ilaint are highly significant. 
Suppose that an over-the-counter retail dealer, as a result 
3 ýS" 
of: suporior analysis of publicly available information 
concludes that a. -particular security is a good buy, it 
. 
is open to question whether he can amass a position. for 
himself before he-recommends a purchase of that security 
by his customers, and-if indeed he does, whether he must 
disclose his-forthcoming recommendation to the sellers 
from-whom he acquires these undervalued securities. - 
-It would appear that he must make-full disclosure to the 
persons to whom he makes:. the recommendation. To require 
disclosure of the impending recommendation would certainly 
mean progressing beyond the. so-called fairness approach 
and into the realm of parity of ihformation. - Of course 
where certain priority: customers are informed in advance 
of- the recommendation and thus allowed. to capitalise 
upon the market impact of such. liability- might well be 
predicted, 
(489) 
to the sellers and also the purchasers 
when they sell. There can be no analogy here to the 
potential offeror which is desirous of obtaining the 
assistance of investors because of the need to'harness 
additional capitals Cn the other hand it would seem that 
liability is not necessarily to be predicted because a 
particular broker does not make the results of its esearch 
available to all investment clients similtaneouslY, 
490) 
Generally communication will be upon the basis of economic 
importance and this would seem to comport with the 
expectations of most clients, and provided the basis of 
priority communication is known, there would appear to 
be no real objection. 
(491) 
Thus in conclusion it must be emphasised that the 
American law on liability for failure to disclose or 
misuse 'outside' information is uncertain, and in places 
dangerously vague. There are areas, in particular those 
covered by the. proposed Rule 17j which are more or less 
clear, but the vast remainder of the topic remains obscure. 
The traditional relationship test for predicting liability 
is nebulous and artificial in the present context, and 
although cases have indicated an extended tupe of 
relationship, with the_securities market as a basis for 
liability, this would seem little more than a statement 
i 
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of the fairness or even parity. of. information- approach. 
The American Bar Association' in their letter of Comment 
-to the SEC. thought that '-it would be appropriate for 
the Commission- to establish -guidelines as to the 
disclosure requirements for outside, facts. ' : But. -the Bar 
added that 'not every failure -to disclose material. 
information constitutes a violation of-the anti-fraud 
rules'. There remains the requirement that the non-disclosure 
either renders- some other statement misleading-or itself 
comprises part of an artifice . or course of business 
operating as a fraud upon the other party to the. transaction. ' (492. ) 
Furthermore, it was pointed out that it may . be 
preferable to deal with the question of outside information 
in the context of certain securities professionals by 
special devised rules. "-- 
e 
j 
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(3 }" SECURI 'TES MARKETS SURVEILLANCE AN! S "TIMEI Y DTSCL OURS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 'OF AMERICA . 
(A. ) SURVEILLANCE OF SECURITIES MARKETS 
In the present author's mind critical to the enforcement 
. of anti-insider -trading rules 
is. the " question of market 
surveillance. This is a vital facit to the detection of, the 
abuse and without it, detection and, thus enforcement in 
sophisticated securities markets can only achieve minimal 
effectiveness. In discussing-this topic-it is-again to 
North America that we must turn. 
. 
(a) THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE SNY. S LE , 
The North American Stock-Exchanges consider that the 
maintenance of market-surveillance is nothing more or less 
than is required by their duty to ensure-the existence 
1493) ' 
of a fair and orderly market. It is not an extra 
luxury but something integral to the market. 
The Stock Watch programme on the N. Y. S. E., and for 
that matter on the other national securities exchanges, 
'is tied closely into the policy of timely disclosure' 
and viable surveillance can only exist if there is a high 
degree of 
I* 
liaison between the two. 
(494) 
The Stock List 
Division is under the control of a Vice President of the 
Exchange, and the Division is divided into several 
Departments. The most important from the point of view. 
of the present discussion is that of Corporation Liaison. 
Each listed company is assigned to a Listing Representative 
who is a member of the staff of the Department of Corporate 
Liaison.. The allotment of corporations to these representatives 
is upon a geographical basis. 
(495) 
The normal method of publication of important develop- 
ments by a company is by a press release, communicated to 
the press or a. wire service in written or verbal form. 
But whore this is done itimust be for immediate release. 
The Stock Exchange realises that companies can hardly be 
made responsible for information once it has gone out of 
its direct control. 
(4g6) 
>" Where such a. release is made 
shortly before the commencement of trading or during such, 
* It: i 
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the N. Y. S. E. 's Timely Disclosure. Policy. '. recorends' that 
the company contact its relevent Listing. Representative, ' 
no later than simultaneously with the release or the 
announcement- of the- news * to- the- media. - . 
(497) 
The Senior 
Staff Attorney of the Division` of Market Surveillance 
informs the present author that-this is interpreted as 
being mandatory and not merely permissive. 
(498) 
The Listing Representative of the North-east Region informed 
the author that as ä matter of courtesy most companies 
would inform their Listing Representative at least fifteen 
minutes before the release. 
(499) 
As soon as the- -- 
Representative 'receives' this. advance' , information he will 
pass it'to the Corporate Liaison- and Surveillance Coordinator. 
The Director of the Corporate Liaison Department, Mr. Dick 
Grasse, considers however, that 'if the representative has 
been doing his job properly, he will be able to guess 
that a release is coming through or more to the-point, 
should 'lye 'coming through. 
(500) 
The Department keeps 
copious files on each issuer, -and the Coordinator apart 
rº 
from constantly checking with the Listing Representatives 
continually scans the news media for indications-that a (501) 
release is pending or should have been made. 
The Expanded Disclosure Policy of the N. Y. S. E. makes it 
clear that one of the main reasons why it-requires -prior 
notification is so that it can decide whether the market 
needs' a temporary, I hold' on trading so as to allow 
settlement and adjustment. Furthermore the Listing 
Representative is in a position to advise the company how 
best to go about disclosure. Indeed the Listing Representative 
for the Southeast pointed-out that many of the-Representatives 
had built up a very good relationship with the senior 
executives of their corporations and would often be brought 
*in at -an -early stage for the purpose of advising, and 
" because- of mutual respects 
(502).. 
The Exchange Company 
Manual provides in this'respect, 
(503) 
'preliminary discussion- on important matters 
may be undertaken- by 'listed. companies 
officials with the assurance that extreme 
security measures, have been-taken-by-the. 
'. ' ýý: 
ýj i'ý 
!ý 
'; i', 
.ý 
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Exchange. to avoid. revealing any confidential 
'information a listed Company may disclose. t 
Although'there is an Obvious duty upon listed companies 
tö ensure that their releases and both: accurate and not 
misleading, 'the Stock Exchange does not check such or 
approve them. The Senior Finäncial Adviser to the 
Exchanges Financial Reporting Department informs the present' 
author that Ohere' suspicions. are aroused, the releases 
might well be checked, but this is ' certainly not "routine. 
X504 ) 
Furthermore., as Mr. Grasso observed, in the end the truth 
wi-11`inevitably come out and, when it does, it-will be 
'hard' for those-concerned with the 'cover-up', 
(505) 
Where there-is prior notif ication,, and the Representative 
has alerted the Coordinator, he will immediately alert 
and 
consult the Trading Floor Governors and officials, 
and in conjunction with the Coordinator and the Director, 
decide upon the appropriate 
courserof conduct. Usually 
a 'News Pending Hold'-*(NPH) will be imposed or 'News 
Dissemination Hold' (PDH) where the information'has been 
disclosed but hassnot been digested. The Coordinator 
considers that usually a '. 'DH of an hour is sufficient, 
but-very muth'depends dpon. the facts of the case, and in 
" par ticular the impact of the information and how thin the 
trading "is. The Company Manual states, 
:a delayin trading which normally lasts 
.. 
fifteen. minutes after . 
the appearance, of 
the news-on the Dow-Jones ticker, provides 
a period for the public evaluation-of the 
announcement. '. (506), 
The Department of'CQrporate Liaison favours dissemination 
through . the U. S. 
Finaricial. * or Reuters tapes- however, as 
a matter of practice, as Dow Jones is inclined to. treat 
news . very arbitrarily. 
For. instance In one case an 
t.. important corporate release came across in bits and pieces 
over a three. hour interval. The Arperican Bar-Association 
In a letter of Comment. to. the'SEC on non-public information 
published. in: October. 1973,. also made the point that the 
news: - servides. often abbreviated 
the. news. in such a way 
asý to' -render, it-, often misleading.: : Trading halts can last 
ýý; ýýSý 
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1 for much longer-than an 
hour, and have rün to several 
50? ) 
weeks. 'Under Rule 12d (2)-l of the Securities 
Exchange Act 1934. where a security is suspended, the 
Exchange must 'promptly notify the SEC. both as. to the 
fact and the. reasons. Of course, in certain cases 
even though the information is highly significant, it 
may not be necessary to impose a hold. The officials 
in the Corporate Liaison Department fully r3alise that 
the 'Holds' are at best blunt instruments, and any large 
broker is going to be hardpressed to do more than notify 
a'tiny proportion of his clients interested in the relevant 
securities, during the hold. ' In-effect the 'holds' 
really only serve to afford a degree of protection to 
those investors who have given their brokers 'limited 
sell out' orders at a certain threshold. 
Although. 'holds' on trading are generally directed 
at price fluctuation-they can , be used. for volume fluctuation. 
A Floor Official in his discretion may instigate a 
'Buyers Influx hold' (BIH) ora 'Sellers Influx Hold' (SIH) 
This is significant as the automated surveillance 
procedures only pick: up price: movements and not volume, 
unconnected to price, here on floor surveillance is required. 
These 'holds'. are-to allow brokers and Specialists an 
opportunity to get -their books in order and arrange 
matches, and to allow the Corporate Liaison Department, 
which will be'in. constant touch with the Floor, to get 
back to the Company and enquire if there is any known (508) Where there is reason for the market activity. 
something the'Department will change the influx hold 
to -a NPH. .'.. 
Certain. 'corporations because of ' ignorance or. design, 
might"not'consult the Exchange in advance and just announce 
the information: The Coordinator Informs the present 
author that where this. constantly occurs,. the Department 
would -threaten. suspension 6f '. the listing. Although it 
would: seem' that. in general the N. Y. S. E. I s Timely. D. isclosure 
: -policies are reasonably well observed, -.. the author . under-- 
stands from several of the Listing Representatives that 
there are certain instances of non-compliance which are 
very disturbing. The Department on occasions has felt 
S 
37( 
4 
it necessary to advise de. listing,.. although in. fact this 
is rarely, if ever,.. actually done,. -. There have -been no 
cases where a company has, been delisted solely because of 
non-compliance with the Timely Disclosure Policy, usually 
fraud would be the primary reasons . as, 
for example, -in 
the.: case. of the- Equity Funding Corporation of America. 
Very. . rarely when the Exchange is more or less certain what 
the material information is that. the company is holding 
back on', it might 'force the -issue by threatening, and 
indeed actually disclosing 
, 
itself. 
(SQ9} 
During the currency of a 'hold' the Stock Exchange 
will put 'indicators' across the Tape. The indicators 
are representative quotations by specialists, and keep 
the market, in' touch with evaluation during the 'halt' in 
, 
trading. 
: Turning now to the Division of Stock Watch or Market 
Surveillance, one cannot but be impressed by the degree 
of sophisticated computer hardware that this Division 
possesses-. The programme is highly complicated, and here 
attention wi111 only, be given to those aspects of particular 
relevance to -insider trading, ." 
At the heart of the programme 
is the. Trading Surveillance Department which was established 
in-late-1973.. It -is through this Department. that the Stock 
List Division, : through the Coordinator, ' the Division of 
Enforcement, the Division of Member Firms and the Division 
of Floor.. Procedures, . are all 
brought -together. - The 
Departments surveillance programmes are operated on several 
levels.. Firstly; the 'on line! surveillance programme 
operated by two-experienced analysts of the entire market. 
This irsmediate surveillance is possible only with the 
sophisticated electronic aids. that the two - analysts have 
,.;, access 
to, - Television Scantlin Display Units are locked 
.., -:. 
intQ j the N. Y. S . E's Mainframe IBM Computer, and the 'on line' 
investigators. can monitor-simultaneously a variety of 
'on floor' -grading. activities. The screen which each 
investigator has, -and. which 'is more or less watched 
_., c. onti. nuously during trading,. is divided into three View Bands. 
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Through -the 'top band the complete. ' Tape. of. all. trades on 
the exchange - Floor-, - 'plus .a- selected 'tape of. 
thirty' br 
forty stocks, that the-Stock Watch Programme want'to keep 
a particular-eye on, are presented.. On'the-second band 
there is the Dow-Jones - Tape, and a running record 'of the 
" days 'block trading. Finally; there- is- a band' für, the 
Reuters Tape and-room for -the . -investigator. to 'retrieve 
and scan, all current transactions and -data- on a given 
'stock --or group- of stocks for any trading : period : that he 
may choose. " Both- t on lineI. '-investigators-, Dlr. " . Frank Rosana 
and"-Mr. ' Peter -Ionel-lo' assure-the-present author that there 
are-few, if any, transactions-that-could gb, through- without 
at least one of' them. seeing it.. 
(510) 
A- similar system 
is also available-to the Corporate' Liaison' and Market 
Surveillance Coordinator in the Stock List Divisiori. ' 
Apart 'from : acting as aback-up this system is' utilised by 
" the Coordinator to focus down on to -a particular'-security 
or related group of securities. ' 
The second level, and a particularly -important. one, 
is the automated surveillance programme. Eve'ry, listed 
issuer is programmed in-to the -computers with-set, parameters 
on its' stock. ' These parameters are based on normal trading 
patterns. " 
(511) When a, transaction exceeds those : parameters 
'the computers 'instantaneously :t kick , it " out'': - '. These 'kick 
outs' are printed by the computers - viith the -particular 
symbol, the price, 'and the exact -point in time that the 
transaction occured. - 
-On the N. Y. S. E. all transactions have 'tobe . reported 
" and go' through the tape 
(512. ) 
and will . 'thus , be recorded in 
the computers. ' Immediately' a bargain is-made on . 'the Floor 
ä- Stock' Exchange Reporter wi'll' mark the relevant details 
on an IBM Computer card'"and'feed it straight away into a 
clearing terminal situated at- each'trading posto, ' Within 
seconds-'the'"transaction 'Wil. l' come across' the 'Exchange Tape 
and 'all other connected and--relay tapes. 
(513) 
As 'soon 'as the parameter violations , are 
printed out as. 
kick' -outs'' they' are scrutinised by-. the i. on line! ' -analysts 
and generally immediately referred to the Manager of the 
37 3i 
Market Surveillance Department. Of course in many cases 
the reasons for the 'kick out' will be obvious to. the 
ton line' -analysts and, if necessary, then can take the 
appropriate action immediately., The Trading Surveillance 
Department also possesses detailed and files on listed 
companies and has a number of researchers trained to do 
preliminarj'. searches , 
for the 'on line' investigators. 
In those cases where a ready explanation cannot be. found 
the investigators will contact "the . 
Coordinator, who-would 
probably already be on to the matter, and the relevant 
Listing Representative. 
The Coordinator informs the present author that the 
number of-'kick outs' is on the increase, and on average 
there are several dozen each day, although it would seem 
out-. of these only five or so are, not immediately explicable. 
As has already been mentioned,. where the Listing Representative 
is 
, 
given advance warning of an impending release, the 
Coordinator will notify the 'on line' investigators so 
that they can keep a special look out for that. security. 
When a report is made to the Corporate Liaison, 
Department the relevant listing representative will contact 
. the corporation concerned, and under the terms of the 
listing agreement, the company. is obligated to cooperate 
fully with the Stock Exchange in trying to determine why (514) 
normal trading has occurred. The Coordinator and 
Representative for. the Northeast rather cynically observed 
that in 985 of cases the corporation flatly denies that 
there is any question of informed dealing by'insiders and 
their privies., Certainly the 'on line' analysts consider 
that the vast majority of fluctuations are not the result 
of insider information, but outside or market information. 
(515) 
The third surveillanceprocedure is that operated on 
the Floor of the Exchange by the Floor Officials and Governors. 
They are-particularly concerned to identify unusual trading 
patterns, crowding and the possible abuse of market 
information. The computers-on the N. Y. S. E. are not set 
for volume fluctuations, although such does appear on the 
tapes. -Thus-the Floor. 01ficials play an important role in 
identifying such. Although under the N. Y. S. E's rules all 
rumours must be. immediately notified to the Exchange, this 
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is not always observed and 'thus the -Floor Officia'ls' and 
" also ' the Specialists play ' an 'important role' in - picking 
these up and re-parting -them to the Stock" List 'Department 
and Market Surveillance: 
Where the Stock List Department of Market Surveillance 
Department cannot find- an explanation for - the -unusual 
price-or volume movement, the, Market Surveillance Department 
will start än: investigation. The Department has'seven 
Investigators, including a'Chärtered Financial Analyst, 
and a Financial'Supervisory Analyst, -an Accountant, 
a former. Branch Manager of a large securities firn; 
a former'registered representatives a'former-Floor Trader 
and a' Lawyer who was a Compliance' Officer Tin 'a large 
corporation. In. -addition, there are five Attorneys-. under' 
"a Chief Counsel. There'are also-people running'the` 
computers, ' secretaries rand clerical assistants. 
Furthermore, there is a considerable degree of interfacing 
and cooperation' with other Departments dnd Divisions, 
" in particular the Stock List Division through the coordinator. 
51) The'Senior Staff Attorney was also at' pains to 
"' emphasise' that there is' also a considerable degree of 
cooperation with the SEC. particularly through the-New 
'York Regional Offico; 
(517) 
and the other self-regulatory 
" authorities. 
initially the Department has to' decide whether the 
fluctuation is more likely "to- have 'been -the result 'of an 
abuse' by a member firm or by a member of the 'investigating 
public. -If'it appears probable--that 'a Mamber füm -is 
involved 'and at-'fault, the matter-is; handed over to' the 
Division ' of, Enforcement. This- is' a- much' larger Division, 
'having a staff 'in 'excess of fifty' persons, with-some 
thirty-five of them being lawyers. ' This Division is 
concerned' with. the enforcement 'bf 'Stock Exchange rules 
and 'does not 'generally concern Itself"iith investigations, 
although it 'does occasionally assist" In, such 'There 'is 
little'döubt'that the'Market Surveillance-Department 
-likes to find a ; violation : of' the- Rules ,' as"this''*makes 
the investigation 'so 'much easier, "'as the Division of 
Enforcement can'come down'upon the Firm concerned and 
obtain 'a degree of*cooperatiön" that, it would normally not 
Iý 
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be possible to -get. - Both-the Chief Counsel and the Senior 
Staff Attorney assured the present author that whilst there 
were no rules specifically on insider. trading by member 
firms, Rule 435(5), which has already been mentioned, is 
interpreted as doing just this, and placing an obligation 
upon members to report all sensational rumours, which 
includes inside information, to the Exchange-immediately 
(518) it hears such. Moreover, the N. Y. S. E. considers 
that the Federal Laws outlawing insider trading, would 
afford them sufficient grounds to investigate and discipline 
its members, 
In the case 'of a suspected trading abuse. by a non-member, 
which will of course be the more usual case, the Director 
and Manager of the Department in liaison with the Stock 
List Division will on the basis of preliminary. trading 
scans, provided by the-computer section, determine the 
period through which a closer investigation should be made. 
The N. Y. S. E's permanent records in the 'Journal of Transactions' 
can be used with the comprehensive lists prepared by the 
Emery Francis. Finch Inc. to provide a list of all trades, 
in transactional order, the details of "the. transaction 
and the broker concerned. The investigators can then 
approach the brokers and obtain details of the-clients 
concerned, and whether the order was solicited or unsolicited. 
Once the name of the client is obtained then the investigators, 
by consulting Standard and Poors Business Records., the 
N. Y. S. E. 's own records and Section 16(a) filings, tell whether 
the particular individual had any contacts tjhrough which 
he might 
'have 
obtained inside, information 
(519). 
o 
The Division has on occasions, asked customers to appear 
before the investigators 
(520)and 
be examined by. the 
Attorneys. These statements are generally-unsworn and 
voluntary. It seems that it has been the Departments experience 
that people generally cooperate fully with -it,, unless of 
course they have something to hide.. 11here the person 
concerned is an insider-of a listed company, the Department 
will not be adverse in exerting-pressure on the company 
through the Stock List Division to persuade the-insider (521) to be, more cooperative. 
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The Department investigators -do cooperate -with -officers 
from -the SEC and State Blue Sky authorities ; as -well* as 
the other. self regulatory authorities. 'Certainly --if the 
Departraent, considers that- there has been- a violation of 
the securities laws,, it will -hand "the report -over-to the 
SEC as it did. recently in the L. ' & A. Tobacco Company case. 
It is - likely however, that. the SEC -will have been -brought 
in at a -much "earlier stage-"in such " 
cases: ' It is . obviously 
an advantage for - the investigators 
Ito beable'to appear 
to be working with the SEC,. '. or -at 'least being in'. touch with 
such. The investigations can be very wide ranging and 
have gone As, far -as - Indonesia. 
522} 
-The Department acknowledges that' the, presence, of nominees 
can -cause great problems with. regard to identification. 
The Manager of the Department described foreign nominees, 
both banks and. financial institutions, ' as well =as- private 
individuals as 'dead ends', and added. that the SEC". doesn't 
get much further, 
(523) 
With -regard to domestic nominees 
there is not the same degree of difficulty--as here- the N. Y. S. E. 
will simply rely upon the -' know, your client' rule. The N. Y. S N. Y. S. E. 
interprets this- as placing. an -obligation -upon member firms 
-to- know' who --their--client actually -is* Thus- the onus of 
identification is -transferred on to the member"-firm. -- Thus 
Member firms make sure that they know who' their client is 
when 'they' take, his -account on in the first place. - Furthermore 
Member' firms generally can *get to the facts in away that 
the -regulators would not be ableto. ' Of - codr`s"e, -this does 
place a: very great- burden upon- member firms', and although 
no fI m' has--yet been disciplined for failure to find out 
the true identity of-ohe of their 'Clients' -the prospect 
is always there* The 'Stock Watch-programme is also used 
to- test the market once a trading halt is 1"if ted. - Here there 
will -be- close cooperation -with, -the' Floor officials' and the 
" Stock List Department to see whether the market can be 
allowed ' to 'run'., It should also be mentioned that the 
Department. will -act--upon complaints- made to them about 
dealings in a particular security over a'particular period 
of time. Indeed the present author understands that the 
Department receives a considerable number` of- such enquiries 
ýýý 
each year from a wide variety of sources. The SEC foreign 
Governments, and not least, the issuers involved, are among 
these. The N. Y. S. E. 's surveillance is by all standards 
impressive. The officers. concerned are experienced and of 
a very high calibre. Indeed the dimension of the programme 
underlines the importance that the Exchange attaches to 
the maintenance of proper market surveillance. On the 
other hand nobody would argue that the machines are infallible, 
and there have been technical problems. It is surprising 
that the automated surveillance does not register volume 
parameters, as it is understood that this would require 
minimal alterations to the programming. Furthermore, the 
Journal'of Transactions is not immediately available and 
there is a time lag of about 5 hours whilst it is prepared 
and, more to the point, it does not list the trading broker 
who must be identified from the Emery Francis Finch Inc. 
Lists by a process of cross reference which is not always 
accurate. It must also be doubted whether the Exchange 
can always get to the bottom of an investigation by applying 
pressure upon member firms. In a letter to the SEC. from 
Representative Charles A. Vanik, concerning his request 
for an SEC investigation into dealings in Abbott Laboratories, 
the Representative referred to the fact that a spokesman 
for the N. Y. S. E. had admitted that the Exchange bad no way 
of finding out and, 'did not have the authority to find out' 
who had traded two large blocks of securities, both in 
excess of 50,000 shares, prior to the announcement of the 
material information. 
(52L ) 
Also whilst many in the 
N. Y. S. E. deny it, one cannot help feeling-that in certain 
instances there is a reluctance to disclose because of 
possible liability in defamation. 
It is interesting that the N. Y. S. E. systems of 
surveillance have attracted considerable attention in recent 
years. The Deputy Secretary of the Department of Trade, 
the Principal of the Companies Policy Division, the 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Companies, 
Aviation and Shipping, and the Director General of the 
Takeover Panel have all been shown around the Department, 
with the British Ambassador, during the last eighteen 
months. 
i, 
ýýý ý 
(b } THUP, AI PRICýý V STOCK EXCHANGE 
After the Re affair in the early 1960s, the SEC staff 
Report on the organisation, Management and Regulation of 
Conduct of Members of the American Stock Exchange, 
(525) 
found the dificiencies in regulation' goes beyond isolated 
violations, and amounts to a general deficiency of standards 
and a fundamerizal failure of controls'. The . Aerican 
Stock Exchange immediately coramenced a drive to tighten 
up its self regulation and surveillance procedures. 
Wile present mecbani sra for stock watch is basically similar 
to that operated upon the N. Y. S. E. although not so extravagant. 
The American Stock Exchanges Securities Division has 
-a staff of listing representatives similar to that of the 
" Corporate Liaison Department in the N. Y. S. E. The Exchanges 
Disclosure Policy enuhasises that these officers are 
intended to develop and preserve intimate contacts with the 
particular companies in the Crou; -) for which they are made 
responsible. 
(520) 
Each representative has direct telephone 
contacts with the relevant floor official; the division of 
issuers not being on a geographical basis, but by industry. 
Each reuresentative is also in direct contact with the 
Market Surveillance Department. There is no Stock List 
and Surveillance Co-ordinator. 
(527) The American Stock 
Exchane-e's Disclosure Policy underlines the critical position. 
of the Listing Representative in evaluating. disclosure as 
and when they arise. The corporation should consult the 
representative as much as is practicable, and unlike the 
N. Y. S. E. there is an express duty upon issuers to alert 
the representative prior to the disclosure of information 
during trading hours. (526) 
Supervision of the market and the e'xchange's Members 
is carried out primarily by the Market Operations Division, 
and the Legal Compliance Division. 
(529) 
The Stock 1ýatch 
programme is in the bands of the Department of Market 
Surveillance however, which is part of the Legal Compliance 
Division. The entire programme is under the control of 
Mr. Frank J. Savarese, an Assistant Vice President of the 
Stock Exchange. The Department consists of-lr. Savarese 
who is a well-known expert on stock market surveillance 
programmes, seven clerical and secretarial assistants and 
SSC 
six professional officers. This latter category includes 
an Accountant, an Analyst and an ex Broker. There are 
no lawyers in the Department as the Department is solely 
concerned with the isolation and identification of abuses, 
and compliance and enforcement is dealt with by the 
Division as a whole, which does possess a number of Attorneys. 
The market surveillance programme operates on the 
basis of a number of 'imputs' of information, upon the 
basis of which the Department tries to identify irregular 
trading patterns. ' Firstly, there are the tapes upon which 
market transactions appear and are recorded within a few 
moments of their execution. The tapes are watched more or 
less continuously through Scanlin screens which are set 
into the main computers, similar to those at the N. Y. S. E. 
and which can retrieve and present on the screens past 
transactional data. Secondly, the Department maintains 
large and comprehensive files on all its listed issuers, 
which are constantly being updated by the insertion of 
information from the media and tapes. Apart from allowing 
members of the Department to detect likely movements in the 
securities prices, this also allows the Department an 
immediate system of reference. Thirdly, as ; ii th the N. Y. S. E. 
a careful watch is kept on the various new tapes for important 
developments. The American Stock ExchanE: e. operates News 
Pending and Dissemination Holds in much the sane way as 
does the N. Y. S. E. Fifthly, tbe, computers are programmed 
along the lines as those already mentioned possessed by 
the N. Y. S. E. It is important to note that the American 
Stock Exchange computers have both price and volume parameters 
however. C5 The American stock Exchange computers do 
not however, immediately isolate and 'kick out' deviant 
trading patterns, but the 'exceptions' are printed out by 
the main transactional computers at the close of every 
trading session, and listed in an 'exceptions ? Report' which 
is forwarded to the Market Surveillance Department for the 
following day. Of course, 'on line' surveillance and 
detection of these transactions is possible from the tape. 
Sixthly, there are some 28 Floor Officials on the actual 
trading floor who are in constant contact with the listing 
representatives and the Department of Harket Surveillance. 
3ý ti 
Indeed four floor officials are particularly designated 
to conduct on-floor surveillance throughout trading. 
(531) 
The American Stock Exchange considers that on-floor 
surveillance is very important. ; Seventhly, the Market 
Surveillance Department often receives enquiries from 
the corporation, the general public and member firms. 
A large proportion of enquiries from the public are 
anonymous and often turn out to be mere suspicion rather 
than fact. Nevertheless the Department does attempt 
to investigate and check out all reported cases. 
Finally, the Department has the opportunity of detecting 
whether an undue -proportion of the market in a given 
security is taken by a particular firm, through the 
Exceptions Report. Generally, it may be possible for the 
price of a security to remain within the parameters, 
even though there had been important corporate developments 
if all the tradin` was concentrated in the hands of a 
particular firm. he price of a security may remain 
quite steady whilst a very high proportion of. all purchases 
in a given period were effected by a sine firm porhalps 
having` the benefit- of privileged information. This has 
also allowed the Department to detect fictitious 
transactions in options for the purpose of influencing 
the market price on the tape. 
(532) 
', -'hen unusual market activity is detected it will be 
immediately reported to the relevant listing representative, 
who will often be in a position : t0 give on opinion as to 
whether it is likely that an impropriety has occurred. 
If the listing representative cannot give"a satisfactory 
explanation., the I"iarket Surveillance : )epartment, often 
'through the Floor Officials or the Hembership Department, 
might approach the individual brokers and ask them if they 
know of any reasons for the particular unusual trading 
pattern. If still no source is found the listing 
representative will approach the issuer and request assistance 
in isolating the reasons. This assistance is not always 
forthcoming. For example, in the merger negotiations between 
Geon Corporation and Burmah Oil, the Market Surveillance 
Department detected an imbalance to sell orders and 
suspended trading. The listing*reprosentative contacted 
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Goon and enquired whether there was any material 
. undisclosed 
information in their possession. The Financial 
Officer of Geon had recently learned that the company': 
profit estimates were overstated, but on legal advice 
denied that there was material undisclosed information 
available. Two days later Geon made a public announcement 
of the shortfall, and that Burmab Oil had terminated the 
acquisition programme. It is surprising that whilst 
the American Stock Exchange with some justification, felt 
that this was a breach of their Timely Disclosure Policies, 
the District Court for South New York rejected the 
allegation that Geon had been guilty of misrepresentation 
under Rule 1C(b)(5) as 'Geon only had raw unverified 
information which might have been-misleading had it been 
made public. loreover it is significant that the officer 
sought and followed the advice of counsel in telling the 
American Stock Exchange that the company would have no 
public announcement to make'. 
(733). 
Where it proves impossible to trace a reason for the 
irregular trading, or where it is thought necessary to 
determine who exactly was trading , the Market surveillance 
Department, in conjunction with the Legal Compliance 
Division will attempt to reconstruct the market. This 
reconstruction will be . achieved by utilising 
the Transactions 
Journal compiled by the Exchancge, which contains the 
chronological order of transactions, the price and volume 
of each transaction, and also the Daily Clearhnce Sheets 
prepared by Emery - rancis Finch Inc. as do the N. Y. S. E. 
investigators. The Daily Clearance Sheets 
, 
identity the 
brokers and the shape of the transaction. 'Tbus neither 
the American Stock Exchange nor the N. Y. S. E. has yet 
{ 
effected a procedure whereby the market, on a k,,, iven day, 
can be easily and accurately reconstructed so that all 
buyers and sellers can be identified. And further each 
Exchange has difficulty in deter: ý: inin exactly at what 
time the broker traded. If. the market is consistently 
expanding or contracting, it 'is possible. by matching the 
Journal and Daily Clearance Sheets to fix at what tine a 
particular Member traded, but where the prices are fluctuating: 
it is exceedingly difficult to obtain a satisfactory 
match. The only y viable tray to ,ý pin point the time of a 
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particular transaction in an active tao--way market, is 
to obtain the Order 'rickets from the particular Member 
firm. All firms are required to keep these tickets for 
at least two years. Nevertheless -vihilst in the majority 
of cases it is possible to trace the relevant brokers and 
table the time that the relevant transaction occurred, 
there are practical problems and it does not always follow 
that identification will be possible. 
Once the names of the transacting brokers are discovered 
" the Department will contact them and ask them for- details 
as to their clients. There is, of course, the major 
difficult;; of nominees, and again the Exchange relies 
upon the 'know your Client' rule. Indeed Nr. Savarese 
informed the present author that 
'one of the questions that we expect a broker 
to be able to answer if we happen to ask, is the 
identity of his client. By this we mean bis 
nar. e, address, e.. ýýloycr, occupation and any connections that he -Lli ht have with listed 
companies'. (534) 
The Market Surveillance Department does consider that it 
is reasonably successful in finding possible sources. 
Certainly where the transaction is placed through several 
brokers, the Exchange would expect the brokers to be 
particularly careful and searching. Where the Department 
and the ilttorneys from the Le al Compliance Division 
cannot discover any tan`ible contacts, the Department will 
send the names of the jprincipls to the company end as:: 
if it is aware of any contacts with such. The Department 
will exert considerable pressure upon a corporation to 
co-operate fully here, and suspensions have been threatened 
on several occasions. Where there was a blank wall, 
particularly where financial institutions were involved, 
the Department might request assistance of the SEC. 
However, Mr. Savarese was sceptical as to the success of this. 
Where there was not -a formal order of investigation, the 
powers of the äEC were usually less effective than the 
de facto powers possessed by the Exchange. Where foreign 
" nominees were involved the investigation was invariably 
frustrated. 
The Department on average uncovers three or four 
cases of significant insider abuse each week on av©rage. t- 
ýý 
Each day however several abnormal trading patterns will 
be encountered. The lengths to which the Department 
will go in following these up will depend upon a number 
of circumstances. .,, here the transaction is small and 
appears an isolated occurrence the Department does not 
bother over much, but the attitude of the Department is 
very different where thousands of shares are involved. 
If it appears that the irregularity involves a "member firm 
a report will be made to the Membership Compliance Division, 
and the investigation would be handled by the Attorneys . 
of that Division, occasionally with the-assistance of 
lawyers from the Legal Compliance Division. ! here the 
irregulatory involves outsiders the matter will usually 
be passed to the SEC or some other regulatory authority. 
On average every three weeks the Deýcartment forwards an 
insider tradin; case to the SEC, but apart from this the 
Exchange has adopted n policy of alerting: the Commission 
to the merest suspicion of abuse, and invariably does not 
wait until a final retort has been prepared. There would 
seem to be a considerable measure of frustration, if not 
disgust, tiw, i"tb the SEC's general apathy or laxity of 
approach in the Department and Division as a whole. 
In particular the Exchange is concerned that in proven 
cases of significant insider abuse the SEC will settle for 
a consent injunction, which is nothing more than 'a slap 
on the wrist and a promise to be Good, or at least not 
get caught in the future'* 735) ; jhilst "Ir Savarese, does 
sympathise. with the 3EC to the extent that its enforcement 
programme is short of both staff and resources he considers 
that the present 'easy approach' turns regulation into a 
'sham'. 036) z Indeed he doubted whether more than a small 
proportion of the reports sent to Washington were even 
considered. 
Feelinsomewhat let down by the SEC 
. 
the American 'Stock 
Exchange attempted to devise its own procedures to deal with 
proven insider traders. Over the last four years the Exchange 
has sought to utilise its substantial powers over listed 
corporations to apply pressure upon corporate insiders. Once 
an investigation has identified an insider, the American 
Stock Exchange will attempt to persuade the insider to cancel 
the abusive transaction if the innocent party so desires. 
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Ironically there have been cases where the victim thinks 
that having been caught once-by the insider, the insider 
night 'know something else' and thus tender recision, so 
be rejects the insider's 'offer'. Once a recision has 
been effected or at least tendered, the case will then be 
forwarded to the SEC. The procedure adopted by the 
Department is described by Mr. Savarese - 
"r 
' -, ie go along to the issuer and tell them 
that their executive Vice President was 
dealing, on such and such a date, on the 
bases of what later appeared to be inside 
information ... Often they defend, him and 
say that be did not have access to it, 
or has a clean record. We generally ignore 
this! We discuss it all with them and 
suggest, often outright, that we think 
that nonetheless the case is fishy and looks 
bad and that publicity would do no one. any 
good. We will then work on them, remind 
them of the possible civil liability that 
could fall upon them, and at the end of the 
day we find that we have 'persuaded' them 
to 'ask' the Vice . resident to make an offer 
of recision. We then get the Corporation 
to agree to fire the director if be döesn't 
agree to co-op-rate'. (537) 
After this the . )epartment will Generally see the 
director concerned and explain that to comply with his 
company's ultimatum he must get his broker to offer 
recision to the other party. 
Of course whilst this does deprive the insider of his 
ill-gotten gains, the procedure is fraught with difficulties. 
The Exchange admits that as a last resort it would seem 
unwise to suspend or delist, as this only harms the investor 
and the market, and the reason for the suspension would be 
unconnected to the market in the issuers securities. 
Nonetheless whilst corporations feel that the Exchange 
might just do this., it does have an interim effect. It is 
interesting that Fr. Rick Norei 1, the Chief of the SEC's 
Market Surveillance Office, informed the present author 
that there was a lot of 'unofficial' support in the SEC for 
the American Stock Exchan ep approach. It certainly got 
re: aults in his view. 
(538) 
In fact he regretted that as a 
Government Department the SEC could not itself really adopt 
such tactics. 
The position with regard to specific rules agmainst 
insider trading on the American Stock Exchange is the same 
as that on the N. Y. S. E. There are no rules specifically 
directed to the misuse of such information, and primary 
reliance is placed upon the general law and the provisions 
that the Exchange has on the avoidance of false markets and 
rumours in its rules. The American Stock Exchange in cases 
of. proven insider trading by its members usually relics 
however, upon Rule 16 of its Rules and Regulations. This 
places an obligation upon all members and their employees 
to at all times adhere to good business practice. Insider 
trading is, of course, violative of such a standard. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the American 
Stock Exchange has been responsible for the main pioneering 
work in the field of stock market surveillance or stock 
watch, more so than the 1;. Y. S. E. Indeed, in, programming 
the snaller: American Stock Exchange is ahead still of the 
much larger and more prestigious I. Y. S. B. It is"interestin` 
that in the last couy le of years representatives from 
Venezuela, 11'rance, äou th Lorea, Canada, New ;: youth Males and 
Ger: any, have all been sent to examine the American 3tocý. 
Exchange; surveillance programmes. 
0 
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{c} NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITY DEALERS (NASD)- 
I 
In recent years the regulation of the very important 
Over-the Counter securities market-in the United States, 
has attracted considerable attention. 
(539), 
This is an 
amorphous and fluid market, without a ticker tape qnd no 
public record of transactions,. Bid and asked prices by 
various dealers who are interested in making a market in 
a particular security, are generally circulated through 
`the National Daily-Quotation Service. 
(54Cý 
--Broker-dealers 
utilising interstate fdcilities must register with the 
SEC under Section 15(a)l of the 1934 Act, and rule-making 
power is given to the SEC concerning conduci and suitability 
for registration. 
(541) 
The SEC has considerable disciplinary 
authority over registrants and their personnel. 
(542) 
This regulatory scheme was supplQmented in 1938 by-the 
'MMnalony Act which. added Section 15A under which the. National 
Association of Security Dealers was recognised as a self- 
regulatory agency. with similar powers ad responsibilities 
as the national securities exchanges* 
(543) 
Membership 
of NASD is not however obligatory, and prior to the 
amendments of 1964 there was a major lacuna in the regulatory 
scheme for-those registered dealers who did not seek 
membership. After 1964 these dealers who are not NASD 
members are bound by the SECO provisions drawn up by the 
. SEC. which are basically similar to the rules and; regulations 
of NASD. 
(544) 
One of the main requirements for registration as a 
self-regulatory. organisation under Section 15A, is that 
the rules of the organisation 'must be designed to prevent 
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices,, to promote 
just, and equitable principles, of trade, to provide safe- 
guards against unreasonable profits ... and in general 
to protect investors and. the public interest and to 
" remove impediments, to, and perfect the mechanism of a free 
and open market ... 
(545) 
The NASD is. governed by its iý. 
Constitutional Bye Lawso. Un'iform, Practices Code and from 
our present. point, of view most' importantly, the Rules of 
Fair Practice and a Code of Procedure for Handling Trade 
Practice complaints. NASD is alert to the need to ensure a. 
3H1B 
" high degree of. public confidence in. the.. over-the-counter 
market, for example, the Board of Governors in the NASD's 
Manual-emphasise, 
1Implicit. -in all members and registered 
representatives relationship with clients and 
others is *the fundamental res*ponsibility,. 
of fair dealing. ' 
In another policy statement the Governors have made it 
clear that they. and the District. Business Conduct Committees 
-of the NASD will-take disciplinary action wherever 'complete 
fair dealing is not observed', In Article III, paragraph 18 
of the Rules of"Fair Practice it is provided... .. 
tNo member shall effect any transaction' in, 
or-induce the purchase or'sale of any 
security by means of any manipulative, 
deceptive or other fraudulent device or 
contrivance. ' 
The, Hoard of Governors have made it clear. that . 
this would 
extend to misuse of confidential information, , 
from. an 
insider. or indeed-a market source. 
(546) 
Under paragraph 13 
an-obligati6n is placed upon broker dealers to disclose 
to their clients any-interest or connection that they may 
have in the-issuer of the 'securities concerned. There are 
a. number of other-rules relating to anti-fraud 
(547) 
and 
although there is no specific provision dealing with insider { 
trading, -. apart from paragraph 18, the NASD take the view 
-that such conduct would be contrary to the paramount rule 
of fair practice in paragraph 1. that'' a'member in the 
conduct-of his business shall observe high standards of 
commercial honour and just and equitable principles of trade. ' 
The NASD reinforces these rules by a relatively strict 
system of inspection-which has been greatly strenthened 
in recent years.. It is important to note that, as with 
the Stock-Exchange rules, members representatives and' 
associates-must be registered and. undertake. to abide by 
the various rules. Furthermore, under Article III. 
paragraph 27.. an obligation-1s placed upon each member to 
establish written. compliancp codes for its staff, and to 
enforce such. Very important. here is the detection of 
insider abuse by personnel of members. ". 
A particular 
partner or senior officer of . the Member firm must be 
3ýý 
specifically delegated to supervise this internal compliance 
and must also, ensure that proper, 'records are kept. In 
particular teach member shall review and endorse in writing, 
on an internal record, all transactions and all correspondence 
of its registered representatives pertaining to the (548 ) 
-solicitation or execution of securities transactions* 
Under paragraph 27(d) teach each member shall review the 
activities of 'each office which'shall include a periodic 
examination of "customers{ accounts to. detect and prevent 
irregularities or abuse's and at least ' an 'annual' inspection 
of each office of supervisory"j'urisdiction*I 
(549) 
Section 15A(b)9 Of the'1934 Act'places an obligation 
on the registered organisation to provide 'fair and orderly 
procedures' for the disciplining of its'members. Under the 
NASD rules anyone can file acörnplaint w . th 
ä District 
Business. Conduct Committee, although in most instances 
the Committee will act of its own initiative; " There is 
an obligation upon all members to ensure fullest cooperation 
with these Committees. 'The investigation will be conducted 
by the Secretary or another member of the Coº. lmittee's staff 
or a special sub-committee of the Committee. . 
The Committee 
can impose a wide variety of sanctions including suspensions, 
expulsion and fine. The decision is reviewable by, the 
Board of Governors, with a further appeal to the'SEC. and 
then to the relevant U. S. Courts' of'Appeal. The NASD has 
not been slow to utilise 'its extensive powers. ' It'should 
be noted however, that the SEC'cannot take direct action 
against a member for failure to comply'with the NASD rules, 
although, of course, if there'is a violation of its oven 
rules or the Securities laws, it can proceed directly. 
The SEC can always apply pressure to the NASD by threatening 
suspension or cancellation of their 'registration for a 
wilful refusal to carry out their duties. .:... 
The Special Study of the Securities Market' emphasised 
that, the regulatory effort was deficient largely 'because 
of. the lack, of any organised communication' s*Ys-ten, between 
tradin firms and the absence of. anything approaching a 
tape. "The NASD 'thus began to consider the 'intro- 
duction of a, computerised 'transaction system. ' In 1967 
i 
i 
s 
" I, 
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NASD retained the Arthur D. Little Company to study feasibility 
of a new system and the result was the implimentation of 
the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations, or NASDAQ. 'This is a nationwide computer 
communication system constructed and owned by, the Bunker- 
Rama Corporation 
Market makers regustered as'buch in a particular 
security with NASD''will hate in their trading rooms a 
special television screen which will display, on request, 
a list Qf all market. makers and their' current quotations. 
The market maker will also have a terminal keyboard with 
which Ie, can enter into the quotation system. To be listed 
" tinder ! NASDAQ the securities must be registered under 
Section 12(g). and all told some 3,100 stocks are carried. 
The service that NASDAQ provides is essentially threefold. 
(551) 
Firstly, there is a -level designed to provide the individual 
investör with information through his retail broker. This 
service. takes the quotations of all dealers making markets 
, and relays current, constantly correcting representative 
bids and asked prices. This is a median quotation of all 
individual quotations. This representative quotation is 
relayed to over 30,000 display units. The second level 
involves specially designed terminals with television screens 
designed to serve in particular retail broker, -dealers and 
large scäle'professional traders, such as institutional 
investors. On activation the screen will present the 
current quotations of market maker's in a particular security. 
The quotations. of only five market makers ranked according 
to the best prevailing bids or 'offers at the time, are 
displayed on the screen, and if there are more they can be 
retrieved and presented in groups of five. It is important 
to note that NASDAQ is only a quotation service and not a 
trading system like ARIEL. Once the c{uotation has been 
received then the market maket'still has to be contacted 
by-'vire'or telephone and the transaction negotiated. 
The third'level which we have already mentioned is that of 
the market maker himself with his own input terminal. 
The NASD consider that one of the most important 
features of ''the new system is that, it 'brings visability 
2C% S4 1 
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to the -over-the-counter market . and . people.. who 
know what 
is ' going -on - becuase- they -can -see it. 
(552) 
Within a few-months of NASDAQ's introduction .. price 
indices 
on general segments of--the market were prepared and released, 
now the NASDAQ OTC Prices-Indices are available : over the. 
t-JASDAQ system, . where they are updated every f irre: minutes. 
. -At-the end of: each trading. day. each market maker 
is 
required to feed.. into . the central. -computer-details of 
his 
total -volumes- 'in. each-- stock in. which he. has. traded and 
is 
-registered-* as. a market maker.., -This 'is . then . compiled and 
published daily-'giving the total volume' of. -: each security 
within: the -system --traded. - These figures-"are also released 
directly to' the' wire services.. . 
Prior -to the-introduction of NASDAQ,. although 
the NASD 
would on rare occasions. enquire. into, fluctuations, in market 
makers quotations-if thay : are aware of such, .. there was nothing 
really-approaching continuous market surveillance. It is 
also -important. to*. -remember: that there is no listing agreement 
between--the companies whose. securities" are- traded on the 
over-the-counter - market- and" the . NASD , or even 
the NASDAQ 
system-, -" although' NASDAQ only. - carries 'securities within 
the-scope-of. -Section 12(g) and. thus-" subject . to . 
the Federal 
Disclosure requirements.. -The . NASDAQ Market 
Surveillance 
Department is'relatively-. new, having been ih. operation 
--for -only- a few. years:. ". The staff consists of ä manager 
who. -is- currently. - an eminent. computer expert, ' an- analyst, 
; twb senior analysts,, three group analysts, three clerks 
and. a" secretary. « . Vlhere. the market . becomes* more. active 
the (NASD'- will -supply, additional officers. from other 
i- --Departments: -;: In addition 'to' the Market Surveillance 
Department -there are. sorg 14-. District Offices,: 'cach having 
" -ful"l -time -officers -concerned With. enforcement " and also 
" surveillance-. " " -There tare .: a- further. 4Q0 Examiners, working 
-throughout the U. S. A.. -*-. Of"course, ; District. -. Officers and 
-Examiners are - primarily . 'concerned with: observance of NASD 
-rules, and the--laws-by members; - whilst . the , Market Surveillance 
Department-is -concerned mainly with . the- prdservation of 
ä fä'ir " and - orderly makret.:. - In .. both cases however there 
is a'considerable: degree of . overlap-and: 
liaison. 
1553) 
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The Market Surveillance Department also relies to a con- 
siderable extent on the computer staff,. resppnsible for the 
running'of NASDAQ computer system. These people. are 
however,. employed not by. 'NASD but by Bunker--Ramo. 
. The . Department also. - requires. cooperation . 
from the other 
self regulatory -agencies , 
and also.. the SEC. 
Although the. Department . and., also member., 
f irtns obviously 
use the-Dow-Jones and. Reuters., . 
they are., not well. suited 
to the generally smaller corporate. issuers,, on the over=the- 
counter market: ' Indeed:. smaller companies-have a-. considerable 
problem with-effecting timely-disclosure, as-the media and 
wire service editors are, reluctant to carry their disclosures 
at least as a matter of urgency. 
(554) 
Thus NASD have 
sponsored two. separate news.. relays paid for.. by subscribers 
and. * the issuers . on. the market. 
The Market Surveillance 
Department has about six. tapes to watch-as a consequence 
. of . this ,. as" well. as the general media. --It 
attempts to 
.. build up detailed. files.. on particular over--the-counter 
issuers, as do the national securities exchanges. 
.. Once member -firms 
have transmitted their-, trading 
details. -to the . central computers at 
the clpse of trading, 
" the " . computer. staff prepare Securities and Regulation 
Reports 
which. are . relayed . to Washýngton and printed out 
for the 
Market' Surveillance Department by 9 a'. m., the . next 
day, 
" an hour. before . trading starts..: The 
Department.. will then 
examine. all price changes.. recorded "i. n -these Teports 
that 
have* . 'effected the. representative price.. Of course, 
it 
may. well be , possible . 
for a market, maker. to alter, his 
quotation. by. "a point. or so, and this', will : not necessarily 
alter- the representative. price. The computers . will still 
!" 
identify this. 'and . 'immediately relay 
details to the 
Department. which. will. check. it .. out 'as a matter of routine 
immediately, *: and . not 'wait:. until the , 
following morning. 
The Securities cand. RegulatiQn.. Reports identify., all changes 
-in the. representative. price; no matter how. small. 
It should. be emphagised. that unlike on the national 
securities exchanged the surveillance. 'data . 
is, complete 
and it is . possible .. to retrieve from . 
the., computers the 
quotation and exactly what- market makers made, it, the 
.ý 
ilk i 
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the Securities and Regulation Reports, the relevant 
quotation which effects the representative price and 
who made it; and at what point of time will all be recorded. 
In addition there are also 72 price and 12 volume parameters 
individually tailored to the performance of the particular 
security- Securities-are grouped into dollar equivalent (555 
The bands and the parameters fixed upon these.. 
volume parameters are set with reference-to annual. trading 
performance actual, or where necessary, estimated. 
Although the Securities Regulation Report will. identify all 
parameter violations, the computers will alert the Department 
of Market Surveillance as and when they occur, and they will 
thus be-examined in most cases immediately. As a matter 
of practice the entire Securities Regulation Report is not 
required by the Department and generally only those changes 
which effect the parameters, or have a significant effect 
on the representative price, are retrieved and printed out, 
at least in the first place. There are soma 140,000 price 
movements on an average trading day, but there will 
generally only be about 50 significant parameter violations. 
On average the Manager informs the present author that there 
are between 250 to 500 parameter violations in a week. 
The Department's analysts will also examine the Reports 
closely with the intention of discovering-less ovbious 
price-and volume movements. In the result about 20 to 30 
cases a day are isolated as requiring further scrutiny. 
Attempts will be made to match the price or-volume 
fluctuations with items of news from the täpes or from the 
press, and this will. primarily be the responsibility of 
the research clerks in the Department. Where no ready 
explanation can be found, the Department may well contact 
the issuer concerned and enquire whether there were any 
material undisclosed developments.. The analysts who 
conduct the investigation may also ask the issuer to find 
out whether any of its insiders traded during. the relevant 
time and whether it was likely that they were in possession 
r of material non-public information. 
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The investigators--invariably also contact the-market 
makers-and-request details-of, their clients, and whether 
they-were aware: of -any-reasons for the inbalance. 
Whereas the issuers cooperation-is entirely-voluntary, 
members of NASD are-bound-under the Association's rules 
to provide all necessary assistance. ' Where 'the Department 
considers'that there are suspicious circumstances, or is 
not satisfied that a reasonable'-explanation has been found, 
it will instigate a review of-all transactions in the 
relevant securities during the- period of time 'in question. 
Once a'study period' has been selected questionnaires will 
be sent out from the Market Surveillance Department to the 
market makers, and then on the basis-of their replies to 
the customers. The Manager informs the present author that 
there is-invariably a high-degree of cooperation. 'Of course 
it is necessary to bear? in mind-that NASDAQ only has a 
record'of'the quotations and not the-resultant transactions. 
It*is interesting that-NASD operates a 'know your 
client' rule similar to that-of the national-securities 
" exchanges. Where full lists of clients-'are obtained, the 
Department 'then tries to determine whether. any"such client 
probably had possession of inside information or market 
information. The Department does keep-lists of corporate 
insiders in its, traded- issuers, - and will often supply the 
clients names to the relevant corporation asking such to 
identify any known insider connections. " If a NASD member 
is involved the matter will be 'referred to 'a-District 
Business Conduct Committee. '"Where'it appears-there has 
-been an'abuse not exclusively involving members of. NASD, 
the Market Surveillance Department will-refer the case to 
the SEC. The NASDAQ Market Surveillance-Department works 
in reasonably"close contact with the-SEC Market Surveillance 
office, and there' appears - to be a healthy mutual respect 
between the two. " The SEC recognises- that it. would not have 
the resources to maintain the kind- of' programme -that the 
NASDAQ Department operates ; and generally takes-the view 
-! 
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that self-regulation works better here than regulation 
from outside the industry by civil servants. An Attorney 
in the NASD Division of Enforcement and the Manager of 
the Market Surveillance Department are of the opinion 
that insider trading is and always has been a prevalent 
abuse on-the over-the-counter markets. Indeed, --the Manager 
thought that if anything, the abuse was on the increase. 
(556) 
On the other hand the Manager admitted that NASDAQ were 
now better at isolating the abuse, and thus it was the 
proportion of detected cases that had increased rather 
than the abuse in general. Given the bad state of the 
market and the general feeling it was impossible to 'get 
rich honestly' and the quantity of corporate failures, 
and profit cut-backs, all of which produced considerable 
amounts of inside information, the Manager considered 
insider abuse was inevitable. The Department has been 
successful in a number of cases in isolating this abuse, 
and has even surprised some of its most vehement critics. 
(557) 
There is a frustration with the lack of support that it 
gets from the enforcement-programme of the SEC. 
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(d) THE SECS OFFICE OF MARKET SURVEILLANCE 
The SEC possesses considerable investigatory powers, 
but here we are concerned specifically with market 
surveillance. -The present Office of Market Surveillance, 
, which 
is situated in, the SEC's main office in Washington, 
originally grew out of the SEC's Division of Trading and r 
Exchanges. There was growing concern that the SEC should 
extend its involvement to detection rather than waiting 
for complaints to be made to it and then instituting an 
investigation. The SEC thus adopted a proceedure under 
which officers in the Trading and Exchanges Division, 
and in the Regional Officers would monitor the various 
stock exchange tapes, qnd examine the NASD's Daily Quotation 
Sheets whilst maintaining surveillance over the news tapes 
and media. 
(558) 
'there the SEC detected a suspicious 
movement, the relevant Regional Office would instigate 
an investigation invariably informally without publicity. 
Where the ratter. was not tcleared ups the SEC. might well 
make a formal order of investigation. It would seem that 
on average over 100 of these preliminary investigations 
were conducted each year. 
(559) 
This procedure had obvious defects, not the least 
being the lack of coordination and deficient resources. 
In an attempt to up-grade surveillance, the Office of 
Market Surveillance was set up within the SEC'S Division 
of Enforcement. This Office, although primarily responsible 
for market surveillance, does liaise and cooperate with 
other Divisions and the Regional Offices.. Thus before 
, 
discussing the Office's stock watch programme, it is 
worth mentioning the surveillance operated by the Regional 
SEC Offices. - 
The most important Regional Office, that in New York, 
should have a. surveillance staff of four financial analysts 
and a surveillance assistant administering its local stock 
watch-. programme. However, because of a shortage of staff, 
or rather the money to pay them, there is only the Chief 
Regional Administrator himself, and another analyst, both' 
of whom have other considerable responsibilities administering 
S 
c 
the entire programme. 
(560) 
It is probable that similar 
deficiencs exist in other Offices, for example, when the 
Director of the California Insurance Commission reported 
-large scale frauds involving the Equity Funding Corporation 
of America, including insider trading-abuses, to Mr. Lee 
Ogg, the Chief - Attorney at the Los Angelos Regional Office 
it was three and 'a half weeks-before the SEC looked at it. 
(561) 
Washington had been given the same information three years 
earlier! 
In theory the Regional Offices are supposed'to monitor 
the tapes of their local exchanges and check out reports 
submitted-to-them from the-various self--regulatory , agencies. 
The-Chief Regional Administrator for New York informs the 
present author that occasionally the Office will check out 
an abnormal trading pattern, but this tivas-really tonly as 
a matter of curiosity'. Volume fluctuations-that did not 
effect price would not, in his view, be detected in the 
first place. 
(562) 
The Office does keep reasonably detailed 
files on locally listed issuers, and clerical assistants 
are detailed-to keep these permanently up to date. This 
can be most useful should it be necessary to check something 
out. 
(563) 
, The Chief considers that at most the Regional 
" Offices-can. cooperate and occasionally back up-the local 
self-regulatory authorities, and investigate specific cases 
sent äown to them from Washington. " 
(564) 
it is interesting 
that the Chief and also the Associate Regional-Administrator 
at the Boston Regional Office 
(565) 
thought. only the small 
cases of insider abuse got past the self-regulatory 
surveillance programmes and what backup the SEC had. The 
same situation would a pear to pertain throughout the 
Regional network. 
(566 
The Director of the Office - of , Market Surveillance in 
Washington, - likewise is under-no delusions about the critical 
significance of the self-regulators-surveillance programmes. 
(567) 
At best the SEC's procedures-are-only a -'back-up, ' or overview. 
This is-an important facts as the limited resources of the 
SEC Market -Surveillance Office could do nothing. more than 
this. (ý568) The Office only has fifteen-trained officers 
to monitor all the securities markets in the United States. 
[. 
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The SEC's surveillance programme, like those-operated by 
the self-regulatory authorities, is at several levels. 
Firstly- the Office, in conjunction with other Offices 
and Sections in; the SEC, will check-insiders-reports 
under Section 16. (a) and reports under Section. 13(d). 
Secondly, the Office mainta. ns- copious files or} virtually 
all registered securities, which are constantly being 
up-dated. Thirdly 
. 
the 
, 
Office works in reasonably close 
, contact with the 
surveiilance_personnel of the various 
self-regulatory agencies. This includes the receipt of 
stock watch reports, which are then examined and a decision 
reached as to-whether, there is a need for further-enquiries. (569) 
. Fourthly, the , 
Office maintains, at least in theory, 
a continuous-watch over the tapes of both-the NYSE and 
the American Stock Exchange. It is perhaps ironical 
that the personnel in the Market Surveillance Departments 
in these Exchanges think that the SEC does in fact run a 
complete and thorough check of their own surveillance 
programmes. In... fact this is very far from the truth. 
. hilst the Director of the SEC's Office thought that this 
was a. good. illusion to preserve, he emphasised that the 
. 
Office would definitely not have the technical- and 
personnel, capabilities to do this.. In practice the SEC 
merely keeps 
_an 
eye- upon, the news. tapes, and when-something 
significant comes through, looks back at the Exchange's 
tapes, previous. to the disclosure. -The SEC has developed 
a fully automated surveillance programme. for the over-the- 
counter-market however. - The Sec's. computers are very 
similar to those; used. by the Stock Exchanges and NASDAQ. 
They are set for. parameters fixed daily upon. the basis 
of an, analysis . of . 
the previous days trading. The parameters 
relate to both price and . volume fluctuations. There , 
is 
a similar facility for alerting-the stock watcher. and 
kicking out, parameter violations, -. as on the NYSE. 
It; is possible also to retrieve and hold almost indefinitely 
historic. information, and there is. the capacity for scanning 
sub--catagories of companies, and their relevant-market data. 
rinally, -the computers can also retrieve and present, or 
indeed print out, news releases and comments about 
particular securities. Thus, if for example, the computers 
ýý 
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identified unusual trading patterns in-the securities 
of Exxon, it would=be possible for-the observer to 
immediately scan a historic revieVv'of trading in that 
security and also other corporate issuers in, the-same 
-industrial sub-group, and also retrieve recent news items 
about that corporation, 
Fifthly, the Office: of Market Surveillance will be 
prepared to examine complaints from the public and the 
industry and, of course, other regulatory agencies. 
Generally the warnings or-complaints come through the 
Regional Offices, which pass them -on to the-main office 
" in Washington. Finally, the SEC Regional offices and 
District Field Offices, as well as-the SEC's investigators 
and examiners might refer cases or suspicions to the 
Office of Market Surveillance: 
As soon as suspicious circumstances. are- identified, 
the SEC will have to determine whether- there -is any ready 
explanation for the irregularity. This-will be primarily 
a decision for the fifteen analysts employed-'-in the Office 
of ; harket Surveillance. The Market Surveillance-Office 
does work in reasonably close cooperation with another 
Office in the same Division, which is mainly concerned 
with investigating securities transactions,; -referred to 
it by Market Surveillance. ' This office has a" staff 'of 
thirteen Attorneys, two Accountants and a-resident Analyst. 
This office will call 'upon assistance 'from' investigation 
officers in the SECs Regional and Field Offices, where 
such is necessary'. 
(570) 
The Director of-the Office of 
" Market Surveillance 'arid the Associate Director of the 
Division -of- Enforcement on the available evidence' have 
then to decide whether to recommend to the Commission 
the =king of 'a formal order of 'investigation. This has 
the effect of' giving SEC officers=subpoena- and testimonial 
powers 'relevant to that matter.. -The investigation will 
invariably be- conducted by the relevant Regional Office, 
often with the assistance 'of -a- couple of officers from 
" Washington. ' Of course, in-'a number 'of cases -it might be 
thought that a-formal order of investigation -is unnecessary. 
4 "1 
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It is of great interest that the Director of Market 
Surveillance 'considers- that there Is a -large. number of 
s,. all . transactidns probably . 'involving -insider -trading 
that were' jiist =ignored, or only token efforts . 'made to 
identify -the . parties: ' This. was -a result of 
the limited 
resources available to the SEC. It was 'admitted that some 
of the reports sent to the Office by the self--regulatory 
agencies were filed and never actually . *examined. 
It is *undderstood that In cases where only -200 or 300 shares 
are. involved:, ' the SEC would normally only. 'write. a 'nasty 
letter' to the, culprit to let'him-know that the SEC were 
award öf 'hi: s transgression; -and to '. warn him against further 
violätion. s-. The Director, considers that in the majority 
of cases . tl is' has the desired-effect.. On the , other hand 
speaking of the probable-extent of insider trading, the 
Director commented -: = 
We hardly see *the tip of the iceberg ':. 
you could pick. up any case -and find 'that 
someone with access traded.. Our problem 
is 'that purely and simply we just 'd6 not' 
have-the staff, and-therefore we. have .. to . 
go just for the, big transactions although, 
that is 'not to say that we would ' not - like 
to get the small' ones as well,.. The . 
'abuse 
is the same no matter how many dollars. you 
make out of it. ' (571)' 
At the London Conferende'on Insider Trading 'in April 1975. 
the SEC's -Chairs an, Ray Garrett; 'said much 'the same thing. 
The most difficult problem in catching insider abuse, 
in the vi-ew of the Director of the 'Office of Market 
Surveillance, is the reconstruction of the märket Which 
is vital for the identification of the parties. The Office 
of Market Surveillance or the investigators from the 
Division of Enforcement will approach the Exchange and 
obtain copies of the Clearing Sheets. It can take up 
to a week to get these in some cases. Once these are 
obtained the brokers names are identified, and enquiries 
are made as to their clients. This is usually done by 
sending the broker questionnaires, but if there is a need 
for urgency, the officers might obtain the information 
by telephone or by visiting the relevant office. Provided 
the brokers have properly maintained their records, the 
SEC could expect to get replies-back to their questionnaire 
4ÖZ 
after, four days. The. main problem. from the SEC's standpoint 
_is 
the_presence of nominees, especially foreign nominees, 
which : the Director described as. a 'serious and insoluable 
problem'., One of the, greatest -problems is knowing when 
one is dealing with a . nominee. 
It would seem that. in many 
instances the SEC' are forced_to, rely upon past . 
conduct 
of, the 'parties as-. an indication of -the present.. This is 
naturally most-unsatisfactory. Another -difficulty, is in 
'detexmining at exactly what time the transaction-occurred. 
However, in most cases it is. only,; necessary to . 
fix,. the 
, 
day upon-which the transaction occurred. 
(572 ) 
_. 
The. Commission seems to be reasonably. well* satisfied 
with the present system of market surveillance, and has 
. expressed. the view that the -strengthening of. the 
SEC's 
regulatory role should not effect the .. 
functioning of the 
self-regulatory agencies surveillance programmes. 
Certainly the SEC's Director do-es not consider that the 
American taxpayer should be burdened with the tremendous 
cost. that would be involved 'if the SEC was made responsible 
'for. the' entire 'market surveillance, programme. 
Finally.,. it should be pointed out that the Commission 
has the power to-suspend trading in a particular security, 
which can be of major im ortance with regard to the over- 
the-counter market*. 
(573p} 
The advantage of an SEC trading 
halt is that. it is effected nationally and prevents 
circumvention of halts imposed by the self regulatory 
agencies. 
(574) 
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(B) 
. 
TIMELY DISCLOSURE. 
It has already been seen that there are a number of 
deficiencies in the present disclosure obligations for 
companies both in the United States of America and in "r 
Great Britain. ' The former SEC Chairman Manuel Cohen 
put his finger upon the maindeficiency of 'corporate 
disclosure in an address' to the Securities-Analysts Society 
in Baltimore in January 1969. when he commented 
' the nature and timing of these reports 
prevent them from serving as an adequäte 
medium for the rapid and widespread 
dissemination of current material information 
to the investing public. '- 
Thus in recent years growing attention has. been given to 
the question of timely disclosure. The essence of this 
is the imposition upon the. company Of a duty to disclose 
material corporate developments as and when they occur. 
This is, of course, vitally linked to the problem of 
insider trading, as an effective system of rtimely disclosure 
will effectively take away a substantial number of potential 
opportunities for insider' trading. At the forefront of 
the development of Timely disclosure in North America. 
have been the national securities exchanges. 
One of the longer term results of the SEC's proceedings 
against the Texas Gulf Sulphur Corporation in the mid 1960s. 
was the impact that it had. on the development of 'Timely 
Disclosure Policies' by the various self, regulatory 
agencies. 
... f (a) NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 
The New York Stock Exchange's (NYSE) policy is laid 
down in Section A-2, Part 1. of the Listing Agreement 
(575) 
and provides 
a corporation whose. stock is listed on 
the' NYSE is expected to `release quickly 
to the public any news or information 
-which might reasonably be expected to 
materially affect the market for securities. ' 
This is 'one of the most important and fundamental purposes 
of the listing agreement'. The policy emphasises that 
the company should act promptly to dispel unfounded rumours 
which result in unusual activity or price variation. 
Indeed the company should closely monitor the performance 
404- 
6 
of its securities in the market., immediately. prior) to a 
public announcement or when material developments are 
about to occur or are being contemplated. If there are 
indications that the information has leaked. into the 
market, then 'a frank and explicit announcement is clearly 
required. ' Of course, the Stock List Division-of the 
Exchange will play an important role in detecting the 
leakage and in effecting the disclosure, as has already 
been described. If false rumours are circulating in the 
märket, the corporation should immediately issue an 
appropriate denial, but where the rumours are correct 
-or substantially correct then:,, ' an-' immediate candid 
statement to the public as to . the state of 
the negotiations 
--or the state of development of the-corporate'plans in 
the rumoured area'mus't be. -made directly' and openly. ' 
Moreover, such statements are'essential despite the 
" business inconvenience which night be caused , and even 
though the matter has not yet been presented to 
. the 
com. pany's Board of Directors for consideration. ' 
The NYSE is-conc-erned that where unusual trading 
patterns exist, before the. announcement- of a* material 
corporate development, -there will be suspicions of 
insider trading, and this does nothing for the reputation 
of the company or the stock exchange. On the other hand, 
where-highly significant developments are being discussed, 
-the' Exchange is willing to allow non-di'sclosure, - provided 
that only 'a small 'group of the 'top management 'of the 
company ... and their individual confidential advisers' 
among which adequate-security can'be-maintained, are 
involved. - Where outsiders are involved 'experience'has 
shown 'that maintaining 'security e*'* , is virtually, impossible. 
Accordingly, fairness requires that the company make. an 
'immediate public' announcement -. as 's*oon as confidential 
disclosures relating to. such* important matters are made 
to outsiders. ' Of. course in -this: situation the advice of 
the NYSEts Listing Representative should be sought. 
It is not without 'interest that 'the Exchange' -advises that 
the company should make a* paint of periodically warning 
S. 
F ýi 
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its Directors and employees over the need to exercise 
caution when handling- such confidential information. 
Provided there is honesty and a proper degree of 
consultation with the Corporate Liaison Department, the 
NYSE is prepared to allow a corporation to exercise its own 
discretion as to the timing of public releases. Of course, 
the-Exchange will only allow such a discretion where there 
has been no leakage pf information and where there are 
no -rumours. 
In addition there are a number of obliCations imposed 
upon listed companies under the current form of listing, 
to notify the Exchange immediately upon the occurrence of 
certain events. Furthermore, under paragraph 13 of the 
form, the corporation is obliged to furnish the NYSE on 
demand with such information concerning the company as 
the Exchange may request. 
" (b ) L. 'E APý; 1ICAT"i STOCK EXCHJ EGE 
The , imarican Stock Exchange has always placed 
considerable store by timely disclosure and has long 
appreciated the deficiencies of 'historical disclosure 
olicies'. 
(57b) 
But it is only in recent years that it 
has"reduced its timely disclosure policies to a written 
fora. (777) 
Here it is underlined that: 
'the conduct of a fair and orderly iarl: et 
requires every listed company to make 
available to the public information necessary 
to informed investing and to ensure that the 
investors enjoy equal access to information'. 
From this the American ätock Exchange has derived six 
specific policies. Firstly, all material information 
should be disclosed forthwith. : °: hether the information is 
sufficiently material or not, should be determined by 
reference to whether it is likely to have a substantial or 
significant impact on the prices of the company's securities, 
or whether the information after necessary interpretation by 
analysts is likely to be considered important by investors. 
This is similar to the advice given by the Vice President of 
the NYSE 'when in doubt -- disclose'. 
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It is interesting 
that the American Stock Exchange's disclosure policies 
expressly include market on outside information, within 
their purview. teilst the policy makes it clear that the 
transactions of insiders and controllers are generally 
material items of information worthy of disclosure, 'the 
company should not indiscriminately disclose publicly any 
knowledge it has of the trading activities of outsiders 
for. such outsiders normally have a legitimate interest 
in preserving confidentiality of their securities 
transactions'. Of course, this is an area where the advice 
of the listing representative is very important. 
As with the policy of the NYSE it is provided that 
there are occasions where the company need not disclose 
material developments. But it is emphasised that these 
are infrequent exceptions to the general rule requiring 
disclosure. It is accepted that where immediate disclosure 
would harm a legitimate corporate purpose, as would the 
premature disclosure of t1e mineral strike in the Texas 
Gulf Sulphur case, disclosure may be postponed. Likewise 
here he facts are not yet certain and still in a state 
of flux, disclosure may be postponed for a short space of 
time. In both instances however, it is mandatory to notify 
the listing representative so that the stock watch pro` ramme 
can be focused in upon the -particular security. Where rumours 
are present or where there has been a probable leakage of 
information there must, however, be an immediate release. 
It is possible even where probable insider trading is present, 
provided it is not significant and steps have been taken to 
prevent its continuation and re-occurrence, to hold 
disclosure temporarily with the consent of the listing 
representative and in conjunction with the klarket 
Surveillance Department. The NYSE consider, however, that 
as soon as a leakage is discovered there must be complete 
disclosure no natter how significant the abusive trading 
is to the market. The Chief Regional Administrator of the 
SEC's Regional office in New York thought that as a practical 
matter such a strict approach was not really warranted in 
all cases, but admitted that the legal position was unclear, 
and probably as a matter of -law under Rule 10(b)(5) 
, 
as 
soon as an informational inbalance had been detected 
disclosure should follow. 
4C7 , 
The American- Stock Exchange, as does. the NYSE, emphasises 
the importance of preserving.. confidentiality. in the corporation., 
and . advises 
that -those., insiders; and where necessary, outsiders 
are in possession-of material:. undisclosed informatiön, they 
should. be obliged to- report. their transactions, to the company, 
or-where they': are: outsiders: to -their superiors. ::. 
The second- policy is ; that: -where .aI cgmpany-: 
is obliged 
to make a , public disclosure, it should. *do-: so in- a manner 
designed -to obtain the fullest.. possible. 'dissemination. To 
this end the Exchange. , favours disclosure. after the trading 
. ;.:. ' :. _ markets-; have closed.,., 
The third. policy . requires . the _ company 
to ' clarify-. or 
confirm rumours wherever such are present, . _änd . the 'same 
considerations apply-as. those a lready. mentioned. in connection 
with 'the NYSE..:. :. '.,.,.. 
-The fourth-policy relates . 
to unusual market activity, 
which the American Stock .. Exchange points otit is- o'=ten, 
although not invariably, the result of insider. trading. 
Even-where it "-is not, ' it is probable that such will mislead 
investors 'who are likely to assume that'd Sudden and 
appreciable change in.. the.. price. of: - 
the.. company', s istock must 
reflect a parallel change--in its business or prospects. 
Similarly, unusual trading . volume.; even *when . not . accompanied 
by significant change in. -price, 
tends. to encourage rumours 
and give rise. to excessive speculative trading activity which 
may bd unrelated : to --. ac. tual developments.. in the-company's 
affairs. -' Where: the 'issuer. discovers or is. alerted. to 
such abnormal . tradirig : coriditions t the. issuer ý shou id immediately 
seek to %ascertain. the, reasons, and should - in particular 
consider. whether there-is any information-about itself which 
would -. possibly. accoünt-: ýfor° the -abnormal . 'trading.,. which has 
recently been disclösed,.: or. which has' not yet been. released. 
If. the company. decides'. that. -. the abnormal trading Is due to 
information that has-. already been discldsed. then,: ". uhless 
it is misinterpreted, 'nd further- announcement . iss nec-essary. Where-it appears. that,, there has been., a leakage of confidential 
information, it is necessary- to: make. a. public- disclosure 
of the information -immediately. 
. 
Where-: the corporation cannot 
ascertain a reason for. the- abnormal trading,,. it should make 
-: j-. - 
40S 
a statement.. to this effect . and- emphasise that there have been 
no material. j corpörate -developments. = 
_. 
The. ififth -policy is. Icoricerned. with promotional disclosures 
; +hich . are. _nmede 
for: the.. purpöse:: of influencing' share prices 
. .. rather. 
than.: informing . investors. The American- Stock 
'Exchange 
considers". ". that, these . are both'-urinecessary", and unwarranted. 
:, Finai1y; jthe . sixth. *policy is: directed -specifically 
.., at 
insider.. -trading'. -and will -be - examined. ' in-, due course! 
..: The -Ame-rican'Stock: Exchanges.. policies' were reduced to 
written form -after-. those of : the : NYSE and thus have=-the 
benefit of greater experience. In. this respect,: it. is. 
interesting that. the: American, Stock 'Exchanges disclosure 
"policy:: -deals, at some length with'. the: 'content) and' preparation 
of public: -announcements; something", that is given only. passing 
reference in the NYSE's Expanded Disclosure. Policy.. ' 
Virtually all. other. national. securities exchanges operate 
Timely Disclosure 'Policies, although-probably not'of the 
. same standard as those of the NYSE and American. Stock Exchanges, 
-with the. possible ekceptions. '. of 'that. of 'the Midwest Stock 
Exchange. 
(579) 
:.: (c) : N. A. S, D. ' and N. A. S. D. A. Q; ." 
As has alreedy been mentioned the NASD and NASDAQ do 
not have anything -., approaching 'ä listing agreQment with the 
issuers-whose securitieq are traded. upon :: the . Over the-counter 
märket. On the other hand-the NASD will not allow quotations 
. 
'to be carried. 'on : its services unless .. the .. company' s* policy is 
'. to disclose promptly-to the public. through the press, 
iciformati'on. with respgct,. to. significant 'corporate developments 
. which.: may influence invegtors decisions. ' 
(580) 
Furthermore, 
the roles' adopted by . 
the Board of Governors for the operation 
ofý. "NASDAQ.: prov-ide.. that a security: is ineligible for quotation 
if 
. there shall- -have beeri a; failure -by the -issuer. to promptly 
disc-1ose. '. to--- the.. public, through, the press * any material 
-iriforrr ation . which,: niay ýaffec. t the. value .. of... the securities or 
influence 'investors . d-ecisions. 
(d) 
--' EFFECTI'JENESS , OF: SE1 F* REGULATORY TTh ELY 
"". DT. SC LCSURE POLICIES 
Theadministration -of . tint ely disclosure' -is probably far 
better left to the self-regulatory bodie's; 'who. have. -a 'Huch 
greater proximity to the market itself, and are more able to 
evaluate the different, often conflicting considerations. (582) 
qi ýýý 
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The sanctions possessed by the securities exchanges in 
particular are significant. The threat of a suspension 
or de-listing is invariably all that is required to achieve 
the desired result. It is rarely the case that exchange 
will be forced to actually dellst. 
(583) 
It is important 
that the responsibility for administering timely disclosure { 
should be on the same regulator primarily responsible for 
market surveillance as the two things are very much related. 
Thus it would seem that the efforts of the national securities 
exchanges and the NASD in the area of timely disclosure 
in the United States have had a salutary effect on the 
order and fairness of the securities markets, and achieved 
a reasonable degree of success and effectiveness. 
r 
(ý } HE S. E. C. AND i'I_, NELY DISCLOSURE 
(a; '1'D" LY DISCLOSURE -- k EGAL zZr' UIP ý IJT 
In recent years the SEC has been conscious of the fact 
that the market is damnified as a whole just as much where 
there has been a material non-disclosure of a significant 
corporate development as when insiders are trading on the 
basis of such. 
(584) 
The SEC has acted cautiously however,! 
and has been reluctant to impose a similar duty of timely 
disclosure under-Rule 10(b)(5) to that developed-by the 
self-regulatory authorities. For example, in the SEC's 
action against the Texas Gulf Sulphur Corporation, it did 
not allege that there was a duty of timely disclosure on the 
issuer as such, but that in the circumstances the failure to, 
correct a statement that it had already published, constituted 
a mis-statement. The Courts and the SEC seemed to consider 
the period of complete non-disclosure whilst the * company 
was attempting to acquire the other claims unobjectionable. 
The Court of appeals expressly stated: 
'we do not suC-¬est that material facts * nust 
be disclosed immediately the tieing of 
disclosure is a matter for the business judgement 
of the corporate officers entrusted with the 
management of the corporation within the 
affirmative disclosure requirements promulgated 
by the exchanges and the SEC. (585) 
This would seem to place the timing of disclosure with 
regard to material corporate developments fairly within the 
honest discretion of the management. However, District Judge 
Bonsai in the forty consolidated private actions brought 
against Texas Gulf Sulphur Corporation, 
(556) 
that this was 
in fact the. case. He considered that the information was 
'ripe for disclosure' at an earlier date, and intimated that 
all those investors who traded in between this time and the 
date of effective disclosure might have a ground for civil 
recovery. 
(5B7) 
Where the failure to disclose can be said 
to be part of a manipulative design, then there is no question 
that liability can be predicted. 
(588) 
But cogent evidence 
must be shown to displace the business judgment rule, 
and the mere showing of a strong 'motive not to disclose' 
is not enough. 
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Even where the duty to disclose can be 
said to arise, the information must be 'ripe' for disclosure. 
Pl 
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phis mean; that there must be 'time to verity the aa'ca ana 
(5J0) 
:: here a coinppanT makes selective assure its accuracy' . ,ý 
disclosures to analysts and brokers it would seem that it 
would be hard put to argue that the information was not ripe 
for a'eneral disclosure, 
(591) 
and is being withheld for a 
valid business reason. 
The position remains unclear however where there is 
complete-non-disdlosure and no prior'statenentor manipulative 
design. (592) It would be a radical extension of the law of 
disclosure to hold that all companies have an obligation 
under Rule 10(b)(5) to'-publicly release-all material items 
of information relevant to the market in their securities 
as soon as they have had an opportunity for checking its 
accuracy, and there is no business reason supporting 
non-disclosure. Of course, where the company is-itself 
trading, or where it has already leaked the information, the 
matter is completely different. The present uncertainty is 
compounded by the proposed Draft federal Securities Code which 
seeks to impose no affirmative duty on the corporate issuer or 
indeed any other person who is not trading to disclose 
material information. The Comýrent to Section 130 at 
paragraph (3) emphatically states that there is no duty to 
disclose now in such cases, and that 'apart from the new rule 
making authority in 6ection 601(a) it will not be unlawful 
under the Code. The remedy in that event is and will be a 
summary suspension of trading in appropriate cases'. : iahe 
present author has much sympathy with this view and would 
consider that it has the support of the securities exchanges, 
the Commission staff and the corporate community generally. 
. Uthoug_a' the SEC has emphasised the importance of timely 
disclosure(593) there has been no real attempt on the part 
of the SEC-to impose anything approaching an affirmative duty 
of timely disclosure. The yIheat Report, at page 39 commented 
that: 
'the Commission current reporting requirements 
necessarily play a somewhat different role. They 
are not intended to, nor could they adequately 
duplicate the timely disclosure policies of the 
self-regulatory agencies. SEC requirements act to- 
a degree as. a backstop for those policies they 
operate to encourage willingness on the part of the issuer to keep the marketplace informed. 
_ If 
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They provide details that may be overlooked 
in the preparation of the news release or 
may not be included in a-published news 
report. ' 14 
It would appear from the observations of Assistant General 
Counsel Feurestein 
(594) 
that provided the self regulatory 
agencies properly administer their timely disclosure 
policies, the Commission is not anxious-to interfere. 
If the SEC did promulgate a rule requiring timely disclosure 
this would, =of course, give the present regulation another 
-d iaension, that of law, with the possibility of legal 
enforcement, enforcement including probably civil liability. 
Indeed under a recently developing body of law it is even 
" possible that there may be an implied civil action for 
violations of the self-regulatory -timely disclosure policies 
acainst those responsible for the violation. 
(595} 
There has 
been a growing concern in the United States as to whether 
this additional dimension is necessary. The SEC's Staff 
Report on the Financial collapse of the Penn Central'Company 
discovered substantial non-compliance with timely diselbsure 
requirements and rampant insider trading. 
(596) 
Indeed the 
Commission in-its letter of -transmittal of the Report to 
the Congress commented 
'the cornerstone of public confidence in our 
securities laws is full, -accurate and meaningful disclosure made on a timely basis to all 
investors. The Commission's Staff Report shows 
a wide margin of failure on the part of the 
Penn Central company in meeting this standard. '(597) 
There is a considerable degree, of criticism however, 'about the 
lack of action by the SEC. Indeed, the Staff Report of the 
House Banking Committee. on the Penn. Central Fhilure and the 
Role of the Financial Institutions was concerned that 
t at a minimum it seems essential'that the 
people' be made aware of what the SEC will do, 
and. can, do with its powers to, protect the 
pub-l"iciin such situations,. even' though it 
does not. always do so, ' 
In recent years a-number of SEC Chairmen have advocated the 
SECbecoming more, involved "with. this. problem. 
(598) 
Even the 
majority of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
fi 
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the Texas Gulf Sulphur case considered that the SEC has 
power under Rule 10(b) (5) - to 'promulgate- a rule specifically (599 ) 
upon timely disclosure. 
Although the self-regulatory agencies consider that a 
corporation should issue a release where the. market is effected 
by rumour, even though such eminates. from a source other 
than the company, the. law.. has not yet gone this, far,. 
(600) 
Where the corporation has made a statement-previously 
which is in some way connected to the rumour,, there can be 
liability for a failure to adequately correct the-market. 
(601) 
To alleviate these uncertainties the SEC has considered 
drawing up. guidelines on material non-public information, 
and to this end solicited comments from interested parties. 
(602) 
The Sec was particularly concerned with the point at which 
it could be' said information had. been sufficiently dis- 
seminated to take away its privileged status, and whether 
there should be mandatory time limits after the' publication 
of such information during which insiders could not trade, 
so as to allow public dissemination. Although the SEC 
finally decided, that the drawing up of such rules would 
inhibit flexibility and were thus rejected, the submissions 
of the American Bar Association to the General Counsel of 
the SEC are worth a brief mention. 
(603) 
The7ABA doubted 
whether the present system of-timely;. disclosure was as 
effective as it might appear. They were particularly 
concerned that smaller issuers did nöt'get adequate coverage 
by the media, and that there were informational inbalances. 
resulting from geographical proximity. The ABA recommended 
that 
'previously undisclosed material information 
concerning an issuer will 
- 
be deemed to have 
publicly disseminated when such information. 
has been released for transmittal to the 
financial community comprising the principal 
trading market for the securities of the issuer 
through such means of communication as may 
assure, in' the, light of the extent of the 
market significance of -the issuers -securities 
and of-such information, that such information 
will thereby-become public knowledge in the 
relevant -financial community. ' 
ýýý 4 
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The ABA does nöt consider that the fact that the issuers 
obligations are fulfilled by.. disclosure in this way, 
should mean that its insiders are at liberty to trade 
upon the impact Of such by virtue of their 'prior knowledge. 
The present-author respectfully submit's that'the distinction 
of these to questions is- to be 'welcorried and 'should be 
more widely appreciated. The ABA thus recommends that 
the SEC establish guidelines laying down waiting periods 
, 
during whých the issuer and insiders with-prior knowledge 
of the information must 4bstain from the market. after 
public dissemination has taken place, so that the market 
has time to properly digest. the information and thus' 
, 
eliminate the entirity of the insiders privileged position. 
If insiders wait and observe these periods, the ABA consider 
that their transactions should be presumptiver. y lawful. 
The ABA consider that tippees should be under the same 
disability. 
t Insiders may lawfully trade in 
_the, securities of an issuer as to which material information 
has been publicly-disseminated within the 
meaning already discussed, - after-the earlier 
of (i) the end of the first complete calendar 
" day during which any major stock exchange 
is open for trading in. the security,. or the, NASDA system is in operation, following 
--receipt of'such information by the relevant- 
financial community or communities, -, or-(ii). the end of the seventh 'complete calendar 
'" day following release of such information for transmittal to the. relevant financial 
community or communities. ' 
These guidelines could be'safe harbours tests or alternatively 
prohibitions, "or indeed presumptions against trading 
rebuttable by evidence of. earlier full. public dissemination. 
The basic objective of these recommendations is to allow 
for a period of digestion, the 'abs. enceý of which the ABA. 
thought to be one of the greatest deficiencies with the 
present practice. ' 'Of course,.. the waiting periods must needs 
be arbitrary, 'although an attempt has been made to distinguish 
between the disclosure capabilities of the 
. 
larger corporations 
and those of the smaller company, where in many 'cases the 
company would have'to resort to mailing. 'It is not without 
it(O 
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significance that the Court of AFpeals, in the Texas Gulf 
Sulphur case observed that. 
' in any event the '-permissable timing of 
insiders transactions-after disclosures 
of various sorts is one of the many areas 
of expertise for, appropriate 'exercise by ;. 
the Commission's rule-making powers, which 
we hope will be utilised in the, future to 
provide some predictability 17645ertainty 
for the. business community. ' . 
The decision of 'the SEC not to exercise its 'expertise' in 
this ' füzzyt * area of the law 
(605) 
has met with considerable 
opposition. 'Fortdnätely'the self-regulatory agencies have 
not been so hesitant and'have sought. to facilitate an 
acceptable degree of certainty by publishing guidelines 
for insiders with regard to *their trading activities and 
the relationship of such to timely disclosure. The NYSE 
sends free to all corporate directors of listed corporations 
a fifty page booklet entitled 'the Corporate Director and 
the Investing Public. ' 
(606) 
The NYE places considerable. importance on strict 
internal supervision and the drawing up and administration 
of'inhouse procedures to combat insiddr`trading. The Exchange 
advocates shareownership by managers in their corporations, 
but warns that 'hindsight' is remarkably keen and the 
acquisitiöh can always be. made that a purchase and sale of 
stock by ä' director was motivated by inside knowledge .. ' 
The NYSE io assist corporate insiders has drawn up a series 
of policies which, 'if ' followed, should' in many cases rebut 
the 'presumptio'n of insider trading abuse. Firstly, investment 
according to a predetermined periodic investment plan'is 
advocated, provided that it is. administered by a thoroughly 
independant and A nconnected broker. 'Secondly, a prudent 
insider would be advised to deal within a thirty day period, 
commencing one'week from the mailing to the shareholders 
of the annual report. provided, 1. of course, there have *not 
been subsequent undisclosed material corpdrate'developnents. 
Thirdly, insiders' should be able to deal, after the'publication 
of quarterly reports, *and the publication of such disclosure 
documents, sucht as prospectuses-and proxy statements, 
47 
provided there have been no other developments and a 
reasonable period for dissemination is allowed. Fourthly, 
insiders should never deal before the publication of such 
disclosure documents or releases relating to earnings, 
dividends or indeed any other material information, and 
where there has been a material disclosure, insiders should 
refrain from dealing for at least twenty four hours. 
The NYSE makes it clear that similar considerations 
apply to the granting and taking up of stock options, and 
to trading in the'secur. ities of other corporations, such as 
target corporations or subsidiaries and holding companies. 
Furthermore, the same obligations apply equally to'members 
of the insider's family and his close associates. The 
Exchange justifies this offer 'unjustified' extension of 
liability on the basis of public opinion and suspicion, 
which it feels necessary to placate. 
The l,. merican ; 3tock Exchange, in its sixth policy of 
its 'Disclosure policies' states that insiders should never 
trade prior to the public disclosure of material information 
and 'even after material information has been' released to 
the press and other media 'should not trade' for a period 
sufficient to permit through public dissemination and 
evaluation of the information'. The "policy then goes on 
to define both insider and inside information in. expansive 
terms, something that the NYSE does not attempt. Substantively, 
1mowever, the two policies are very similar. It is interesting 
that the llanager of the N ASDAýw Market Surveillance Department 
considers that although the 11ASD does not publish policies 
similar to the major exchanges, the idLSD would support and 
subscribe to those of the American Stock Exchange. (607) 
It is also of interest. that a number of other organisations 
have attempted to issue guidelines in an area where the 
SEC has remained largely aloof. 
(608) 
(b) TUE P OBIL31"1 03 DISSEMII4T yTI Oid 
The self-regulatory agencies attach considerable imoortance 
to there being a period of time during which insiders with 
advanced knowledge of the subject matter of the disclosure 
should not trade immediately after the making of the disclosure, 
so that there is a chance for dissemination. Indeed the 
American Bar Association thought that the absence of such a 
4t8 
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legal requirement was one of the most serious deficiencies 
of the present system. Of course, in essence this argument 
is based more on the attainment of practical informational 
equality than the mere prevention of insider advantage, as 
. it recognises the advantages possessed by those in close 
proximity to the disclosure and the markets. 
The question arose in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case as 
to whether Rule l0(b)(5) required such a period for. 
dissemination during which time trading insiders could be 
held liable. It is illustrative to mention the facts in 
some detail, with regard to two of the defendants. Coates 
was a lawyer and a director of the issuer. He maintained 
that he had not heard of the discovery until April 13th 1964, 
when he read the first corporate press release in the 
newspapers. He claimed this comprised the entirety of his 
knowledge until, he read late on the 15th April, a draft 
press release at the. company's head office, which . was 
published the following day. Coates was told that the 
Canadian Minister of Hines was going to make a public 
statement on the 
. 
strike at Timmins that very night, and the 
following morning was erroneously informed that such a 
statement had in fact been made. 
(609) 
There was a Board 
meeting on the 16th April, *where the Board approved the 
draft and issued a statement revealing the true magnitude of 
the. strike to a press conference. Coates was, at the Board 
Meeting and saw that the Dow-Jones correspondent left 
immediately on publication of the release to contact his 
office. Normally, a communication from a correspondent of 
such magnitude would be on the tape within a couple of 
minutes. 
(610) 
However, because of the number of delays 
caused by extraneous reasons, the tape did not carry the 
announcement for some forty five minutes. 
After the conclusion of the press conference Coates 
telephoned H. Fred Haemisegger, his son-in-law, who was a 
broker in Rauscber, Pierce & Co., and instructed him to 
purchase 2,000 Texas Gulf Sulphur securities for the Coates 
family trust. Although Coates told Haemisegger that there 
bad jist been 'a big release' from the corporation, he did 
not tell him the details or recommend that Haemisegger dealt 
himself. Haemisegger immediately acquired a substantial amount of 
4k9 
Texas Gulf Sulphur securities. for himself and for four 
favoured- clients:. 
(6i ) 
At the time of the '. telephone 
conversation Coates thought . that. Dow-Jones would . 
have already 
carried the release.. . Indeed. the'. 'internal news: wire. service 
of Merrill Lynch carried` the 'release a full -twenty 
five minutes. 
before Dow-Jones. 
(612) 
'Thus Coates claimed that ... 
he had every reason"to assume that the 
nevws of : the Timmins discovery . was no. longer inside informatipn. ' 1613) 
District Judge Bonsai found however, that"'coates lost no 
time in telephoning his son-in-law .... -and 
that he could not 
assume ... without thinking about it : that the 
discovery was 
already a matter of public. information, ' 
(614)' 
Nonetheless 
Judge Bonsai held that the. disclosure had been made 'and 
it-has generally been accepted that it is the making of the 
announcement that controls. ' Referring to the SEC's.: 
contention that there should be a 'digestion period', the 
Court expressed some sympathy and even proffered.. the view 
that those in the communication. media, and thus in a privileged 
position with regard to the recei t of such information, 
should perhaps have to wait. 
(615j Judge Bonsai disagreed 
. with the proposition, that the Crourts should. create such a 
rule, and-it would be more1a propriate if the SEC exercised 
its rule-makir g powers. "(. 
The other defendant relevant to this. discussion was a 
Mr. Lamont, who was a director of Texas . Gulf . Sulphur., and 
also of Morgan Guaranty Trust Company. He claimed that he 
first heard of the discovery on the loth Apr. l. ,. but only 
in outline,. and that -he did not know of the details' until 
he read the full announcement. of the Board in the press 
following the press conference on the 16t1 April. 
(6173 
Evidently after the news had bgen'released to the Press 
Conference, Lamont telephoned'the Executive Vice President 
of Morgan Guaranty . Trust- and 'advised . him .. that good news 
about Texas Gulf . Sulphur Corporation. would be. coming . over the 
-tape 'shortly. The Executive- Vice. President-'immediately 
relayed this ''tip':. to . the banks Trust Department, which immediately 'purchased 10,000 shares, ' -. The telephone Call 
I` 
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by Lamont was made twenty minutes-after Coates made. his, 
. 
but before the release was carried 'by. the Doti-Jones. 
Two hours after the announcement Lamont acquired securities 
in the. company.. for his own account. District Judge Bonsai 
'. rejected : th*e. "charges,,. against Lamont : for the same reasons 
as those relating to. Coates. 
(618 ). 
.. _ 4r 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
the SEC contended. that Judge Bonsai's decision was erroneous. 
In the case of 'Coat'es 'it was *argued*-that even if the 
Canadian Minister 'had made a statement which', in 'fact he 
had not, that co'uTd not be'the equivalent 'of 'a release from 
the company. 
(619) 
' -The SEC also argued 'that 'even ' if the 
release had been'carried by Dow-Jones without any delay, 
the telephone call to Haemiseggar was still two minutes 
premature. With regard to Lamont, the'SEC argued that 
it simply was not enought for, him to argue that he did 
riot know whether the information had been 'carried ' on 'the 
tapes or"not. Although Coates" counsel accepted that a 
rule requiring ä period' of non-trading for dissemination 
and evaluation might be desirable, -this was a matter-for 
the Commission and that it"would be "anomalous - if Coates 
was 'to be regarded as 'fraudulent'', and yet brokers and 
reporters attending the Press Conference could have 
'called the market before their office. t' 
(62a)" 
' 
The' defendant' Lamont unfortunately died before the 
the hearing of the'appeal, and pursuant toCstipulation 
the Judgement, re'l"ating' -to his case was severed from the 
appear '(621) " The "Secönd' Circuit with regard'' td Coates 
reversed the'District Courts decision and found -liability, 
" Circuit Judge 'Waterman stated that'', '' 
"'before insiders may act upon material' 
information, 
. such information. must have '.. been effectively. disclosed in a manner 
sufficient to ensure 'its availability 
-to th'e investing. public. ',.. 
(622 ) 
The majority. were of. the opinion that. Judge Bonsai had 
misinterpreted the -'purpdrt of.. the. Commission's decision 
in Cady. Roberts 
(623. ) 
and. . that. "mereiy . 'issuing 
the 
information only 
ý624),. 
,. "- 'the first step in the process of dissemin- 
ation required for compliance with the 
k 
4, 21 ,i 
Regulatory objective of providing all 
investors with an equal opportunity 
to make informed investment judgements. t 
Circuit Judge Watetman continued that, 
tassuming the contents of the official 
release could instantaneously be acted- 
upon, at the minimum Coates should have 
waited until the news could reasonably 
have been expected to appear over the 
media of widest circulation, the Dow-Jones Broad 
Tape, rather than hastening. to ensure 
an advantage td himself and his broker 
son-in-law. t. (625) 
The SEC's Main Brief had contended that-the effective 
point of disclosure should be the informations 'appearance 
in the morning papers. ' 
(620) 
Indeed the Commission 
argued that until an opportunity has been 'accorded to 
stock holders considering a sale of their holdings to 
consult their advisers as to the significance of the news' 
it remains inside information from the standpoint of 
insiders. 
(627) 
Of course in the present case, the fact 
that the only defendant to trade between the appearance 
of the news on the 'tapes and in the news papers died, 
removed the need for the Court to consider how long 
insiders must hold back. 
(628) 
A former Executive Assistant to the Commission has 
advised insiders as a matter of policy to forego trading 
for a period of twenty-four hours. 
(629) 
On the other 
hand the SEC has consistently argued against promulgation 
of a rule fixing and defining an arbitrary-period, as 
the very vagueness of the requirement acts as a deterren ßt630) 
-. 631) In Shapiro v, ýNSerri. ll Lynch, Pier, ee, 
F nn r8 Smith Inc 
District Judge Tenny emphasised that persons trading once 
the information had been released and disse: inated, could 
not be allowed-to 'but it could not-be said ... that full 
disclosure had been achieved within two minutes of its 
release.: (632) Insiders are placed at a considerable 
disadvantage, in a highly uncertain area. The mere fact 
that the market price has moved after the disclosure, will' 
not necessaril mean that there has been a sufficient 
dissemination. 633) 
.. ß. Z2 
I 
Furthermore, as the Counsel for Coates-pointed out 
in tie Texas Gulf Sulphur case, to require corporate 
insiders to wait during disclosure, dissemination and 
probably evaluation, is to place such behind all those 
who receive the . information 
during this period, and who 
can act upon it immediately: Professor. Jennings has 
argued-that this will have-the salutory effect of encouraging 
strict internal corporate security and uniform disclosures 
outside market. business hours., 
(634) 
`Moreover, : as the 
SEC contended in their Main -Brief . 
in : the -Texas Gulf 
. 
Sulphur case, any different rule would- ericourage insiders 
to publish. the information in the least efficient 
manner. 
(635) 
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